The review is complete. The findings file is written and every path, line and snippet anchor was checked against the tree.

Outcome. The three contracts as they arrived are sound at the level of funds and access control. I found no critical or high defect, so no proof files are attached. The full existing suite passes (156 tests, 22 suites) and my four scratch probes under test/scratch/Probe.t.sol each reproduced exactly what the corresponding finding states.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json (3 low, 5 info):

• Own-ask answer shopping (low). When a retry is made while the first request is still pending and both answers later arrive with different values, whichever bettor proposes first picks the outcome. Bounded because both answers come from the trusted oracle.
• Stale manifest and deploy parameters (low). The tree carries a launch.json and script/SepoliaParameters.sol for the current 10-argument constructor with 100/50/50 fees. After the brief's 15-argument change they will fail the manifest check and the deployment rehearsals.
• agentId undocumented as a label (low). Any caller can pass any agent id and the UI aggregates by it. The brief's required NatSpec is absent.
• Info notes for the adapter and final review: a creator can schedule a market so bets are locked indefinitely (previously accepted trust assumption, now relevant to WETH), the allowlist starts on and empty so a fresh deployment is inert until the owner acts, the oracle owner with zero config delay can author answers for not-yet-asked markets, the exact lines in _ask, _pull and _pay whose token must switch to the bounty token, and a coverage statement.

Coverage. Read in full: all of src/, the test base and mocks, the imported-audit and key lifecycle tests, the manifest, deploy script, and all prior review documents. Not reached: live Sepolia contracts (no fork or RPC), the oracle service's body validation, and the front-end sources.

No repository files were modified other than the findings file and the disposable scratch test.

Everything is green and in scope. Build passes, the complete suite passes with 178 tests in 25 suites, and no protected file (foundry config, lib, web, dist, .github) changed.

What I did

• src/VerdictMarkets.sol: two immutable collateral slots set by the 15-argument constructor the brief specifies, with collateralConfig(uint8) and per-slot fee and cap getters. Params gains collateralId, Market stores collateral and bountyToken, and MarketCreated appends the collateral address. Bets, payouts, refunds, the cap and the fee split use the market's collateral token; the bounty is pulled in the oracle's asset at creation and every oracle fee, settler reward and bounty return pays from that recorded token. Asks revert OracleAssetMismatch if the oracle's asset drifts from it. The two ledgers never mix, and a zero burn share makes no transfer.
• Audit findings: the own-ask outcome shopping finding reproduced, so propose now accepts only the market's most recent paid primary ask. The stale 10-argument launch.json and parameter library reproduced and are removed and rewritten. The missing agentId NatSpec reproduced and is added. The info findings are reproduced as tests or documented, unchanged, as the brief requires. Dispositions are in ADAPTATION.md.
• Tests: every existing test is kept; two regression tests that encoded the old "either ask" rule are rewritten and say why. New suites cover each brief item: per-slot fees and caps, WETH market ledgers, IMD market ledger separation, out-of-range slot, constructor rejections, zero burn, asset mismatch, plus a stateful lifecycle invariant over both slots with settler rewards.
• Review: a separate pass with six reviewer probes (reentrancy through the collateral token, fee-on-transfer collateral, cross-ledger reach, price rise, payment shapes, bounty token after rotation) and docs/COLLATERAL_INDEPENDENT_REVIEW.md. It found no value-moving defect. It is a second pass by this same automated worker, which the report states plainly.
• Docs: docs/AGENTS.md for agents and operators, with this build's ABIs exported to docs/agents/abi/ and docs/agents/addresses.json. README.md and docs/DEPLOYMENT.md carry the new constructor table and accounting.

What I left out and why

• Deployment: the brief says to deploy on Sepolia, but the launch reference forbids a worker from reading keys or broadcasting. I prepared the exact handoff and left deployment to the launch stage. The three contract addresses in docs/agents/addresses.json are null until that stage fills them; I invented none.
• The web ABIs and addresses still target the previous launch, untouched as instructed. A later site job must regenerate them.

