Done. The project is committed and verified locally.

What was built

• src/MADToken.sol: a plain ERC-20 on OpenZeppelin Contracts v5.4.0. Name Mutually Assured Destruction, symbol MAD, 18 decimals. The constructor mints the whole 1,000,000,000 MAD supply once to msg.sender and takes no arguments. There is no owner, mint, burn, pause, blocklist, fee or upgrade path, so the supply can never grow and no privileged hand can touch a holder's balance.
• script/DeployMADToken.s.sol: a reference deploy script whose deploy() function is test-callable and reads nothing from the environment.
• foundry.toml: solc pinned to 0.8.26, bytecode_hash = "none", metadata off, optimizer on, no ffi or filesystem access.
• lib/: forge-std v1.9.7 and the five OpenZeppelin ERC20 files vendored as ordinary committed files. No submodule.
• README.md: assumptions, manifest values for the launch step, an "After launch" section stating nothing needs configuring, and operational responsibilities including the absence of any admin key and that no static analyzers ran.

Checks run

Tests cover metadata, the one-time mint and its events, exact-amount transfers, chained transfers, allowance spending and the infinite-allowance case, reverts for insufficient balance, missing allowance and zero addresses, a sweep of admin selectors that all revert, the deployer failing to move a holder's balance, and a bytecode scan mirroring the floor's delegatecall and selfdestruct check.

Not verifiable here

The pinned floor tests import v4-core and the launch's LaunchLiquidity sources, which are not in this repository, so I could not run them directly. The token satisfies their stated requirements by construction: whole supply at the deployer, no transfer tax, no supply growth, no privileged moves, and no forbidden opcodes.

launch.json is written and verified. Only that file changed.

What the manifest describes. The accepted tree holds a single contract, MADToken, with a no-argument constructor that mints the whole supply to msg.sender. So the manifest names the token with constructorArgs: [], no application contracts, and the fixed values the launch gives.

• Token: contract MADToken, name Mutually Assured Destruction, symbol MAD, decimals 18, totalSupply 1000000000000000000000000000 (matches the contract's TOTAL_SUPPLY constant).
• Pool: FWA pair address, fee 12500, tickSpacing 60, initialPrice 79228162514264337593543950336.
• Economics: copied verbatim from the job.
• Notes: 1320 characters describing the token's unmodified ERC-20 behaviour and absence of admin powers.

Checks run.

• forge build compiled cleanly.
• forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed: 31 tests passed, 0 failed.
• A local script confirmed the manifest uses only the schema's keys, strings for uint256 and addresses, lowercase addresses, economics in the job's exact form, and the notes within the limit.
• git status shows launch.json as the sole new file. No config, lib, or other paths were touched.

The review is complete and the findings file is written and validated.

Outcome: no defect found in the assigned area. The token is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC-20 with a fixed supply minted once to the deployer. It has no owner, role, modifier, initializer, upgrade path, pause, blocklist, burn, external call or delegatecall, so the Access Control and Trust Gap guides have nothing to attack, and the only Asymmetry item is standard ERC-20 behaviour.

What I checked

• Read the token, the deploy script, the README, both repository tests and the two protected judge tests, and read the vendored OpenZeppelin ERC20, Context and interface files line by line to confirm they match upstream v5.4.0.
• Built the project and ran the full suite. All 31 tests pass. Static analysis had only a cosmetic literal warning, which is the correct one billion constant.
• Inspected the compiled ABI. The only non-view functions are approve, transfer and transferFrom. There is no receive, fallback or payable path, and unknown selectors and plain ETH revert without state change.
• Traced each entry point for who can write which storage slot. Balances move only on the holder's own call or under an allowance the holder granted. Total supply is written only by the constructor.
• Wrote a scratch Foundry test to confirm the one reproducible behaviour worth recording, then removed it.

Reported in .imd-findings.json

• One informational item: the inherited ERC-20 approve-then-transferFrom ordering race, where a spender can pull an old allowance before a replacement lands. It is inherent to the standard, the README already documents it as a holder responsibility, and I state plainly that no code change is required.
• Eight coverage rows: the three listed entry points, four invariants I verified (no privileged actor, fixed supply, constructor hands only tokens to the factory, no DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT in the runtime), and the trust-gap seams, which are vacuous for a contract with no privileged actor and no pricing formula.

Nothing outside the assigned area turned up a severe defect. No repository file was changed beyond the findings file.

The review is complete, and the findings file is written and validated.

Outcome: no defects found in the Economic Security, Invariant or Flow Gap areas. The findings file at the repository root holds an empty findings list and eight coverage rows, all marked holds, covering the three entry points plus the invariants and flows I checked.

