I built the squeek (SQUEEK) token. forge build, forge test (12 of 12 pass, including a fuzz test run with the required seed) and forge fmt --check all pass with solc 0.8.26.

• Token: src/SqueekToken.sol defines contract SqueekToken. It's a self-contained ERC-20 named squeek with symbol SQUEEK and 18 decimals. The constructor takes no arguments and mints 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 tokens once to the deployer, which is the launch factory.
• What it can't do: there's no owner, mint, burn, pause, blacklist or transfer fee. The supply can never grow, nobody can move or freeze a holder's balance, and every transfer moves exactly the amount sent. It calls no libraries and contains no DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT.
• Your X and website: @squeekchain and squeekchain.com are only in the README and the code comments, not stored on chain. Your brief listed them under "what it does", but they don't change how the token behaves.
• Tests: test/SqueekToken.t.sol checks the name, symbol and decimals, the mint to the deployer, transfers and allowances. Failure tests cover a transfer larger than the balance, sending to the zero address, spending more than the allowance, approving the zero address and calling a mint function that doesn't exist. The fuzz test checks that transfers keep the total supply the same.
• Config: foundry.toml sets bytecode_hash = "none" as the launch requires. I copied forge-std into lib/ as ordinary files (no submodule) so the tests build without network access.
• Docs: README.md covers the assumptions, deployment parameters and operating duties. Since nothing in the contract needs an admin, there are no "After launch" settings to make.
• Commit: git had no author name set on this machine, so I made the commit with your email from the session. I didn't write launch.json, because the separate manifest step does that.

I haven't run the protected launch checks from the task's inputs. They need setup values only the verifier supplies, though the token was written to pass them.

Done. I wrote launch.json for the squeek (SQUEEK) custom token launch. It is the only new file in the working tree.

What the manifest says

• Token contract is SqueekToken with name squeek, symbol SQUEEK, 18 decimals, no constructor arguments, and a total supply of 1000000000000000000000000000 minor units. This matches the accepted source, whose constructor takes nothing and mints the constant supply once to msg.sender.
• The contracts list is empty. The accepted tree contains only the token, so no application contracts are described.
• Pool and economics are copied exactly as the launch gives them: IMD as the paired currency, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one provenance price, and the requester's economics object verbatim.
• Notes describe the token's fixed supply, lack of privileged functions and exact-amount transfers, in about 860 characters.

Checks run

• forge build compiled cleanly and forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed passed all 12 tests.
• A Node script confirmed every manifest field against the task's requirements, including key set, lowercase addresses, string supply, numeric fee and tickSpacing, and the notes length limit.
• git status --porcelain shows only the new launch.json. No other file was changed and no scratch files remain.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json holds the result. The scratch test directory is removed and no tracked file changed.

Outcome: the SQUEEK token has no permission defects. It is a 66-line fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner, no roles, no initializer, no external calls and no inheritance. The whole supply is minted once to the deploying factory, and the only writers of balances are the two transfer paths, each guarded by a balance check and, for transferFrom, by the caller's allowance. The factory has no special pull path. The project build and all 12 of its tests pass.

One informational finding: _transfer rejects a zero receiver but never checks the sender. Because a zero address has no allowance, any nonzero amount reverts, but transferFrom(address(0), bob, 0) from any account succeeds and emits a Transfer event from the zero address with value 0. No balance or supply changes. The suggested fix is a one-line zero-sender revert, matching OpenZeppelin v5. I confirmed this and the surrounding guards with a scratch Foundry test before reporting.

Coverage: all three listed entry points have rows. approve and transfer hold. transferFrom is marked as the finding above. Five extra rows record the invariants checked: supply conservation, constructor minting to the factory, the launch floor's forbidden privileged calls and opcodes, the trust-gap seams, and the two aderyn style leads, which are not defects.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json is written at the repository root. No project files were changed. The only files I created are the findings file and a scratch test under test/scratch/, both of which git ignores.

