The sources read clean. The shell never came back, so the final state is as follows.

What was delivered (all at the repository root, self-contained, no external dependencies):

• foundry.toml pins solc 0.8.26, cancun, optimizer 200 runs, bytecode_hash = "none", no ffi, no fs permissions.
• src/StrataToken.sol is contract StrataToken, a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 returning name StrataIMD, symbol STRATA, 18 decimals. The constructor mints 1,000,000,000 tokens once to msg.sender and takes no arguments. There is no owner, mint, burn, pause, blocklist, fallback or receive, and no delegatecall or selfdestruct. It follows OpenZeppelin ERC20 v5 semantics with ERC-6093 errors, written directly so nothing is linked or vendored.
• src/interfaces/IERC20.sol holds the ERC-20 interface and the ERC-6093 error set.
• test/StrataToken.t.sol covers metadata, the one-time mint and its single Transfer event, every transfer, approve and transferFrom success and failure path with exact error data, the unlimited allowance, the absence of any admin or mint surface using the same selector lists as the protected floor test, the bytecode opcode scan, and five fuzz tests that bound their own inputs.
• test/StrataTokenLaunch.t.sol deploys through a factory-like contract and checks the swarm share, pool share and remainder move and add up exactly, that the factory cannot overspend, pull from a holder or mint afterwards.
• test/utils/Vm.sol and test/utils/TestBase.sol declare the few forge cheatcodes and reverting assertions the tests use, since forge-std could not be fetched.
• README.md documents assumptions, deployment parameters, named constants, the empty "After launch" section, operational responsibilities and security notes.

What could not be verified. Every shell command in this session, including a bare echo, failed before running with this sandbox error, and the sandbox override is disabled here:

apply-seccomp: write /proc/self/setgroups (nested userns is capability-restricted; caller must provide CAP_SYS_ADMIN): Permission denied

So forge build, forge test and forge fmt --check were not run, no dependencies could be installed, and nothing was committed. The code was written to compile under 0.8.26 and reviewed by hand against the protected floor tests, but its pass status rests on the verifier's run. The next step is to run the three checks on a machine whose shell works and repair anything they report.

I found no defects in src/StrataToken.sol from the economics side. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and a coverage record, the JSON parses, and no tracked file changed. The project's existing 39 tests all pass.

What I checked, using the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides:

• Launch flows: every transfer moves exactly the amount asked for. There is no fee, tax, burn, rebase or hook. So the factory's payment to the distributor, the distributor's payouts to claimants, the pool seed, and swaps through the Uniswap v4 PoolManager all arrive in full.
• Fixed supply: the supply is 1e27 minor units, set once in the constructor and stored as an immutable. There is no mint, owner, roles, pause, blocklist, DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT. One section of unchecked code is safe, because no balance can exceed the fixed supply.
• Edge cases:
  • A transfer to yourself and a transfer of zero leave balances unchanged.
  • transferFrom from the zero address always reverts.
  • An allowance of type(uint256).max is treated as unlimited and is not reduced.
  • transferFrom charges the allowance before checking the balance, and a revert undoes both.
• Static analysis: Aderyn flagged a "large numeric literal" at line 27, which is just the supply constant 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18. That is style, not a defect.

Coverage: approve, transfer and transferFrom are each marked holds. I added three more rows for the supply, privilege and fee-on-transfer checks. Nothing was left unreached.

I did not run the network's protected launch tests, because their supporting libraries (forge-std, v4-core) aren't in this repository. Following those tests, I traced the flows by hand instead. A plain ERC-20 with no transfer side effects should pass them.

launch.json is written and verified. It is the only file added, and the working tree is otherwise clean.

What the manifest says

• kind is custom_token. The token entry names the Solidity contract StrataToken from src/StrataToken.sol, with name StrataIMD, symbol STRATA and 18 decimals.
• constructorArgs is empty, matching the accepted constructor, which takes no parameters and mints the whole supply once to the deployer.
• totalSupply is the exact minor-unit amount the constructor mints, which equals the contract's INITIAL_SUPPLY constant.
• contracts is empty. The accepted tree has no application contracts, so none are described.
• pool and economics are copied verbatim from the launch reference: IMD as the paired currency, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one provenance price, and the requester's economics object.
• notes describes only what is in the tree: a fixed-supply ERC-20 with no fees, no admin paths and no linked code. It is well under the 4,000 character limit.

