Verification is complete. No tracked file changed; .imd-findings.json holds four findings and test/scratch/ holds my harness copies.

Verdict: NO-GO (one unresolved launch risk, no contract defects found)

What passed

• Source identity. HEAD is 3a26e979a5198fa515ded5a32e28b6c34902001b, tree b8800af76ee7df5b312018e26ee518f44636da27. The original-bytecode fixtures hash identically to a clean build of commit 6a78621; compiled runtime sizes match the docs table exactly.
• Seven contracts deploy on the real factory. Fork at mainnet block 26,137,298 against factory 0xfF03…7120: original bytecodes reproduce DeploymentFailed(6), repaired bytecodes complete the full launch (token, 7 apps, distributor, pool, receipt).
• FeeHookDeployer references. poolManager literal, $token (predicted 0x1787…B3a4), quote address(0), waterfall = app 5; the constructor's reserveAsset()/weth() reads resolve to mainnet WETH so the native-quote check passes.
• Launch parameters preserved. launch.json differs from its first commit only in the notes string; all constructor argument lists, token and pool blocks are byte-identical.
• No roles granted. Guardian, executor, signers, quorum, keeper all unset; owner, operator, factory and all apps hold Role.None.
• Tests. 280 offline tests pass, formatting clean, both fork tests pass, and the pinned contracts-only protected check passes with manifest-resolved inputs.

Gas (fork, exact factory)

	gas
Measured total (rehearsal payload)	16,759,438
EIP-7825 cap	16,777,216
Margin	17,778 (0.106%)
Cost per additional agent ID	~23,000 + calldata

Unresolved risk (the blocker). The rehearsal payload is a guess: 12 synthetic agent IDs, synthetic owner, placeholder receipt. Measured on the fork, 13 agent IDs overshoot the cap by 5,425 gas and a one-word-longer repo URL by 27,505. The launch record says "300 agents across 12 wallets", and the repair-job record reports the original simulation at 20,816,126 gas, while the same original bytecodes with the rehearsal payload need 19,733,790 here. That 1.08M difference is 60× the margin; applied to the repaired code it predicts ~17.84M. Nothing in the repo or on-chain can resolve the real agent count (no launch-816 call was ever broadcast). The service must re-simulate the exact production payload before proceeding.

Code findings

• Low: a one-second heartbeat lapse lets anyone hard-quarantine a member; it survives feed recovery, closes deposits and zeroes the target for ≥2 days (reproduced in test/scratch/StaleLapse.t.sol). Mitigate operationally with heartbeat slack.
• Info: manifest is evm_project while the pinned verifier check is the contracts-only floor; the $token/pool path is covered only by the fork test.
• Info: no attestation reachable; the job record cites commit c6a77b2, which is not in this repository.

Coverage. Read in full: all nine src/ contracts and interfaces, the fork/launch harnesses, fixtures, docs. Not reachable: the launch service's attestation, policy row, production payload, and the factory's source.

Verdict: NO-GO on one unresolved item. Everything this repository can verify passes. The one thing it cannot resolve is the production-payload gas margin, which only the launch service holds.

What was verified

• Source. HEAD is the repaired commit 3a26e979 with tree b8800af7. GitHub main resolves to the same commit and tree. The repair job's accepted submission records that exact tree as its verified tree hash, which settles the audit's "c6a77b2" provenance question: that was the worker's local commit of the same tree.
• Factory path. On a mainnet archive fork at block 26,137,298 against the real factory and operator, the original bytecode reverts with DeploymentFailed(6) and the repaired bytecode deploys the token, all seven applications and the distributor at the predicted addresses.
• FeeHookDeployer. Its arguments resolve to the mainnet PoolManager, the predicted token, native quote and the predicted FeeWaterfall. Both waterfall reads return mainnet WETH, and the hook slot is zero after launch.
• Parameters. launch.json differs from its first accepted commit only in the notes string. All seven constructor argument lists, the token block and the pool block match the original launch record's proof section exactly.
• Bytecode consistency. The seven original creation hashes embedded in the repo equal both a clean rebuild of commit 6a78621 and the per-contract hashes in the public launch record. The repaired hashes are now pinned in a test. No attestation exists yet over the repaired tree, so the service must produce one.
• Roles. Admin is $owner; guardian, executor, signers and quorum are unset; the factory holds no role and cannot schedule an operation.
• Checks. forge build clean. forge test: 287 passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped (fork suite offline). The pinned contracts-only protected floor passes with manifest-resolved inputs. Fork suite: 3 of 3 pass.