Outcome: the math, boundary and numerical-gap area is clean. The token has no division, no casts, no decimal scaling, no external calls, no payable or fallback paths and no bytes decoding, so most of the three guides have nothing to attach to. I traced the remaining seams by hand and with a scratch Foundry suite of 12 edge-case tests, all passing:

• Unchecked arithmetic in both blocks is guarded by the preceding < checks, so neither subtraction can wrap. The addition cannot overflow because the sum of balances equals the fixed supply of 1e27 forever, which a fuzzed random-transfer sequence confirmed.
• Self-transfer re-reads the written slot, so the balance is unchanged for any amount up to the full supply.
• Allowance edges: max is infinite and never decremented, max minus one is finite and decremented, and an infinite allowance with a value above the balance reverts on balance with the allowance intact.
• Launch-level arithmetic: the supply is exactly 1e27, below 2^128, so the ten-percent split and Uniswap v4 uint128 fields involve no truncation. Every transfer moves exactly the requested value, so the floor's whole-arrival checks hold by construction.
• Bytecode scan: no CALL, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, CREATE or SELFDESTRUCT opcodes in the runtime. ETH or unknown calldata sent to the token reverts.

One informational finding is recorded. A zero-value transferFrom with the zero address as sender succeeds and emits a Transfer event from the zero address, which indexers read as a mint of zero. No balance or supply changes. OpenZeppelin rejects this path, and the minimal fix is a sender check in _transfer at src/SqueekToken.sol:56. It is not a launch blocker.

Coverage record has eight rows: all three entry points, two invariants, both aderyn leads (dismissed as non-defects), and the external-boundary and launch-flow checks. I could not execute the protected floor test itself because its v4-core and LaunchLiquidity dependencies are not in this tree, and that limitation is noted in the coverage row.

The review is complete and the findings file is written at .imd-findings.json, valid JSON with the snippet matching lines 56 to 59 of the source. The scratch tests are removed, so the tree has no changes beyond the findings file.

Result: the SQUEEK token is economically sound. It is a 66-line plain ERC-20 with no owner, mint, burn, pause, fee, or external call. I checked it against the Economic Security, Invariant, and Flow Gap guides and found no loss-of-funds or broken-guarantee defect.

What I verified, with Foundry:

• Conservation invariant. A stateful fuzz over four actors ran 128,000 random transfer, approve, and transferFrom calls with zero violations of sum(balances) == totalSupply. The supply has no writer after the constructor.
• Launch flows arrive whole. Factory to distributor to claimant, factory to pool manager, and trader buy and sell all move the exact amount and return true.
• Boundaries. Self-transfer, whole-supply round trip, max and max-minus-one allowance, and a transferFrom that reverts after the allowance debit all behave correctly.
• Surface. The compiled ABI exposes only the three state-changing entry points plus views. No receive, fallback, assembly, or library linkage exists.

One informational finding was recorded. transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) succeeds from any caller and emits a zero-value Transfer from the zero address, which indexers read as a mint. No balance or supply changes. The OpenZeppelin reference rejects this sender, and a one-line check in _transfer closes it.

Coverage rows mark approve and transfer as holds, transferFrom as finding 1, plus three invariant and flow rows. The protected launch harness could not run here because v4-core and LaunchLiquidity are not vendored, so its flows were reproduced with plain transfers. The two aderyn leads were checked and are style only.

The review is complete. The findings file is written and the tree is otherwise unchanged.

Outcome: no exploitable defect in the assigned area. The token in src/SqueekToken.sol is a 66-line self-contained ERC-20 with no owner, no libraries, no external calls and no exemption logic, so the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles checklists reduce to arithmetic, sentinel and event paths, all of which hold.

What I verified

• Built with solc 0.8.26 and ran the project suite: 12 tests passed.
• Wrote a scratch Foundry suite of 15 tests covering self-transfer, zero-value transfer, exact and max-minus-one allowances, allowance preserved on balance revert, oversize transfer revert, receive and fallback rejection, and a conservation invariant over 128,000 handler calls. All passed. The scratch directory was removed afterwards.
• Scanned the compiled runtime with the protected floor test's opcode walk: no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. Metadata is solc-version-only.
• Static analysis leads (large literal, non-immutable totalSupply) are style and gas only, not defects.

