The work is complete and committed on main (commit 151ab5f).

What was built

• src/SIMDVault.sol: zero-argument constructor that deploys HolderRewards and JobsVault. launch(body) and bindLaunch(n, token) are dev-wallet-only and run once; bindLaunch checks the factory names the vault as requester and that the token is a pool currency. distribute() is public, gated to 7 days, claims fees with a low-level call (a revert never blocks the split), splits the whole IMD balance 40 / 25.72 / 17.14 / 17.14, burns the launched token balance, and sends native ETH to the marketing wallet. Every address is a constant; no owner, no admin.
• src/HolderRewards.sol: each weekly deposit opens an epoch, pays 0.5 IMD for an oracle.request with a pinned absolute-window question, and refuses any answer that is not from the Intake, not for its own request, not the pinned question hash, from a weak panel, or badly signed. Holders claim pot * balance / total once per epoch against a Merkle proof; the pot cap is enforced; rollover after 28 days moves exactly pot - claimed into the current epoch.
• src/JobsVault.sol: requestJob(body) for wallets holding at least 1,000,000 launched tokens, once per 24 hours, paid from its own IMD. No withdraw.
• Protocol libraries copied verbatim from the oracle reference; forge-std 1.9.7 and OpenZeppelin 5.5.0 vendored as plain files, no submodules.

Verification

• forge build, forge test (58 passing offline, 4 fork tests skipped without an RPC URL), and forge fmt --check all pass with the verifier's fuzz seed.
• The fork tests passed here against live Robinhood Chain: the real Intake took the launch, oracle and job payments at 0.5 IMD, and positionOf and poolManager() match the interface and constants.
• The protocol conformance vector passes (digest, callback selector, real signature). A scratch replica of the protected floor passed: init code 24.4 KB, runtimes under EIP-170, no forbidden opcodes, no owner().

Assumptions to be aware of (all documented in README.md)

• The snapshot block is 8 blocks before the deposit, as the oracle protocol requires an already-final window.
• The pro rata total comes from the attestation's figure, which the question explicitly asks for. An epoch whose answer lacks it rolls over after 28 days.
• The oracle question was not sent to POST /requests/check because its base URL is not in the available references; the exact body is readable from bodyFor(block) and should be checked before launch.

I added an invariant suite, live fork tests and edge-case tests. forge build succeeds, and forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed passes: 71 passed, 0 failed, 9 skipped. The 9 skipped are the fork tests, which skip cleanly when no RPC URL is set. I also found four defects; they are in .imd-findings.json rather than in tests that would pass over them.

What I added (only under test/)

• test/invariant/SystemInvariant.t.sol — the invariant tests. A handler calls everything in random order: distribute (fee claims that pay or fail, plus native ETH), sending ETH and IMD in, oracle answers (some with a figure lower than the true total), claims (including a claim with an inflated balance), rollovers, jobs, and calls by outsiders who aren't allowed. It runs 256 sequences of 40 calls each. After every sequence it checks:

  • every distribute matched the 40 / 25.72 / 17.14 / 17.14 split, with at most 3 wei of dust left;
  • distribute never ran twice within 7 days;
  • no epoch paid more than its pot, and a closed epoch never reopened;
  • the IMD the rewards contract still owes equals what's left in its open epochs, and it holds at least that much;
  • IMD only ever reaches the addresses the brief names;
  • every launched token received was burned, and all native ETH reached the marketing wallet;
  • only the dev wallet can launch or bind, and only once; only the vault can set tokens or deposit; only the Intake can deliver answers.

  A scripted test confirms the handler really reaches claims, rollovers, jobs and burns, so the invariants aren't passing on an empty system.

• test/ForkLimits.t.sol — five more fork tests against the real Intake and launch factory, alongside the four already there. They cover dev-only and once-only launch and bind, rejecting a launch the vault didn't request, the split plus burn plus ETH to marketing, the 7-day limit, only the Intake delivering answers, and the job holding and daily limits. I ran all nine against live Robinhood Chain and they pass. Only the factory's positionOf is faked, because no real launch names a freshly deployed vault as its requester.

• test/EdgeCases.t.sol — offline tests for:

  • a token with 6 decimals, and one with no decimals;
  • an empty week;
  • an answer that arrives after its epoch was rolled over;
  • a proof from one epoch tried in another;
  • one epoch's answer given for another epoch's request;
  • a rollover one second early;
  • two fuzz tests (1,000 runs each) on the split and the pro-rata payouts.

