I built the WORLD token as a Foundry project at the repository root. forge build, forge test (15 tests pass, run with the verifier's fuzz seed) and forge fmt --check all pass with solc 0.8.26. I couldn't commit it: git has no author identity set on this machine, and I didn't make one up. All the files are staged and ready.

The token (src/WorldToken.sol, contract WorldToken)

• It is a standard ERC-20 using OpenZeppelin v5.1.0, returning name() "World mining token", symbol() "WORLD" and decimals() 18.
• The constructor takes no arguments and mints the whole supply of 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 once to whoever deploys it. On the launch, that is the factory.
• There is no owner, no further minting, no burning, no pause, no blacklist and no transfer fee. Every transfer moves exactly the amount sent, so the distributor share, the pool seed and trades all arrive whole.

Tests (test/WorldToken.t.sol)

• What works: name, symbol and decimals; the one-time mint and its event; transfers; approvals and transferFrom; an unlimited approval not being used up; the deploy function.
• What fails as it should: sending more than you hold, spending more than you were approved for, and sending to or approving the zero address.
• Admin functions: calls to mint, ownership, pause and burnFrom all fail.
• Fuzz tests: random transfers and approvals never change the total supply.

Also included

• Config: foundry.toml pins solc 0.8.26 with bytecode_hash = "none", and remappings.txt maps the two libraries.
• Libraries: forge-std v1.9.7 and OpenZeppelin are copied into lib/ as ordinary files (not submodules), so the build works offline.
• Deploy script: script/DeployWorldToken.s.sol is for reviewing or local use only. It doesn't broadcast anything, and I didn't deploy anything.
• README: covers the assumptions, deployment parameters and operational responsibilities, and says there is nothing to set after launch.

I couldn't run the two protected launch tests here. They rely on files the verifier supplies (the Uniswap v4 code, the launch helpers and the owner checks). The token has no owner, so the owner check has nothing to flag. It also has no fees or admin functions, so it shouldn't break the launch flows those tests exercise.

To commit, set a git name and email and run git commit on the staged files.

Created launch.json matching WorldToken, its constructor supply, and the exact pool and economics values.

Validation passed: manifest checks, compiled constructor ABI, forge build, and all 15 tests with the supplied fuzz seed. Only launch.json changed.

The review is complete. No defects found in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap areas, and the findings file records that with full coverage.

What was reviewed. The token at src/WorldToken.sol is a 19-line OpenZeppelin 5.1.0 ERC-20 with one constructor mint and no overrides. I confirmed the vendored ERC20.sol, Context.sol and the ERC-6093 errors are the unmodified upstream texts, so the arithmetic under review is OpenZeppelin's.

Math and boundary probes run. I wrote and ran a scratch Foundry suite of 13 tests against the code, then deleted it. All passed:

• The supply literal is exactly 1e27, divides by 10^18 with zero remainder, and sits well below the uint96 range, so the unchecked receiver addition in _update can never overflow.
• Zero-amount transfers from zero-balance senders and zero-allowance spenders succeed with no state change, as the standard requires.
• Exact-balance, balance plus one, and type(uint256).max transfers revert with the correct error and values. Self-transfer of the whole balance conserves it.
• Allowance equal to the amount goes to zero, max minus one is decremented, max is left untouched while the balance check still applies, and approve overwrites rather than accumulates.
• A fuzzed three-party transfer and transferFrom sequence conserves the sum of balances at 1e27.
• The runtime has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT and no metadata hash in the creation code.

Boundary enumeration. The contract has no external calls, no payable functions, no receive or fallback, no sentinel-address branches of its own and no bytes decoding, so the Boundary guide's call-site list is empty. The Numerical Gap seams need at least one division or scaled formula and there is none.

Static analysis lead. The aderyn large-numeric-literal note on line 13 is a style remark. The literal is a compile-time constant that evaluates to exactly 1e27, so it is not reported.

Output. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and nine coverage rows: the three entry points marked holds, plus six invariant and boundary rows. The existing 15 project tests also pass. No repository file was changed.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list with eleven coverage rows.

Result: no defects in the Access Control, Trust Gap or Asymmetry areas. src/WorldToken.sol is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.1.0 ERC-20 whose only custom code is a constructor minting the full supply to the deployer.

What I verified

• All three listed entry points hold. Each debits or approves only on behalf of the caller, rejects the zero address, and conserves supply. The deployer has no special allowance, so it cannot pull from a holder.
• The compiled ABI exposes only the ERC-20 set plus three constant views. There is no owner, initializer, mint, burn, pause, blacklist, seize or recovery function, and no receive or fallback.
• Twenty-eight privileged selectors called from an outsider and from the deployer all revert, with supply and balances unchanged. This mirrors the protected floor tests, which I could not run directly because they need v4-core.
• The runtime bytecode contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT, CALL, CREATE or transient storage opcodes.
• The vendored ERC20.sol and Context.sol match upstream v5.1.0, so no hidden branch keyed on a privileged address exists in the dependency.
• Name, symbol, decimals and supply match the brief. The aderyn large-numeric-literal lead is the correct supply constant, not a defect.

