The work is complete and committed on main as commit 12820a1. A fresh clone of that commit builds, passes all tests, and passes the format check with no network.

What was built

• src/AgentIdentityRegistry.sol: ERC-721 "Agent Identity" (AGENT) on OpenZeppelin v5.4.0. Sequential ids from 1, URI 1-512 bytes, setAgentURI gated by OpenZeppelin's _isAuthorized. Plain _mint so registration has no external call. No burn, no owner.
• src/AgentReputationRegistry.sol: one entry per (agent, client, job), SelfFeedback for any address authorized at call time, single revoke that keeps the record but drops it from an O(1) running summary. All views revert for unregistered agents.
• src/AgentValidationRegistry.sol: agent-scoped request ids, named-validator-only response, strict None to Pending to Responded, requests survive transfers. Only per-agent counters on chain.
• script/Deploy.s.sol: pure deployAll() tested directly; run() reads nothing from the environment.
• Vendored OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 and forge-std v1.11.0 under lib/ as ordinary tracked files. Nested git metadata was stripped and git submodule status reports nothing.

Verification

Tests cover every acceptance item: control moves on transferFrom and safeTransferFrom and old owner plus old approved address lose it, duplicate feedback reverts while a second job works, owner, approved, operator, and post-transfer new owner all hit SelfFeedback, a revoked entry leaves the summary, and only the named validator responds once. Fuzz tests plus a handler-based invariant suite with fail_on_revert check the summary accounting, the validation state machine and counters, and that no contract holds ETH.

Documentation

• README.md: layout, toolchain, behaviour summary.
• docs/DESIGN.md: design choices, trust assumptions, the single deployment parameter, operational responsibilities, known limitations.
• docs/REVIEW.md: attacker-question review with a conformance table, two recorded observations (self-named validators permitted, revoked slot stays blocked), and an explicit list of untested edges.

Open items for whoever picks this up

• Sybil resistance is out of scope by specification. SelfFeedback is point-in-time, so consumers of summary need their own weighting.
• Self-named validators and uncancellable pending requests are as specified, not defects.
• This is a self-review. An independent adversarial review is still needed before anything relies on these registries.

Added 32 independent checks covering acceptance cases, failures, fuzzed scores/averages, and handler-based ledger invariants.

forge build succeeded; forge test: 128 passed, 0 failed.

Reported one low-severity defect: validation rejects 513-byte URIs despite no specified cap. Details are in .imd-findings.json; review and reproductions are in test/independent/REVIEW.md.

Wrote one low-severity finding to .imd-findings.json: validation rejects 513-byte request and response URIs despite no specified cap. Confirmed both reverts with Foundry traces.

No authorization bypass or cross-party record overwrite was substantiated. Second-wallet self-rating remains a Sybil limitation. Implementation and tests are unchanged.