Defects reported in .imd-findings.json (the first three include a self-contained test that fails on the current code)

1. Medium — the 24-hour job limit is per wallet, not per holding. The same 1,000,000 tokens passed from wallet to wallet open a job from each one: 10 wallets in one block cost the jobs vault 5 IMD instead of 0.5. Anyone who can borrow the tokens for a single transaction could empty the jobs vault without holding any. The code follows the brief's wording, so this is partly a gap in the brief. One existing test, test_movingTokensDoesNotResetTheClock, currently treats the wallet-to-wallet hand-off as correct and will need to change with any fix.
2. Low — a failed oracle request blocks the whole distribution. If the Intake's request reverts while it still quotes a price (paused, or a new rule), distribute() reverts. All of the vault's IMD, the burn and the ETH stay stuck until the Intake accepts again, because there is no other way out.
3. Low — bindLaunch accepts IMD as the launched token. The pool is TEST/IMD, and the check only asks that the token be one of the two, so the dev wallet could bind IMD itself, once and permanently.
4. Info — rollover payouts within an epoch are unequal. When an old epoch rolls into one whose holders have already started claiming, the early claimers were paid from the smaller pot. Nothing is overpaid or lost; the difference waits for a later rollover.

Some fil

The responses file is excluded from git by the harness's own rule, so it is read from the working tree as intended. Everything is in place.

Outcome: the reopened defect is fixed and its proof passes; two advisory findings are fixed; one is disputed as the brief's specified behaviour. forge build, forge test (70 passed, 4 fork tests skipped offline) with the verifier's fuzz seed, and forge fmt --check all pass. The fork suite also ran live against Robinhood Chain and passed 4/4.

What changed

• JobsVault (medium, fixed): eligibility now comes from the latest oracle snapshot instead of the caller's live balance alone. A holder calls proveHolding(epoch, balance, proof) with the same Merkle leaf it uses in HolderRewards, for the newest epoch that has a root. requestJob(bytes) keeps its signature and requires a proof on that snapshot, a live balance of at least 1,000,000 tokens, and the 24-hour per-wallet cooldown. One holding sits at one address per snapshot, so it opens at most one job per day however many wallets it passes through, and a flash-borrowed balance has no leaf. proveAndRequestJob does both steps in one call.
• HolderRewards: tracks latestRootedEpoch in the oracle callback (about 115k of the 200k stipend used) and exposes rootOf. The oracle ask is now inside a try, so a reverting Intake holds the 40% for the next epoch instead of freezing the whole distribution.
• SIMDVault: bindLaunch rejects IMD as the launched token, and passes the HolderRewards address to the JobsVault constructor. SIMDVault still has zero constructor arguments.
• Tests: the recycled-holding test was replaced with one asserting exactly one job for a holding moved through ten wallets, plus tests for flash balances, sub-minimum snapshot balances, foreign proofs, root replacement, no jobs before the first root, the frozen-distribute scenario from the finding, a reverting priceOf, and the IMD bind. The fork test proves a leaf before opening a job against the real Intake.
• README: documents the snapshot rule, its residual (a holding moved between two weekly snapshots can open two jobs around the week the root changes, never more), the isolated oracle ask, the IMD rejection, and the new sizes.

Disputed: the rollover fairness note. Rollover moving exactly pot minus claimed into the current epoch is what the brief specifies, nothing is overpaid or lost, and the README already states that later claimers in a rolled-into epoch get a proportionally larger share.

I updated my three test files to match the author's fixes, checked each fix with a test of my own, and reported one new low-severity problem that the JobsVault fix introduced.

Tests: forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed gives 86 passed, 9 skipped. The 9 skipped are the fork tests, which skip when no RPC URL is set. The only failure is my proof file in test/scratch/, which is supposed to fail and gets deleted before verification. I also ran all 9 fork tests against live Robinhood Chain (https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com), using the real Intake, factory and IMD, and they passed.

