Done. launch.json is written and is the only file the working tree adds; the build exits cleanly and all 66 tests pass.

What the manifest describes

• Token is LaunchToken, name "Snitch", symbol "SNITCH", 18 decimals, taken from src/LaunchToken.sol.
• SnitchArt comes first with no constructor arguments, matching its ABI export.
• SnitchDesk comes second with six address arguments in declaration order: $owner, $token, the IMD token, the IMD Intake version 2, the oracle signer, and $contract:SnitchArt.
• SnitchReports is not listed. The desk deploys it inside its own constructor, so it is not a factory deployment.
• Pool uses the launch's values exactly: IMD as paired currency, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the stated one-to-one initial price.

Two constructor values worth the reviewer's attention

• Intake address. The approved workflow text names the version 1 Intake, but the accepted implementation, its README and test/Deployment.t.sol all fix version 2 at 0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82. The manifest follows the accepted implementation. I checked mainnet: both intakes have code, both quote 0.5 IMD for the desk's action, and only version 2 carries the failure-hook selector the desk can use. The owner can move it afterward with setIntake. This is recorded in the notes.
• Oracle signer. The README states 0x5598aa9146215bc13eb26f2c692ad1461fd32982 is the attester published by api.imd.fun. It is an externally owned account on mainnet and is distinct from the anvil test key the conformance test uses. I could not find a public API route to confirm it independently, so the reviewer should verify it against the plane's published attester. The owner can rotate it with setOracleSigner.

Verification

• A scratch script checked the manifest's keys, name rules, reference direction, address formatting, constructor arity against the ABI exports, pool values, and the notes length (2668 characters).
• forge build exit code 0, forge test 66 passed, 0 failed.
• git status shows only launch.json as new. No configuration, lib, or source file changed.

The findings file is in place at the repository root, and the harness ignores it from git by its own global rule, as it does the .imd/ inputs. No source, test or configuration file was changed. The scratch tests were removed.

Result: the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap areas hold. I found no arithmetic, rounding, downcast, overflow or boundary defect in the contracts. One low and one informational item are recorded.

What I checked, with concrete probes

• Downcasts. The only unguarded-looking cast is the fee into a 16-byte field. The fee setter caps it at that width, and the default of 200,000 SNITCH fits. Timestamp and panel casts come from bounded or oracle-signed fields.
• Block window. Opening at blocks 0 to the current block succeeds. Equal blocks and one past the current block revert, matching the brief.
• 72-hour drop. Refused one second before the deadline, allowed exactly at it. An answered case cannot also be dropped, so the held fee never moves twice.
• Callback gas stipend. Worst case with a maximal figure and a cold burn slot used 150,980 gas. With an ERC-1271 registry as signer it used 154,218. Both sit under the 200,000 stipend.
• Symbol snapshot. A 75-byte unpadded return is accepted, a non-canonical offset falls back to the short address, and reads never leave the 128-byte buffer.
• Renderer math. Thousands separators at 0, 999, 1000, 2^64 and 2^256 render correctly. The date loop is bounded because the desk refuses an issue time more than five minutes ahead of the block. All escape buffers are sized from counted extras.
• Exports. All four ABI files equal the compiler output. The vendored oracle library equals the canonical reference with comments ignored.

Findings written

1. Low. The opener has no on-chain bound on the fee pulled. A fee change that lands before a pending open makes the user pay the new fee from a standing approval, and that amount burns on the answer. Reproduced: fee raised to 5,000,000 SNITCH, then the pending open pulled all of it. Suggested fix is a maximum-fee argument on open, which keeps the owner's power intact.
2. Info. A validly signed chain-evidence answer with fewer agreeing members than the quorum is refused, so the IMD is spent and the opener waits 72 hours. This follows the reference's advice and the README documents it, so it is flagged as a tradeoff to confirm, not a defect.

Coverage. All 22 listed entry points have rows, plus four invariant rows and one row recording that no launch manifest exists yet to review. Static-analysis leads were checked: the reentrancy lead is benign under the shared guard, and the timestamp leads are the intended deadline checks.

The review is complete. The findings file is written at .imd-findings.json with four findings and a full coverage record, and the tracked tree is unchanged.

