Implemented LaunchToken and SorenVault, with vendored dependencies, ABI exports, and deployment/security documentation.

Validation passed:

• forge build
• forge test: 72 passed, none failed
• forge fmt --check
• ABI consistency checks

Tests cover burns, reveal timing, copied commitments, chapter ordering, payout failures, reentrancy, and fund conservation.

After deployment, the owner must set the SORN token once and fund prizes. Manifest generation and independent review remain separate workflow stages.

Created launch.json with Sorn/SORN, SorenVault("$owner"), and the required pool values.

Manifest checks and compiled ABI comparison passed. forge build succeeded; forge test passed all 72 tests. Only launch.json is a submission change.

I found no defects in access control, trust gaps or asymmetries that I could reproduce. .imd-findings.json has an empty findings list and a coverage row for all 9 entry points, each marked holds, plus rows for the invariants and static-analysis leads I checked. No repository files were changed; I deleted the scratch test after running it.

Checks run

• The full suite passes: forge test, 72 tests.
• scripts/export_abi.py --check confirms both ABI files in docs/abi/ match the compiled ABIs.
• I wrote a scratch test that confirms:
  • Someone who isn't the owner can't call setToken, fund, publishChapter or setHint.
  • setToken can only be set once.
  • A chapter can't be republished.
  • A wallet that copies another player's commit hash can't reveal it.
  • A rival who commits only after seeing an answer can't reveal in the same block.
  • After the first win, later reveals and new hints are refused.

What I covered

• Permissions: the owner is the explicit initialOwner ($owner), fixed at deployment, and can't be zero. It's never the factory or tx.origin, and the constructor makes no outside calls. The token can only be set once and only by the owner, so nobody else can set it first. All four owner functions are guarded consistently, and no function lets anyone gain extra rights.
• Asymmetries: money only goes in through fund, a direct transfer, or the commit burn to the dead address. It only comes out to whoever solves the chapter. reservedPrizes goes up when a chapter is published and down by the same amount when it's solved. Chapters must be published in order, and a published chapter's answer and prize can't change.
• Trust gaps: the owner knows the answers and can win their own prizes. They can also set the wrong token or publish a chapter nobody can solve, which locks its prize and every later chapter. Both the README and docs/SECURITY.md disclose these, and the brief asks for an owner-set token. They are trust assumptions, not permission bypasses, so I didn't report them as findings.
• Static analysis leads: the reentrancy warnings from slither and aderyn don't hold. Every function that changes state has the reentrancy guard, the launch token has no callbacks, and the vault updates its records before moving tokens.

Not covered: there is no launch.json in the tree yet, so I couldn't review the constructor arguments. That includes checking that $owner resolves to the README's 0xee8a…6e95. The final review should do this once the manifest exists.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. Summary:

Result: the control-flow area is clean apart from one informational note. The build, all 72 project tests (including the 3 stateful invariants), the ABI parity check and the format check pass on the current tree. No launch.json exists yet, which is expected before the manifest assignment runs.

What I traced (Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles):

• Every state-changing entry point of SorenVault and LaunchToken, including parameter relationships, sentinel values, stale reads, partial-update rollback, wrong-state calls and interleaving across transactions.
• The two balance-delta helpers and the vendored OpenZeppelin 5.0.2 SafeERC20 and ReentrancyGuard.
• The reserved-prize solvency invariant, the single-open-chapter ordering, the absence of any withdrawal path, and the constructor against the protected launch floor.
• The slither and aderyn reentrancy leads. They sit under nonReentrant with accounting written before the external call, and the standard SORN token has no callbacks, so none were promoted.

One finding (info): in setToken, a token whose decimals() call succeeds but returns undecodable data makes the function revert with empty data instead of the documented InvalidToken error. Solidity's catch does not cover return-data decoding failures. The call is still rejected and no state changes, so the impact is only a mismatch with the documented error contract. I verified this with a scratch Foundry test and removed the scratch directory afterwards.

Coverage record: all 9 listed entry points have rows, 8 holds and 1 finding, plus 4 invariant and lead rows. Two README claims could not be verified from the tree and are noted in the coverage: the 88% pool / 2% wallet split and the named owner address, which belong to launch inputs the manifest step will resolve with $owner.

The review is complete. The findings file is valid JSON, every snippet matches its cited line, the scratch test directory is removed, and the working tree is clean apart from the findings file itself.