Gas

Quantity	Gas
Cap	16,777,216
Repaired total (rehearsal payload)	16,759,438
Margin	17,778
Cost of one extra agent ID	23,203
Cost of one extra receipt-URL word	22,767

The service recorded 20,816,126 gas for the original bytecode with the real payload, versus 19,733,790 for the rehearsal payload. That difference is payload, not code, and projects the repaired launch to roughly 1.06M gas over the cap. The public job record truncates the simulation call after its kind field, so the real agent count, owner and receipt cannot be recovered here. The launch service must re-simulate its exact payload before anything proceeds.

Audit findings

• Gas margin (medium): reproduces exactly. It is the NO-GO item, now covered by a fork test.
• Heartbeat lapse (low): reproduces. Source left unchanged because this follow-up verifies a fixed, attested tree, and the mitigation the finding proposes is a post-launch timelock configuration. A new test pins the behaviour and the mitigation.
• Manifest kind (info): confirmed and documented. Manifest unchanged, as the brief requires.
• Provenance (info): resolved via the work record's verified tree hash.

Files delivered

• docs/VERIFICATION-816.md holds the full GO / NO-GO report.
• ADAPTATION.md lists each change and the finding or brief item behind it.
• New tests in test/Launch816Record.t.sol and test/StaleFeedQuarantine.t.sol, plus one fork-only margin test.
• One index line added to README. No src, manifest or configuration file changed. Nothing was deployed or broadcast, and the working tree is left uncommitted for the harness.

Verdict: NO-GO (one unresolved item, outside the math area), with the math area itself clean apart from one low-severity boundary defect.

What I checked. The source under review is the repaired tree: git diff 3a26e979..HEAD touches only docs and tests, and src/, foundry.toml and launch.json are byte-identical. Build is clean and the full suite passes (287 passed, 1 skipped, the skip being the offline fork suite). I audited every division, scale conversion, downcast, subtraction and boundary comparison in all nine contracts against the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides, and confirmed the seams I could not settle by reading with scratch Foundry tests, which I then removed.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json:

1. Low, src/IndexVault.sol:329. The share lock keeps balance - value >= mintedThisBlock, so a full-balance redemption or transfer always fails in a block where anyone minted dust shares to that holder. A front-run deposit(1, victim, 0) reverts the victim's full exit with SharesLocked for that block. Verified: the full-balance redeem reverts, redeeming balance - dust in the same block succeeds, and the dust redeems the next block. No loss of funds, one-block griefing only.
2. Info, docs/VERIFICATION-816.md:50. The launch gas margin recorded by the prior follow-up is 17,778 gas (0.106%) under the 16,777,216 cap with a rehearsal payload, less than one extra agent ID or one extra calldata word. The fork measurement cannot be re-run here without an RPC. This is the NO-GO item and only the launch service can resolve it by simulating its real payload.

Math checks that hold, with the numbers that settle them:

• Vault share math uses a 1e6 virtual-share / 1 wei virtual-asset offset. A donation attack costs the attacker more than the victim loses. Deposit-cap check equals preview availability at the exact cap.
• Redemption uses pre-burn supply and floors every slice, so payouts never exceed balances.
• FeeWaterfall gives the basket the remainder. Across a split change the basket credit was 24,691,365 against 24,691,360 recorded by the hook's per-swap floors, so the "never credits less" invariant holds.
• Executor delta, buffer, drift and oracle-floor math are all in reserve units. After buying the basket to target, the rounding residual was 79 units on a 1e12 NAV and the follow-on sell was refused.
• FeeHook fee uses amount * pips / 1e6 with pips at most 30,000, so no overflow, the hook delta never exceeds the swap amount, and the afterSwap fill check matches for both exact-in and exact-out.
• Timestamp subtractions in EpochManager, AssetRegistry and the executor window are all guarded by a prior ordering check. All downcasts are bounded.

