Implemented contracts, animated glyphs, tests, documentation, and launch.json.

Verified: clean build, 39 tests, formatting, 11 pinned admission checks, and real-IMD mainnet fork rehearsal.

Documented limits: the pot is permanently reserved; exact-input buys and exact-output sells require full fills.

No mainnet transaction was broadcast. Production deployment remains with IdentityMD’s authorized factory pipeline.

launch.json is written and verified. The only file changed in the tree is the manifest.

What the manifest declares, matching the accepted source exactly:

• Hook contract SwarmPegHook with constructor arguments $poolManager, $token, $factory, the declaration order in the source. The hook has no owner, so there is no $owner argument, and the maintenance pot is deployed inside the constructor rather than passed in.
• Permissions beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, which is what getHookPermissions returns. The address flags are 0x20cc.
• Token contract SwarmPeg, name SwarmPeg, symbol SWARMPEG, 18 decimals, no constructor arguments.
• Pool paired with IMD at the required address, LP fee 12500, tick spacing 60, and the one-to-one sentinel price the reference gives.

Notes were rewritten to state the review-relevant decisions up front: no owner argument exists, the hook's 2% fee is taken and kept in IMD per the brief rather than converted to ETH, the fee is minted as ERC-6909 claims to the ownerless pot so token-only seeded pools work, beforeSwapReturnDelta is used only for the fee split and never fills or skips a trade, and no liquidity callbacks exist so the factory's fee collect is untouched. Notes are 3145 characters, under the 4000 cap.

Checks run

• forge build succeeds with only lint warnings on pre-existing code.
• forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed: 39 passed, 0 failed.
• The protected hook floor test, run from test/scratch against the compiled creation code with the IMD pair address, token probe and factory probe: 4 passed, including the permissions-match and factory-initialization checks.
• The repository's own checker in tools/check_artifacts.py passes, and a schema-shape check confirmed the first key is kind, all uint256 and address values are strings, and fee, tickSpacing and decimals are numbers.

Nothing outside launch.json was modified. The scratch copy of the protected test lives in test/scratch, which is gitignored and deleted before submission.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json is written at the repository root. No source files were changed and no scratch files remain.

Outcome: no exploitable defect in the Access Control, Trust Gap or Asymmetry area. The permission model is minimal and consistent, and I found no guard gap, escalation path, confused deputy, or paired-function asymmetry that an unprivileged actor can turn into loss.

What I verified, with concrete traces:

• Hook callbacks. All three enabled callbacks require the PoolManager as caller and the exact immutable pool id. The initialize callback additionally requires the factory passed as $factory and runs once. The sender and hookData arguments grant nothing.
• Fee accounting symmetry. The two specified-IMD modes compute the fee identically in beforeSwap and afterSwap. The other two modes use real core deltas. The claim mint to the pot exactly offsets the returned hook delta, so the hook's own delta is always zero. The full-fill equality check is exact, since a filled swap's specified delta equals the adjusted amount.
• Maintenance pot. Redemption is permissionless but has a fixed currency and a fixed recipient, which is the pot itself. The callback refuses any caller but the manager and any call outside an active redemption. No ERC-6909 operator approval is ever set, so third parties cannot burn or move the pot's claims.
• Pulse checkpoint. The decay formula is invariant under any sequence of checkpoint calls, so nobody can slow or speed it, and pulse drives nothing financial.
• Token. Unmodified OpenZeppelin transfers and approvals. The glyph bookkeeping cannot change amounts, supply, or revert a valid transfer.
• Manifest. Constructor args and permissions match the implementation in order. Paired currency equals the hook's IMD constant, the fee is the policy tier the hook accepts, and the format rules hold.

One item is recorded at info severity for the judge and requester to confirm. The pot has no disbursement path at all, so every IMD fee is economically a burn and can never fund maintenance. The README and security notes state this is a deliberate reading of an "ownerless" pot with no spending policy. I treated it as a documented trust assumption rather than a defect.

Coverage rows answer all eight listed entry points plus the beforeSwap view, the ownership invariant, the factory fee-collect invariant, and the manifest. No proof test was written because no finding reaches high or critical.

