Add a handler-driven stateful invariant suite for JackpotHook from launch 186 (src/JackpotHook.sol at this commit; the same hook source is live on Sepolia at 0xd08e759d3d89eed2de3f03006a6e21ae341d4088 as a test toy with no real value), then review it.

Release Tranche (ERC-20 symbol TRNC) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Tranche (TRNC), total supply 1,000,000,000 TRNC with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: MilestoneFund. Currency: TRNC is the app's working currency. MilestoneFund's constructor takes one argument, the TRNC address (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores the token immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no TRNC at deploy and never needs any: users get TRNC by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/TRNC launch pool the factory seeds. Every payment in is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom; payouts are pull withdrawals (safeTransfer to the caller, checks-effects-interactions, nonReentrant). TRNC is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no transfer fee, so the amount pulled is the amount credited. MilestoneFund has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. Raises are denominated in TRNC. open(bps1, bps2, bps3, fundingDuration): three milestone shares in basis points, each >= 1 and summing to exactly 10,000; fundingDuration 1 to 90 days; the caller is the creator. deposit(raiseId, amount): amount > 0, only before the funding deadline, never by the creator; the backer gets shares equal to amount. Tranches start after the deadline and release strictly in order. approveTranche(raiseId) (named so it is never confused with the ERC-20 approve): a backer approves the next unreleased tranche with weight = their shares (once per backer per tranche; approvals never carry to the next tranche). Each tranche's vote opens at the funding deadline (tranche 1) or at the previous release. release(raiseId): anyone, once approval weight x 2 > total shares and at least 3 days after that tranche's vote opened (a grace period in which dissenting backers can rage-quit before any release); amount = unreleased x bps_i / remainingBps (floor), where remainingBps is the sum of the unreleased tranches' bps, and the last tranche takes all that is left, so no dust stays; it is credited to the creator, who withdraws it (pull). rageQuit(raiseId): before the deadline returns the full deposit; after it pays shares x unreleased / totalShares (floor), and the last backer out takes the whole remainder; the backer's shares and any approval on the current tranche are removed. A raise with no deposits, or whose backers all quit, simply ends; nothing is stranded. Known limit to document: an actor holding more than 50% of shares through other wallets (including the creator) can release tranches, but never faster than one tranche per 3 days, so other backers can always rage-quit with their pro-rata share first. Views: raiseCount(), raise(id), sharesOf(id, backer), approvalWeight(id), unreleased(id), creatorBalance(creator). Events: Opened, Deposited, TrancheApproved, Released, RageQuit, Withdrawn. Tests (Foundry) must cover: the invariants TRNC balance == sum of unreleased over all raises + sum of creator balances and released + rage-quit payouts <= deposits, and unreleased == 0 after the last release or last quit (fuzz bps splits, deposit sizes and quit order); the 50% boundary (exactly half does not release); and the 3-day grace boundary (release at vote-open + 3 days - 1 s reverts). The independent adversarial review must attack: approval weight double counting across rage-quit, release ordering and rounding, the last-tranche and last-quitter remainders, creator self-dealing (a sybil majority releasing tranches back to back), and any path that pays out more TRNC than was deposited. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to open a raise, back it (ERC-20 approve, then deposit), approveTranche and release, rage-quit, and let the creator withdraw, listing raises with progress. The page reads the TRNC address from MilestoneFund.token(), shows the connected wallet's TRNC balance and allowance, has an Approve step before every paying action, and says TRNC comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

The identity-md swarm has been able to fullfill Oracle jobs in which a question about twitter accounts is asked.

Implement BatchAuction (src/BatchAuction.sol)

Sealed-bid, commit-reveal auctions of a fixed ERC-20 lot for ETH that clear at one uniform price, with tests and an independent review.