Checks run

• forge build compiles cleanly with solc 0.8.26.
• forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed passes all 39 tests across both suites.
• A scratch script confirmed the manifest uses only schema keys, that the supply and economics match, and that addresses are lowercase.

No protected invariant in the token floor test depends on manifest content beyond supply and decimals, and both match the contract.

The review is complete and the findings file is written and validated. The working tree is clean apart from the ignored scratch test and the findings file.

Outcome: no access-control, trust-gap or asymmetry defect found. The file .imd-findings.json holds one info-level note and ten coverage rows.

What I checked, in my area:

• Permission map: the token has no owner, roles, modifiers, settable state, mint, burn, pause, blocklist, upgrade, receive or fallback. The ABI exposes only the nine ERC-20 methods and the supply constant getter.
• Trust gap: the deployer, which is the factory, holds the initial balance and nothing else. After payout it cannot pull, freeze, dilute or redirect value. Correct distribution is a launch-level trust assumption, recorded as such.
• Asymmetry: both transfer variants share one internal transfer path with identical checks, and both allowance writers share one internal approve path. The unchecked balance arithmetic is bounded by the immutable fixed supply, including self-transfers of the whole balance.
• Launch flows: no address is treated specially and no fee or burn exists, so distributor, pool seed and trader flows move exactly what they state.

The one recorded item is informational. The allowance is set by overwrite, so a spender watching the mempool can spend an old allowance and a reduced new one in sequence. This matches the OpenZeppelin v5 semantics the author deliberately chose and is standard ERC-20 behaviour, so it is a design note rather than a defect. The reproduction in the file was verified with a scratch test.

Verification run:

• The project's 39 tests pass, and the delivered files pass forge fmt --check.
• Five scratch probes under test/scratch/ confirmed the allowance race, the zero-sender revert path, whole-balance self-transfer, approve isolation per caller, and that admin-style selectors revert.
• Static analysis leads were a single low-severity large-literal note, which is the intended supply constant and not a defect.

Coverage: all three listed entry points have rows. One is marked finding for the info note, and the other two holds. Seven further rows record the invariants traced.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json is written and validated.

Result: no math defects in the StrataIMD token. The Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap passes found nothing that loses, misroutes or freezes value.

What I checked in src/StrataToken.sol:

• Supply constant. The literal flagged by aderyn folds to exactly 1e27, the manifest's minor units, minted once to the deployer. Lead dismissed.
• Transfer arithmetic. The subtraction is guarded by the balance check, and the unchecked addition is bounded by the fixed supply, so neither can wrap. Self-transfer of the whole balance, zero value, balance plus one and max uint all behave correctly.
• Allowance arithmetic. Max is treated as unlimited, max minus one decrements exactly, overspend and zero-address cases revert with the right ERC-6093 errors.
• Boundaries. There are no divisions, casts, scaling, external calls, payable paths, receive or fallback, or bytes decoding, so the Boundary and Numerical Gap seams have no surface. The 10/80/10 launch split of 1e27 is exact and no flow arrives short.

Two items are recorded as info, both verified with a scratch Foundry test and both identical to EIP-20 and OpenZeppelin v5 semantics, so neither needs a fix:

• The allowance-lowering race through approve, where a spender can move the old and the new allowance.
• A zero-value transferFrom succeeding for any from without an allowance and emitting a Transfer event, which is only an address-poisoning surface.

Coverage has rows for all three listed entry points plus five invariant rows. The existing 39 tests pass, forge fmt --check is clean, and the scratch directory was removed so no tracked file changed.

The review is complete. The findings file is written and the tree is otherwise unchanged.

Result: no defects found. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and ten coverage rows, one for each of the three state-changing entry points plus the invariants I checked.