Coverage: 57 of 57 entry points answered plus three invariant rows. No critical or high finding, so no proof file was required.

Review complete. The findings file is written at the repository root with 2 findings and a 62-row coverage record covering all 57 listed entry points. No repository file was changed. Scratch tests were removed.

Verdict: NO-GO, for one unresolved item outside the code. Every check this tree can perform passes, and I reproduced each one independently. The blocker is unchanged from the existing verification record: the rehearsal payload fits the EIP-7825 cap with a margin smaller than one extra agent ID, and the production payload is not in this repository.

Check	Result
1. Source checked	HEAD adds only docs and tests on top of 3a26e979. Sources, manifest, config, libs and script are byte-identical to the repaired commit.
2. Seven apps deploy via real factory	Fork suite passes 3 of 3 at block 26,137,298 through a public archive RPC. Original bytecode reproduces DeploymentFailed(6).
3. FeeHookDeployer args	Resolve to PoolManager literal, the CREATE2 token, native quote, and the FeeWaterfall predecessor. Both waterfall getters return WETH.
4. Original parameters preserved	Token, pool and all seven constructor argument lists are identical to the first accepted manifest commit. Only the notes string changed.
5. Manifest, commit, tree, bytecode	Creation hashes pinned in the record test match the build. No attestation exists yet over the repaired tree, and HEAD's tree differs from 3a26e979's, so the service must attest whichever tree it publishes.
6. No automatic roles	Confirmed on the fork: admin is the owner, guardian, executor, signer count and quorum are zero, every role lookup is None.
7. Tests, verifier floor, fork	287 offline tests pass. The pinned protected check passes with manifest-resolved inputs. Fork suite passes.
8. Gas	Total 16,759,438 of 16,777,216. Margin 17,778 gas, about 0.1%. One more agent ID costs 23,203.

Findings in my area (Access Control, Trust Gap, Asymmetry):

• Low. A permissionless stale-feed quarantine, which anyone can trigger one second past a heartbeat, is treated by the executor as full authority: the keeper may then dump the entire position outside any rebalance window, and the executor's NAV shrinks so every healthy member becomes sellable down to a lower target. Each sale clears at the oracle floor. In the fixture one unprivileged call exposed about 3,460 USDC of a 1,000,000 USDC vault to slippage capture before a two-day timelocked release. This widens the already-recorded heartbeat finding from a deposit outage to realisable value loss and basket drift without signer or guardian action.
• Info. The predicted application addresses in the verification record and its record test are derived from the rehearsal owner 0xA11CE. All seven production addresses depend on the real policy owner and will differ.

Permission model otherwise holds. I traced every state-changing entry point: one role per address, admin holds no role, guardian powers are tighten-only, recovery operations cannot be vetoed, the executor contract moves vault assets only inside its own swap, and the fee hook pays only the waterfall. No escalation chain, unguarded initializer, or inconsistent guard was found.

Unresolved risks, in order: production payload gas, missing attestation over the published tree, the heartbeat quarantine behaviour above, and the out-of-scope economic fork validation and independent audit the repair itself lists.

The review is complete. No tracked file changed; the findings file and my one scratch test are in place and ignored by git as intended.

Verdict: NO-GO on one unresolved item, unchanged from the prior verification. Every check this repository can perform passes, including two I re-ran independently here. The single open item is the production payload's gas, which only the launch service can simulate.

What I verified myself

• Source identity holds. The contracts and manifest are byte-identical between the working tree and the repaired commit 3a26e979 (tree b8800af7). The creation-code hash pins in the record test pass.
• Full offline suite: 287 passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped (fork suite, offline).
• Fork rehearsal at block 26,137,298 through a public archive RPC: 3 of 3 pass. Original bytecode reverts DeploymentFailed(6); repaired bytecode deploys the token, all seven applications and the distributor, with every role, guardian, executor, signer count and quorum unset.
• Pinned protected floor re-run with manifest-resolved inputs (real factory address, chain 1, seven resolved creation codes and salts): passes. The computed addresses equal the recorded set exactly, token 0x1787…b3a4 and applications 0x05b6…8Dcc through 0x53B0…4a11.
• FeeHookDeployer references resolve: it reads reserveAsset() and weth() from the FeeWaterfall deployed one index earlier, both WETH, so the native-quote branch passes, and hook() is zero after launch.

