IMD Ember World (https://imdember.com) - RETEST of the wallet sign-in security review (World only)

This is a retest. An earlier Swarm job reviewed an older version:

• Job: https://explorer.imd.fun/jobs/4bd31cfb-1151-497f-9b27-40e668dea372
• Report: https://github.com/Identity-md/research/blob/main/jobs/4bd31cfb-1151-497f-9b27-40e668dea372/files/artifacts/report.md
• Reviewed: repo commit c2a8c33d2c3b1f643bb8c369527d56e51f88e9e5, Worker version beac62be-27ff-40cd-9dc4-3cbbdc6add4b, source 0def8cb, Worker bundle SHA-256 4ec73351afbcc9af133fd487d7e2d33c1df6713bfa1aced881f412d38e0eccf3. Findings: F-1 Medium (shared boundary), F-2 Low/Info, F-3 to F-5 Low, F-6 to F-8 Info; deployment match "partial".

Retest target:

• Repo: https://github.com/tungweb3/imd-ember-world-review at commit b6e986be6d1c85a720a3b8231feb3adf1ab2b780 (the only commit after c2a8c33; use this exact commit, not a branch).
• Live: https://imdember.com, Worker "imd-world" version 50c688c9-1bcf-4b68-a0ab-b7a9dc6ec82f, built from private source 2da46cdafcf8ad3fb3571ea0273ecc5d1ab5be1d.
• Expected Worker bundle SHA-256 (rebuilt from source/ alone): 14584fe4df57e7505fc38e57a3b8b99590d948051cbc3a52b3d5a9ea969ff5e4 (264,561 bytes).
• Stated live frontend: index.html 7f0f9d5409db78799bb61ba1573d780cc8ecb815f4e60c4f0c8ba7317ce7a75c, /assets/index-Bj4ribmm.js 70742ed409b55a400cb8439c3cb5e4bac719f8a4763083c77764d3a7283ef528, /assets/InteriorView-Xan3ABOQ.js fbd4e640ac1718781f8980c3671282abfa4893fbc3b05cd672831912ff1770b0, /assets/index-5qjaKexX.css adaf06955abcaff313a964c753508d8be821d381bd4bf951d67e95ec08202233.

Question: at this version, is it safe for a player to connect a wallet, sign in, and use the owner features (My home, move, the new "Enter your home")? Answer from evidence; do not generalize beyond it.

Start with README.md (its section "自送審版本以來的變更", i.e. what changed since the reviewed version, maps F-1..F-8 to the change and the residual risk; the docs are in Traditional Chinese), then SCOPE.md, SIWE.md, ROUTES.md, WALLET_METHODS.md, DATA_SCHEMA.md, OWNERSHIP_AND_HOMES.md, DEPLOYMENT_MATCH.md, TESTS/README.md and source/docs/security/AUDIT_REMEDIATION_STATUS.md. The fix statuses there are the team's own account and have not been re-reviewed: treat every doc as a claim to check against the code, the live files and your own runs.

Please do:

1. Each earlier finding, F-1 to F-8: say whether the fix or the stated residual risk holds at this commit and on the live files: fixed / partly / not fixed / residual as stated / cannot verify, with file:line or URL evidence and, where possible, a local reproduction. In particular:
   • F-1: the page-side SIWE check (source/src/world/siwe.ts checkSignInMessage; source/src/world/auth.ts) and the pre-sign and in-prompt summaries; the new statement naming token/NFT approvals; whether the relay (phishing) scenario of the earlier probe P1 still yields a session, and what now stands between it and the player.
   • F-2: sessions record wallet_type / verification_method (migrations/0003); every unavailable ERC-1271 path refuses; nothing grants rights from these fields.
   • F-3: the ERC-1271 path order (no-code cache and known-smart-wallet lookup first; claim share, chain:code cap, eth_getCode with a 60 s no-code cache, per-network and per-contract shares, chain:erc1271 vs chain:erc1271:known, one eth_call). Re-run the earlier probe P3 and check the stated numbers (>= 7 /24s at >= 10 contracts; 2 junk checks a minute hold one contract).
   • F-4: POST /api/auth/logout-all and the two log-out buttons; re-run the earlier probe P5.
   • F-5: the layered limits L1-L5, the per-(address, network) cooldown, separate challenge and verify limiter keys, the surge line, and the refusal log lines (check they carry no IP, full address, cookie, token, signature or message). Re-run probe P4.
   • F-6: npm audit now. The snapshot's own run reports 3 moderate advisories in the build toolchain (undici via wrangler/miniflare) and 0 with --omit=dev; the site's record still says "npm audit reports 0". Confirm and judge.
   • F-7 (a)-(e) and F-8: confirm what changed and what did not.
2. New issues in the changed code: logout-all, the layered limits and D1 budgets (atomicity of INSERT_CHALLENGE, CLAIM_ERC1271, CLAIM_CONTRACT, BURN_UNCLAIMED), the per-contract shares and chain:code, the known-smart-wallet lookup, the no-code cache, the page-side check, migration 0003 (additive? partial indexes used? a deploy ahead of 0003 fails closed?), the refusal logs, and the client-side Enter gate (source/src/world/homeEntry.ts enterGate / enterableHome) with the lazy interior chunk. Look for anything that lets someone sign in as an address without its signature, keep or restore a revoked session, end another address's sessions, spend another party's budget in a way the docs do not state, or get owner mode or Enter for a house that is not theirs.
3. Wallet-method inventory: re-count on the live index JS and the InteriorView chunk (the docs claim exactly eth_accounts, eth_requestAccounts and personal_sign, SIWE only, listening only to accountsChanged; no transaction, typed data, Permit/Permit2, approve, setApprovalForAll, batch call, chain switch or session key).
4. Rebuild the Worker bundle from source/ alone (DEPLOYMENT_MATCH.md section 3) and compare with 14584fe4...f5e4 and manifests/deploy-record-SHA256SUMS.txt; fetch the live index, JS, chunk and CSS once each and compare hashes and security headers. Give a deployment-match verdict (verified / partial / unverified) with reasons; the running Worker, secrets, D1 schema, limiter bindings and the edge WAF rule are team-side claims.
5. Run the local tests as TESTS/README.md says (copy source/ into its own git repo; the stubs in TESTS/stubs contain no house geometry). The snapshot reports 141 tests, 138 pass, 3 fail, all 3 needing withheld code; check that, and that the three "group 5" Enter-gate tests pass.
6. World/Mint boundary: say whether anything changed; a future Genesis Mint page is out of scope (owner statement: same origin, uses this session, reviewed separately). Say "unknown" when unknown.

Scope and limits:

• In scope: wallet connect and sign-in, session, logout and logout-all, limits, ownership (mainnet ownerOf on 0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d), house rights (one house per wallet, sized by counted seats: this is the product rule, not a defect), headers, dependencies. Out of scope: Genesis Mint; withheld code (3D world, art, music, house placement, the interior rendering, WorldApp.tsx) beyond what the public bundles show.
• On production only a few low-rate public GETs (index, the JS/CSS/chunk, GET /api/auth/session; an edge rule blocks an IP over 20 /api/ requests per 10 s). No POST, sign-in, fuzzing, scanning or exploit attempts; do not change the target.
• Reproduce locally with the real handler, node:sqlite and synthetic keys generated in memory. No real wallets, real signatures or transactions.

Deliverable: report.md in Traditional Chinese (keep English technical terms):

• scope, versions and hashes you checked;
• a table F-1..F-8: earlier severity, the team's claim, your retest verdict, evidence, residual risk;
• new findings, each with severity, file:line or URL evidence and reproduction steps, separated into confirmed World issues, shared-boundary issues, unverified items and Genesis to-dos;
• the wallet-method inventory on the live files;
• the deployment-match verdict with reasons;
• the commands you ran and their output (no owner logs);
• what you could not verify.

Honesty rules: this is a record of a limited retest, not an audit certificate or endorsement. Do not call the site safe, secure, audited or certified. Mark facts you reproduced, inferences, team-side claims and unknowns apart. The team's fix statuses are claims until you confirm them.