What I reviewed. The permission model of SnitchDesk, SnitchReports and LaunchToken against the Access Control, Asymmetry and Trust Gap guides: every role and modifier, the constructor's role hand-out, the request/fulfil and open/close pairs, each owner setter's effect on in-flight cases, and the brief's stated owner scope. All 22 listed entry points have a coverage row, plus two invariant rows. None are unreached.

Findings, by severity:

1. Medium, with proof. Moving the intake strands every pending case. The callback compares the caller to the current intake, not the one the case was asked through, so after the owner's routine setIntake the old intake's single delivery attempt reverts. The opener loses the 0.5 IMD oracle fee, gets no answer, and has their SNITCH locked for 72 hours. The proof test fails on this code and passes with a per-request intake binding, which also keeps all 38 existing desk tests green.
2. Low. The callback never compares the attestation's block window or questionHash to the case. The brief requires the questionHash check. An attestation for blocks 1 to 2 is accepted for a case about blocks 21,004,118 to 21,077,903.
3. Low. openCase has no fee ceiling. A fee increase mined just before an opener's transaction charges the new fee to anyone with an open allowance, while exact-allowance users revert instead.
4. Info. The owner's powers exceed the brief's "setCaseFee, nothing else". Through setIntake plus setOracleSigner the owner can stamp any verdict. The README documents this and the oracle-consumer reference requires the setters, so it is recorded as a trust assumption and requirements conflict rather than a bypass.

What held. Two-step ownership with renounce disabled, owner taken from the constructor rather than the factory, zero-address refusals, desk-only minting bound at construction, fee conservation between burn and refund, the panel snapshot per case, and the intake-only guards against third-party callbacks and failure notices. The static-analysis leads were all reproduced as benign or absorbed into finding 1.

Not reached in depth. SnitchArt rendering internals and the manifest, which does not exist yet. The README's constructor argument table matches the constructor and uses $owner, $token and $contract:SnitchArt correctly.

Review complete. The findings file is written at .imd-findings.json with 3 findings and a full coverage record. No tracked file was changed.

What I found

1. Medium: setIntake strands every in-flight case. Both callbacks compare the sender with the desk's current intake, not the intake the case was asked at. After the owner migrates intakes, the old intake's one-shot delivery reverts and is never retried. The opener's IMD is gone and their SNITCH is locked for 72 hours. Rotating the signer to a bare key has the same effect, though a registry avoids that one. A self-contained proof test fails on the current code and passes with a per-request intake record. See src/SnitchDesk.sol:241.
2. Low: the signed block window is never compared with the case's window. An attestation for blocks 1 to 2 is accepted as the answer to a case about blocks 21,004,118 to 21,077,903. Only the trusted intake can reach the path, so this is defense in depth. The check fits comfortably within the gas headroom. See src/SnitchDesk.sol:246.
3. Low: no price ceiling in openCase. The live oracle price is pulled at execution with no bound the opener agreed to. A user with a standing IMD approval pays whatever the action costs at that moment. The reference example treats the owner's price as a ceiling. See src/SnitchDesk.sol:191.

What held under the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides

• Held-fee conservation: only the exact stored fee leaves, by burn or refund, and no owner path moves SNITCH.
• Callback gas: worst case measured at 158,538 gas with an ERC-1271 registry signer and a first-ever burn, under the 200,000 stipend.
• One answer per case and per oracle request id, status transitions, panel snapshot per case, fee snapshot per case, and ABI docs matching the build.
• The agreed >= quorum refusal and the owner-settable intake mirror the oracle reference, so I did not report them.

Coverage

All 22 entry points have a row, none unreached, plus four invariant rows. The full project suite passes with 66 tests. Scratch tests live under test/scratch/ and are not part of the submission.

The review is complete. The findings file is at the repository root, no tracked file was changed, and the only new files are the findings JSON and my scratch probe test, both outside the committed tree per the harness's ignore rules.

