Approved workflow

Release Escalation (ERC-20 symbol ESCL) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Escalation (ESCL), total supply 1,000,000,000 ESCL with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: DollarAuction. Currency: ESCL is the app's working currency. DollarAuction takes the ESCL address as its only constructor argument (constructorArgs ["$token"]), stores it immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no ESCL at deploy; players get ESCL by swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool the factory seeds. Every payment in is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom (permit not required). DollarAuction has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. Payouts are pull-based (the recipient calls to collect; nothing is pushed to third parties), follow checks-effects-interactions and are nonReentrant. No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. Shubik's dollar auction as a Sepolia game-theory demo, all in ESCL, many auctions by id. open(prize): prize >= 100 ESCL is pulled from the seller; the auction's lastActivity = block.timestamp. Each address has at most one standing bid per auction. bid(id, newTotal): not the seller, not the current highest bidder, newTotal >= highest + 1 ESCL (the first bid >= 1 ESCL), and only while block.timestamp < lastActivity + 1 hour; the contract pulls newTotal minus the caller's current standing bid (top-up), records newTotal as their bid, makes them highest (the previous highest becomes second-highest) and sets lastActivity = block.timestamp. Ties are impossible because every bid strictly exceeds the highest. settle(id): anyone, once, when block.timestamp >= lastActivity + 1 hour: the highest bidder is credited the prize; the seller is credited the highest bid plus the second-highest bid (just the highest if there was only one bidder). settle is constant-gas and never loops over bidders: every other bidder calls reclaim(id) after settlement, once, to move their standing bid in full to withdrawable (the winner and the second-highest cannot reclaim). With no bids, settle credits the prize back to the seller. withdraw() pays credited ESCL. Views: auction(id), auctionCount(), bidOf(id, bidder), topTwo(id), deadline(id), withdrawable(address), token(). Events: Opened, Bid(id, bidder, total, lastActivity), Settled(id, winner, prize, sellerTake), Withdrawn. The site and README say plainly that bidding past the prize loses ESCL by design and that this is a test toy with no real value. Tests (Foundry) must cover: the 1 ESCL increment, top-ups by a returning bidder, the highest bidder and the seller refused, bidding at exactly lastActivity + 1 hour reverting while settle works, one-bidder and no-bid settlements, double settle, reclaim by the winner, the second-highest or twice reverting, a settle with 200 bidders costing the same gas as with 2, and the invariant that ESCL held == prizes and standing bids of unsettled auctions + unreclaimed losing bids of settled auctions + withdrawable balances. The independent adversarial review must attack: miscounting the second-highest bid after top-ups, a loser's bid being both paid to the seller and refunded, settle racing a last-second bid, and reentrancy on withdraw. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to explain the game in two sentences, show the prize, the top two bids and a countdown, and bid, settle, reclaim and withdraw. The page reads the ESCL address from DollarAuction.token(), shows the connected wallet's ESCL balance, allowance and withdrawable balance, has an Approve step before every paying action and a Withdraw button, and says that ESCL comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Sepolia (11155111) only. GitHub publication and IPFS hosting are approved. Launch token: a separate fixed-supply ERC-20, 18 decimals, no constructor arguments, exactly 1,000,000,000 minted to msg.sender, no mint or admin functions. The factory sends that supply to LP and rewards, so no application contract may need a launch-token balance at deploy. Application contracts are fully configured in nonpayable constructors using only address, uint, bool or bytes32 arguments (no strings, arrays, proxies, delegatecall or selfdestruct); anything else is set at runtime. No owner unless the request names one, and then it is $owner. No external oracles, VRF or keepers: randomness is commit-reveal or a future blockhash read within 256 blocks with a refund path. foundry.toml sets bytecode_hash = "none". The website is a static export with index.html in dist/. Site label lab-dollar-auction.

Build ESCL and DollarAuction (DollarAuction takes constructorArgs ["$token"]; prizes and bids are ESCL) with Foundry tests and an independent adversarial review, deploy them through the project factory, then build the one-page website against the live deployment.

One static page, no framework beyond what the skill needs, reading the live deployment's ABI and address. Approve ESCL before paying; show ESCL balance and allowance and the withdrawable balance.