Why my tests needed changing: after the fix, a wallet has to prove its balance against the latest oracle snapshot before it can open a job. That broke three of my tests:

• test/EdgeCases.t.sol: the 1,000,000-token threshold for a 6-decimal token is now checked twice: one unit short at the snapshot is refused, and one unit short in the live balance is refused. The "jobs vault has no IMD" test proves the holding first; before, it was failing for the wrong reason.
• test/invariant/SystemInvariant.t.sol: the random-sequence tests now prove holdings against the latest root, sometimes skip the proof on purpose, and try a forged balance. I added a token-transfer action so one holding moves between wallets. A job is expected exactly when the caller proved at least 1,000,000 tokens at the snapshot, still holds that much, is past its 24 hours, and the vault can pay.
• test/ForkLimits.t.sol: before opening a job on the live Intake, the test now delivers a snapshot from the Intake's address and proves a holding. It also covers a holder one token short being refused, the 24-hour wait, and a second job after it.

Your four findings from last round:

• One holding opening jobs from many wallets (medium): fixed. My original reproduction now opens exactly one job (0.5 IMD) for one 1,000,000-token holding moved through ten wallets.
• A failed oracle request freezing distribute() (low): fixed. With the request made to revert, distribute() still pays every share, burns the tokens and sends the ETH. The 40% waits in HolderRewards with nothing left approved, and joins the next week's pot.
• IMD accepted as the launched token (low): fixed. bindLaunch refuses IMD, nothing gets bound, and the real token still binds afterwards.
• Unequal payouts after a rollover (info): I accept the author's answer. Moving pot - claimed into the current pot and paying each holder once per epoch is what the brief asks for, and the invariant tests confirm nothing is overpaid or lost. I didn't report it again.

New finding (low), written to .imd-findings.json with a test that fails on the current code: JobsVault can't open any job until an oracle snapshot has arrived. If one never arrives, because the body is refused, the panel disagrees, the callback runs out of gas, or the oracle stops being sold, JobsVault's 25.72% share is stuck for good because it has no other way out. In the reproduction, after four weekly distributions JobsVault holds over 90 IMD, and a holder with 10,000,000 tokens is still refused (HoldingNotProven(alice, 0, 0)). The README calls "no job before the first root" a known limit, but doesn't say it can be permanent or that funds pile up.

Those untracked entries are sandbox device masks owned by nobody, not files I created, so they are outside my work and I left them alone.

Done. I wrote launch.json as the only changed file. The accepted source has one top-level application contract, so the manifest lists that one entry.

• SIMDVault with an empty constructor argument list. Its constructor creates HolderRewards and JobsVault itself and calls no outside contract, so it deploys on an empty chain.
• HolderRewards and JobsVault are not listed. The vault deploys them in its constructor and exposes them through its immutable getters. Separate factory instances would not be linked to the vault, so naming them would be wrong.
• No owner argument appears anywhere. None of the three contracts has an owner, admin, upgrade or pause. Every address and rate is a constant, matching the brief and the README.
• Notes describe the fixed addresses, the three contracts' behaviour and the post-deployment steps, at under 2,800 characters.

Checks I ran:

• The manifest parses as JSON with exactly the keys kind, contracts and notes, and the contract name is 9 ASCII characters.
• forge build succeeds.
• forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed passes 86 tests with 9 skipped. The skipped ones are the fork tests, which skip cleanly because no RPC URL is configured here.
• git status shows launch.json as the only new file of mine.

Fork runs against live Robinhood Chain state are still owed by whoever has network access, as the test suite documents.

I found one defect in the math area, a medium one. It's written to .imd-findings.json with a coverage row for all 13 entry points plus one invariant row. No repository files were changed; the scratch test has been deleted.

Finding 1 (medium): a rollover changes the payout rate partway through an epoch (src/HolderRewards.sol:236, together with :214)

