Implemented Proof House (ARTIFACTS) with 18 decimals and exactly 1,000,000,000 tokens minted once to the deployer.

Dependencies are vendored for offline builds. README documents deployment, assumptions, and operational responsibilities.

Verified with Solidity 0.8.26:

• forge build — passed, including a fresh offline build.
• forge test — all 38 tests passed with the required fuzz seed.
• forge fmt --check — passed.

Created launch.json matching ProofHouseToken, its parameterless constructor, exact supply, and required pool/economics.

Validation passed: manifest checks, compiled constructor ABI, forge build, and all 38 tests using the supplied fuzz seed.

Only launch.json is changed for submission.

The review is complete and no defects were found. The findings file is written with an empty findings list and a full coverage record.

What I reviewed

The token at src/ProofHouseToken.sol is a 17-line contract that inherits the vendored OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20 unchanged and mints the whole supply once in the constructor. I checked it against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides, the Senior Auditor's Mindset, and the Finding Validation gates.

• Vendored dependency. The ERC20 body, Context, and the interface closure match upstream v5.0.2. There is no override of the transfer or allowance internals.
• Entry points. The compiled ABI exposes only approve, transfer and transferFrom as state-changing functions. There is no receive, fallback, owner, mint, burn, pause or blacklist path.
• Conservation. Supply is minted once and can never change. The existing invariant suite and my own multi-actor fuzz confirm the sum of balances always equals the supply.
• Launch flow economics. The ten percent swarm and eighty percent pool splits divide the supply with zero dust. Transfers to the distributor, the pool, the requester and a trader in both directions move exactly the stated amount. No fee, exemption or callback exists to short any leg.
• Sentinels and boundaries. Transfers and approvals involving the zero address revert. Overdrafts and over-allowance spends revert atomically, restoring state. The unlimited allowance is never decremented.
• Static-analysis leads. Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's large-numeric-literal note is the supply constant and is not a defect.

What I ran

The existing suite of 38 unit, fuzz and invariant tests passes. My scratch tests covering the launch split, eight-actor conservation and the absence of supply growth or ETH acceptance also passed. The scratch directory has been removed so the tree is unchanged apart from the findings file.

Coverage record

All three listed entry points are marked holds, with four extra rows for the supply, launch-flow, privilege and deployment invariants. The only standard caveat is the ERC-20 approve ordering race, which the README already documents and which is inherent to the requested design rather than a defect.

Extended only the existing files under test/ with allowance edge cases, failure rollback checks, fuzz tests, and randomized invariants.

Verified:

• forge build passes.
• All 45 tests pass with the supplied seed.
• Invariants pass across 32,768 handler calls.

No implementation defects found.

The review is complete. No defects were found, and the findings file on disk records that result with full coverage.

Outcome: .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and six coverage rows, all holds: the three listed entry points, the constructor mint, the vendored OpenZeppelin periphery, and the launch flows.

What I verified

• Execution Trace. Each of approve, transfer and transferFrom was traced through OpenZeppelin's _approve, _transfer, _update and _spendAllowance. There are no external calls, so no stale reads or partial-update windows exist. A failing transfer inside transferFrom reverts the whole call and restores the allowance. Zero-address sentinels revert on every path, and the max-uint allowance is the only special value, behaving as documented.
• Periphery. All five vendored OpenZeppelin files are SHA-256 identical to the upstream v5.0.2 tag, so the base contract the token trusts is genuine. Context returns plain msg.sender, with no meta-transaction forwarder.
• First Principles. The constant equals 10^27, matching one billion tokens at 18 decimals. One mint to msg.sender means the factory holds the whole supply under CREATE2 deployment. The compiled ABI exposes only the three non-view functions plus views, with no receive, fallback, owner, mint, burn, pause or forbidden opcodes.
• Checks run. The shipped suite passed with the README's seed, 38 tests including the invariant run. forge fmt --check passed. A scratch suite of seven extra boundary tests passed and was removed afterwards. Static analysis reported only a style-level large-literal note, which is not a defect.

Trust assumptions, not findings. The standard ERC-20 approve ordering race applies, as it does to every OpenZeppelin v5 token, and the README already advises revoking before re-approving. Tokens sent to the contract itself are unrecoverable by design, since there is no administrator.

Not reached. Nothing within the assigned area was left unchecked. The protected Uniswap v4 harness could not be executed here because it depends on platform contracts outside this tree, but the token has no transfer rule that could short those flows.

Review complete. The findings file is written with zero defects and a full coverage record. Nothing else is needed.

Result: no math, boundary or numerical-gap defects in Proof House (ARTIFACTS). The token is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20 whose only addition is a constant supply minted once in the constructor. There is no division, scaling, casting, fee or external call anywhere in the contract, so most failure modes in the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides have no code to attach to.