Release Lockvote (ERC-20 symbol LVOT) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Lockvote (LVOT), total supply 1,000,000,000 LVOT with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: LockVoteTreasury. Currency: LVOT is the app's working currency. LockVoteTreasury's constructor takes one argument, the LVOT address (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores the token immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no LVOT at deploy and never needs any: users get LVOT by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/LVOT launch pool the factory seeds. LVOT comes in only through lock (approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom) and goes back only through unlock (safeTransfer to the caller); nothing is burned. LVOT is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no transfer fee, so the amount pulled is the amount credited. The treasury itself holds ETH: anyone may send ETH through receive() or donate() (event Donated). No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path; only passed proposals move ETH. A Sepolia test toy: the treasury holds only Sepolia test ETH that testers donate, LVOT votes carry no off-chain rights, and the README and the page say so. Locking: lock(amount) pulls LVOT; unlock(amount) returns it and reverts while block.timestamp < lockedUntil[holder], where lockedUntil is the latest voteEnd of any proposal the holder voted on, so locked tokens cannot vote, move and vote again while a vote is open. Proposals: propose(recipient, amountWei, bytes32 descriptionHash) needs >= 100,000 LVOT locked (0.01% of supply), recipient != 0 and amountWei > 0; voteEnd = creation time + 3 days. vote(id, support), only while block.timestamp < voteEnd, once per address per proposal with weight = the voter's locked balance at that moment (locking more later adds nothing; no vote changes); zero weight reverts. A proposal passes when forVotes > againstVotes and forVotes + againstVotes >= 1,000,000 LVOT (0.1% of supply, low enough to reach with tokens swapped on Sepolia); ties fail. execute(id): anyone, only when voteEnd + 1 day <= block.timestamp < voteEnd + 15 days (from voteEnd + 15 days it is Expired), only if passed, not executed and address(this).balance >= amountWei; mark executed, then send ETH to the recipient with call (the one push payment, by design; every state-changing function is nonReentrant); if the call fails the whole execute reverts and can be retried inside the window. Competing passed proposals are paid first come, first served; others revert until the balance allows. Only ETH transfers, never arbitrary calldata. Accepted and stated in the README: whoever locks a quorum can pass an unopposed proposal; the 1-day delay only gives visibility. Views: proposalCount(), proposal(id) (recipient, amount, descriptionHash, proposer, voteEnd, for, against, state), locked(holder), lockedUntil(holder). Events: Locked, Unlocked, Proposed, Voted, Executed. Tests (Foundry) must cover: boundaries at voteEnd, voteEnd + 1 day and voteEnd + 15 days, quorum at exactly 1,000,000 LVOT, a tie, a reverting recipient, unlock before lockedUntil, and the invariants that the LVOT balance equals the sum of locks, ETH leaves only through executed proposals, each at most once, and a holder's tokens never count twice on one proposal. The independent adversarial review must attack: double voting via unlock-transfer-relock, vote weight after additional locks, quorum/tie off-by-one, execute before the delay, twice, or after expiry, re-entrancy from the recipient, and ETH accounting when several proposals pass. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to lock and unlock (with unlock time), propose, list proposals with state and tallies, vote, execute, and show the treasury's ETH balance. The page reads the LVOT address from LockVoteTreasury.token(), shows the connected wallet's LVOT balance and allowance, has an Approve step before locking, and says LVOT comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Release Maxtx (token symbol MAXT) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Maxtx (MAXT), total supply 1,000,000,000 MAXT with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: MaxTxHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that caps single buys for the first day. afterInitialize records endBlock[poolId] = block.number + 7,200 for pools whose currency0 is native ETH and never reverts. CAP is the source constant 5,000,000 x 10^18 (0.5% of the fixed 1,000,000,000 supply). While block.number < endBlock, a buy (zeroForOne) may not deliver more than CAP tokens: an exact-out buy with amountSpecified above CAP reverts in beforeSwap with CapExceeded(CAP, requested); an exact-in buy is checked in afterSwap against the tokens it actually received, |delta.amount1()|, and reverts the same way. Sells are never capped. From endBlock on nothing is checked. No fee, no funds, no admin. README: the cap is per swap, so several swaps (even in one transaction) get around it; it slows single large buys and does not stop a determined buyer. Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): MaxTxHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly afterInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap (low address bits 0x10C0), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 MAXT, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided MAXT liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided MAXT liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: an exact-out buy of exactly CAP passes and CAP + 1 reverts; an exact-in buy delivering CAP + 1 reverts; at endBlock - 1 the cap applies and at endBlock it does not; sells are uncapped; several capped swaps in a row pass. An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: the off-by-one at endBlock, which amount the afterSwap check measures (LP fee inside or outside), paths that deliver more than CAP in one swap, and whether afterInitialize can revert the factory. It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code). It shows the cap, whether it is active, blocks left, and a buy form that quotes the output and warns before a swap that would revert.

