Implemented SoothToken.sol: Sooth Protocol (SOOTH), with 1 billion tokens, 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer.

Added vendored dependencies, success/failure tests, fuzz tests, invariants, and deployment documentation.

Verified with Solidity 0.8.26:

• forge build passes.
• forge test passes: 33 tests using the required seed.
• forge fmt --check passes.
• Clean offline build and parallel tests pass.

I found no defects in SoothToken, and .imd-findings.json has an empty findings list plus a coverage row for each entry point.

The token is src/SoothToken.sol, a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 with nothing changed. Its constructor mints INITIAL_SUPPLY = 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18 once, to msg.sender (the factory). It has no owner, no mint or burn after deployment, no transfer hooks, fees or pause, and no external calls, so the Execution Trace and Periphery guides have nothing to trace beyond OpenZeppelin's own logic. On First Principles, the supply can't grow, and the launch transfers (to the distributor, into the pool, and swaps) each move exactly the amount sent.

Coverage, all holds:

• approve(address,uint256): sets the allowance and reverts on a zero address; no side effects.
• transfer(address,uint256): checks the balance before debiting and credits the exact amount.
• transferFrom(address,address,uint256): reduces the allowance (except an unlimited one) and reverts when it is too small.
• Fixed-supply invariant: the whole supply is minted only in the constructor, to the deployer.

The project's existing tests pass (33 of 33 from forge test). The static-analysis lead, aderyn's "large numeric literal" at line 10, is only a style note: the value is the intended 10²⁷ base units, which is 1,000,000,000 SOOTH at 18 decimals. I didn't run the protected harness tests myself. I read their assertions and the code meets them. No files in the repository were changed apart from the findings file.

I wrote launch.json for the Sooth Protocol launch, and it is the only changed file.

What the manifest says

• Kind is custom_token, with token contract SoothToken, name Sooth Protocol, symbol SOOTH, 18 decimals.
• Constructor arguments are empty, matching the compiled ABI, which has no constructor inputs.
• Total supply is one billion tokens in minor units, exactly what the constructor mints to msg.sender.
• Contracts list is empty, since the accepted tree contains only the token.
• Pool and economics are copied exactly as the launch gives them: IMD pair address, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one provenance price, and the requester's economics object verbatim.
• Notes describe the token's fixed supply, lack of privileged functions, and that all launch flows move exact amounts.

Verification

• forge build compiled cleanly.
• forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed passed all 33 tests across both suites.
• git status shows launch.json as the only new or changed file.

The review is complete. The findings file is valid JSON with zero findings and nine coverage rows, and no tracked file was changed.

Outcome: no defects found in the assigned area. SOOTH is a plain fixed-supply token built on an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20, and every failure mode in the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides either does not apply or is blocked by a guard I traced.

What I verified:

• Library provenance. The vendored ERC20.sol and Context.sol match the hashes in DEPENDENCIES.json and are verbatim OpenZeppelin v5.4.0. There is nothing custom in the transfer path.
• Entry points. The compiled ABI has exactly three state-changing functions: approve, transfer and transferFrom. There is no receive, fallback, mint, burn, owner or pause path. All three rows are marked holds.
• Supply invariant. The constructor mints 1e27 units once to msg.sender. Internal mint and burn have no external caller, and a transfer to the zero address reverts, so supply can neither grow nor shrink after launch. The aderyn large-literal lead is benign since the literal evaluates to the brief's supply.
• Launch flows. The token takes no fee and has no exemption list because it needs none. The factory-to-distributor transfer, the claim, the pool seed and swaps each way all move exactly what they say. A privileged caller without allowance cannot move a holder's balance.
• Economic surface. No oracle, no external call, no ETH acceptance, no blacklist or pause. The ERC-20 allowance replacement race exists but is inherent to the standard and documented in the README, so I did not report it as a defect.
• Tests. The project's 33 unit, fuzz and invariant tests pass under the pinned seed.

One coverage row is unreached: launch.json does not exist yet because the manifest step runs after this review. The README's stated values for contract name, decimals, empty constructor arguments and total supply match the compiled contract, so the later manifest should be straightforward.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json holds the result. The math area is clean; the one item reported is an informational provenance note outside my area.

What I checked

• Supply constant. The literal on line 10 of src/SoothToken.sol evaluates at compile time to exactly 10^27, which equals one billion tokens at the live decimals() of 18 and matches the README, the test suite and the manifest. It is far below the uint128 ceiling, so no downcast in the v4 liquidity path can wrap it. The aderyn "large numeric literal" lead is style only.
• Transfer arithmetic. The vendored OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 _update guards fromBalance < value before its unchecked subtraction, and the unchecked receiver addition cannot overflow because every balance is bounded by the fixed supply. Supply, supply plus one, and max-uint amounts all behave as specified.
• Allowance arithmetic. Max-uint is infinite and untouched, max minus one is finite and decremented, an allowance equal to the amount reaches exactly zero, and an infinite allowance does not bypass the balance guard. Failed transfers roll the allowance decrement back.
• Zero and sentinel paths. Zero-amount transfers are no-ops that still revert for a zero sender or receiver. Launch splits of 10, 80 and 10 percent divide 10^27 with no remainder.
• Evidence. The project's 33 tests pass under the pinned fuzz seed, and a 12-test scratch suite covering the boundaries above passed before I removed it. All six vendored OpenZeppelin files match their recorded hashes.