The review is complete and the findings file is written and validated.

Outcome. The arithmetic in the two-collateral Verdict contracts holds up. Both per-market ledgers conserve exactly, with no dust, under fee-on-transfer collateral, random stakes and random claim orders in both slots. I found one low defect and one documentation inaccuracy, both in the settler-reward reserve logic.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json:

• Low, src/VerdictMarkets.sol:559. The reward reserve reads the oracle's current price without checking that the oracle's asset still equals the market's bounty token. After an asset rotation the reserve is in the new asset's units. With a nominal price above the remaining IMD, a proposer's reward is clipped to zero although 1.5 IMD is available. With a tiny price the full reward is paid and nothing is reserved. No funds leave the ledgers, so the impact is an unpaid or unreserved reward. A scratch test reproduces the zero payout.
• Info, docs/AGENTS.md:98. The guide says a reward is "clipped to zero" when the reserve is short. The code pays the surplus above the reserve, so a settler can receive a partial amount. Verified with concrete numbers: a price raised to 1.3 IMD yields a 0.2 IMD reward, not zero.

What was checked and found sound:

• Fee split rounds down with a bounded sum, so the remainder always reaches winners.
• The last winner takes the exact remainder, and the floor-share sum can never exceed the net pool.
• The bounty minimum check cannot overflow, and the received amount is re-checked for taxed tokens.
• The pool cap is checked against the credited amount and can never be exceeded.
• Every timing inequality forms a consistent chain, with finalize and void mutually exclusive.
• Deployment constants match the brief exactly for both slots, the oracle and the owner.

Not reported as findings. A paid ask in the last seconds of the answer window whose answer is issued after answerUntil is dead on arrival, and minAgreed above minPanelSize is accepted. Both are already covered by tests that name them as intended behaviour.

Coverage. All 23 entry points have rows, plus three invariant rows. Resolve and propose are marked as carrying finding 1. The rest hold. The existing suite of 178 tests passes, and my scratch tests live under test/scratch/, which is discarded.

The review is complete. The findings file is written, the scratch directory is removed, and the working tree has no stray files.

Result: no economic, invariant or flow-gap defect in the two-collateral contracts. The only item reported is an informational documentation gap.

What I checked, against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides:

• Both ledgers per market. Every collateral debit (payouts, refunds, fees) and every bounty debit (oracle spend, settler rewards, returned bounty) updates its counter before the transfer, in the token the market recorded at creation. The last winner receives the exact remainder, so no dust is left.
• Cross-ledger leakage. I wrote scratch probes that put a WETH-bounty market (created during an oracle asset rotation) beside an IMD-bounty market in slot 1, then settled and drained both. Contract IMD and WETH balances both ended at zero. The shipped fuzz lifecycle over both slots with settler rewards and price changes also passes.
• Price and asset changes. A price rise after the first ask clips the proposer's reward instead of overdrawing the bounty. An asset rotation makes existing markets revert with OracleAssetMismatch on asks while void, refund and bounty return still work in the recorded token.
• Retry economics. Two resolves, a proposal and a finalize never exceed the five-reward budget. The retry rule that refuses a late first answer is the documented fix for prior audit finding 94b4f1d1, so I recorded its liveness cost in coverage rather than as a defect.
• Deliverables. The exported ABI files match the compiled ABIs byte for byte. The full suite passes (178 tests).

The one reported item: docs/AGENTS.md tells agents to scan logs from "the deployment block in addresses.json", but addresses.json defines no such field. Severity info.

Trust assumptions noted in coverage, not as findings: the oracle owner can rotate asset, price and signer with zero delay, which also means a creator's pending WETH approval could be pulled as bounty if the asset were switched to WETH. Both powers come from the brief's constructor arguments.

Coverage: all 23 listed entry points are marked holds with reasons, plus three invariant rows and the ABI check. The only unreached row is the live Sepolia token and Intake behaviour, since no RPC was used.