Gas (fork, rehearsal payload)

Quantity	Gas
Cap (EIP-7825)	16,777,216
Repaired launch total	16,759,438
Margin	17,778
Cost of one extra agent ID	23,203
Cost of one extra receipt-URL word	22,767

Either payload change alone exceeds the cap. The production agent list, owner, receipt hashes and URL are not in this repository, so the margin cannot be confirmed here. That is the NO-GO item.

Control-flow audit (Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles)

I traced all 57 listed entry points plus the launch resolution path, checked the Uniswap v4 callback accounting against the vendored Hooks library, and found one defect, recorded as low in .imd-findings.json with a reproduction in test/scratch/DeadProposal.t.sol:

• EpochManager.publish accepts a proposal that can never activate. The publish-time checks omit the rebalance-cadence rule that activate enforces. With launch defaults, any proposal published earlier than six days after the last activation is dead on arrival, yet it occupies the single pending slot and blocks a correctly timed replacement until its expiry, up to seven days. It needs an honest but early signer quorum, so it is a liveness gap, not a fund-loss path. The guardian can cancel it.

Two leads were traced and set aside as documented design, not defects: a held token that becomes permanently unreadable keeps deposits and treasury pushes closed with no write-off path (README lines 240-244 state this deliberately), and the one-second heartbeat quarantine lapse already recorded under finding 72f24c4d.

Still unresolved before launch

1. Production payload gas simulation by the launch service against tree b8800af7.
2. No attestation yet exists over the repaired tree; the service must produce one and recompute the manifest hash, per-contract hashes and addresses with the real owner.
3. Operational: approve feeds with heartbeat slack above the nominal value; the manifest kind is evm_project while this review's protected floor is the contracts-only check, so the token, distributor and pool path is covered only by the fork suite.

Verdict: NO-GO, for one unresolved item only. Every check this repository can perform passes, but the atomic launch fits the gas cap by 17,778 gas with a rehearsal payload, and the production payload is held only by the launch service.

Findings are in .imd-findings.json (3 findings, 62 coverage rows covering all 57 listed entry points). No tracked file was changed; scratch tests live under test/scratch/.

The eight verification items

1. Source checked. The working tree is commit 1200788, whose src/, launch.json, foundry.toml and lib/ are byte-identical to the repaired commit 3a26e979. The later commit adds only docs and tests. All eight creation bytecode keccaks recomputed from a fresh build equal the record table.
2. Seven applications deploy through the real factory. Fork at block 26,137,298 against the mainnet factory: original bytecode reverts DeploymentFailed(6), repaired bytecode deploys token, all seven applications and the distributor at the predicted addresses.
3. FeeHookDeployer arguments resolve. PoolManager literal, the CREATE2 token address, native quote and the FeeWaterfall address. Both constructor getter reads return mainnet WETH. The hook slot is zero after launch.
4. Original parameters preserved. The manifest differs from the first accepted commit only in the notes string (3,258 characters). Argument counts and values are unchanged.
5. Manifest, commit, tree, bytecode consistent. Yes for everything that exists. No attestation over the repaired tree exists yet. The service must attest whichever tree it publishes.
6. No roles assigned. After the fork launch the owner is admin; guardian, executor, signer count and quorum are zero; no address holds a role.
7. Tests, verifier floor, fork. Offline suite 287 passed, 0 failed, 1 skip. The pinned protected check passes with the manifest-resolved factory, salts, init code and addresses. Fork suite 3 of 3 pass.
8. Gas.

Quantity	Gas
Transaction cap (EIP-7825)	16,777,216
Rehearsal total, repaired bytecode	16,759,438
Safety margin	17,778
One extra agent ID	+23,203
One extra receipt-URL word	+22,767

The service recorded about 1.08M more gas for its real payload than the rehearsal payload on the original bytecode. Applied here that predicts roughly 1.06M over the cap. Only the service can confirm or refute this.