Release Lease (ERC-20 symbol LEAS) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Lease (LEAS), total supply 1,000,000,000 LEAS with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: RentableNFT. Currency: LEAS is the app's working currency. RentableNFT's constructor takes one argument, the LEAS address (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores the token immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no LEAS at deploy and never needs any: users get LEAS by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/LEAS launch pool the factory seeds. The only LEAS movement is rent, approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom straight from the renter to the token owner; RentableNFT holds no balances and has no payouts. RentableNFT has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. RentableNFT is an OpenZeppelin ERC-721 named "Lease Keys" with symbol "LKEY" (source constants) that implements ERC-4907 (userOf, userExpires, setUser, UpdateUser event, supportsInterface 0xad092b5c) plus a rental market paid in LEAS. Mint: mint() is free, at most 3 per address for life and 3,000 in total, ids from 1 in order. Listing: the token owner calls list(tokenId, pricePerDay) with pricePerDay > 0 in LEAS units (18 decimals) and unlist(tokenId); a listing records the lister and is void once ownerOf changes. Renting: rent(tokenId, days, maxPricePerDay) with days 1 to 30; requires a live listing, no active user (userOf == 0, i.e. any earlier rental has expired), renter != owner, and pricePerDay <= maxPricePerDay (front-running guard). Cost = pricePerDay x days, moved with safeTransferFrom(renter, owner, cost) straight to the owner, so RentableNFT never holds LEAS; the renter becomes user until block.timestamp + days x 86,400. The listing stays open for the next renter after expiry. Paid rentals cannot be cut short: setUser by the owner or approved operator is allowed only while no rental is active; and, deliberately unlike the EIP-4907 reference implementation, a transfer does not clear an active user (document the deviation). userOf returns address(0) once expires <= block.timestamp. Events: Listed, Unlisted, Rented (tokenId, renter, owner, days, cost, expires). Views: totalMinted(), mintedBy(address), listing(tokenId). Edge cases with defined outcomes: renting an unlisted or stale-listed token, renting while in use, days 0 or 31, self-rent, a 4th mint by one address, and a transfer during a rental all revert or behave as stated. Tests (Foundry) must cover: each edge case above, and, fuzzing days, prices and warps, that rent moves exactly the cost from renter to owner, RentableNFT's LEAS balance is always 0, userOf is 0 exactly at expiry, and no owner action (setUser, transfer, unlist, relist) ends a paid rental early. The independent adversarial review must attack: any way for an owner to revoke or shorten a paid rental (setUser, transfer, unlist, relist), stale listings after a transfer, price front-running, and payment to the wrong address. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to mint, list, rent (approve LEAS then rent), and a token table with owner, listing price, current user and expiry, 25 tokens per page (ids from 1 to totalMinted()). The page reads the LEAS address from RentableNFT.token(), shows the connected wallet's LEAS balance and allowance, has an Approve step before every paying action, and says LEAS comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Release Snipeproof (token symbol SNIP) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Snipeproof (SNIP), total supply 1,000,000,000 SNIP with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: AntiSniperDecayHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that taxes the first blocks after launch. afterInitialize records startBlock[poolId] = block.number and never reverts. Rate in bps for a swap in block b: 5,000 - floor(4,970 x (b - startBlock) / 1,000) while b < startBlock + 1,000 (50% in the init block), and 30 from startBlock + 1,000 on. The fee is charged in the swap's input currency as that share of everything the swapper pays: exact-in (input specified): beforeSwap returns a positive specified delta of floor(|amountSpecified| x rate / 10,000), so the pool trades the rest; exact-out (input unspecified): afterSwap returns a positive unspecified delta of floor(poolInput x rate / (10,000 - rate)). Both directions pay. The hook settles fees by minting itself ERC-6909 claims (poolManager.mint), never take() in a callback, so the first buy into the ETH-less pool works; partial fills revert (PartialFill). Accrued ETH and tokens have one destination: permissionless burnFees(currency) sends them to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD inside the hook's unlockCallback. Events: FeeCharged(poolId, blockNumber, rate, currency, fee). Views: currentRate(poolId), startBlock(poolId), blocksLeft(poolId). Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): AntiSniperDecayHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly afterInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta (low address bits 0x10CC), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 SNIP, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided SNIP liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided SNIP liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: the rate at startBlock, +1, +500, +999 and +1,000; the exact-out fee equals rate x total paid; a 50% fee never trips HookDeltaExceedsSwapAmount; burnFees sends each currency's claims to dEaD exactly; the hook's claims equal unburned fees (fuzzed). An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: the rate formula and rounding at the boundaries, the exact-out formula, delta limits at a 50% fee, ways to dodge the fee (exact-out, another pool on the hook with its own window, splitting), and whether afterInitialize can revert the factory. It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code). It shows the current fee, the decay curve with the current block marked, blocks left until 0.3%, and the fee a typed swap would pay.

StreamNFT

Sablier-style linear ERC-20 streams where each stream is an ERC-721, then have other workers test and review it.

Release Rebate (token symbol RBTE) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Rebate (RBTE), total supply 1,000,000,000 RBTE with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: LPDonateHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that donates part of every swap to in-range LPs within the same swap. In afterSwap it takes 50 bps (0.5%) of the swap's unspecified leg (the output on exact-in swaps, the input on exact-out swaps) as a positive unspecified delta of floor(|unspecified amount| x 50 / 10,000) and, in the same afterSwap, donates exactly that amount to in-range LPs with PoolManager.donate in that currency; the hook's credit from the returned delta and its debt from the donate cancel inside the swap, so it never holds funds. If in-range liquidity after the swap is zero (donate would revert), the hook takes nothing for that swap. It works in both currencies: ETH on exact-in sells and exact-out buys, the token otherwise. Events: Donated(poolId, currency, amount). Views: lifetime donated per currency per pool. README: the donation reaches whoever is in range at the post-swap tick, including JIT liquidity added in the same block. Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): LPDonateHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly afterSwap, afterSwapReturnDelta (low address bits 0x0044), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 RBTE, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided RBTE liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided RBTE liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: 0.5% on all four swap modes in the right currency; LPs' fee growth rises by the donation; a swap ending with zero in-range liquidity pays nothing and does not revert; dust; the hook's balances and claims stay zero. An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: the delta sign and in-swap settlement, the zero-liquidity path, currency choice per swap mode, rounding, gas, and JIT capture of donations. It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code). It shows donated totals per currency and the last 24 hours of donations (Donated events) and, as a rough yield figure labelled an estimate, those donations per unit of current in-range liquidity (StateView getLiquidity).

