Removed redundant original renders. Remaining source files total 7.26 MiB, below the 8 MiB limit. All five logo options and artifacts/logo.png remain byte-for-byte unchanged.

Offline build, 21 tests across two seeds, formatting, deployment simulation, manifest and asset checks passed.

Artwork remains five image-generated drafts, all retained as exports; no new drafts or discarded designs.

Completed using the existing compliant token, Foundry configuration, and exact launch manifest. Added two event smoke tests and clarified deployment responsibilities.

Verified: forge build, all 23 tests, forge fmt --check, and manifest/ABI checks pass.

The external protected Uniswap integration harness remains unexecuted locally.

Implemented entirely under test/:

• ERC-20 edge cases and failure paths.
• Balance and allowance invariants.
• Offline PoolManager swaps with fees in both currency orderings.
• Vendored dependencies for offline verification.

forge build, forge test, and the manifest checker pass: 51 tests passed, none failed or skipped.

No token defects found. Live mainnet integration was not tested.

The manifest is complete and verified. Only launch.json is modified in the working tree.

What I found. The accepted tree holds one contract, SPALACEToken, with a parameterless constructor that mints exactly 1e27 units to msg.sender, plus constant name, symbol and 18 decimals. It has no owner, no admin functions, no mint or burn, and no delegatecall or selfdestruct. A launch.json from an earlier contributor was already present and structurally correct.

What I changed. I rewrote only the notes string. It previously described logo files in the repository, which are not contracts. It now describes the token's constructor, fixed supply, plain transfer semantics, the factory's role in distribution, and that no application contracts are deployed.

Verified manifest contents:

• Top-level keys are exactly kind, token, contracts, pool, economics, notes.
• token.contract is SPALACEToken, constructorArgs is empty, totalSupply is "1000000000000000000000000000".
• contracts is an empty array, matching the single-contract source tree.
• pool is the IMD pair at the lowercase address, fee 12500, tickSpacing 60, initialPrice "125270724187523965593206900".
• economics matches the job's object verbatim.
• notes is one string under 4000 characters.

Checks run. The build compiled cleanly with solc 0.8.26, and all 51 tests across 5 suites passed. No scratch files were created and git status --porcelain shows only launch.json modified.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. The working tree has no changes to tracked files, and the scratch directory was removed.

Outcome: no defects in the assigned area. The token has no permission model to break: no owner, no initializer, no fallback, and the only state writers are the constructor and the three ERC-20 entry points, each gated by the caller's own balance or allowance.

What I checked, per guide:

• Access Control: mapped every writer of balanceOf and allowance. The deployer and factory have no bypass. A transferFrom against a holder without approval reverts, and the runtime contains no delegatecall or selfdestruct.
• Asymmetry: diffed transfer against transferFrom and approve against the allowance decrement. All mirror writes are present, self-transfer conserves balance at the full 1e27, and the zero-sender path is unreachable except through a reverting transferFrom.
• Trust Gap: no privileged actor and no economic formula exist in the token, so no seam exists. Launch flows carry no address-dependent branch, and the manifest's pool, economics and provenance price match the order.

Reported: one informational note on the standard ERC-20 approve overwrite race, with a concrete sequence that lets a spender move 150 after the holder meant to cap at 50. It is not a defect against the requested design.

Verification run: the existing 51 tests pass, and a scratch probe confirmed the five edge behaviours I cite in the coverage rows. Coverage has seven rows covering all three listed entry points, the constructor and three invariants.

Not reached: live pool initialization and swap settlement against the real PoolManager, which the protected harness runs later with network inputs.

The review is complete. No defects found in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap areas, and the findings file records that with full coverage.

What I checked

• Arithmetic in SPALACEToken. The only operations are one checked constant, two guarded unchecked subtractions and one unchecked addition. Both subtractions sit behind a strict < guard. The addition cannot overflow because no mint or burn path exists, so all balances always sum to 1e27. Self-transfer re-reads storage after the debit, so a full-balance transfer to oneself preserves the balance.
• Sentinel and edge inputs. Value 0, exact balance, balance plus one, max uint256, allowance of max minus one, allowance exactly equal to value, and a recipient already holding the whole supply all behave correctly. A balance revert after the allowance check rolls the allowance back.
• Boundary enumeration. The token makes no external calls, has no payable, receive or fallback function, and decodes no bytes. The only sentinel branches are the three address-zero rejections, walked on both sides.
• Manifest math. The declared sqrtPriceX96 equals the value derived from a 2500 IMD cap over 1e27 units with SPALACE as currency0, digit for digit. Keys, types, lowercase addresses, empty constructorArgs and totalSupply all match the schema and the constructor.
• Static analysis lead. The aderyn large-literal note on line 12 is a style remark. The literal evaluates to exactly 1e27.

Verification run

I ran the repository's 51 existing tests, which all pass, plus a scratch suite of 7 corner-case tests including a 2000-run conservation fuzz, which also passed. The scratch directory has been removed and the tree is clean apart from the findings file.

Output

.imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and six coverage rows: one holds row for each of the three entry points, plus rows for the supply-conservation invariant, the manifest price derivation and the boundary enumeration. Nothing in my area was left unreached.

The review is complete. .imd-findings.json is written at the repository root with an empty findings list and eight coverage rows, and the working tree has no stray files (the scratch probe was removed; only out/ and cache/ build output remain, both gitignored).