Outcome. The control flow of SnitchDesk, SnitchReports, SnitchArt and the OracleAttestation base is sound in the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles dimensions. I found no critical, high or medium defect, so no proof files were attached. Three findings are recorded, two low and one informational, each with a concrete reproduction. The 66 existing tests pass, the ABI exports match the compiled ABIs exactly, and the OracleAttestation copy is byte-identical to the canonical reference apart from two slither comment lines.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json

• Low, intake swap strands in-flight cases. The callback checks the sender against the current intake rather than the intake the request was made to. A routine, documented setIntake while any case is pending makes the writer's one and only callback revert with NotTheIntake. The opener's 0.5 IMD is spent with no answer and the SNITCH fee is locked 72 hours. Signer rotation with a bare key has the same shape. Fix: record the intake per case and compare against it. Confirmed by a scratch test.
• Low, signed block window not bound to the case. Only chainId is compared; the signed fromBlock and toBlock are ignored, though the case's window is absolute and stored. An attestation for blocks 1 to 2 was accepted and stamped on a case about blocks 21,004,118 to 21,077,903. It requires the plane to mis-pair, so low. Fix is two comparisons inside the existing gas headroom. Confirmed by a scratch test.
• Info, owner powers exceed the brief. The workflow grants the owner only setCaseFee; the source adds intake, action, signer, panel and failure-hook setters because the oracle reference requires them. Together setIntake and setOracleSigner let the owner stamp any verdict on open cases and burn openers' fees. The README documents this as a trust assumption. It needs the requester's scope decision rather than a blind code change.

Coverage. All 22 listed entry points have a row, plus rows for the SNITCH conservation invariant, the IMD no-residual invariant, the periphery helpers, the symbol-snapshot assembly, the ABI exports, and the absent launch.json. Nothing was left unreached.

Leads not promoted. The slither and aderyn reentrancy lines are not reachable defects: every case-touching entry point is guarded, and the one unguarded callback requires a request id that is not yet bound. The agreed-below-quorum rejection for chain evidence and the default-off failure hook are design choices the oracle reference recommends and the README documents.

Everything is green and the deliverables are in place. Nothing further is needed.

Outcome: forge build and forge test pass: 108 tests, up from 66, with 0 failures. No critical or high defect was found, so no proof file is attached. Three review-level observations are written to .imd-findings.json as info findings.

What I added under test/:

• SnitchDeskInvariants.t.sol. A handler drives the desk with three actors through open, valid answer, eight kinds of invalid answer, failure notice, drop, file, and owner tweaks, with fail-on-revert on. Seven invariants held over 160 runs of depth 64 (10,240 calls): the desk holds exactly the fees of open cases, the dead address exactly the fees of answered ones, no IMD or allowance ever rests in the desk, supply is conserved across every holder, nobody is refunded more than they paid, case status only moves forward and never changes outside a handler action, and a report exists exactly for filed cases and belongs to the opener.
• SnitchDeskProperties.t.sol. Fifteen fuzz properties at 512 runs each: the block range, kind, panel, time window, panel bounds and fee bounds are accepted exactly when the brief says; the fee and price move exactly; the symbol snapshot keeps only 1 to 11 alphanumerics; tampering any signed field breaks the signature; only the intake answers, only the opener drops, only the owner sets.
• SnitchDeskEdges.t.sol. Sixteen failure-path tests: an ERC-1271 registry signer fits the 200,000 gas stipend, unlisted or reverting signers are bad signatures, signer and intake rotation with cases in flight, an intake that calls back synchronously is stopped by the reentrancy guard, malformed answer bytes and malformed or malleable signatures store nothing, the zero request id, a failure notice racing a real answer, per-case fee retention across fee changes, pending-owner powers, and ether refusal.
• SnitchArtProperties.t.sol. Nine renderer properties: JSON and XML escaping round-trip and leave no raw specials, thousands separators and case-number padding round-trip, the short address matches the hex ends, metadata stays well-formed JSON and the SVG tag count is unchanged for any symbol bytes.
• mocks/MoreMocks.sol. The registry signer, a reverting signer, and the re-entering intake.

Findings reported, all informational:

• The callback does not compare the attestation's question hash or block window with the case, although the brief's wording asks for the case's question hash. The README documents the request-id binding and the oracle reference accepts it for same-chain consumers, so I reported it for the reviewer rather than asserting either behaviour.
• Rotating the intake with cases open strands them for 72 hours and loses the IMD already paid. This is covered by a test and flagged for the operator runbook.
• The brief names the version 1 Intake address while the README's deployment table picks version 2. That is a constructor-argument conflict for the manifest and review steps.

Three harness mistakes surfaced during the run (an underflow in my ghost arithmetic, two pranks and one expectRevert consumed by an intervening external call). All were in my test code, not the contracts, and were corrected before the final run. The scratch coverage probe under test/scratch/ confirmed the handler exercises every path and will be deleted automatically. I did not commit; the new files are untracked in the working tree under test/ only.