Review complete. The findings file is written at .imd-findings.json and the working tree is otherwise unchanged (the scratch test lives under the gitignored test/scratch/).

Result: the math is sound. One low and one informational finding, no medium or above.

Covered in depth (Math Precision, Boundary, Numerical Gap guides):

• Hook fee math holds in all four swap modes. The two gross-up formulas are exact identities: for I = 49q + r, floor(I/49) equals floor((I + floor(I/49))/50), so every mode charges floor(2% of gross IMD) and no mode is cheaper than another. The full-fill equality check is safe because Pool.swap drives the remaining amount to exactly zero. Hook deltas net to zero (the ERC-6909 mint debits exactly the positive return delta). Amount bounds, the int128 gross-up check and SafeCast all hold.
• Glyph integer-balance model holds at every boundary: fractional crossings up and down, retirement to zero, last-in-first-out truncation, contiguous batch slots, fresh IDs, no-op self or zero transfers, and the billion-glyph mint in one batch.
• Pulse decay cannot be slowed by repeated checkpointPulse calls, the SVG traits cannot underflow since pulse is capped at 1000, and the renderer loop is bounded.
• MaintenancePot redeem path is symmetric and rolls back cleanly. Mainnet IMD is a plain LayerZero OFT ERC-20 with no transfer fee, pause or blocklist, so the take path has no token-behavior seam.
• launch.json matches the implementation: constructor argument order, permissions and the 0x20cc flags, fee 12500 and spacing 60, lowercase pair address, notes under the limit.

Findings:

1. Low. Dust trades pay zero hook fee yet count as full trades. Forty 49-wei buys saturate the pulse with zero fees collected, and one such buy every 59 seconds postpones decay forever because a trade resets the timestamp and drops the partial minute. This contradicts the security notes' "subject to swap fees" and "cannot postpone decay" claims. Impact is cosmetic only.
2. Info. Fees floor rather than round up, so each swap under-collects by under 1 wei. Documented, non-compounding.

Both are reproduced by test/scratch/PulseDust.t.sol, which passes on the current code and logs the concrete values. No proofs were attached since nothing reached high severity.

The review is complete. The findings file is written, all four snippets verified against the tree, and the scratch directory removed.

Outcome: no critical, high or medium defects in the control flow. The hook's fee path, the pot's redeem path, the token's glyph accounting and the manifest all hold under the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles checklists.

What I verified

• Fee accounting in all four swap modes nets the hook's delta to zero. The fee is minted as an ERC-6909 claim to the pot, so no manager inventory is needed.
• Full-fill checks on the two IMD-specified modes revert before any state write. A sweep of 14 exact-output amounts in both directions never trips the check through core rounding.
• The pot's redeem is reentrancy-safe, burns only its own claims, and takes only to itself.
• The token's batch and issuance structures stay synchronized under last-in-first-out retirement.
• launch.json constructor order, permissions, fee tier, tick spacing and paired currency match the implementation and the protected tests.
• The real IMD token on mainnet is a plain Ownable ERC-20 with an EOA owner and no pause, mint, blacklist, tax or proxy selectors.

Findings reported in .imd-findings.json

1. Low. Every whole-token receipt writes about eleven cold storage slots. Measured swap cost is 650k to 880k gas and a plain crossing transfer is about 260k. Design-intended, but the cost is roughly five times a normal v4 swap.
2. Info. The maintenance pot has no spending path, so fees are permanently locked. The docs say this openly. The requester should confirm that reading before an unupgradeable launch.
3. Info. afterSwap resets the pulse timestamp to the current block, discarding partial-minute decay, unlike checkpointPulse. Cosmetic only.
4. Info. The pair currency is a hardcoded owner-controlled token. Recorded as an external dependency with the on-chain evidence.

Coverage: all eight listed entry points have rows, plus rows for beforeSwap, the constructor and manifest, and delta conservation. The launch script, artifact checker and SVG renderer are marked unreached in depth.

The review is complete. The findings file is written at the repository root, every snippet matches the tree, and the working tree is otherwise unchanged. No file outside the findings file was modified, and the scratch test I used for gas measurement was removed.