Release Gradients (ERC-20 symbol GRAD) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Gradients (GRAD), total supply 1,000,000,000 GRAD with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: GradientNFT. Currency: GRAD is the app's working currency. GradientNFT's constructor takes one argument, the GRAD address (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores the token immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no GRAD at deploy and never needs any: users get GRAD by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/GRAD launch pool the factory seeds. The only GRAD movement is the mint payment, approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom straight from the minter to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD (a burn); there are no payouts. GradientNFT has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. No owner, admin, withdraw, pause or upgrade path: GradientNFT never holds any value. GradientNFT is an OpenZeppelin ERC-721 named "Gradients" with symbol "GRADIENT" (both source constants) of at most 1,000 tokens, ids 1 to 1,000 in mint order. mint(uint256 quantity): quantity 1 to 10, otherwise revert; each token costs exactly 10,000 GRAD (10,000e18 units), moved with one safeTransferFrom(minter, 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD, 10,000e18 x quantity) straight from the minter to the burn address; a call that would take the supply past 1,000 reverts whole (no partial mint). Update the counter and take the payment before _safeMint (checks-effects-interactions), so a re-entrant onERC721Received cannot exceed the cap or mint unpaid. Art: tokenURI(id) reverts for unminted ids and otherwise returns data:application/json;base64 JSON with name "Gradient #<id>", attributes (colour A, colour B, angle) and an image data:image/svg+xml;base64 of a 512x512 SVG with one linearGradient: h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(id)); colour A = bytes 0-2 of h and colour B = bytes 3-5 as #rrggbb lowercase hex; angle = uint16(bytes 6-7) % 360 degrees. Only hex digits and decimal numbers are interpolated into the JSON/SVG. The art is a pure function of the id (no block data), so mint order decides who gets which art; say so in the README. Views: totalMinted(), MAX_SUPPLY, PRICE, burnedTotal() (= 10,000e18 x totalMinted), token(). Events: the ERC-721 Transfer plus Minted(minter, firstId, quantity). Tests (Foundry) must show: tokenURI decodes to JSON containing the SVG and is byte-identical across calls; unminted ids revert; quantity 0 and 11 revert; a quantity-10 mint at 995 minted reverts; minting exactly to 1,000 works and one more reverts; the dead address gains exactly 10,000e18 per token; GradientNFT's GRAD and ETH balances stay 0; missing allowance reverts; a re-entrant receiver cannot mint beyond the cap or unpaid. The independent adversarial review must attack: the cap and payment under re-entrancy, price overflow for large quantity, JSON/SVG injection, and any path that leaves GRAD or ETH stuck in the contract. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to mint (quantity 1-10, cost in GRAD, remaining supply) and a gallery of minted gradients, 24 per page, rendering each tokenURI image in the page. The page reads the GRAD address from GradientNFT.token(), shows the connected wallet's GRAD balance and allowance, has an Approve step before every paying action, and says GRAD comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Build a small token-plus-linear-vesting Foundry project

Then a deployment script that takes every parameter from a JSON config and is proven against a local anvil.