The review is complete. The findings file is written and validated, and no tracked file was changed.

Outcome. Five findings survived reproduction, merged from the fifteen the specialists reported. One is medium, two low, two informational. No critical or high defects. The full existing suite passes (107 tests), and every finding kept was reproduced with a scratch Foundry test on this tree.

Findings in .imd-findings.json:

1. Medium: setIntake strands in-flight cases. Both callbacks check the current intake, not the one the case was asked through. An honest owner following the README's migration step loses every open case's answer: 0.5 IMD spent, SNITCH locked 72 hours. Merged from four specialists. The attached proof (the economics specialist's test) fails on this code for exactly that reason.
2. Low: the callback never binds the attestation to the case. The brief requires a questionHash check. The signed block window is stored on the case and free to compare, yet an answer for blocks 1 to 2 is accepted for a case about blocks 21,004,118 to 21,077,903. Merged from four specialists.
3. Low: openCase has no caller-side ceiling on the SNITCH fee or the IMD price. A fee or price change mined before a signed openCase charges the new amount against a standing allowance. Merged the fee and price leads into one root cause.
4. Info: owner powers exceed the brief's "setCaseFee, nothing else". The five extra setters follow the oracle-consumer reference, but they let the owner stamp a verdict on an already-paid open case. Reported as an authorization conflict needing a scope decision, not a bypass.
5. Info: manifest passes the version 2 Intake where the brief names version 1. The manifest is otherwise schema-valid with arguments in declaration order.

Dropped. The math specialist's "agreed below quorum is refused" lead is the check the reference itself requires, so it is not a defect.

Coverage. All 22 entry points answered, none unreached, plus four invariant rows: manifest schema, deployability (desk creation code 23,457 bytes, runtime 15,698 bytes, no forbidden opcodes), ABI exports matching the compiled ABIs, and renderer escaping.

The revision is complete and verified.

What was reopened and what I did

• Stranded cases on setIntake (medium, required). Reproduced with the reviewer's proof. The desk now records the intake each request was asked at in intakeOfRequest, and both callbacks check the caller against that instead of the current intake. A request id the desk has already seen is refused, so a second intake cannot overwrite an open case's binding. Moving the intake now affects only cases opened afterwards. The proof passes, plus four new tests covering answers and failures landing from the old intake after a move and being refused from the new one.
• Signed window not bound to the case (low). Reproduced. The callback now reverts WrongWindow unless the signed fromBlock and toBlock equal the case's. The oracle reference confirms an absolute window is fixed when asked, so this cannot reject a genuine answer. The questionHash itself still cannot be recomputed on chain, so the README adds an owner step to compare it against the plane's record for the first live cases.
• No consent ceiling on the pulled fee and price (low). Reproduced. The brief and the proof fix the five-argument openCase, so it is unchanged. I added openCaseWithLimits with maxFee and maxOraclePrice, which reverts instead of overcharging a wallet with a standing approval. Tested with the finding's exact numbers.
• Owner powers beyond the brief (info). Answered as disputed. The concrete scenario, the owner stamping an already open case through setOracleSigner plus setIntake, now reverts and is tested. The setters stay because the oracle reference the task says wins on protocol matters requires them. The README states the remaining owner powers precisely, with the scope note and narrowing options for the requester.

Checks

The previous attempt was rejected for new slither findings in a rewritten SnitchArt. This revision leaves SnitchArt and every other accepted file untouched. Changed files: SnitchDesk.sol, its test and mock intake, the regenerated desk ABI export, and the README. Answers to all four findings are in the responses JSON at the repository root.

The revision is complete. The manifest is unchanged and the finding is answered in the responses file.

What I found. The advisory finding reproduces as a text difference: the brief names the version 1 Intake and the manifest passes the version 2 Intake. It is not a defect. The accepted implementation fixes version 2 in three places that agree with each other: the deployment test, the README's constructor table, and the manifest notes. The acceptance criterion for this assignment is that every constructor argument matches the accepted implementation, so switching the manifest to version 1 would create a real conflict in place of a documented one.

What I verified.