Created launch.json with the approved deployment order, constructor arguments, and $owner references.

Validated against compiled ABIs. forge build passed; all 178 tests passed. Only the manifest changed outside permitted scratch files.

Review complete. The findings file is valid JSON and no tracked files were changed.

Outcome: no reproducible defect in the assigned area. The review file holds an empty findings list and a coverage row for all 23 listed entry points plus three invariant and deployment rows, each marked holds.

What I covered, in depth

• Access control. Every guardian path (pause, unpause, allowlist, two-step transfer, renounce) has a single writer with the same guard, and renounce is refused while paused or while the allowlist is on, so entry can never be left locked. The oracle's config and ownership paths are owner-only with two-step ownership. The settlement functions are permissionless by design, and pause touches only creation and betting.
• Trust gap. The oracle owner's zero-delay rotation of intake, signer, asset and price cannot reach in-flight value: pending requests keep their recorded intake and signer, markets keep their recorded bounty token, and rewards and bounty returns pay only in that token. Third-party purchases through the oracle are keyed to their own intake id and cannot establish an outcome. I found no unprivileged amplifier for any owner action.
• Asymmetry. The paired windows are complementary at every boundary: propose versus voidMarket at voidAfter, replacement propose and escalate versus finalize at disputeEnds, finalize versus voidMarket on winning stake. The IMD and WETH branches of finalize move the same amounts, the collateral and bounty ledgers never share a writer, and claim's remainder logic cannot underflow.

Verification done

• Full suite: 178 tests passed, 0 failed, including the two-slot lifecycle invariants.
• Exported ABIs in docs/agents/abi match forge inspect for all three contracts.
• Deployment parameters in the script and docs match the brief exactly.

Known limitations I did not report as defects because they are pre-existing, documented design choices outside this adaptation's scope: escalation is unavailable once answerUntil passes even if a dispute window is open, voidAfter has no upper bound, and the retry rule can strand a late first answer.

The review is complete. The findings file is at the repository root, no tracked file changed, and the scratch probes live only under the ignored test/scratch/ directory.

Outcome: no critical, high or medium defect in the control flow. One low contract finding and two documentation mismatches, all with concrete reproductions.

What I did

• Read the three assigned guides (Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles) plus the Senior Auditor's Mindset and validation gates, then traced every state-changing entry point of VerdictMarkets and VerdictOracle from caller to final transfer.
• Rebuilt the project and ran the existing suite. All 178 tests pass.
• Wrote seven scratch probes covering paths the suite does not reach: the retry-versus-late-delivery ordering race, the oracle asset rotated to the slot-1 token (same-token WETH creator payment), fee-on-transfer collateral with bettors on both sides, an unanswered escalation on a WETH market, a replacement outcome with no winning stake, a creator betting on both sides, and escalate after a retried ask. All ledgers closed with zero dust in every variant.
• Confirmed the agent-doc ABIs are byte-identical to the current build and that the deployment parameters match the brief's constructor arguments.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json

1. Low, resolve retry ordering. The retry guard only reads on-chain pending state. A losing bettor who sees an unfavourable first answer about to be delivered at least 24 hours after the ask can front-run the delivery with a retry. That spends a second oracle price from the creator's bounty, pays the attacker the resolve reward, and makes the honest answer unusable under the current latest-ask rule. Rated low because it needs an oracle delay of a day or more. The fix direction needs a design decision since it touches the oracle's unchanged code.
2. Info, docs/AGENTS.md escalate section. The guide says any market with an escalation body can escalate during its dispute window. A market whose primary ask was retried reverts with AskLimit. Reproduced deterministically.
3. Info, docs/AGENTS.md event scanning. The guide tells agents to start scanning from the deployment block in addresses.json, but that file has no such field.

Coverage: all 23 listed entry points have a row, plus four invariant rows. Twenty-one hold, two carry findings, none are unreached. The parts outside my budget were the live Sepolia Intake, TestIMD and WETH contracts, which I could not reach without a network, and the website, which was out of scope.