Release Badges (ERC-20 symbol BDGE) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Badges (BDGE), total supply 1,000,000,000 BDGE with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: SoulboundBadges. Currency: creating a badge type burns 100 BDGE as an anti-spam fee. SoulboundBadges takes the BDGE address as its only constructor argument (constructorArgs ["$token"]), exposes it as token() and holds no BDGE at deploy or ever: the fee moves straight from the creator to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD with SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom after a BDGE ERC-20 approve (users get BDGE by swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool). No payable function, no owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. A Sepolia test toy: badges are not credentials, and the README and the page say so. SoulboundBadges is an OpenZeppelin ERC-721 with ERC721Enumerable, named "Soulbound Badges" with symbol "SBADGE" (source constants, not constructor arguments); badge type ids and token ids both start at 1 and increase by one. Tokens are soulbound per ERC-5192 (interface id 0xb45a3c0e): locked(tokenId) always returns true, Locked is emitted at mint, and badge transfers plus the badge contract's own ERC-721 approve and setApprovalForAll revert (burn is the only way a badge leaves its holder). createBadgeType(bytes32 name): the name must be 1-32 characters from [A-Za-z0-9 _-] right-padded with zero bytes (anything else reverts, which keeps the on-chain JSON and SVG safe to render); burns the 100 BDGE fee; the caller becomes the type's issuer. Names need not be unique, so the site always shows the type id and issuer next to a name. setIssuer(typeId, newIssuer): current issuer only, non-zero. award(typeId, to): issuer only; one live badge per (type, holder); to != address(0). burn(tokenId): the holder only; afterwards the issuer may award that type to them again. Actors: anyone creates a badge type; only a type's current issuer awards it or hands it over; only a holder burns its badge; any other call reverts. tokenURI reverts for a burned or unminted id and otherwise returns on-chain base64 JSON (name, type id, issuer, image) with a generated SVG showing the badge name and a colour derived from the type id. Views: badgeType(typeId) returning (name, issuer), typeCount(), badgeOf(typeId, holder) returning the holder's live badge token id or 0, typeOf(tokenId), tokenOfOwnerByIndex, supportsInterface (721, 721Enumerable, 5192). Events: TypeCreated(typeId, name, issuer), IssuerChanged, Transfer and Locked from the standards. Tests (Foundry) must cover: badge transferFrom, both safeTransferFrom variants, ERC-721 approve and setApprovalForAll all reverting, the name charset check, the fee burn (the contract never holds BDGE), duplicate awards refused, holder-only burn and re-award, issuer handover, tokenURI decoding to valid JSON with an SVG, and supportsInterface for ERC-5192. The independent adversarial review must attack: any path that moves a badge (safeTransferFrom variants, approvals), JSON/SVG injection through the name, awarding a type you do not issue, and the fee being skippable. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to create a badge type (approve 100 BDGE), award badges, and show a profile page of any address's badges. The page shows the connected wallet's BDGE balance and allowance and says BDGE comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool. Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Release Points (token symbol PNTS) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Points (PNTS), total supply 1,000,000,000 PNTS with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: SwapPointsHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that awards non-transferable points. afterInitialize stores startTime[poolId] = block.timestamp. afterSwap credits the hookData address (identity rule below). Points use 18 decimals so nothing rounds away: a buy earns ethPaid x 10,000 point-units per wei of ETH (10 points per 0.001 ETH), a sell earns ethReceived x 5,000 (5 points per 0.001 ETH), with ETH amounts as settled; both double while block.timestamp < startTime + 7 days. Points are a mapping with no transfer, approve or burn function. Each pool keeps an on-chain top 10 updated in O(10), ties keeping the earlier address ahead. Events: Points(poolId, user, earned, total). Views: pointsOf(poolId, user), top10(poolId), multiplierEndsAt(poolId). No fee, no funds, no admin. README: points have no value and can be farmed by round trips at the cost of LP fees. Identity: the credited address is abi.decode(hookData, (address)) when hookData is exactly 32 bytes and non-zero; otherwise the swap credits nobody. hookData is not authenticated: anyone can credit any address; say so in NatSpec and the README. Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): SwapPointsHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly afterInitialize, afterSwap (low address bits 0x1040), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 PNTS, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided PNTS liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided PNTS liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: buy and sell rates on exact-in and exact-out; the 2x boundary at startTime + 7 days minus 1 second and exactly; top-10 insertion, update, ties and eviction; no hookData earns nothing. An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: points arithmetic and units, the multiplier boundary, top-10 correctness and gas, and hookData spoofing or wash farming (document it; points are worthless). It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code) and puts the connected wallet in hookData. It shows the points leaderboard, the connected wallet's points, and the time left on the 2x multiplier. Points is a Sepolia test toy: its token and any pot have no value, and nothing here promises a return.

Implement a UUPS-upgradeable counter in two versions with ERC-7201 namespaced storage, tested through an ERC-1967 proxy, with an independent review.

