Approved workflow

Implemented Pachu (PACHU): one billion fixed-supply tokens, 18 decimals, and no administrative powers. Added vendored dependencies, ABI exports, deployment documentation, and success/failure tests.

Verified:

• forge build passes.
• All 31 tests pass, including fuzz and invariant tests.
• Offline tests pass with a cleared environment and four threads.
• forge fmt --check passes.

Manifest generation, independent review, deployment, and frontend publication remain with their assigned stages.

Created launch.json for Pachu (PACHU), with no application contracts and native ETH pairing.

Validated the supplied schema, refinements, and accepted constructor ABI. forge build succeeded; all 31 tests passed. Only launch.json changed outside permitted scratch files.

Review complete. No defects found in the Access Control, Trust Gap, or Asymmetry areas. The findings file holds an empty list with full coverage, and the working tree is unchanged apart from that file.

What I checked

• Permission map. The token is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20. The compiled ABI exposes exactly three state-changing functions, all intentionally public, and no owner, role, minter, pauser, upgrade, or initializer entry. The constructor takes no arguments and hands out no role.
• Trust gap. There is no privileged actor at all, so no access-times-economics seam exists. The factory receives the whole supply as an ordinary holder with no special authority over the contract.
• Asymmetry. The transfer and transferFrom pair share the same internal update path. The allowance decrement is rolled back on any later revert, unlimited allowance is not decremented, and no branch skips validation the other enforces.
• Vendored dependency integrity. All five vendored OpenZeppelin files match the upstream v5.0.2 raw files by SHA-256. No submodules are present.
• Artifacts. The ABI export under docs/abi matches the compiled artifact exactly. The verifier's protected token floor passes against the real creation code with supply and decimals supplied. The project suite passes and the formatter check is clean.
• Static analysis leads. Slither reported nothing. The aderyn large-literal lead on line 12 is the intended supply constant and not a defect.

Not reached. No launch.json exists yet because the manifest assignment has not run, so I recorded that row as unreached. The README's handoff parameters match the brief and the launch guidance, including the empty application-contract list and the 88% pool share.

Review complete. The math, boundary and numerical-gap audit of the Pachu launch token found no defects. The findings record is written at .imd-findings.json with an empty findings list and nine coverage rows, and no other file in the tree was changed.

What was checked in the assigned area

• Math Precision. The contract has no division, multiplication at runtime, downcast, scale conversion or fee path. The only arithmetic is the supply literal, which is a compile-time constant equal to 10^27, confirmed with cast and a scratch assert. The aderyn large-numeric-literal lead is style only.
• Boundary. There are no external calls, payable functions, receive or fallback, bytes decoding or token-address parameters. The only sentinel branch is the zero address, and it reverts on every side (sender, receiver, approver, spender). ETH and unknown selectors revert without state change.
• Numerical Gap. The invariant that balances sum to total supply holds exactly because nothing rounds. Scratch tests exercised value equal to 2^256-1, supply+1, exact supply, zero, self-transfer aliasing at full balance, exact-allowance drain, allowance above balance, and allowance of 2^256-2 versus 2^256-1. All behaved as the OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 implementation documents.

Additional evidence gathered

• The committed ABI at docs/abi/LaunchToken.json is identical to the compiler's output.
• All five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the upstream v5.0.2 tarball, whose checksum matches the one recorded in the dependencies document.
• The verifier's protected token floor passes against the real creation code with the policy supply and 18 decimals supplied.
• The repository's own 31 tests, including the stateful invariant run, pass.

Not reached. No launch.json exists in the tree yet, so the manifest row is marked unreached. The README's stated manifest parameters are consistent with the source, so the later manifest reviewer has a clear reference to compare against.

The findings file is valid JSON with one finding and nine coverage rows. Node parsed it. The file is excluded from git tracking by the workspace's ignore rules, which is why the working tree reads clean, and the scratch directory and temp download are gone. The review is complete.

Outcome: no defects in the Solidity, one info-level documentation inaccuracy.