• Cause: rollover() adds pot - claimed to the current epoch's pot. claim() pays e.pot * balance / e.total from that pot as it stands at claim time. A rollover arrives about 28 days after the old epoch opened, so the current epoch is usually already being claimed.
• Effect: holders who claimed before the rollover are paid at the old rate, and the once-per-epoch check stops them collecting the difference. Holders who claim afterwards get a share of the rolled-in IMD as well. Anyone can call rollover, so a holder can roll an old epoch over and then claim. The PotExceeded cap doesn't catch this because payouts only go up. No IMD is lost; the shortfall rolls forward later. It is still taken from holders who claimed promptly.
• Reproduction:
  1. Epoch 1 opens with a pot of 100 IMD and nobody claims it.
  2. On day 21, epoch 2 opens with a pot of 100 IMD. Alice and Bob each hold 50 of 100 snapshot units.
  3. Alice claims and gets 50 IMD.
  4. On day 28, rollover(1) raises epoch 2's pot to 200 IMD.
  5. Bob claims and gets 100 IMD. 50 IMD stays behind until a later rollover.
• Proof: an attached self-contained Foundry test fails on the current code with 50e18 != 100e18.
• Suggested fix: either add the rollover to the next epoch to open instead of one already being claimed, or let a holder who already claimed collect pot*balance/total - alreadyPaid. Either way, exactly pot - claimed still moves forward, as the brief requires.

What holds in the math area

• Weekly split: the percentages are 4000/2572/1714/1714 out of 10000. Each share rounds down, and at most 3 wei of dust carries to the next week.
• No overflow: none of the a*b/c steps can overflow at IMD and token scale.
• Rewards bookkeeping:
  • The pot is free - price, where free is the balance minus what open epochs still owe.
  • The amount owed always equals the sum of open pot - claimed across deposit, claim and rollover.
  • Rollover moves exactly pot - claimed.
• Time limits: each opens exactly on its boundary (7 days, 28 days, 24 hours), and an attestation is still valid at its expiry second.
• Jobs threshold: the 1,000,000-token minimum is compared in the same smallest unit as the snapshot balances.

The existing suite passes: 86 tests passed and 9 skipped (the fork tests, which need a fork RPC URL and so skip here).

Leads I left out

• Decimals overflow: JobsVault.setToken overflows only if the token reports 72 or more decimals. That would block bindLaunch for good, but a factory-launched token doesn't have that many decimals.
• Last epoch's remainder: what the last epoch still owes can't roll over if no newer epoch ever opens.
• Claim window: the 28-day clock starts when the epoch opens, not when its root arrives, so a late root shortens the time holders have to claim.

Static-analysis leads checked and rejected:

• Unchecked ETH send: the destination is a fixed constant wallet.
• Ignored positionOf return values: the unused tick values don't matter.
• Reentrancy: these are calls to trusted fixed contracts.

I only went into areas outside math (access control, oracle trust, gaming the snapshot) as far as needed to trace the math paths.

Review complete. The findings file is written and every snippet was verified against the tree; the scratch test directory was removed and the working tree is clean apart from the findings file.

Outcome. The three contracts hold up well under the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles passes. The full local suite passes (86 tests, 9 fork tests skipped offline), and the oracle callback runs in about 115k gas against the 200k stipend. I found no loss-of-funds or permission defect. Three low findings are reported, each with a concrete state and call sequence:

• Snapshot is caller-timed. distribute() is permissionless and the holder snapshot is fixed eight blocks before it, so an address can buy, wait nine blocks, call distribute(), sell, and claim a pro-rata share of the pot. The brief's "buy just before a claim" guarantee holds, but the snapshot itself is gameable. Anchored at src/HolderRewards.sol:141.
• A refused launch body consumes the single launch(). No callback is registered, so the vault never learns a status-1 refusal, and the only recovery is a launch paid elsewhere plus the factory's setRequester, which the README does not document. Anchored at src/SIMDVault.sol:85.
• JobsVault is dead until the first root arrives. The snapshot tie is the accepted fix from the earlier round and I did not dispute it, but while no root exists every holder is refused and the 25.72% share has no other exit. If the oracle question is refused every week, that IMD is stranded. Anchored at src/JobsVault.sol:123, reproduced locally.

Coverage. All 13 listed entry points have a row: 10 hold, 3 carry findings. I also recorded the reserved-versus-balance invariant, the periphery encoders, and the documented constant-signer trust assumption as holding. One row is marked unreached: the fork runs and the wording-screen check on the oracle body need network access this review did not have.

Not re-reported. The rollover late-claimer skew, the impossibility of signer rotation, and the JobsVault snapshot gating are all documented design decisions in the README, so I left them out of the findings and noted them in coverage instead.

The findings file is valid, every snippet matches the tree, and the coverage record answers all 13 entry points. The scratch tests are in the gitignored test/scratch directory and nothing else in the tree changed.