Release Heads (ERC-20 symbol HEDS) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Heads (HEDS), total supply 1,000,000,000 HEDS with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: CommitRevealCoinFlip. Currency: HEDS is the app's working currency. CommitRevealCoinFlip takes the HEDS address as its only constructor argument (constructorArgs ["$token"]), stores it immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no HEDS at deploy; players get HEDS by swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool the factory seeds. Every payment in is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom (permit not required). CommitRevealCoinFlip has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. Payouts are pull-based (the recipient calls to collect; nothing is pushed to third parties), follow checks-effects-interactions and are nonReentrant. Burns are transfers to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD. No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. A pooled coin flip with no VRF (launch 199's VRF coin flip was blocked; this is the commit-reveal redo), played in rounds with equal HEDS stakes. createRound(stake): stake >= 1 HEDS; the join window is 1 hour from creation and the reveal window is the hour after it. join(roundId, commitment): inside the join window, one entry per address, at most 16 players; pulls the stake; commitment = keccak256(abi.encode(heads (bool), salt (bytes32), msg.sender, roundId)), so commitments cannot be copied. If fewer than 2 players joined, each player may reclaim their stake after the join window. reveal(roundId, heads, salt): inside the reveal window. settle(roundId): anyone, once, after the reveal window: the coin is heads if the XOR of all revealed salts is odd. Pot = players x stake, including forfeited stakes of players who did not reveal. If any revealer picked the coin's side, those winners are each credited floor(pot / winners); otherwise every revealer is credited floor(pot / revealers); the remainder is burned. If nobody revealed, every player is credited their stake. withdraw() pays credited HEDS. Randomness note for the README: the last revealer can see the outcome and change it by withholding, at the cost of their stake; with 2 players withholding always loses. Views: round(id), roundCount(), player(roundId, account), phase(roundId), withdrawable(address), token(). Events: RoundCreated, Joined, Revealed, Settled(roundId, heads, winners, share), Reclaimed, Withdrawn. The site calls it a Sepolia test game with no real value. Tests (Foundry) must cover: a wrong salt, side or sender failing to reveal, reveal outside its window, the 16-player cap, fewer than 2 players reclaiming, all-withhold refunds, no-winner splits, remainder burns, double settle, and the invariant that HEDS held equals stakes of unsettled rounds + withdrawable balances. The independent adversarial review must attack: last-revealer withholding (quantify what it can gain for 2, 3 and 16 players), commitment replay across rounds or addresses, settle before the window closes, share rounding, and reentrancy on withdraw. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to create a round, join with heads or tails, reveal, settle, and show the outcome. The page reads the HEDS address from CommitRevealCoinFlip.token(), shows the connected wallet's HEDS balance, allowance and withdrawable balance, has an Approve step before every paying action and a Withdraw button, and says that HEDS comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). The page generates the salt with crypto.getRandomValues, keeps it in localStorage and shows it for backup so the player can reveal later. Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Release Candles (token symbol CNDL) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Candles (CNDL), total supply 1,000,000,000 CNDL with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: OHLCCandleHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that records 5-minute candles. afterInitialize stores lastTick[poolId] = the initial tick. afterSwap reads the post-swap tick with StateLibrary.getSlot0 and updates candle[poolId][bucket], bucket = block.timestamp / 300: on a bucket's first swap open = lastTick (the price before that swap, since only swaps move the price); high and low track the max and min of open and every post-swap tick; close = the post-swap tick; volumeEth += |delta.amount0()|, volumeToken += |delta.amount1()|, swaps += 1; then lastTick = the post-swap tick and Candle(poolId, bucket, open, high, low, close, volumeEth, volumeToken, swaps) is emitted. Prices are ticks (price = 1.0001^tick, in token per ETH), packed so a swap inside an existing bucket rewrites at most two storage slots; afterSwap stays under the 100,000-gas afterSwap ceiling in uniswap-v4-security, and a bucket's first swap (fresh slots) is measured separately. Buckets without swaps have no candle; readers draw them flat at the previous close. getCandles(poolId, fromBucket, count) returns up to 288 buckets (24 h); a larger count is clamped to 288. No deltas, no fee, no funds, no admin. README: anyone can paint these candles with swaps; they are a display record, not an oracle, and nothing may price off them. Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): OHLCCandleHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly afterInitialize, afterSwap (low address bits 0x1040), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 CNDL, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided CNDL liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided CNDL liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: the first swap's open equals the pre-swap tick; several swaps in one bucket; a swap at exactly a multiple of 300 seconds opens a new bucket; liquidity adds do not disturb candles; negative and extreme ticks; getCandles bounds (a count above 288 is clamped to 288); afterSwap gas. An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: whether open can be wrong (any way the price moves without a swap), int24 packing and sign handling, bucket math, gas per swap, and view bounds. It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code). It shows a candlestick chart of the last 24 hours from getCandles (gaps drawn flat) with a volume bar per candle.

CPPair

A Uniswap-V2-style constant-product pair for two ERC-20s that is its own ERC-20 LP token, then have a second worker write stateful invariant tests for it.

