Implemented Pegzeus (PEGZ): 1 billion tokens with 18 decimals, minted once entirely to the deployer.

Included vendored OpenZeppelin dependencies, 22 passing tests, and deployment/operations documentation.

Verified with Solidity 0.8.26:

• forge build
• forge test using the required fuzz seed
• forge fmt --check

I found no defects in the permissions of Pegzeus (PEGZ), and .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list with a coverage row for each entry point.

The contract, src/Pegzeus.sol, is an OpenZeppelin v5 ERC20 that adds and overrides nothing. Its constructor mints exactly 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 to msg.sender (the factory), and that is the only place tokens are ever created.

Access Control: there is nothing to control. The token has no owner or roles, and no mint, burn, pause, blacklist, freeze, seize or upgrade function. No address, the deployer and factory included, can move or freeze another holder's balance or increase the supply after deployment.

Trust Gap: no address gets special treatment. The factory, the PoolManager and the distributor are treated like any other holder, with no exemptions and no fee or burn on transfer. So the swarm's ten percent, the pool seed, claims and swaps all move exactly the amounts they say. The deployer gets no allowance bypass either.

Asymmetry:

• approve only sets the caller's own allowance, and rejects the zero address as spender.
• transfer only debits the caller and checks the balance first.
• transferFrom spends the allowance before moving tokens and reverts when the allowance is too small.

The standard ERC20 approve race applies, but it is ordinary ERC20 behaviour and I did not report it as a defect.

Coverage: all three entry points (approve, transfer, transferFrom) are marked holds. I added two invariant rows, also holds: no privileged role or supply change after deployment, and no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. I confirmed the second by reading the source, not by scanning the bytecode.

Static analysis: the only lead was aderyn's large-numeric-literal at line 10, which is just the supply constant and correct.

The project's existing 22 tests pass. I did not run the protected launch tests: they need the launch environment variables, and their imports (the floor/ harness and other src/ contracts) are not in this tree.

Created launch.json matching Pegzeus’s constructor, exact supply, and required pool and economics values.

Validation passed: manifest checks, forge build, and all 22 tests using the supplied fuzz seed. Only launch.json is changed for submission.

The review is complete and the result is clean: no math precision, boundary or numerical gap defect in Pegzeus reproduces. The findings file holds an empty list with eight coverage rows, and the tree is unchanged.

What the token is. src/Pegzeus.sol is 15 lines: it inherits the vendored OpenZeppelin ERC20 and mints a constant supply to the deployer in the constructor. There is no owner, no fee, no division, no external call, no payable path and no post-construction mint or burn.

What I verified.

• The supply constant is a compile-time exact 1e27 with 18 decimals, which answers the aderyn large-literal lead. Mint goes through checked addition from zero, so no overflow.
• Transfer and transferFrom arithmetic: the unchecked subtractions sit behind a strict less-than check, and the unchecked additions cannot wrap because balances always sum to 1e27. Full-balance self-transfer, max-uint transfer, supply-plus-one transfer, zero-value transfer and self-transferFrom all behave as the standard requires.
• Allowance sentinel: max is infinite and never decremented, max-minus-one is finite and decrements, an allowance equal to the value spends to zero, and an allowance larger than the balance still reverts on balance and leaves the allowance untouched.
• Supply conservation held under fuzzing of chained transfers and the project's own 40-step sequence test.
• Boundary enumeration found no external calls, no receive or fallback (sending ETH or an unknown selector reverts), and no bytes decoding. The only sentinel branches are the zero-address reverts.
• The launch flows cannot arrive short, since transfers are exact and 1e27 divides evenly by 10,000 for any basis-point split.
• The five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the v5.0.2 release.

Coverage. All three ABI entry points are marked holds, plus five invariant and boundary rows. Nothing was left unreached. The existing 22 project tests and 14 scratch edge tests passed; the scratch tests were deleted afterwards and nothing in the repository was modified.

The review is complete. The findings file is valid JSON, the scratch harness is removed, and the tree shows no tracked changes beyond the findings file.

Result: no defects found in the Economic Security, Invariant or Flow Gap areas for Pegzeus (PEGZ). The file .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and eight coverage rows.

What the token is. One constructor mint of 10^27 base units to msg.sender on top of OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20. The five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to upstream v5.0.2. There is no owner, minter, pauser, burn, rescue, hook, proxy or external call anywhere in the token.

What I checked.

• Conservation and fixed supply. A stateful invariant over transfer, approve and transferFrom across a fixed actor set never broke sum of balances equals total supply, and total supply never moved. 256 runs, 128,000 handler calls, 0 reverts.
• Launch flows. Factory to distributor, distributor to claimant, factory to pool manager, pool manager to trader and back, and the remainder forward all arrive exactly, so no periphery assumption in the PoolManager or MerkleDistributor can diverge from the passed amount.
• Boundaries and sentinels. Self-transfer, transferFrom with from equal to to, whole-balance moves, 1 wei over balance, zero-value transfers, transfer and approve to the zero address, and calls to common privileged selectors all behave as the ERC-20 and the brief intend.
• Allowance semantics. Finite allowances decrease by exactly the spent amount, max-uint allowances persist, and a short balance or zero recipient reverts the whole call with the allowance restored.
• Static-analysis lead. The aderyn large-literal note points at the supply constant, which evaluates to exactly 10^27 as the brief requires.