Not covered: the protected floor's pool seed and swap tests, which need the Uniswap v4 harness. Nothing in the token's transfer path differs by caller, so I do not expect them to fail.

The scratch tests were deleted and the tree is otherwise unchanged.

The review is complete. The findings file is in place and the working tree holds nothing else of mine.

Outcome: no defects in the assigned area. WorldToken is a bare OpenZeppelin v5.1.0 ERC20 whose constructor mints the full supply to the deployer. It has no owner, mint, burn, pause, fee, hook, callback or external dependency, so none of the failure modes in the Economic Security, Invariant or Flow Gap guides have a surface to act on.

What I verified, and how:

• Economic Security. No oracle, external call or callback exists. Zero-address transfer and approve revert rather than silently succeed. There is no receive or fallback, so ETH sent to the token is refused. The token returns true and reverts on failure, so callers that check the return value or rely on reverts both work.
• Invariants. Total supply is written only in the constructor and the amount fits comfortably in uint256. The internal mint and burn helpers have no external caller. A 256-run Foundry invariant fuzz over eight actors, including the token's own address, kept total supply constant and sum of balances equal to supply. Probing twelve plausible hidden selectors from the deployer changed nothing.
• Flow Gap. The launch sequence in the protected test was replayed in a scratch test: factory to distributor, distributor to claimant, factory to pool manager, pool manager push and pull via transfer and transferFrom, and remainder. Every leg arrived whole and supply did not move. The constructor takes no arguments, so the factory's CREATE2 deployment mints to the factory as the floor requires.
• Library integrity. The five vendored OpenZeppelin files the token compiles against hash byte for byte to upstream v5.1.0.

One standard ERC-20 property worth knowing but not reported as a defect: approve is the plain two-transaction allowance update, so the known allowance front-running race applies as it does to every unmodified OpenZeppelin token.

Coverage rows were written for all three entry points plus five invariant and flow checks, all marked holds. The scratch test directory and build output were removed. The static-analysis lead about the large numeric literal is a style note and was not reproduced as a defect.

I added two test files for WorldToken and didn't find any defects, so there's no .imd-findings.json. With the verifier's fuzz seed, forge test passes all 33 tests: the 15 that were already there plus 18 new ones.

The token is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20. It mints exactly 1,000,000,000 WORLD with 18 decimals to the deployer and has no owner, mint, burn, pause or fee.

• test/WorldTokenInvariant.t.sol: a handler drives transfers, approvals (including unlimited ones), transferFrom and calls involving the zero address, at random among 5 actors. Amounts go past what the sender holds or is allowed to spend, so the failing calls get run as well as the successful ones. After every sequence (256 runs, 64 calls each), these must hold:

  • total supply never changes;
  • balances add up to the supply, and the zero address holds nothing;
  • every balance and allowance matches what the handler tracked;
  • every call either succeeded or reverted exactly when it should have.

• test/WorldTokenEdges.t.sol: 17 tests, mostly failure paths:

  • zero-amount transfers, including to the zero address;
  • transfers to yourself, and moving the whole supply at once;
  • transfers of type(uint256).max;
  • a new approval replacing the old one, and approving 0 to revoke;
  • allowances being per-spender, and a failed transferFrom spending none of the allowance;
  • calls from the zero address, sending ETH, and calling a burn function that doesn't exist.

  It also deploys the token through CREATE2 the way the launch factory does, to show the supply goes to the deploying contract, and has a 1000-run fuzz test of transferFrom between holders.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. No file in the tree was changed; the scratch test directory was removed after it ran.

Verdict: clean review, zero findings. All four specialists and the independent tester reported nothing, so there was nothing to reproduce or merge. I re-read the code myself against the supplied checklists and the protected floor tests, and found no defect.

What I verified:

• Token source at src/WorldToken.sol is a seventeen-line contract inheriting stock OpenZeppelin v5.1.0 ERC20. The vendored ERC20.sol, Context.sol and interfaces read as unmodified upstream.
• Constructor mints exactly 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 to msg.sender once. A scratch Foundry test deployed it via CREATE2 from a factory stand-in and confirmed the factory holds the whole supply, name, symbol and decimals match the manifest, and the factory-to-distributor-to-claimant flow moves exact amounts.
• Mutating ABI surface is exactly approve, transfer and transferFrom. Common mint, burn, pause and ownership selectors revert. Plain ETH sends revert. Runtime code contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. Sizes are far under the EIP-170 and initcode limits.
• Existing suite passes: 33 tests including an invariant run of 16,384 handler calls with balances summing to supply.
• launch.json has no extra keys, lowercase addresses, empty constructorArgs matching the no-argument constructor, and a totalSupply string equal to the minted amount.
• Static-analysis lead from aderyn about a large numeric literal is a style note on a compile-time constant, not a defect, and was left out.

The coverage record in .imd-findings.json marks all three entry points as holds, plus rows for the supply invariant, the manifest and the dismissed aderyn lead.