Approved workflow

Done. Summary of the delivery:

Contracts (src/)

• Streamline.sol — STRM, 18 decimals, zero-argument constructor crediting all 10²⁷ minor units to msg.sender. totalSupply is a compile-time constant rather than a storage slot, and there is no mint, burn, owner, minter, pause or upgrade path. transferFrom always decreases the allowance, including type(uint256).max.
• StreamingVault.sol — one constructor argument, the token address ($token). createStream / withdraw / withdrawMax / cancel, linear accrual with multiplication before division and an exact deposit at stopTime. No fee, owner, admin or upgradeability, so no manifest argument can grant a privileged role; the token is the only external counterparty. Checks-effects-interactions throughout plus a reentrancy latch. Settlement freezes accrual at the settlement instant via settledAt, so history stays readable instead of being deleted.

Verification — all run offline from a clean clone of the commit:

• forge build → exit 0
• forge test → 83 passed, 0 failed (25 token, 58 vault), with no environment variables set
• forge fmt --check → exit 0
• Rehearsed both evm_project floor suites in test/scratch/ against the real attested creation code (CREATE2 addresses predicted from an etched factory): 8/8 pass.

Also delivered: docs/abi/Streamline.json, docs/abi/StreamingVault.json, and a README covering entry conditions, accrual, cancellation/refunds, the deliberate absence of timeouts and randomness, events, six numbered assumptions, deployment parameters, the protected-suite environment variables, and operational responsibilities.

forge-std v1.9.6 is vendored as 51 ordinary tracked files (git archive of the tag, no nested repository) — git ls-files -s reports no gitlink entries. ffi is off, no filesystem permissions are granted, and the compiler is pinned by version string.

Three things I want to flag rather than bury:

1. Scope left alone deliberately. No launch.json (the manifest node owns it) and no web/ (a later stage). The README states the manifest requirements this source implies — single application contract, $token as its only argument, no $owner, Streamline before StreamingVault.
2. Only the sender can cancel, per the approved workflow text. The recipient has no cancel of their own; documented with the reasoning, since a reviewer may want to challenge it.
3. The suite is not an audit. The vault custodies other people's STRM. The one assumption a reviewer should press hardest: createStream credits the stream with deposit without measuring a balance delta, so a fee-on-transfer or blocklisting token would break it. STRM satisfies the assumption and the floor asserts exact transfers against the deployed bytecode, but the guarantee comes from the pairing, not from the vault.

Wrote .imd-findings.json with one low-severity finding: cancelled streams continue reporting already-paid refunds as refundable.

Reviewed source, tests, and ABI exports without modifying them. Findings are based on static analysis; tests were not rerun. No launch.json was present to review.

Created launch.json with:

• Streamline token metadata
• StreamingVault configured with $token
• Native ETH pool parameters
• No initialization, supply, allocation, or ownership fields

Validation completed:

• forge build: passed
• forge test: 83 passed, 0 failed
• Manifest invariant checks: passed
• Git scope check: only launch.json added

I found one low-severity defect and wrote it to .imd-findings.json. I changed no source, test or config files.

Finding (low), src/StreamingVault.sol:229: refundableAmount reports a refund that has already been paid on a cancelled stream. It returns deposit - accrued whatever the stream's status, but cancel() has already sent that amount to the sender.

• Reproduction (confirmed in a scratch copy under /tmp, since removed): open a stream of 1000 over 1000 seconds, warp 250 seconds, cancel. The vault then holds 0 tokens and the sender has received 750, but refundableAmount(id) returns 750 instead of 0.
• Impact: funds are not at risk. A frontend showing a "refundable" column would display a phantom balance for every cancelled stream.
• Test coverage: test_cancelFreezesAccrual asserts the wrong value at test/StreamingVault.t.sol:624.

What I checked and found correct:

• Vault accounting: the recipient and sender payouts on cancel always sum to deposit - withdrawn, including rounding. Accrual is exact at stopTime.
• Vault safety: the reentrancy latch and checks-effects-interactions ordering both hold. There is no owner, admin or fee path, and the constructor takes only the token.
• Token: Streamline mints the constant 10^27 supply to msg.sender and has no mint path.
• ABIs and manifest: the committed ABIs match forge inspect output. launch.json matches the approved manifest, uses $token as the only vault argument, and grants no privileged role.
• Build and tests: foundry.toml uses bytecode_hash = "none", and all 83 tests pass.

I did not raise the unbounded per-recipient stream lists, because the README already discloses them (item 5). In the scratch copy, 1000 spam streams cost about 350k gas to read.

Implemented the complete Streamline frontend and static export.

Key deliverables:

• React/Vite/TypeScript source under web/
• Committed-ready static export under dist/
• Runtime deployment manifest at imd-deployment.json
• Validation and rebuild documentation at frontend.md

Features include wallet connection, wrong-network handling, STRM approval, stream creation, live sent/received stream state, accrued withdrawals, cancellation, transaction feedback, and explorer links.

Validation completed:

• Strict TypeScript check passed
• 5 interaction/configuration tests passed
• Production build passed
• ABI canonical hashes match the handoff
• Sepolia RPC and both deployed contract bytecodes verified read-only
• Manifest verifies all 75 exported assets
• Export size: approximately 2.56 MB
• No out-of-scope paths modified
• No transactions broadcast