Coverage rows. The three ABI entry points hold. Four invariant and flow rows hold. One row is marked unreached: no launch.json exists in the tree yet, which the README states and which is expected before the manifest step. When it is written it must carry empty constructorArgs and the total supply string 1000000000000000000000000000.

Tools run. Foundry build, the project's 22 tests, and my scratch invariant and flow harness. Slither and aderyn output came from the verifier. Nothing in lib, configuration or source was modified.

The review is complete. The findings file is written and the working tree is otherwise unchanged.

Result: no defects found. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and nine coverage rows, one for each of the three entry points plus the constructor and five invariants.

What I checked, against the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides:

• Source. Pegzeus is a 15-line contract inheriting the OpenZeppelin ERC20 and minting one billion tokens with 18 decimals to msg.sender in the constructor. The compiled ABI has exactly three state-changing functions and no receive, fallback, owner, mint, burn, pause, blacklist, permit or initializer.
• Entry points. I traced approve, transfer and transferFrom through the vendored implementation and confirmed each with a scratch Foundry test. Zero-address checks, insufficient-balance and insufficient-allowance reverts, atomic rollback of the allowance on a failed transferFrom, infinite-allowance handling, self-transfers, full-balance transfers and a contract spender attempting to reenter all behave as the standard specifies.
• Deployment. Deployed by CREATE2 from a factory stand-in, the whole supply lands at the factory and the outer caller receives nothing. The supply equals 10 to the 27th, matching the stated total, and the creation code takes no arguments.
• Launch flows. With no fee, burn or exemption logic, the factory-to-distributor, factory-to-pool, distributor-to-claimant and trader buy-and-sell flows all move exact amounts with the supply unchanged.
• Periphery. All five vendored OpenZeppelin files are sha256-identical to upstream v5.0.2. Context uses plain msg.sender. An opcode scan of the deployed runtime finds no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT, CREATE or any CALL.
• Toolchain. The build, the existing 22-test suite with the README's fuzz seed, and the formatter check all pass. The single aderyn lead is a style note on the supply literal and is not a defect.

Not reported on purpose. The standard ERC-20 approve front-running pattern is inherent to the requested interface and already documented in the README, so I recorded it in the coverage row rather than as a finding.

The scratch test directory and the temporary upstream download were removed. Only .imd-findings.json was created, and it is git-ignored.

Added boundary and failure-path tests, seven fuzz properties, and three stateful invariants. Only test/ changed.

Offline forge build and forge test with the required seed pass: 42 tests, including 32,768 invariant calls with no handler reverts or discards.

No implementation defects found.

The review is complete. No defects were found, and the findings file is written with an empty list and a full coverage record.

What the code is. Pegzeus is a 15-line contract: an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20 whose parameterless constructor mints one billion tokens at 18 decimals to msg.sender. It has no owner, no mint, no hooks, no fees, no receive or fallback.

What I verified.

• The five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the upstream v5.0.2 release, fetched and diffed outside the repository.
• The project's own suite passes with the pinned fuzz seed: 42 tests, including three invariants over 32,768 handler calls.
• The protected floor test could not run verbatim because it imports v4-core and launch helpers that are not in this tree. I reproduced its token-level checks in a scratch test: CREATE2 deployment from a probe at the factory address, exact supply to the factory, decimals, the swarm share arriving and being claimed whole, all ten mint and admin selectors reverting for both a stranger and the factory, all twelve freeze and seize selectors reverting with the holder still able to transfer, a push-aware opcode scan for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT, and ETH and unknown-selector rejection. All six passed. The seed-and-swap check was not reproduced, but a plain ERC20 with no transfer hook gives it nothing to trip on.
• The manifest matches the ABI: empty constructor args for a parameterless constructor, the supply string equals the constant, decimals 18, a 7-character contract name, lowercase addresses, and creation and runtime sizes well under the factory limits. The paired currency on chain 1 has code and returns the symbol IMD with 18 decimals. The remainder address is an EOA.
• The aderyn large-numeric-literal lead is a compile-time constant that evaluates to exactly the manifest supply. It is a style note, not a defect, and was dropped.

Specialist findings. All four specialists and the test writer reported nothing, so there was nothing to reproduce or merge.

Coverage. All three entry points are marked holds with one-line reasons, plus five invariant rows covering supply, privileged calls, the vendored library, the manifest, and the static-analysis lead.

One note for the verifier rather than the author: the project vendors no forge-std, so any proof file that imports forge-std/Test.sol will not compile in this tree as it stands. That did not matter here since no finding carries a proof. The scratch directory was removed and the working tree is unchanged apart from the findings file.