Done. The whole suite passes, 198 tests including 20 new ones, and only paths under test/ changed.

What I added

• test/CollateralAdversarial.t.sol (18 tests). Fuzzed constructor over both slots' fees and caps, checking each slot's 500 bps ceiling and zero-cap rejection independently and the check order. WETH stakes of one wei against a one-wei cap and at the last wei of the launch cap. A stake taxed to zero, bets after close, while paused, on an unknown outcome or id, and a creator with WETH but no IMD. A fuzzed WETH fee split up to 500 bps with stakes down to one wei that must close the WETH ledger with no dust while the bounty ledger closes in IMD. A WETH token that re-enters claim, finalize, voidMarket and bet from every finalize payout. Claim failure paths, refunds while paused, and a price rise that clips rewards without touching the WETH pool. Bounty-token snapshot cases: an IMD-collateral market opened while the oracle's asset is WETH keeps its two ledgers in swapped tokens, a WETH/WETH market pays the creator once, rotation after a proposal still finalizes in the recorded token, and rotation to an unheld token cannot open markets or reach existing custody. Guardian actions leave both slots untouched, no mutator selector exists, and native ETH and unknown selectors are refused.
• test/CollateralRotationInvariant.t.sol. A second invariant campaign, 256 runs of 64 calls, that opens markets during the sequence in either slot while the oracle asset rotates between IMD and WETH and the price moves. All four collateral/bounty pairings coexist. Every token movement is measured in the token it should use, the other token is asserted not to move, and after each call the contract's balance in each token equals that token's pools still owed plus bounties still held. After each sequence everything is settled and claimed and both balances reach zero. A deterministic walk proves the handler reaches all four pairings, the clipped-reward path and WETH-denominated rewards.
• test/TESTING.md gained a section describing the two suites.

Findings

No defect was found, so no .imd-findings.json was written. One observation already recorded in the earlier collateral review stands: the bounty token is a snapshot of the oracle's asset at creation, so if the owner rotates the asset to WETH, new markets take their bounty in WETH. The new tests pin that behaviour and show both ledgers still close correctly in that case.

Not covered

No fork runs against live Sepolia Intake, TestIMD or WETH9. The WETH stand-in is a plain ERC-20 with optional fee and reentrancy hook, which is a superset of what WETH9 does.

Review complete. The findings are in .imd-findings.json at the repository root, and the working tree is otherwise unchanged.

Outcome. No critical, high or medium defect reproduced. The two-collateral change is sound: both ledgers stay separate on every transfer path, the constructor rejects bad slots, bytecode and argument counts fit the factory's limits, and the shipped ABI files equal the build. The full suite of 198 tests passes.

Findings kept (all reproduced against the code, duplicates merged):

• Low, reserve in rotated asset units. The settler-reward reserve reads the oracle price without checking that the oracle's asset still equals the market's bounty token. After an asset rotation a large nominal price clips an affordable reward to zero and a tiny one reserves nothing. Reproduced with concrete balances.
• Low, retry front-runs a late delivery. When a first answer lands at least 24 hours after the ask, a losing bettor can send a retry in the delivery block, get paid the resolve reward from the creator's bounty, and make the known answer unusable. Reproduced end to end. The fix needs a design decision because the oracle contract is unchanged.
• Info, three documentation gaps in docs/AGENTS.md. The reward is reduced to the surplus rather than clipped to zero, a retried market cannot escalate, and the guide points at a deployment block that addresses.json does not contain. The last one was reported by two specialists and is merged into one finding.

Dropped. Nothing was dropped. The static-analysis leads on reentrancy, strict equality and uninitialised locals were traced and do not reproduce: every path is guarded and balance-checked.

Coverage. All 22 entry points are answered. Two are marked as findings (propose for the reserve units, resolve for the retry front-run), the rest hold, plus two invariant rows for the ledger conservation and the deployment limits.