Result: no defects found in the economics area. The SPALACE token is a 70-line, dependency-free ERC-20 with a constant 1e27 supply credited once to the constructor caller, no fee, limit, exemption, admin surface, external call or fallback. Every failure mode from the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides that applies to a token of this shape was checked and holds.

What I verified:

• Conservation. The only balance writers are the constructor and _transfer. Transfers to the zero address revert, the subtraction is checked before the unchecked block, and the recipient is read after the subtraction, so self-transfers and full-balance transfers conserve the sum exactly. No burn or mint path exists.
• Allowances. Finite approvals decrement exactly, max uint persists, a revert on insufficient balance or zero receiver rolls the allowance back, and from-equals-zero is rejected even at value zero. No residual accumulation path.
• Launch flows. Factory to distributor, factory to PoolManager, distributor claims and trader round trips all arrive whole. The repository's tests run against the vendored Uniswap v4 PoolManager in both currency orderings, including single-sided seeding within the 90% budget, exact-output swaps, one-unit-short settlement reverting, and fee collection. I re-ran them from a clean environment with no network: 51 tests passed, plus four scratch probes of my own on allowance residuals, zero-sender paths and the full launch flow sum.
• Manifest. Exactly the six required top-level keys, token fields match the compiled ABI, economics and pool copied verbatim, lowercase addresses, notes under the limit. The declared opening sqrt price equals the value derived from 2500 IMD over 1e27 units with SPALACE as currency0.
• Bytecode. No DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, no receive or fallback, no linked libraries.

Static analysis leads: the single aderyn note about the large numeric literal is a compile-time constant expression for the supply and is not a defect.

Not covered here, and owed to the network's own harness: live factory, hook and Merkle distributor integration on mainnet, and the actual CREATE2 address ordering of the token against IMD, which decides whether the provenance price or its inverse is used by the deployer.

The findings file is in place and excluded from git by the harness's own exclude rule, which is expected for a review deliverable. The working tree is otherwise unchanged. Nothing further is pending.

Outcome: no defect found in the token. The review of SPALACEToken under the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides is complete, and .imd-findings.json holds two informational notes and a full coverage record.

What was checked

• transfer and transferFrom: every guard and state write traced. The zero-address reverts, the balance check before the unchecked subtraction, the self-transfer ordering, the finite-versus-unlimited allowance split and the rollback of a consumed allowance on a failed move all behave as a plain ERC-20 should. Scratch probes covered self-approval, self-transferFrom with unlimited allowance, and maximum values.
• approve: overwrites the allowance as EIP-20 specifies. The classic reduce-approval front-run reproduces (holder lowers 100 to 50, spender takes 150). Recorded as info only, since it is inherent to the requested plain ERC-20 and OpenZeppelin v5 behaves the same.
• Constructor and supply: whole 1e27 credited to msg.sender, including when a CREATE2 contract deploys it. balanceOf has exactly two writers, totalSupply is a constant, there is no receive or fallback, and neither runtime nor creation code contains DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.
• Launch flows and manifest: the existing suite drives the real v4 PoolManager at the mainnet address in both currency orderings and passes (51 tests). launch.json has exactly the six keys, an empty constructorArgs matching the no-arg constructor, and an initialPrice that I recomputed from the economics and matched exactly.
• Periphery: no linked libraries. The one note is that script/Deploy.s.sol wraps the deployment in a broadcast with a chain guard defaulting to mainnet, so a careless --broadcast run would mint a look-alike token to the signer outside the factory. The README documents it as simulation-only, so this is info, not a defect.

Coverage record: eight rows, one per listed entry point plus the constructor, the fixed-supply invariant, the launch-flow invariant, the manifest and the periphery. Nothing was left unreached. Static-analysis lead (aderyn large numeric literal) is style only and was not promoted.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json is written at the repository root. Only the findings file exists outside the committed tree; the scratch tests were removed and git status is clean.

Outcome: no defects. The token is a minimal fixed-supply ERC-20 and behaves as the brief requires. The findings file holds two informational notes and a full coverage record.

What I verified against the code

• Build with solc 0.8.26 and all 51 project tests pass, including the in-place Uniswap v4 PoolManager suite at the mainnet address and the conservation invariants.
• The constructor credits exactly 1e27 units to msg.sender. There is no mint, burn, pause, blacklist, owner, fallback or upgrade path.
• An opcode scan of creation and runtime bytecode finds no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. Runtime is 1,315 bytes, no link references, no submodules, and every import resolves to a committed file.
• The transfer path checks balance before the unchecked subtraction, handles self-transfer correctly, and transferFrom treats max uint as unlimited and reverts atomically on failure. I confirmed the self-transfer and conservation cases in a scratch test.
• launch.json has exactly the six required keys, an empty constructorArgs matching the parameterless constructor, and pool and economics copied verbatim from the order.

Specialist findings, settled

• The approve front-run note from audit_permissions and audit_flow is the same root cause at the same line. I merged it into one info finding and reproduced it in a scratch test. It is inherent EIP-20 behaviour and the brief asks for plain ERC-20, so it is not a defect.
• The deploy script note from audit_flow reproduces. The chain guard defaults to mainnet, so a broadcast there would create a standalone look-alike token. The script is documented as a simulation helper and is not part of the factory launch, so it stays informational.

Coverage. All three entry points are marked holds, plus four invariant rows for the constructor mint, bytecode limits, manifest shape and the protected launch flows. No proofs were attached because nothing reached high or critical severity.