The QuietPay token is built, tested, documented and committed on main as commit 3355bf7.

What was delivered

• src/QuietPayToken.sol: a fixed-supply ERC-20 on OpenZeppelin v5. Name QuietPay, symbol QUIETPAY, 18 decimals, 1,000,000,000 tokens minted once to the deployer in a no-argument constructor. It has no owner, mint, pause, blocklist, fee or upgrade path, so nothing privileged exists to trip the launch floor.
• test/QuietPayToken.t.sol and test/DeployQuietPayToken.t.sol: 28 tests covering metadata, exact supply, mint-to-deployer (fuzzed over deployers), transfer and transferFrom success and failure paths with exact OpenZeppelin errors, supply conservation under fuzzing, the launch flows arriving whole, the floor's admin-call and holder-freeze probes, no owner, ether refusal, and an opcode scan for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT.
• script/DeployQuietPayToken.s.sol: a reviewable script whose deploy function the tests call directly. It reads no environment.
• README.md: assumptions, manifest-ready deployment parameters, an empty "After launch" section, operational responsibilities, trust assumptions and security notes against the eth-security checklist.
• foundry.toml pins solc 0.8.26, cancun, optimizer 200 runs, bytecode_hash none, ffi off, no fs permissions.
• lib/: forge-std v1.9.7 and the five OpenZeppelin v5.2.0 files the ERC-20 needs, vendored as plain files with no git metadata or submodule entries.

Verification

The build, format check and test suite all pass with the verifier's fuzz seed, after a clean rebuild:

forge build         -> Compiler run successful!
forge fmt --check   -> clean
forge test          -> 28 passed, 0 failed (FOUNDRY_FUZZ_SEED=0x1272b5...06c8)

Notes

The protected floor tests pin a harness with Uniswap v4 and LaunchLiquidity that the verifier supplies, so they are not reproduced here. My own test file mirrors their supply, admin-call, holder-freeze and opcode-scan checks against the token directly. No launch.json was written. The pre-existing dotfiles at the repository root are character devices owned by another user and were left untracked.

I wrote launch.json for the QuietPay launch and verified it against the accepted tree.

What the manifest says

• Kind is custom_token. The token contract is QuietPayToken, named QuietPay with symbol QUIETPAY and 18 decimals.
• constructorArgs is empty, matching the accepted contract's no-argument constructor.
• totalSupply is the exact amount the constructor mints to msg.sender, one billion tokens in minor units.
• contracts is empty, because the accepted tree has no application contracts.
• pool and economics are copied exactly as the launch gives them: IMD as the paired currency, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one provenance price, and the requester's economics object verbatim.
• notes describe only QuietPayToken and the launch flows, well under the limit.

Verification

• The JSON parses and contains only the schema's six top-level keys.
• forge build compiles cleanly.
• forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed passes all 28 tests across both suites.
• git status shows launch.json as the only change. No configuration, library or workflow file was touched.

The review is complete and the findings file is written and validated.

Outcome: no exploitable defect in the control-flow area. The token is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.2.0 ERC20 whose constructor mints the fixed supply to the deployer. All three state-changing entry points hold.

What I checked, per guide:

• Execution Trace. Traced approve, transfer and transferFrom through the vendored library: zero-address sentinels revert, balances and allowances use checked math, the infinite-allowance path is the documented OpenZeppelin behavior, and there are no external calls, hooks or callbacks. Launch flows move exactly the amount requested.
• Periphery. Diffed every vendored OpenZeppelin file against the pinned upstream commit and four key forge-std files against theirs. All are byte-identical. Remappings point at them.
• First Principles. Verified the constructor's only assumption, that the creator is the factory, matches the floor's CREATE2 deployment. Walked the full deployed bytecode and found no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT or any CALL. Confirmed the supply literal equals the manifest string in the README. Build and all 28 project tests pass.

One informational finding recorded. The DECIMALS constant is documented as what decimals() returns, but decimals() is never overridden, so both read 18 only because that is OpenZeppelin's default. There is no failing input on the current build. The reproduction shows that editing the constant alone would rescale the supply while decimals() stays at 18. The one-line fix is to override decimals() to return the constant.

Coverage. Nine rows written: the three listed entry points, the constructor, the fixed-supply and banned-opcode invariants, dependency integrity, the decimals consistency row that carries the finding, and the deploy script. Nothing was left unreached. The static-analysis lead about the large numeric literal was checked and is not a defect.

