I've added src/deployment/GatedHookDeployer.sol, a deployer that refuses to deploy a generated hook unless the oracle has signed a passing review for it. It's committed as 2ebeffa on top of 510bcfb. Nothing was deployed, no paid request was made, nothing was signed, and this is not an audit or a claim of live readiness.

What I changed in contracts

• New deployer. It works for any generated hook that exposes poolManager() and getHookPermissions(), not just BoundedSwapHook. It mines a CREATE2 salt whose address carries exactly the hook's callback permission bits, deploys there, and reads back the runtime code hash, poolManager() and getHookPermissions().
• HookJobRequester is unchanged, by necessity. It is 24,117 bytes, only 459 bytes under the contract size limit, so there was no room to add an artifact-specific review. Instead, the artifact is bound through the job's result document:
  • The document's hash must equal the job's stored result hash.
  • It must contain "hooksStoreArtifact":"0x<digest>".
  • The digest covers the job id, source and build identity, initcode, constructor arguments, expected runtime code hash, chain, the deployer itself, the PoolManager and its code hash, and the permission mask.
• Gate conditions. A deployment needs a delivered job and an oracle-signed Passed review that hasn't been revoked. It also needs a job younger than maxJobAge (default 30 days) and must be sent by the job's requester. Each job and each digest can deploy only once, the approval is used up before CREATE2, and the function has a reentrancy lock. deploy is the only gated entry point.
• Chains. On Ethereum, Base, Robinhood Chain and Sepolia, only one PoolManager address and code hash can ever be enabled. I took the addresses from Uniswap's own deployment table and checked the code hashes live; script/recheck_gated_managers.sh reruns that check (all four were OK). Local 31337, Base Sepolia 84532 and Robinhood testnet 46630 accept a manager the owner enables. Every other chain is refused. No chain has a manager enabled until the owner calls setManager.
• Legacy route. HooksStoreFactory is untouched and is documented as the old ungated, testnet-only, BoundedSwapHook-only route.

Path from job result to calldata: python3 -m sdk.gated_deploy reads the job and checks the result document and its artifact line. It mines a salt with an eth_call, runs the contract's own check(...) as an eth_call, and prints an unsigned deploy transaction plus a list of the evidence it checked.

Local evidence

• forge build, forge fmt --check and forge test with the given fuzz seed: 297 tests pass across 29 suites. 44 of them are in test/GatedHookDeployer.t.sol and cover every rejection the brief lists, against the real requester:
  • success, and both callback/binding orders
  • forged signatures, and missing, failed or unanswered reviews
  • substituted code, arguments, documents or other jobs' approvals
  • wrong chain, deployer, manager, code hash or mask
  • address collisions, replay, stale approvals and revoked signers
  • six malicious constructors
  • a real pool initialized on a gated BoundedSwapHook
• Python: 35 tests pass, including 5 new ones in test/test_gated_deploy.py. These run on a local Anvil chain against a stand-in requester with no oracle checks, so the signature path is covered only by the Foundry tests.
• Both JS tests pass. Sizes: the deployer is 10,342 bytes; the requester is unchanged.
• Gas: deploy averages 375k and peaks at 1.1M. A full 131,072-candidate mining page can use up to about 32M gas as an eth_call, so the tool uses 4,096-candidate pages.
• The new ABI is in site/GatedHookDeployer.abi.json.

Trust assumptions that changed

• Artifact binding rests on the review panel. The deployer does not recompute the digest from source. The panel and reviewers must confirm that the digest named in the result document is the artifact they