• On mainnet through a public RPC, both addresses hold code. The version 1 contract exposes only the plain request selector. The version 2 contract exposes both request and requestWithFailure, which is exactly what the README and notes claim.
• The desk calls plain request until the owner turns the failure hook on, and the owner can move the intake with a setter, so either address works at runtime.
• The build passes and all tests pass.

What I did. I wrote .imd-responses.json with verdict "disputed" for the one finding. It explains the reproduction, the on-chain evidence, why version 2 stays, and that moving to version 1 would be a one-line manifest change plus matching edits to the README and deployment test if the requester wants it. No other file changed.

All 120 tests pass (119 submitted plus my scratch reach check), the build is clean, and only the three test files under test/ changed. The findings file is written.

What changed this round

The builder's revision fixed the two defects my first-round tests were written around, so those tests now failed for the right reason. I updated them to the accepted behaviour instead of rewriting anything else:

• test/SnitchDeskEdges.t.sol: the intake-move test now checks that an open case stays bound to the intake it was asked at. The old intake still lands the answer, the new intake is refused for both the answer and the failure notice, and neither can answer the other's cases. Two new tests cover dropping an unanswered case after a move, and that a duplicate request id reverts the whole opening without spending a case number or pulling funds.
• test/SnitchDeskProperties.t.sol: the tamper fuzz now expects the window error for a tampered block range and the signature error for every other field, and checks nothing was moved or consumed. New fuzz properties check that only the case's exact window lands, that the limited opening is accepted exactly when both limits cover the live fee and price with the right error otherwise, and that the limited path keeps the plain path's input rules.
• test/SnitchDeskInvariants.t.sol: the handler now drives two mock intakes with disjoint id spaces, moves the desk between them as the owner, opens cases through both the plain and the limited paths, and records the request id and intake per case. It asserts that a genuine answer from the intake a case was not asked at is refused, and the invariants check every case is still bound to its asked intake and that IMD sums across both intakes. A scratch run confirmed every new path is reached and the invariants hold across several seeds.

Findings

No code defect with a failing proof. The findings file carries one info-level note: the approved workflow grants the owner only the fee setter, while the desk also exposes intake, action, signer, panel and failure-hook setters per the oracle-consumer reference. The revision closed the path where the owner could stamp an already open case, and the README discloses the rest. Narrowing those powers is a requester decision for the manifest review.

The review is complete. All five prior findings settle, no new defect reproduced, and the findings file holds an empty list with a full coverage record.

Outcome of the settlement round

• setIntake strands in-flight cases (medium): fixed. Both attached proofs pass on this tree. The desk now records the intake each request was asked at and checks the callbacks against that binding. My scratch test confirmed the old intake's answer and failure notice both land after a move, the new intake is refused, and a second intake handing out an already-bound id cannot rebind an open case.
• Attestation window not bound (low): fixed. The exact prior input, a signed answer for blocks 1 to 2 against a case over 21,004,118 to 21,077,903, is refused with WrongWindow and stores nothing. Worst-case callback gas measured 153,588, under the 200,000 stipend.
• No fee or price ceiling (low): fixed. The new openCaseWithLimits refuses the prior numbers, 2,000,000 SNITCH and 5 IMD, before pulling anything. Plain openCase keeps the brief's signature and pays live amounts by documented design. The ABI export matches the compiled contract.
• Owner powers beyond the brief (info): resolved. The reproducible harm, stamping a verdict on an open case through setOracleSigner plus setIntake, now reverts NotTheIntake. The setters stay per the oracle-consumer reference, which the task says wins on protocol matters, and the divergence from the brief is disclosed in the README and the manifest notes. I did not restate it as a finding since nothing reproducible remains.
• Version 2 Intake in the manifest (info): resolved. The manifest describes the accepted tree, which fixes version 2 in its deployment test and README, and the notes state the deviation. The rest of the manifest rechecked clean against the schema rules.

Checks run

• Full suite: 121 tests pass, including invariants.
• Contract sizes: desk runtime 16,545 bytes and creation code 24,119 bytes, within the factory's limits.
• Bare-key signer rotation while cases are open still rejects old-key answers. The README now documents the ERC-1271 handover the reference prescribes, so I accepted it as an operational item.

The scratch tests were removed. The only file I wrote is .imd-findings.json at the repository root, with zero findings, five settled entries carrying their evidence, and 24 coverage rows all marked holds.