What I verified, all passing:

• Supply constant is exact. The literal evaluates to exactly 10^27 at compile time with zero remainder against 18 decimals, and it fits uint96 and uint128. The aderyn "large numeric literal" lead is style only.
• Every unchecked block is guarded. The balance subtract and allowance subtract each sit behind a checked comparison, and the balance add cannot wrap because balances always sum to the supply.
• Edge inputs behave correctly. Zero, one wei, full supply, supply plus one, max uint, allowance of max and max minus one, exact allowance, self-transfer and self-overdraw all either move the exact amount or revert atomically with the OZ custom error.
• Supply conservation holds under rounding-adjacent splits. A seven-way split with a non-zero dust remainder, the project's 8,192-call invariant run, and fuzzed allowance decrements all conserve totals exactly.
• Launch split math is exact. The ten, eighty, two and eight percent shares of 10^27 have no remainder, and the basis-point multiplication cannot overflow.
• Vendored library is genuine. I downloaded the v5.0.2 release, matched its SHA-256 to the hash declared in UPSTREAM.md, and all five vendored files are byte-identical to upstream.

The coverage record marks all three entry points as holding, plus five invariant rows. The scratch tests I wrote under test/scratch were removed after they passed, since there is no finding to attach them to, and the working tree is otherwise untouched.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. The permissions audit of Proof House (ARTIFACTS) found no defect in the assigned area.

Outcome. .imd-findings.json holds one informational note and six coverage rows, all holds. The token is a 17-line wrapper over the vendored OpenZeppelin ERC-20 with a single constructor mint, and nothing in the Access Control, Trust Gap or Asymmetry checklists reaches a failure.

What I verified

• No privileged surface. The compiled ABI exposes only approve, transfer and transferFrom as state-changing functions, plus seven views. There is no owner, role, modifier, initializer, proxy, delegatecall, selfdestruct, receive or fallback. ETH and unknown selectors revert.
• Supply is fixed. The mint branch of the internal update function is reachable only from the constructor. Calling transferFrom with the zero address as the source is stopped by the allowance check before any balance write. No burn caller exists and transfers to the zero address revert.
• Deployer has no residual power. Once the factory moves its balance it is an ordinary account and cannot pull from holders without allowance.
• Paired surfaces are symmetric. transfer and transferFrom share the same internal path. The only asymmetry is the standard approve-replace semantics, recorded as the info note with a concrete front-running reproduction. The README already tells holders to revoke to zero first, and the requested design is a plain ERC-20, so I recommend no contract change.
• Dependencies are genuine. All five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the v5.0.2 release archive, whose hash matches the project's UPSTREAM.md. The context helper uses plain msg.sender with no meta-transaction forwarder.
• Static analysis leads. Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's large-literal lead is a compile-time constant equal to the manifest supply of 10^27, so it is not a finding.

Checks run. The existing suite of 38 unit, fuzz and invariant tests passed with the documented seed. Six scratch probe tests I wrote to pin down the claims above also passed. The scratch directory has been removed and no repository file was changed.

Not covered. The protected launch harness depends on the platform's factory, pool manager and manifest environment and cannot run here. I did not attempt it.

I found no defects in Proof House (ARTIFACTS), so .imd-findings.json holds {"findings":[]} plus a coverage record for every entry point.

What the code is: src/ProofHouseToken.sol is a plain OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-20 that changes nothing in the library. Its constructor mints 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18 once to msg.sender, the launch factory. There is no owner, no mint or burn function, no fee or burn on transfer, no pause or blacklist, and no DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT.

The specialists' one finding (permissions, info) is dropped. It describes the approve front-running race, where a spender uses the old allowance before a new approve replaces it. I confirmed the vendored _approve overwrites the allowance, so the behaviour is real. But every ERC-20 works this way under the standard, and nothing in this code makes it worse, so it isn't a defect to send back to the author. The other areas reported no findings. There was nothing to merge.

Static-analysis lead: aderyn flagged a large numeric literal at line 10. That is the INITIAL_SUPPLY constant, and it equals the manifest's totalSupply of "1000000000000000000000000000". Slither reported nothing.

Coverage, all holds:

• approve: rejects a zero owner or spender, sets the allowance and emits the event.
• transfer: moves exactly the amount sent and rejects zero addresses and short balances. So the launch flows arrive whole: factory to distributor, distributor to claimants, and in and out of the pool manager.
• transferFrom: spends the allowance before the transfer, and an unlimited allowance is not reduced. A transferFrom from the zero address cannot mint.
• Fixed supply and deployability: the constructor takes no arguments, which matches constructorArgs: []. Decimals are 18, as the manifest says, and nothing needs special address bits or exceeds size limits.

forge test on the existing suite passed 45 of 45. I ran the project's tests only, not the protected launch-floor tests (Token.protected.t.sol), because they need the verifier's launch environment. I wrote no test of my own because there was nothing to prove. No other files were changed.