Review result

Eight findings are written to .imd-findings.json: four medium, three low, one info. No critical or high defects were found, so no proof files were attached. All six supporting reproductions in test/scratch/Econ.t.sol pass against the current code.

Medium findings

• Refused launch bricks the vault. The one-shot flag in launch is set when the Intake takes the price, not when a launch exists. If the plane refuses the body, the dev wallet cannot retry, no launch ever names the vault as requester, and all IMD in the vault is stranded. The Intake v2 failure hook would let a refused ask be retried while keeping "only once" for real launches.
• Constant action ids and signer with no exit. If the oracle or job action is retired or the signer rotates, held deposits never open an epoch, the last epoch can never be rolled over, and JobsVault reverts on every job. The vault keeps routing about two thirds of every week's fees into the two dead contracts. The brief's no-admin rule forces the constants, so this is a tradeoff for the requester, with a dead-man's switch suggested as a no-admin fix.
• Caller-chosen snapshot. The snapshot sits 8 blocks before a permissionless distribute, so a buy, an 8-block wait, a distribute call and a sell earns a full week's share. The literal claim-side guarantee in the brief holds, but the economic intent does not.
• Rollover order dependence. A rollover credits the current epoch after holders may already have claimed from it. Two equal leaves were paid 19.75 and 39.4 IMD in the reproduction, and the early claimer's share drifts into a later epoch. The existing suite never claims from the receiving epoch before a rollover into it.

Low and info: no minimum pot so a dust epoch spends the full oracle price, a failed fee claim still consumes the weekly slot, an oracle failure locks a pot for 28 days instead of being retried, and bindLaunch does not require the pool's other side to be IMD.

What held: the 40/25.72/17.14/17.14 split and dust handling, the burn and native ETH path, the pot cap and once-per-epoch claim, the balance-equals-reserved conservation in HolderRewards, the Intake-only oracle callback with pinned question and consumed UUID, and all JobsVault gates.

Not reached: live Robinhood Chain behaviour. There is no network here, so the nine fork tests were skipped and the plane's acceptance of the oracle question body remains owed.

The review is complete. The findings file is valid, every snippet matches the tree, all 13 entry points have a coverage row, and the working tree is clean apart from the findings file and my gitignored scratch test.

Outcome

The permission model itself holds. Every state-changing entry point has the guard the brief asks for: launch and bindLaunch are dev-only one-shots, both setToken functions accept only the deploying vault, onOracleResult accepts only the Intake and rejects foreign requests, and no address or rate can be changed after deployment. I found no permission bypass. The defects are at the trust-gap and asymmetry seams, where a correct guard meets an economic path with no recovery.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json (four medium, one low), each with a reproduction I confirmed in a scratch test that passes against the current code:

1. JobsVault gate stricter than the brief. A wallet holding 1,000,000 tokens live is refused until it proves a leaf in the latest oracle root. Before any root exists, no job can ever be opened. The README states this is deliberate anti-sybil design, so it needs a requester decision.
2. One-shot launch() with no failure path. If the plane refuses the body, launched stays true, nothing can be bound, distribute reverts forever, and all IMD in the vault is stranded. The Intake's requestWithFailure offers the recovery hook the vault does not use.
3. Rollover breaks pro rata within an epoch. rollover raises the current epoch's pot after some holders have claimed. In the reproduction, two identical leaves received 1.75 IMD and 21.4 IMD. Anyone can time this since rollover is permissionless.
4. Fixed action ids and signer with no setter. Once the Intake stops selling oracle-1, every weekly 40% share is pulled into HolderRewards and held with no epoch, no claim and no rollover able to reach it. JobsVault's share is stranded the same way when job-1 retires. This is mandated by the brief's "no admin" rule, so I flagged it as a scope decision with three design-preserving options.
5. Decimals bound off by six. _decimals admits values up to 77 but the multiplication overflows at 72, which would make bindLaunch revert for such a token. Unlikely for the planned 18-decimal token.

Not reached: the fork tests against live Robinhood Chain skip here because there is no network. Live behaviour of claimFees payout assets and the Intake's request-id scheme is taken from the references and the README's recorded run, not re-verified.

Everything is green: 82 tests pass offline (including the reviewer's proof), the 4 fork tests pass against the live Robinhood Chain RPC, the fuzz seed the verifier uses passes, and forge fmt --check is clean. Sizes stay within limits (HolderRewards runtime 16,322 bytes, SIMDVault init code 29,215 bytes).