I added two test files for QuietPay. The token has no defects to report, and forge build and forge test pass with the verifier's fuzz seed: 54 tests across 4 suites, 0 failures.

What I found: The token is plain OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-20 with nothing added except constants and a constructor that mints all 1,000,000,000 tokens (18 decimals) to the deployer. It has no owner, no fee, no extra mint and no external calls. Nothing in the tests or the random-call runs failed, so I did not write .imd-findings.json.

test/QuietPayToken.invariant.t.sol (new): random call sequences, 256 runs of 64 calls each, set in the test file.

• Handler: five actors who make valid transfers, approvals (including unlimited ones) and transferFrom calls. They also make calls that must fail:

  • sending more than the balance;
  • sending to the zero address;
  • spending more than the allowance;
  • spending more than the balance despite an unlimited allowance;
  • approving the zero address;
  • a stranger with no allowance trying to move someone's tokens.

  Each of those must revert with the exact OpenZeppelin error and arguments.

• Invariants checked after every call:

  • total supply never changes;
  • balances add up to the supply;
  • every balance and allowance matches an independent record kept by the test;
  • the zero address, the token contract and the handler never hold tokens, and the token never holds ETH;
  • no balance exceeds the supply;
  • every call turned out the way the record predicted.

  That last check matters because forge ignores reverts inside a handler by default. So the handler counts wrong outcomes instead of asserting, and an invariant requires the count to be zero. I confirmed in a throwaway test that the count catches a call that unexpectedly succeeds, a revert with the wrong error, and a revert on a valid call. That throwaway test is not submitted.

test/QuietPayToken.edge.t.sol (new): 25 unit and fuzz tests for cases the earlier suite didn't pin.

• Amounts: the whole supply, the supply plus 1 wei, the maximum uint256, a 1-wei round trip, zero from an empty account, and repeating a transfer after the balance is spent.
• Zero address: transferFrom to it, transferFrom from it, sending from it and approving from it.
• Allowances:
  • an owner still needs an allowance to call transferFrom on their own tokens;
  • a new approval replaces the old one rather than adding to it, and approving zero revokes;
  • an allowance spent exactly to zero then blocks further spending;
  • allowances are separate per spender and per owner;
  • spending an allowance emits no Approval event;
  • an unlimited allowance is not reduced, but one just below the maximum is.
• Fuzzed, 1,000 runs each: a failed transfer changes nothing; two transfers equal one combined transfer; transferFrom to yourself keeps the balance and spends the allowance; a stranger can never move tokens.

I changed nothing outside test/ and committed nothing; the two new files are untracked in the working tree. The other untracked dotfiles that git status shows were already on this machine and aren't mine.

The review is complete and the findings file is written.

Outcome: no exploitable math defect. QuietPayToken is OpenZeppelin 5.2.0 ERC20 plus three constants and a single constructor mint. Every failure mode in the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides was checked against the source and the inherited paths, and none applies. There is no division, ratio multiplication, narrowing cast, shift, scale conversion, external call, payable path or bytes decoding anywhere in the token.

What I verified with tests (project suite 27 passing, plus a scratch suite of 10 I wrote under test/scratch/):

• Supply constant evaluates to exactly 1e27 at compile time and fits uint128, so the aderyn large-literal lead is not a defect.
• Transfers of max uint or balance plus one revert with the OpenZeppelin insufficient-balance error. Zero and self transfers are exact.
• Allowance of max minus one is finite and decrements by exactly the value spent. Only exactly max is the infinite sentinel. Self transferFrom keeps balance and spends allowance.
• transferFrom from the zero address reverts for both zero and non-zero values.
• Sum of balances equals totalSupply after random transfer sequences, 2000 fuzz runs.
• The launch split of 10, 80 and 10 percent of 1e27 divides with no dust.

One info-level note recorded. The DECIMALS constant is documented as what decimals() returns, but decimals() is never overridden and returns OpenZeppelin's hardcoded 18. The values agree as shipped, so nothing fails on chain. The note describes the latent state in which editing the constant would desynchronise supply scaling from decimals() and offers a one-line override as the fix.