Finding reported (info)

Seven vendored forge-std files do not match the per-file SHA-256 values in DEPENDENCIES.json, although the README says they are vendored without modification. A diff against the upstream v1.9.7 archive, whose hash does match the record, shows only line-wrapping changes. No deployed bytecode is affected. The fix is to re-vendor those files byte-for-byte or regenerate the recorded hashes.

Coverage

All three entry points, approve, transfer and transferFrom, are marked holds, with four additional rows for the supply, conservation and launch-split invariants and the static-analysis lead. Nothing in my area was left unreached.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. Nothing else is pending: the only repository file I created is .imd-findings.json, the working tree is otherwise clean, and no scratch tests were needed because nothing rose to high or critical.

Outcome. The permission model of Sooth Protocol (SOOTH) holds. The token is the unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC-20 with a constructor that mints the whole supply once to the deployer. There are no roles, modifiers, initializers, hooks, exemption lists, receive or fallback paths, and no inherited mint, burn or permit functions. The compiled ABI exposes exactly the three listed entry points as state-changing functions.

What I checked in the assigned area

• Access Control. Mapped every writer of each storage slot. Balances are written only through the shared update path, allowances only by the owner's own approve or the spender's own transferFrom. No slot has two writers with different guards. The deployer and factory hold no power over other holders after construction.
• Asymmetry. Compared transfer against transferFrom and approve against the allowance-spending path. Validation, storage writes and revert behaviour mirror each other. The infinite-allowance branch is the documented OpenZeppelin behaviour.
• Trust Gap. With no privileged actor and no economic formula, there is no seam where authorization, economics and asymmetry can interact.

Evidence. All 33 project tests pass under the README's fuzz seed, including the invariant campaign. The six vendored OpenZeppelin files match their recorded SHA-256 hashes. The runtime bytecode contains no delegatecall, callcode or selfdestruct.

One finding, severity info, outside the assigned area. The README says the vendored forge-std sources are unmodified and points to DEPENDENCIES.json for hashes. Seven forge-std files in the tree do not match those hashes. I fetched the real v1.9.7 archive, whose hash does match the record, and confirmed every difference is whitespace only. This affects test tooling, not the deployed token. The fix is to restore the seven files byte-for-byte or to re-record the hashes and reword the README.

Leads from static analysis. The single aderyn note on the large numeric literal is a compile-time constant equal to the brief's supply and is not a defect.

Coverage. Nine rows are recorded: the three entry points, the constructor, four invariants, and the provenance row tied to the finding. Nothing was left unreached.

Added 16 boundary, failure-path, and fuzz tests, and expanded the stateful invariant handler to 12 actions.

forge build and forge test pass offline with the supplied seed: 49 tests passed, including 32,768 invariant calls.

No confirmed implementation defects found. Only files under test/ changed.

Review complete. The findings file is written and no tracked files were changed.

Outcome: The Sooth Protocol token is sound. One info-level finding survives, merged from the two specialists who reported the same root cause.

What I verified

• Token code: src/SoothToken.sol is a bare OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 with a no-argument constructor minting 10^27 units once to the deployer. The ABI has only three state-changing entry points. I traced approve, transfer and transferFrom through the vendored ERC20 and each holds: correct zero-address and balance/allowance reverts, exact amounts moved, atomic failure, no hooks, fees, burns or external calls.
• Vendored dependencies: All six OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the upstream v5.4.0 archive, which I downloaded and hashed. So the token's behaviour rests on genuine library code.
• Deployability: Build succeeds with the pinned compiler. Runtime is 1753 bytes, creation 2645 bytes. An opcode-level scan finds no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT or CALL family instructions.
• Tests: The project's 49 unit, fuzz and invariant tests pass with the README's seed, and forge fmt --check is clean.
• Manifest: launch.json uses only schema keys, the supply string matches the mint, constructor arguments are empty as the constructor requires, and addresses are lowercase.

The one kept finding (info): Seven vendored forge-std files do not match the hashes recorded in DEPENDENCIES.json, contradicting the README's claim that libraries were vendored without modification. I confirmed against the upstream v1.9.7 archive that every difference is whitespace only. forge-std is test-only, so there is no on-chain impact. The fix is to either restore the seven files byte-for-byte or re-record the hashes and correct the README wording.

Dropped: nothing else was reported by the specialists or the tester, and the static analysis leads (aderyn's large numeric literal) are stylistic, not defects. My own pass found no additional issues.

The coverage record answers all three entry points as holds, plus three invariant rows for the constructor and supply, the opcode and size floor, and the manifest.