What changed

• Rollover pro-rata (proof, medium): each epoch now stores claimable, fixed to its pot when the root arrives, and claims pay from that base. Rollover still moves exactly pot - claimed into the current epoch, so the proof's assertion that the pot grows holds, but anything rolled into an already-rooted epoch passes through to the next epoch that opens instead of changing a share being claimed. The current epoch may also roll itself over after 28 days, so an unanswered ask is no longer stuck behind a newer epoch.
• Stranded shares (medium): a permissionless dormancy exit that keeps "no owner". HolderRewards records a stall at the first deposit no root follows and clears it on any root; after 60 days anyone can send the held IMD and carry to the dev wallet. JobsVault falls back to the brief's literal live-balance rule while the oracle is dormant, and gains a notice-then-recover path if the job action itself is unsold for 60 days.
• Advisory items fixed: minimum pot of twice the oracle price before an epoch opens, the decimals bound at 71, bindLaunch requiring the pool's other side to be IMD, and a distribute that moved nothing no longer spending the week.
• Documented rather than changed: the refused-launch recovery through the factory's setRequester, the requirement that the launch body name an owner or be a custom-token body, and the caller-chosen snapshot block, which I disputed as the brief's own design.

The answers to all twelve findings are in .imd-responses.json at the repository root. The README covers the new dormancy section, the revised rollover and claim semantics, the new constants, and the updated test count.

The finding I raised last round is fixed, and I've filed one new low-severity defect that the fix opened up. The full forge test run passes with the verifier's fuzz seed: 100 passed, 0 failed, 9 skipped. The 9 skipped are the fork tests, which skip cleanly because this machine has no RPC. A run against live Robinhood Chain state is still owed.

Last round's finding (2207eb88). I re-ran my original setup: four weekly distributions with the oracle never answering. Up to one second before 60 days, requestJob still reverts HoldingNotProven(alice, 0, 0). At exactly 60 days a live 1,000,000-token holder opens a job for 0.5 IMD. The 24-hour limit and the holding minimum still apply during that fallback. Once a root arrives the proof is required again. This is test_theReportedNoRootReproductionNowOpensAJobAfterSixtyDays in test/EdgeCases.t.sol.

Tests I changed or added:

• Invariant suite. My invariant suite was failing against the author's new rules, so I updated its model in test/invariant/SystemInvariant.t.sol:

  • Payouts now use the pot as it stood when the root arrived.
  • An epoch can roll itself over, with the remainder held in a carry for the next epoch.
  • The reserved total includes that carry.
  • A call whose fee claim fails while the vault holds no IMD no longer uses up the week.

  I also added the new exits: both recoverDormant functions, noticeUnsold, and switching the job action's price off and on. All four invariants pass at 256 runs × depth 40, and every action is reached.

• test/EdgeCases.t.sol. Two new tests:

  • JobsVault's recovery failure paths: still sold, an Intake that reverts, a repeated notice, and a job resetting the clock.
  • The new week-keeping rule. Tokens are still burned and ETH still goes to marketing on such a call, and a single wei of IMD uses up the week.

Reported in .imd-findings.json:

• Low: HolderRewards counts as "dormant" even though the oracle was never asked. Every deposit starts the 60-day clock, including one that is only held because it is below the minimum pot of 3 × price. So a quiet launch whose 40% share stays under 1.5 IMD for 60 days counts as having a dead oracle, while oracle.request is still sold and was never paid for. Two things follow:

  • Anyone can call recoverDormant() and send the holders' held IMD to the dev wallet. 0.72 IMD in my reproduction.
  • JobsVault drops its snapshot proof, which brings back the anti-recycling problem: one holding passed to a second wallet opened two jobs in the same block.

  I confirmed this with a scratch test. I did not assert the behaviour as correct. The suggested fix is to start the clock only when an ask fails or goes unanswered, or when the action is unsold.

• Info: new IMD exits the brief doesn't have. Both recoverDormant functions send IMD to the dev wallet, while the brief says JobsVault has no withdraw. It's narrow and documented, so I flagged it for the requester to accept explicitly rather than calling it a defect.

The only tracked changes are the two test files above. The findings file sits in the repository root as the task asks.