What I covered, against the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides and the Senior Auditor's Mindset:

• Execution flow of approve, transfer and transferFrom: guard order, the max-allowance sentinel, from == address(0), self-transfer through an allowance, zero values, and allowance at max minus one. Every path matches OpenZeppelin v5 semantics and ERC-6093 errors.
• Conservation: a fuzzed random walk of mixed operations across four actors kept the balance sum equal to the fixed supply in every run. There is no mint, burn or supply-changing path in the compiled ABI.
• Launch flows: balance delta equals the requested amount in both directions for every amount up to the full supply, so the distributor, pool manager and remainder transfers arrive whole.
• Runtime bytecode: disassembled and found no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT, CALL, STATICCALL, CREATE, CREATE2 or transient-storage opcodes.
• Periphery: the interface file and the two test utilities are consistent with forge's cheatcode ABI and the ERC-20 standard. All 39 project tests pass under forge 1.8.3, and formatting is clean.

Documented, not reported: the standard ERC-20 approve front-running property is recorded as a trust assumption in the coverage record, since the brief asks for a plain standard token.

Outside my area and unverified: the README's deployment table names Ethereum mainnet and a specific IMD pair address. No network file is present in this tree to confirm either, and the manifest step owns those values.

The findings file is excluded from git by the repository's own exclude list, so it is collected from disk as intended. Everything is done.

Outcome. The suite now has 68 tests across four files and all pass with the verifier's fuzz seed. I found no defect in the token, so the findings file holds an empty list.

What I added, all under test/:

• test/StrataTokenInvariant.t.sol is the invariant suite the criteria required. A handler drives the token from six actors with bounded inputs through transfer, approve and transferFrom, plus four failure-path drivers: over-balance transfers, over-allowance pulls, sends to the zero address, and privileged selectors tried by every actor including the deployer. Each driver asserts the exact ERC-6093 revert. Seven invariants run after every call: fixed supply, balances summing to the supply, balances and allowances matching a ghost ledger, flow accounting, the zero address and harness holding nothing, constant metadata, and every holder still being able to transfer. The run is 256 sequences of depth 64 with fail-on-revert on, so an escaped revert fails the test.
• test/StrataTokenEdges.t.sol pins the branches the existing suite left untested: the zero address as caller, approver and transferFrom source, the allowance one below the unlimited sentinel, repeated unlimited spends, the maximum as a value, self-approval, transferFrom back to the owner, tokens sent to the token contract, unknown selectors and empty calldata, ether sent with a call, and four fuzz properties that use bound rather than assume.

One thing worth knowing. A zero-value transferFrom from the zero address reverts with the approver error, not the sender error, because the allowance write-back runs first. That matches OpenZeppelin v5 and the call still reverts, so I pinned the real error rather than reporting it.

The working tree contains only the two new test files plus the findings file, with no scratch files or changes outside the allowed paths.

Review complete. The findings file is written and validated, the snippets match the tree, and the scratch directory is removed so no repository file is changed.

Outcome: no defects. StrataIMD is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 and behaves as the brief specifies. The build succeeds and the project's 68 tests pass, including the invariant suite.

Specialist findings settled. Three were reported across the four areas, all info-level, and all three reproduce.

• The approve overwrite race was reported by both the permissions and math specialists with the same root cause, so I merged it into one finding. It is standard EIP-20 and OpenZeppelin v5 behaviour, documented in the README, and I reproduced it: after approve 100, a front-run spend, approve 50 and a second spend, the recipient holds 150.
• The zero-value transferFrom without an allowance is also standard behaviour. I reproduced the single Transfer event with no balance or allowance change.
• The static-analysis line about a large numeric literal is a style note on the supply constant and is not a defect.

My own pass. I traced all three entry points, the constructor and the launch flows. The runtime bytecode contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, and runtime and creation sizes are far below the protocol limits. Ether and unknown selectors are refused. Whole amounts move through the swarm share and claim path. The manifest matches the constructor: no arguments, supply and decimals agree, and the contract name is within the 32-character limit.

Not run here. The protected floor tests need the verifier's harness with forge-std and v4-core, which is not vendored in this tree, so I checked their properties directly rather than executing them.

Coverage. All three listed entry points are answered, two pointing at the info findings and one holding, plus three invariant rows.