The token in src/LaunchToken.sol is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20 with a no-argument, nonpayable constructor that mints exactly 10^27 minor units to its deployer. I traced every state-changing entry point from my area, the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides, and found nothing that breaks:

• approve writes one allowance slot, rejects a zero spender, and cannot reach the zero-owner error since the owner is always the caller.
• transfer rejects a zero recipient and an overdraft before any write, and the unchecked arithmetic is bounded by the fixed supply.
• transferFrom spends a finite allowance first, never decrements an unlimited one, and any later revert rolls the allowance back. A zero-address source always reverts inside the allowance step, so no state changes.
• Periphery: the five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the upstream v5.0.2 tarball at the checksum the repo documents. There is no forwarder, override, receive or fallback.
• Evidence run: the existing 31-test suite passes, the committed ABI matches a fresh compiler export, and the verifier's protected token floor passes all seven tests when run against the real creation code with the policy supply and 18 decimals. The aderyn large-literal lead evaluates to exactly the policy supply.

The one finding is in docs/DEPENDENCIES.md at line 12. It says all upstream files are unmodified, but seven forge-std files differ from the v1.9.7 tarball at the stated checksum. The differences are line re-wrapping only. The files are identical with whitespace stripped, and forge-std is test-only, so there is no runtime impact. The author can either restore the upstream bytes or correct the note.

Not reached: no launch.json exists yet because the manifest assignment has not run. The README's handoff parameters match the canonical manifest guidance, and the 88% pool share the brief asks for is a policy input rather than a manifest field, so its absence is not a defect.

Completed changes only under test/.

• Added adversarial tests and strengthened failure-path invariants.
• Corrected administrative-call ABI probes.
• Offline forge build and forge test passed: 44 tests, including 24,576 randomized invariant calls.
• No reproducible contract defects found.

The economics review found no defects in LaunchToken: all three entry points hold, and the only thing I'm reporting is one informational documentation discrepancy outside my area. Findings and coverage are in .imd-findings.json; no tracked file was changed.

What holds

• approve, transfer, transferFrom: each either does exactly what was asked or reverts whole. There is no fee, callback, external call, or reachable mint/burn path.
• Supply: totalSupply stays at 10^27 and equals the sum of balances. I checked this against an independent model over 307,200 calls using zero, max and sentinel inputs (zero address, the token itself, a precompile).
• Bytecode: the runtime has only the nine ERC-20 selectors and no call, delegatecall, create or self-destruct opcodes.
• Protected floor: both protected test files pass 9/9 with none skipped, using supply 10^27, decimals 18 and a CREATE2 factory deployer.
• Handoff values in the README: ETH pair, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60, initial price 2^96 and the 88/2/2/8 split match the brief and the manifest schema. The split sums to the full supply with no remainder.
• Project tests: all 31 pass, including under three extra fuzz seeds. The ABI export is byte-identical to compiler output.

The one finding (info)

docs/DEPENDENCIES.md:12 says upstream files are unmodified, but 7 of the 28 vendored forge-std files differ from the v1.9.7 archive it cites. The differences are whitespace-only reformatting, and building against the pristine files gives identical bytecode for every project contract. The OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to v5.0.2. The fix is to restore the seven files or correct the sentence.

Not reached

On-chain enforcement of the 88% pool share, opening price, fee split and equal-share dust is done by the factory, fee contract, distributor and launch policy. None of those is in this tree, and launch.json has not been written yet. The piece of evidence still needed is that the pinned policy sets the pool share to 88% rather than the 80% default.

I did not run the token against a real Uniswap v4 pool; compatibility there rests on the token's exact-amount, one-word-true, no-callback behaviour, which I did test.

The approve overwrite race, allowance-free zero-value transferFrom, and unrecoverable tokens sent to the token's own address are standard OpenZeppelin behaviour and documented in the README. I recorded them as assumptions, not findings.

Wrote .imd-findings.json.

• One reproduced informational documentation finding; duplicates merged.
• All 3 entry points marked holds.
• All 44 Foundry tests passed.
• ABI matches compiled code; no contract or manifest defects substantiated.

Protected tests were inspected but not executed. No source or configuration files changed.

Built the frontend, source, lockfile and static export in dist/, including the runtime deployment manifest and verified asset/ABI hashes.

Build, typecheck, 6 protocol tests and 14 browser scenarios passed. Export: 884 KB. Live funded swaps remain untested.

Commit 71af16b is delivered in frontend.bundle, requiring the supplied base commit; workspace .git is read-only. Validation records the checks. DESIGN.md is under docs/ to respect the path restriction.