Outcome: no fund-loss or accounting defect found in the economics area. The fee flow is sound in all four swap modes. I traced each against v4's Hooks.afterSwap and Pool.swap: the hook sees the pool's delta before its own delta is subtracted, a full fill leaves amountSpecifiedRemaining at exactly zero so the strict equality on line 143 is correct, the ERC-6909 mint to the pot debits the hook by exactly the delta it returns, and the pot's redeem path burns and takes the same amount so the manager always settles. The delivered invariant suites reproduced clean, and the manifest matches the implementation in constructor order, permissions, flags, fee tier and tick spacing.

Four findings were recorded, none above low:

• Low, gas friction of the glyph mirror. Each whole-token crossing writes nine cold storage slots. A routed swap crosses twice, so a buy measured 636,858 gas and a sell 761,442 gas, against about 53k for a non-crossing transfer. The brief asks for the model, but Issuance and Batch could be packed into four slots instead of nine.
• Low, the maintenance pot is a terminal sink. Redeem only moves IMD into the pot itself, and nothing can move it out. Economically this burns 2% of all volume. The README calls it deliberate, so it is a scope decision the requester should confirm before an unupgradeable launch.
• Info, partial-fill reverts. Exact-input buys and exact-output sells revert when the IMD leg cannot fully fill. Correct and documented, but integrators need to know.
• Info, pool-local fee. A hookless pool for the same pair trades fee-free, which is inherent to a hook fee on a standard token.

Coverage has sixteen rows: all eight listed entry points are answered, seven as holds and the two token transfer functions pointing to the gas finding, plus rows for the fee conservation, settlement, liquidity, manifest, supply, rounding and pulse invariants I checked. The SVG renderer is marked unreached as outside my area. The static-analysis leads were all examined and none rose to a finding: the strict equalities and divide-before-multiply are intentional, the pot's post-call state write is behind a reentrancy guard, and the randomness is cosmetic by design.

Added 34 tests under test/, covering failure paths, atomic factory launches, fee accounting, glyph metadata, and randomized balance/reserve invariants.

forge build passes. All 73 tests pass offline with the supplied seed, including 49,152 new invariant calls.

No confirmed implementation defects found. Only test/ files were added.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json holds five findings and eleven coverage rows, all snippets verified against the tree.

Outcome: no blocking defects. The fee accounting, pot redemption, initialization gate, deployability and manifest all hold. All 73 local tests pass, the hook's runtime and initcode sizes are well under the limits, and the address flags match the declared permissions.

Findings kept, after reproducing each against the code:

1. Low, gas cost of glyph bookkeeping (src/SwarmPeg.sol:122). Merged from the economics and flow specialists. I measured swaps at roughly 600k to 815k gas and a whole-token transfer at 260k versus 50k without a crossing. The model is requested; the unpacked storage layout is not.
2. Low, the maintenance pot is a terminal sink (src/MaintenancePot.sol:54). Merged from three specialists. Redeem moves IMD into the pot and nothing can ever move it out. Documented as deliberate, but it needs the requester's confirmation since "maintenance" implies spendable funds.
3. Low, pulse can be saturated and frozen for free (src/SwarmPegHook.sol:149). Merged the math specialist's dust-trade point with the flow specialist's fractional-minute reset. Forty 49-wei buys reach pulse 1000 with zero hook fee, and one trade every 59 seconds stops decay entirely. Cosmetic only.
4. Info, partial fills revert in the two specified-IMD modes (src/SwarmPegHook.sol:143). Correct and documented, kept as an integrator note.
5. Info, the fee binds only the launch pool (src/SwarmPegHook.sol:249). Inherent to a hook fee on a standard token.

Dropped: the fee-rounding note folded into finding 3 as its enabling cause, and the IMD dependency note since it reports a verified-safe dependency rather than a defect. The static analysis leads (divide-before-multiply, strict equality, encodePacked, weak randomness, reentrancy) were each traced and are intended behaviour or cosmetic entropy, not defects.

Coverage: all eight listed entry points are answered, five as holds and three pointing at findings 1 and 3, plus rows for beforeSwap, deployability and the manifest. No proofs were attached since nothing reached high severity.