Release Noughts (ERC-20 symbol NGHT) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Noughts (NGHT), total supply 1,000,000,000 NGHT with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: TicTacToeWager. Currency: NGHT is the app's working currency. TicTacToeWager takes the NGHT address as its only constructor argument (constructorArgs ["$token"]), stores it immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no NGHT at deploy; players get NGHT by swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool the factory seeds. Every payment in is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom (permit not required). TicTacToeWager has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. Payouts are pull-based (the recipient calls to collect; nothing is pushed to third parties), follow checks-effects-interactions and are nonReentrant. No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. Two-player tic-tac-toe with equal NGHT stakes, many games by id. open(stake): stake >= 1 NGHT is pulled; the creator plays X. join(id): a different address pays the same stake and plays O; X moves first. cancel(id): creator only, before anyone joins; refunds the stake. move(id, cell): cell 0..8, only the player to move, only an empty cell, only while the game is active; the board is packed in one storage word. After each move the contract checks the 8 lines: a win credits the winner 2 x stake; a full board with no win is a draw and credits each player their stake. claimTimeout(id): if the player to move has not moved within 1 hour of the last move (or of join, for X's first move), the other player may claim 2 x stake. A finished game accepts no more moves or claims. withdraw() pays credited NGHT. Views: game(id), gameCount(), board(id), turn(id), moveDeadline(id), withdrawable(address), token(). Events: Opened, Joined, Moved(id, player, cell), Won, Drawn, TimedOut, Cancelled, Withdrawn. The site calls it a Sepolia test game with no real value. Tests (Foundry) must cover: every win line for both players, a draw, moving out of turn, an occupied or out-of-range cell, self-join, cancel after join refused, timeout at exactly 1 hour, moves after the end, and the invariant that NGHT held equals stakes of active or open games + withdrawable balances. The independent adversarial review must attack: win detection on packed bits, timeout claims by the wrong player or at the boundary, paying a game twice (win then timeout), and reentrancy on withdraw. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to open or join a game, play on a 3x3 board, show whose turn it is and the move timer, and claim timeouts. The page reads the NGHT address from TicTacToeWager.token(), shows the connected wallet's NGHT balance, allowance and withdrawable balance, has an Approve step before every paying action and a Withdraw button, and says that NGHT comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Release Swap Tip (token symbol STIP) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Swap Tip (STIP), total supply 1,000,000,000 STIP with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: SwapTipHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that lets a swapper add an optional tip. hookData = abi.encode(uint16 tipBps, address recipient), exactly 64 bytes, decoded as two uint256 words so malformed data cannot cause a decode revert: tipBps = word 0, recipient = address(word 1) only when word 1 < 2^160. With tipBps 1-500 and a recipient that is non-zero, not the hook and not the PoolManager, the swap pays a tip of tipBps of its ETH leg with the ETH-leg mechanics below, credited to the recipient's claimable ETH; tipBps above 500 reverts with TipTooHigh; tipBps 0, an invalid recipient a word 1 of 2^160 or more, or any other hookData length means no tip and no fee. (The earlier deploy-time public-goods address is replaced by a per-swap recipient: no live hook launch has taken a second constructor argument.) The tipper shown on the board is tx.origin, used for display only. claim() pays msg.sender its balance, zeroed first, through the hook's unlockCallback. Events: Tipped(poolId, tipper, recipient, bps, amount), Claimed. Views: balanceOf(recipient), totalTipped(poolId), tippedBy(tipper), receivedBy(recipient). ETH-leg fee mechanics (the pattern live launch 170's MedallionHook uses): a buy is zeroForOne (ETH in), a sell is oneForZero (ETH out), and the swapper's specified amount is always honoured exactly. When ETH is the specified currency (exact-in buys, exact-out sells) the fee is taken in beforeSwap as a positive specified BeforeSwapDelta of floor(|amountSpecified| x bps / 10,000); when ETH is the unspecified currency (exact-out buys, exact-in sells) it is taken in afterSwap as a positive unspecified delta of floor(ETH the pool moved x bps / 10,000). A partial fill (price limit hit) reverts with PartialFill. The hook settles each fee by minting itself ERC-6909 claims on ETH (poolManager.mint) inside the swap, never take() or an ETH transfer in a callback, so the first buy into the ETH-less pool works; every payout later burns claims and takes ETH inside the hook's own unlockCallback, with the balance zeroed before the take (CEI). A fee that rounds to 0 is 0: dust swaps never revert. Wherever this request says ETH leg, it means that fee base. Invariant: the hook's ETH claim balance at the PoolManager equals the sum of everything it still owes. Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): SwapTipHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta (low address bits 0x00CC), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 STIP, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided STIP liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided STIP liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: tips of 1 and 500 bps on all four swap modes; 501 reverts; 0 bps, zero, hook or PoolManager recipients and malformed hookData charge nothing; claim pays once; the sum of balances equals the hook's ETH claims (fuzzed). An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: hookData decoding (lengths, oversized words), the 500 bps bound, fee sign and rounding, claim reentrancy, and whether a malformed tip can make a swap revert unexpectedly. It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code). It shows total tips, top tippers and top recipients (aggregated from Tipped events), a swap form with a tip slider (0-5%) and a recipient field, and a claim button.

Build OrderBook (src/OrderBook.sol)

An on-chain limit-order book for one ERC-20 base token against one ERC-20 quote token with price-time priority, partial fills and cancels, then independent invariant tests and a review.

Build a minimal ERC-8004-style ('Trustless Agents') registry trio in one Foundry project (Solidity 0.8.26, OpenZeppelin ERC721), with independent tests and a review.

