I built D.S.I as a Python standard-library tool with no dependencies, and the offline suite passes (13 tests). It is not committed: git has no author identity configured on this machine, and setting one would mean writing to .git/, which is off limits. Every file is staged and ready to commit.

What runs: ./scan --wallets wallets.json [--block N] [--candidates candidates.json] (or python3 -m dsi scan …). It writes report.json and report.md with one entry per wallet, covering:

• Delegation, from eth_getCode: an EIP-7702 delegation and its target, a contract, or a plain account.
• Owned contracts and accounts: candidates come from the OwnershipTransferred and RoleGranted events, the event Circle's SingleOwnerMSCA and its ERC-6900 single-owner plugin share (taken from circlefin/buidl-wallet-contracts), the Safe Transaction Service, and --candidates. Each is confirmed at the report block with owner(), getNativeOwner(), isOwner, hasRole or getOwnerOf. Candidates the wallet no longer controls go to a separate droppedCandidates list.
• Allowances read at the block; only those above zero are listed, with unlimited ones marked.
• Value at stake per token: what the owned accounts hold, plus the wallet's own balance of each token it approved.

All state reads go through Multicall3 aggregate3. History is kept on disk per event filter, with a watermark that is only ever extended. The Blockscout logs API is tried first; when it doesn't answer, chunked eth_getLogs takes over, halving the chunk on refusals or timeouts.

Replay fixture: I recorded it from real mainnet data. Four scans share one cache, and the tests confirm:

• At block 26300760, Binance 14 is delegated to 0x63e842…6fae; at 26301900 it is a plain account. Its code is plain at 26300752 and delegated at 26300753, matching the brief.
• At 26300700, 0xEe7a…4055 is owned. getNativeOwner() confirms it, and the tool found it from its ownership event. Its USDC balance (818,173,722.41 USDC) is listed.
• USDC, given as a candidate, is dropped as not owned.
• The scan after the watermark only asks for newer blocks, and repeating a scan makes no log requests at all.

Another test runs on a made-up chain and checks that zero allowances and ownership the wallet has given up are not listed. A further check confirms the code holds no signing or transaction-sending calls.

Things to know:

• Full history: Blockscout covered three of the four filters from genesis. It timed out on the Approval filter, so in the fixture approvals only cover blocks from 26290000 (the fixture config's rpcStartBlock). The report's historyCoverage section states this. On a busy wallet like Binance 14, a full eth_getLogs backfill from genesis through public endpoints would take a very long time.
• Not run end to end: I didn't do a full scan at the latest block with the default public endpoints. My live checks went through this machine's archive endpoint, and its URL is not stored in the fixture.
• Coverage gaps: owned-account balances are only read for a configured token list (USDC, USDT, WETH, DAI, WBTC) plus tokens the wallet approved. NFT approvals, Permit2 and Ownable2Step are not covered. The README lists these limits along with ownership set without an event.

The README covers how to run it, every config key and its environment variable, what each report field means, and how to re-record the fixture (tests/record_fixture.py).

All snippets match the tree. The findings file is complete and valid, and no repository file was changed. Final recap follows.

Review complete. The implementation is a careful, read-only Python stdlib scanner, and the replay test does establish the required incident facts (delegation at 26300760, plain account at 26301900, MSCA owned with USDC at 26300700). I found no critical or high defect. Seven findings are written to .imd-findings.json, ranked by severity, each with a concrete reproduction. The three substantive ones are reproduced by failing scratch tests in test/scratch/test_audit.py.

Medium: history watermark outruns the source. LogHistory._extend stores the requested block as the watermark even when Blockscout's indexer has not reached it. Since nothing below the watermark is ever rescanned, any ownership or approval log in the un-indexed tail is lost from every future report. I observed Blockscout one block behind the RPC head live, and the fixture shows rate limiting that makes larger gaps likely. The same applies on the RPC path when rotation lands on a lagging node.

Medium: a JSON-RPC error aborts the whole run. RpcClient.call rotates only on transport failures. An endpoint answering with an error object, such as "missing trie node" from a non-archive node at --block N, raises straight out of the scan. The next archive endpoint is never tried and no report is written for any wallet.

Low: Multicall result count never checked. An eth_call answer shorter than the batch, including a bare 0x, is consumed as "no data". Every candidate is then dropped with the definitive reason "no view call names the wallet as owner", producing a confidently clean report instead of an error.

Low and info items. Safe membership via isOwner counts the full Safe balance regardless of threshold, which is a scope question against the brief's wording. Address validation accepts non-hex strings and crashes late. The incident fixture contains no positive allowance, no RoleGranted, no Safe and no explorer pagination, so parts of the green suite are vacuous. Candidate discovery is attacker-influenceable by design, noted as an observation only.

What I checked and found correct: Keccak and selector vectors, EIP-55 checksum, aggregate3 encoding and decoding, delegation parsing, the Circle MSCA and plugin event topics against the live-recorded fixture, Blockscout's 1000-row ascending pagination against the live API, the Safe service still answering keyless through a redirect, the chunk halving and watermark resume logic, and the absence of signing or sending code.