Approved workflow

Release Snipeproof (token symbol SNIP) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Snipeproof (SNIP), total supply 1,000,000,000 SNIP with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: AntiSniperDecayHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that taxes the first blocks after launch. afterInitialize records startBlock[poolId] = block.number and never reverts. Rate in bps for a swap in block b: 5,000 - floor(4,970 x (b - startBlock) / 1,000) while b < startBlock + 1,000 (50% in the init block), and 30 from startBlock + 1,000 on. The fee is charged in the swap's input currency as that share of everything the swapper pays: exact-in (input specified): beforeSwap returns a positive specified delta of floor(|amountSpecified| x rate / 10,000), so the pool trades the rest; exact-out (input unspecified): afterSwap returns a positive unspecified delta of floor(poolInput x rate / (10,000 - rate)). Both directions pay. The hook settles fees by minting itself ERC-6909 claims (poolManager.mint), never take() in a callback, so the first buy into the ETH-less pool works; partial fills revert (PartialFill). Accrued ETH and tokens have one destination: permissionless burnFees(currency) sends them to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD inside the hook's unlockCallback. Events: FeeCharged(poolId, blockNumber, rate, currency, fee). Views: currentRate(poolId), startBlock(poolId), blocksLeft(poolId). Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): AntiSniperDecayHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly afterInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta (low address bits 0x10CC), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 SNIP, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided SNIP liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided SNIP liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: the rate at startBlock, +1, +500, +999 and +1,000; the exact-out fee equals rate x total paid; a 50% fee never trips HookDeltaExceedsSwapAmount; burnFees sends each currency's claims to dEaD exactly; the hook's claims equal unburned fees (fuzzed). An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: the rate formula and rounding at the boundaries, the exact-out formula, delta limits at a 50% fee, ways to dodge the fee (exact-out, another pool on the hook with its own window, splitting), and whether afterInitialize can revert the factory. It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code). It shows the current fee, the decay curve with the current block marked, blocks left until 0.3%, and the fee a typed swap would pay.

Sepolia (11155111) only, launched as univ4_hook on the native-ETH pool the factory opens. GitHub publication and IPFS hosting are approved. Launch token: fixed supply of 1,000,000,000, 18 decimals, no constructor arguments, minted to msg.sender, no mint or admin. One hook; enable only the permission flags its logic uses and never revert the factory's pool initialisation or its one-sided seed. Like every hook launch that has gone live, the hook constructor takes exactly one argument, the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; rates, recipients and the token are source constants or learned from the pool key, and there is no owner. Take any hook fee through return deltas (settled as ERC-6909 claims, paid out by pull) instead of assuming a dynamic-fee pool key. Where a swapper identity is needed, read it from hookData; a swap without valid hookData credits nobody (a router can never claim), and hookData is unauthenticated, which the README states. No external oracles or VRF, no proxies, delegatecall or selfdestruct. foundry.toml sets bytecode_hash = "none". Any website is a static export with index.html in dist/. Site label lab-anti-sniper-hook.

Build SNIP and AntiSniperDecayHook (permissions afterInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta; PoolManager-only constructor) with a launch-rehearsal Foundry suite and an independent adversarial review, deploy them through the factory on Sepolia, then build the one-page site against the live pool.

Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code). It shows the current fee, the decay curve with the current block marked, blocks left until 0.3%, and the fee a typed swap would pay.