One informational finding

A zero-value transferFrom from the zero address succeeds and emits a mint-shaped Transfer(0, to, 0) event, where the OpenZeppelin reference reverts. Balances and supply are untouched, so there is no loss. The reproduction and a one-line fix are in the findings file.

Coverage: all three verifier entry points have rows (two holds, one finding pointing at the info item), plus rows for the constructor, supply conservation, exact launch flows, forbidden opcodes and the empty periphery. The manifest row is unreached because launch.json does not exist yet. The protected floor test could not be executed locally since it imports v4-core and launch helpers that are not in this tree.

Done. The suite passes under the verifier's seed, and the only observation about the implementation is informational.

What I added (three new files under test/, alongside the existing unit file, which I left as is):

• test/SqueekTokenEdges.t.sol: 46 unit tests on failure paths and edges. Zero, one wei, the whole supply, one wei over, the maximum, self-transfer, repeated calls, reverted calls leaving no trace, approvals that overwrite rather than add, self-approval, directional and per-spender allowances, unlimited versus max-minus-one allowance, strangers and the deployer having no power over holders, ether and unknown selectors refused, twenty admin-style selectors all reverting, no DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT in the runtime, and the launch flows. The launch flow test deploys through a factory stand-in and forwards the swarm's share in the same call, so it exercises the one-transaction path the real factory takes.
• test/SqueekTokenFuzz.t.sol: 18 property tests at 1000 runs each. Exact movement, round trips, split-equals-whole, random transfer sequences conserving supply, allowance decrement and sticky unlimited allowance, every revert with its exact error arguments, and a random-selector probe that the supply never grows.
• test/SqueekTokenInvariant.t.sol: a handler with six actors that calls transfer, approve and transferFrom in random order with bounded inputs, plus over-balance, over-allowance, zero-receiver, zero-spender and stranger attempts checked in place with try/catch for the exact error. Ghost balances and allowances back six invariants: fixed supply, balances summing to supply, balances and allowances matching the ghosts, no sink address holding anything, and constant metadata. It runs at 256 runs by 64 depth with fail-on-revert enabled.

Grounding. I ran the same handler against a scratch mutant whose transferFrom never spends allowance. The allowance invariant failed on the first run, so the harness detects real defects rather than passing vacuously. The scratch files are removed.

Findings. I found no value-affecting defect. The token is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no admin surface, exact transfers, and no way to grow supply. One informational item is recorded in .imd-findings.json: transferFrom does not reject a zero from address, so a zero-value call from anyone succeeds and emits a mint-shaped Transfer event of zero. Nothing moves and supply is unchanged, so the launch flows are unaffected. The edge test for it pins only that balances and supply stay put rather than blessing the event.

Verification. Final run under the verifier seed: 77 tests passed, 0 failed, across four suites. Files are formatted with forge fmt. Nothing outside test/ and the findings file was touched, and nothing was committed.

Review complete. The findings file is written and validated, the snippet matches line 57 of the source, and the working tree is otherwise untouched.

Outcome: one finding, severity info, and no blocker. The token is a 66-line fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner, mint, burn, pause or fee, and it passes the launch floor.

Specialist findings: all five areas reported the same defect, so I merged them into one finding. The call transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) passes the allowance and balance checks because both read zero, then emits a Transfer event from the zero address that indexers read as a mint. I reproduced it with a scratch test under test/scratch that confirms the event, the unchanged supply and the revert for any nonzero value. Nothing moves, so severity stays at info with a one-line fix suggested.

My own pass found nothing further. Unchecked arithmetic is safe because the balance sum is pinned to the fixed supply. The approve race and zero-value transfers without allowance match the standard and OpenZeppelin. Static analysis leads were a gas nit and an underscore-formatted literal, not defects.

Coverage: all three entry points answered, plus rows for the constructor, the launch invariants and the manifest. The manifest is schema-valid, its empty constructor list matches the no-argument constructor, and bytecode sizes are far under the deploy limits.

Check	Result
Project test suite	88 passed, 0 failed
Scratch reproduction tests	11 passed
Creation / runtime code	1,429 / 1,311 bytes