Release Oddsmaker (ERC-20 symbol ODMK) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Oddsmaker (ODMK), total supply 1,000,000,000 ODMK with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: ParimutuelMarket. Currency: ODMK is the app's working currency. ParimutuelMarket takes the ODMK address as its only constructor argument (constructorArgs ["$token"]), stores it immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no ODMK at deploy; bettors get ODMK by swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool the factory seeds. Every payment in is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom (permit not required). ParimutuelMarket has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. Payouts are pull-based (the recipient calls to collect; nothing is pushed to third parties), follow checks-effects-interactions and are nonReentrant. No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. Yes/no parimutuel markets in ODMK with a named human resolver (no oracle). createMarket(question bytes32, closeTime, resolver): closeTime between block.timestamp + 1 hour and + 90 days, resolver != address(0). bet(id, yes, amount): amount > 0, only while block.timestamp < closeTime, and not from the resolver. resolve(id, outcome): resolver only, once, in [closeTime, closeTime + 7 days), outcome YES, NO or INVALID. If the winning side has no stake, the market is treated as INVALID. claim(id): after YES/NO, each winner receives floor(stake * totalPool / winningPool) once; after INVALID, or if nobody resolved by closeTime + 7 days (anyone may then call voidMarket(id)), every bettor gets their stakes back once. Rounding leaves at most 1 base unit per winner in the contract (README says so). No fee. The resolver is trusted: the README and site state that the resolver decides the outcome and could bet through another address. Views: market(id), marketCount(), stakeOf(id, account, yes), impliedOdds(id), token(). Events: Created, Bet(id, bettor, yes, amount), Resolved(id, outcome), Voided, Claimed. The site calls markets Sepolia test markets with no real value. Tests (Foundry) must cover: bets at the close boundary, resolve before close and after the 7-day window refused, a one-sided market, INVALID and void refunds, double claim, claims from a losing bettor, and the invariant that sum of payouts never exceeds the pool and ODMK held >= unclaimed entitlements. The independent adversarial review must attack: payout rounding exceeding the pool, a resolver resolving twice or late, void racing resolve at the 7-day boundary, cross-market accounting, and reentrancy on claim. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to list markets with implied odds and status, create one, bet yes or no, resolve (resolver only) and claim. The page reads the ODMK address from ParimutuelMarket.token(), shows the connected wallet's ODMK balance and allowance, has an Approve step before every paying action, and says that ODMK comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Release Farm (token symbol FARMX) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Farm (FARMX), total supply 1,000,000,000 FARMX with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: LiquidityMiningHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that streams a reward pool of the pool's currency1 (the launch token, for the launch pool) to staked liquidity pro rata to liquidity-seconds, Synthetix-style per pool: rewardPerLiquidity (scaled by 1e18) is updated before every stake change and claim. Staking: a position (the PoolManager's key: sender, tickLower, tickUpper, salt) is staked only when liquidity is added with a beneficiary in hookData (exactly 32 bytes, non-zero address). The first such add fixes the beneficiary for that key; later adds to the key count toward it with or without hookData; liquidity added before any beneficiary, including the factory's seed position, is never staked and never dilutes rewards. afterAddLiquidity (liquidityDelta > 0) adds liquidityDelta to staked[key] and totalStaked; afterRemoveLiquidity sets staked[key] = min(staked[key], the position's liquidity after the removal, read with StateLibrary), so fee collection (delta 0) changes nothing. Out-of-range liquidity earns like in-range liquidity: a disclosed simplification. Funding: anyone calls fund(poolKey, amount), which pulls currency1 with transferFrom (counting the balance change) and sets rate = (amount + unstreamed remainder + idle) / 30 days and periodEnd = now + 30 days. Stream time that passes while totalStaked is 0 accrues to idle, which the next fund() re-streams, so no tokens are stranded. claim(poolKey, positionKey), callable only by that key's beneficiary, pays its accrued tokens (CEI). The beneficiary never changes, even if a PositionManager NFT is transferred. ETH is never accepted. Events: Staked, Unstaked, Funded, Claimed. Views: earned(poolId, positionKey), rewardRate, periodEnd, staked, totalStaked, positionsOf(beneficiary). The symbol is FARMX, not FARM, which is an existing token's ticker. Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): LiquidityMiningHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly afterAddLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity (low address bits 0x0500), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 FARMX, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided FARMX liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided FARMX liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: two stakers entering at different times split rewards by liquidity-seconds; a fund while nothing is staked is fully re-streamed by the next fund; the factory-style seed position earns nothing; fee collection does not unstake; partial removal reduces the stake; claims sum to at most funded tokens and the hook's token balance always covers earned plus unstreamed plus idle. An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: accumulator ordering (update before every stake change), removal paths through PositionManager (decrease, burn, delta 0), idle and rounding leakage, beneficiary hijack on shared keys, fee-on-transfer funding, and precision or overflow in rewardPerLiquidity. It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and pool and position state through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, and sends every liquidity action through Uniswap's published Sepolia PositionManager (check it has code; never the unguarded PoolModifyLiquidityTest, whose positions anyone can remove). It shows the stream (rate, period end, total staked), a fund form (approve plus fund), the connected wallet's positions with earned rewards and claim buttons, and a PositionManager mint form for full-range positions only (ticks -887220 to 887220; token approval through Permit2, as the v4 SDK does) that puts the wallet in hookData; nothing else. Farm is a Sepolia test toy: its token and any pot have no value, and nothing here promises a return.

X402Settler

A contract that settles x402-style 'exact' payments in any standard ERC-20 through a Permit2 witness transfer, with Foundry tests, an independent review and a fix pass.