Outcome. The SorenVault economics are sound against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides. I found no defect that lets an unprivileged actor extract or lock funds. The 72 existing tests pass, the ABI exports match the build, and formatting is clean. Slither's reentrancy lines and Aderyn's state-change-after-call line are false positives: every mutating entry point is nonReentrant, the only external calls go to the owner-selected token, and accounting is written before the transfer with the whole transaction reverting on failure.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json:

• Low, publishChapter line 144. The strict sequential gate with no cancel, republish, or timeout means one unsolvable chapter strands the entire vault balance, not just that chapter's prize, and halts chapters 2 through 7 forever. Confirmed with a scratch test: fund 7,000 SORN, publish chapter 1 with an unmatched hash, and all 7,000 are permanently unreachable. This is an owner-error hazard the brief does not forbid fixing, since the brief only bans owner withdrawal.
• Info, reveal line 205. The specified unsalted answer hash makes offline guessing free, so the 100 SORN burn is a single ticket paid by whoever finds the answer locally. Confirmed with a dictionary scratch test.
• Info, reveal line 198. The specified one-block gap defeats same-block copying but not a builder who drops the honest reveal for one block and races at the next. Both info items are spec-mandated and already disclosed in the security document; they are recorded so the judge sees the economic view.

Coverage. All nine entry points have a row, plus four invariants I traced and one row marking the manifest as unreached because no launch.json exists yet and the request's owner and split facts were not supplied to me.

The findings file is valid, both snippets match the tree exactly, and no repository file was changed (the scratch test lives under the ignored test/scratch/ path).

Review result

No math, boundary or numerical-gap defect was found in the contracts. The vault's arithmetic surface is small and every edge I could construct behaves as the workflow specifies. I recorded two minor findings in .imd-findings.json, neither affecting funds.

What I verified with my own scratch probes (all passed, on top of the project's 72 passing tests):

• Reveal timing: same block refused even with time advanced; exactly commit time plus 24h accepted; one second later refused.
• Prize boundary: prize equal to the live balance, including a 1-wei donation, is accepted; one wei more and type(uint256).max both revert with InsufficientFunding, never a panic, because only one chapter can be open so the reserve is always zero at publish time.
• Byte limits: 2000 and 500 bytes accepted, 2001 and 501 rejected, empty hint clears.
• Chapter ids 0 and 8 rejected on reads and writes.
• A player holding exactly 100 SORN can commit; 100 SORN minus 1 wei cannot.
• Reserve and available-prize accounting stays exact through a solve and re-publish.
• All burn counters increment by the same constant together and cannot overflow.
• The slither reentrancy-balance and aderyn state-change leads are false positives: every mutator is nonReentrant, effects precede transfers, and the standard token has no hooks.

Findings written:

1. Low, outside my area. Nine of the forty vendored library files were reformatted by forge fmt and no longer match the SHA-256 values in the provenance record that the README calls hashes of "unmodified" files. I confirmed against upstream that the differences are whitespace only, so bytecode is unaffected, but the provenance claim is false and a verifier following the README gets nine mismatches.
2. Info. A contract whose decimals() returns no data makes setToken revert with empty data instead of the documented InvalidToken error. Outcome is identical, only the error signature differs.

Coverage: all nine listed entry points have rows, eight holds and one finding (the info item on setToken), plus four invariant rows. Nothing was left unreached. I did not verify the README's stated 88/2 supply split against the launch policy, since the policy is not in the tree; that belongs to the manifest review.

Added failure-path, boundary, fuzz, and invariant coverage, with all changes confined to test/.

• forge build: passed.
• forge test --offline: 90 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped.
• Invariants exercised 49,152 randomized calls, plus completion checks for all seven chapters.

No contract defects were reproduced.

Implemented frontend source, static export, and the handoff-bound deployment manifest.

Passed build/typecheck, 11 unit tests, 18 Chromium scenarios, keyboard/reflow checks, and ABI/asset verification. Submission bundle: 764,390 bytes.

Validation is documented in docs/FRONTEND_VALIDATION.md. WebKit page creation timed out; no live writes were broadcast. Design documentation is in docs/DESIGN.md to respect the overriding write scope.

Recorded in .imd-findings.json. Site files remain unchanged.

• Medium — bug: valid decimal slippage settings prevent quotes. At 390×844 in Chromium and WebKit, entering 1 IMD with 1.1%, 0.29%, 0.57% or 2.01% slippage incorrectly produces a range error. Parse exact integer basis points instead of requiring the floating-point multiplication result to be an integer.
• Medium — bug: swap connection failures appear more than a screen above the action. At 390×844 without a wallet, clicking “Connect to swap” leaves no visible feedback. The error appears at viewport y=−1083 while the button remains at y=408. Render connection errors beside the initiating control.

The rebuild matched the committed export byte for byte. Typechecking, 11 unit checks, 18 Chromium scenarios, the keyboard flow and WebKit’s commit/reveal scenario passed. Wallet transactions were mocked; live checks performed reads only.

The visual idea is a seven-chapter mystery hunt presented as an intercepted green terminal. The probe’s monospace flag follows the brief’s explicit direction; its eyebrow flags identify functional wallet, status and metric labels.

“Met” below means the required implementation or artifact exists; the two functional defects above remain. Contract requirements were checked against preserved source and existing tests, without rerunning Solidity tests. Duplicate workflow text is counted once.