Coverage record. All three listed entry points are marked holds with reasons, plus rows for the constructor, the sum-of-balances invariant, the launch-split invariant, and the Boundary and Math Precision guide passes. No row is unreached.

No repository files were changed. The scratch test under test/scratch/ is disposable and the findings live in .imd-findings.json at the repository root.

The permissions review of QuietPay found no defects, so .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list plus coverage rows for all three entry points and four invariants.

The token is OpenZeppelin v5.2.0 ERC20 plus four constants and a constructor that mints the whole supply to msg.sender. It has no owner, role, initializer, fee or exemption logic, so there is very little surface for the three guides to bite on.

Access Control

• approve writes only the caller's own allowance row; a fuzzed stranger could never change another owner's row.
• transfer debits only the caller and reverts on the zero address, so there is no burn path.
• transferFrom checks the allowance before moving anything. Calling it with from == address(0) reverts for values 0, 1 and max, so there is no mint path.
• Supply is written once, in the constructor. A 128,000-call invariant run, including arbitrary calldata from five actors, left the supply and the balance sum unchanged.
• Bytecode: the runtime dispatch table holds exactly the 13 ABI selectors. There is no fallback or receive, and no CALL, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT, CREATE or ORIGIN opcode.
• Vendored library: the five OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to upstream at the pinned commit.

Trust Gap

• No privileged actor and no economic formula exist, so none of the four seams applies.
• The one trust point is whoever creates the contract. A CREATE2 factory received the full supply and tx.origin received nothing; the deploy script's run() gives it to the broadcaster, as the README says.

Asymmetry

• transfer and transferFrom share one _transfer, with no caller-dependent branch.
• The mint has no burn counterpart, which is the stated design.

Three behaviours I looked at and did not report, because they are standard or documented rather than defects:

• approve overwrites, so the classic allowance-change race exists; the README states this.
• A holder calling transferFrom on their own balance still needs an allowance.
• The DECIMALS constant is not wired to decimals(); both are 18 today, so there is no failing input.

Not reached: the protected launch test could not be run here because it imports Uniswap v4 and floor files that are not in the tree. I substituted a CREATE2 factory deployment for the mint-to-factory check; the pool seed and swap flows against a real PoolManager were not executed. The existing 28 tests pass with the verifier's seed, and my scratch tests were removed, so no repository file is changed.

The background invariant run with the default budget was stopped at its time limit and produced no output. It is not needed: the same scratch suite was re-run in the foreground with a reduced invariant budget and passed all five tests, and the findings file already reflects that run.

Final state, unchanged from my last message:

• .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and eight coverage rows, all holds, covering the three verifier-listed entry points plus the supply, conservation, launch-flow and privileged-surface invariants.
• QuietPayToken is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.2.0 ERC-20 with constants and a constructor. The vendored library is byte-identical to upstream. No fee, burn, exemption, mint, owner or upgrade path exists, so no economic, invariant or flow-gap defect was found.
• The project's 28 tests pass, and my scratch suite under test/scratch passes with 5 tests. Nothing in test/scratch is kept.

The review is complete and the findings file is written.

Outcome: no defects. The token is an unmodified OpenZeppelin 5.2.0 ERC20 with no overrides, no owner, and no privileged functions. One informational note is kept.

What I checked

• All three entry points (approve, transfer, transferFrom) traced through OpenZeppelin's code and exercised in a scratch test. They move exactly the stated amount, so the factory, distributor, pool seed and swap flows arrive whole.
• The constructor mints the full supply once to the deployer with no arguments and no external calls. Supply, decimals, name and symbol match launch.json.
• Runtime bytecode scanned for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT. None present. Size is well under the deploy limit.
• The project's own 54 tests and invariants pass. The protected floor tests cannot run locally because they import the verifier's v4-core tree, so I traced their checks by hand instead.

Specialist findings

• The audit_flow and audit_math reports describe the same root cause and are merged into one info finding. It reproduces as stated: the DECIMALS constant is not read by decimals(), which returns OpenZeppelin's default. Both are 18 today, so nothing fails on chain and no revision is needed. The suggested one-line override is recorded as an optional cleanup.
• The tester, economics and permissions areas reported nothing, and my own pass with the Pashov and entry-point checklists found nothing more.

Output: .imd-findings.json holds the one info finding and five coverage rows, all marked holds. The scratch directory was removed and no repository file was changed.