Economic findings (Economic Security, Invariant, Flow Gap guides)

• Medium, gas margin. The blocking item above, reproduced exactly on the fork. Not a code defect.
• Low, oracle-lag round trip at launch defaults. The deposit fee starts at zero and the share lock lasts one block. With feeds lagging the market by one deviation, a depositor of 100,000 units leaves the next block with 100,890.9 units at market, taken from existing holders. README documents the risk; this quantifies it and shows a 1% deposit fee neutralizes one deviation. A proof test fails on the current code.
• Info, hooked pool initialization. Anyone can initialize the single hooked pool at any price once the hook exists. Recoverable with a zero-liquidity swap, so operational only.

Fee conservation, waterfall split math, hook delta accounting against v4, vault backing and in-kind pro-rata, executor delta and floor rules, and timelock role exclusivity all held under trace. Nothing in my area was left unreached.

Unresolved risks, in priority order

1. Production payload gas. The service must simulate its exact payload against this bytecode.
2. No attestation over the repaired tree.
3. Deposit fee left at zero at launch, and feed heartbeats configured with slack above nominal (existing low).
4. Still open from the repair: live-market economic validation and an independent audit before real funds.

The findings file is in place and intentionally excluded from git by the harness, as is the scratch folder. All work is done and verified, so here is the report.

Verdict: NO-GO on one unresolved item, everything else GO

The repaired commit 3a26e979 (tree b8800af7…) is the source in this tree, and src/, launch.json, foundry.toml and lib/ are byte-identical to it. Every check this repository can run passes. The one item that cannot be resolved here is the production-payload gas margin, which only the launch service can settle. Do not launch until it does.

Checks against the brief

1. Source commit. Tree hash of 3a26e979 is b8800af7…; no source drift since. Creation hashes and runtime sizes of all seven applications match the report tables exactly.
2. Factory path. Fork at block 26,137,298 against the real factory, run today against a public archive endpoint: original bytecode reverts DeploymentFailed(6), repaired bytecode deploys token, seven applications and distributor at their predicted addresses. The pinned contracts-only protected floor also passes with the manifest-resolved codes, salts and addresses.
3. FeeHookDeployer. Arguments resolve to the PoolManager literal, the predicted token, native quote, and the FeeWaterfall address. The new tests show the three constructors that depend on an earlier application, that wrong sibling references and a non-wrapping waterfall roll the whole batch back, and that the hook deploys offline with the launched literals.
4. Parameters. Every init-code tail decodes to the exact launch.json argument list, for both original and repaired payloads.
5. Consistency. Bytecode, addresses and report tables agree. No attestation over the repaired tree exists yet; the service must produce one.
6. Roles. Fuzzed over arbitrary addresses: no role, allowlist entry or balance anywhere. Every configuration entry point refuses the owner wallet, the factory and strangers until the two-day timelock has run.
7. Tests. Full suite: 324 passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped (fork test offline). Fork suite 3 of 3 pass. Protected floor passes.

Gas

Quantity	Gas
Transaction cap	16,777,216
Repaired, rehearsal payload (fork)	16,759,438
Safety margin	17,778
Cost of one more agent ID	23,203
Service's record, original bytecode, real payload	20,816,126
Saving from repair (offline, matches fork within 300)	2,974,128
Predicted repaired total, real payload	17,841,998

The predicted production total is about 1.06M over the cap. The margin is smaller than a single extra agent ID. This is recorded as a medium finding in .imd-findings.json, alongside an informational note that a $token resolved from different bytes than the deployed token would pass the factory's address check, so the service must resolve it from the attested payload.

Files added (all under test/): Launch816Resolution.t.sol, Launch816State.t.sol, Launch816Deployer.t.sol, Launch816Gas.t.sol, invariant/Launch816Waterfall.invariant.t.sol, and the shared fixture utils/Launch816Live.sol. The invariant suite drives the launched waterfall and vault with native-ETH fees, timelock treasury pushes, claims, split changes and rescue attempts in the exact WETH configuration, with fee conservation, liability coverage, basket-floor and cap invariants over 128 runs.

What remains for the requester: the launch service must simulate its exact production payload against tree b8800af7… and publish the gas, and attest the repaired tree. If the simulation lands under the cap, every other item is GO.