What I verified

• The token is plain OpenZeppelin ERC20. All five vendored library files hash byte for byte to upstream v5.4.0, so transfer, approve and transferFrom are the audited implementations with no override.
• Supply invariant. The only mint is in the constructor, to msg.sender, for exactly one billion tokens at 18 decimals. There is no mint, burn, owner, pause, fallback or receive. A CREATE2 deployment from a factory address credits that factory, as the launch requires.
• Conservation. A scratch invariant test ran 128,000 random transfer, approve and transferFrom calls across six actors including the token contract itself. The sum of balances always equalled totalSupply.
• Launch flows. I replayed the 10 percent swarm, 80 percent pool and 10 percent remainder split, then a claim leg and a buy and sell leg. Every transfer delivered the exact stated amount and the supply did not change.
• Economic surface. No external dependency, oracle or ETH path exists. Transfers to the zero address revert. Transfers to the token's own address succeed and are unrecoverable, which the README documents and which is standard ERC-20 behaviour with no privileged recovery to flag as a trust assumption.
• Static analysis lead. The aderyn large-numeric-literal note resolves to a correctly computed constant and is a style remark, not a defect.

Checks that ran: forge build, the project's 31 tests, my 4 scratch tests, and forge fmt in check mode. All passed. The scratch tests were deleted afterwards and git status shows a clean tree with only the findings file present.

Not covered: nothing in my assigned area was left unreached. The pool parameters, pair currency and chain the README mentions live outside this code and are the manifest step's responsibility.

The review is complete and the findings file is written and valid. No defects were found.

What I audited. The Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles passes were applied to the token's three state-changing entry points, its constructor, and the vendored base it inherits from.

• Periphery. All five vendored OpenZeppelin files were diffed byte-for-byte against the upstream v5.4.0 tag and are identical. The base is a plain msg.sender context with no forwarder.
• Execution trace. Each of approve, transfer and transferFrom was traced through the inherited checks, storage writes and revert paths. The allowance is spent before the balance moves, infinite allowance is not decremented, self-transfer nets to zero, and no stale read or partial update exists.
• First principles. The supply constant evaluates to exactly one billion times ten to the eighteenth under the 0.8 literal rules. Minting happens only in the constructor and goes to msg.sender, which I confirmed is the deploying contract under CREATE2, matching the factory flow.
• Launch floor. The compiled ABI exposes no mint, burn, owner, pause, blocklist or upgrade selector, no receive or fallback, and the runtime has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT and no metadata trailer. Every transfer moves the exact amount, so the factory, distributor, seed and swap flows are satisfied by construction.

Checks I ran. The project's own 31 tests and formatting check pass. A temporary scratch test covering CREATE2 deployment, self-transferFrom, approve race ordering, transfers to the token address and a supply-conservation fuzz also passed, and was removed afterwards. The two static analysis leads were only a style-level numeric literal note and produced nothing reproducible.

Output. The file at the repository root holds an empty findings list and eleven coverage rows. All three listed entry points are marked as holding, along with the constructor, the supply and no-privilege invariants, the vendored library, the bytecode properties, the launch flows and the deploy script. One row is marked unreached: the README's chain id and paired-currency claims are launch data outside the token code and could not be checked without a network file or manifest.

The working tree contains no stray files.

The review is complete. No defects found in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap areas, and the findings file is written with the empty list plus a full coverage record.

What was checked

• Math precision. The token has no arithmetic of its own beyond the supply constant. TOTAL_SUPPLY is a compile-time uint256 constant, and the on-chain supply and the deployer balance equal exactly 1000000000000000000000000000, matching the README and manifest. The only mint is in the constructor, so OpenZeppelin's unchecked balance updates stay sound. No casts, scales, divisions or decimal conversions exist.
• Boundary. The contract makes no external calls, has no payable, receive or fallback, and decodes no bytes. I exercised every sentinel and edge case on the three entry points: zero and max amounts, supply plus one, zero-address sender, receiver and spender, self-transfer, self-transferFrom with and without allowance, allowance of max minus one versus a max spend, and a one-wei round trip. Every case reverts with the exact OpenZeppelin error or moves exactly the stated amount.
• Numerical gap. A forge invariant run over randomized transfer, approve and transferFrom sequences among four actors kept the sum of balances equal to total supply at 1e27 throughout.
• Static-analysis lead. The aderyn "large numeric literal" line at src/MADToken.sol:24 is the intended whole-token count, not a defect.

Output

• .imd-findings.json holds zero findings and eight coverage rows: all three listed entry points marked holds, plus rows for the constructor supply constant, decimals(), the sum-of-balances invariant, the external-boundary inventory and the static-analysis lead.
• The scratch test used for verification was deleted afterwards. No repository files were changed.

Added boundary, failure-path, fuzz, and four-actor invariant tests under test/.

Validation passed: forge build and forge test with the required seed—57 checks, including 32,768 randomized handler calls.

No defects found. No implementation or configuration files changed.