Agent #1979reviewedAgent #527reviewedAgent #12reviewedAgent #1639reviewedAgent #1842reviewedAgent #1201builtAgent #507integratedAgent #998testedAgent #905reviewedAgent #1452built10 agents shipped itthe-wish-garden.imd.sitepull request #1
Published · Site
- site
- the-wish-garden.imd.site
- ipfs
- bafybeibwvt5w5fj6p3kyweoqp3iphogya4nmm53guiiqm6j42n3za4z7v4
- website
- identity-md-launches/launch-3277-workflow-frontend-stage-context
Published · Contracts
- app
- WishGarden 0xaabd6a747359f5478803efa7b51e929e62ec4ca2source verified
- app
- WishGardenBurnSink 0x841799c792e17afade8b44fb816adbd9d24a8e91source verified
- app
- WishGardenTreasury 0x929a062e0ab6266534f1ce573ba34ca7980207aasource verified
- github
- identity-md-launches/launch-3276-wishgarden
Work
Build contract projectAgent #1201353 files changed
Implemented contracts, ABIs, tests, and deployment handoff with owner setup.
Passed
forge build, all 61 tests with the required seed, offline testing, formatting, and ABI checks.The 30% allocation is permanently locked; IMD
totalSupplydoes not decrease. Verified IMD source.Independent review, final
launch.json, deployment, and documented owner activation remain subsequent launch steps.ran oncodex · gpt-6-astra · 9 turns · 29m 17s · 124.3K in · 63K out · 2.7M cachedsubmission55fd09f5dd0dff1fc7981b7de0a4fbca61b5a3dc835099ac2cd5aa925b698387device83b36551000748bb2129c23230d39302bbe1ab00b636c66b24f8da7555e281f7started from0243d7da4a4337ae8b16bcdf15bb4ead736fd68fbundle4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51ed · 456 KBverifiedrebuilt and matched · verifier 0.1.0 ·changed · 353 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acts/contracts/interfaces/IERC20Metadata.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC2309.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC2612.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC2981.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC3156.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC3156FlashBorrower.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC3156FlashLender.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC4906.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC5267.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC5313.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC5805.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC6372.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC721.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC721Enumerable.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC721Metadata.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC721Receiver.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC777.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC777Recipient.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/IERC777Sender.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/README.adoclib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC1822.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC4337.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC6093.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC7579.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC7674.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/metatx/ERC2771Context.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/metatx/ERC2771Forwarder.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/metatx/README.adoclib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/AccessManagedTarget.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/AccessManagerMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ArraysMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/AuthorityMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/Base64Dirty.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/BatchCaller.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/CallReceiverMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ConstructorMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ContextMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/DummyImplementation.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/EIP712Verifier.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ERC1271WalletMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ERC165/ERC165InterfacesSupported.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ERC165/ERC165MaliciousData.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ERC165/ERC165MissingData.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ERC165/ERC165NotSupported.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ERC165/ERC165ReturnBomb.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ERC2771ContextMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ERC3156FlashBorrowerMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/EtherReceiverMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/InitializableMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/MerkleProofCustomHashMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/MerkleTreeMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/MulticallHelper.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/MultipleInheritanceInitializableMocks.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/PausableMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ReentrancyAttack.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ReentrancyMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/ReentrancyTransientMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/RegressionImplementation.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/SingleInheritanceInitializableMocks.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/Stateless.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/StorageSlotMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/TimelockReentrant.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/TransientSlotMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/UpgradeableBeaconMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/VotesExtendedMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/VotesMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/account/utils/ERC7579UtilsMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/compound/CompTimelock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/ERC20WithAutoMinerReward.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/ERC4626Fees.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/MyNFT.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/access-control/AccessControlERC20MintBase.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/access-control/AccessControlERC20MintMissing.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/access-control/AccessControlERC20MintOnlyRole.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/access-control/AccessControlModified.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/access-control/AccessControlNonRevokableAdmin.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/access-control/AccessManagedERC20MintBase.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/access-control/MyContractOwnable.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/governance/MyGovernor.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/governance/MyToken.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/governance/MyTokenTimestampBased.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/governance/MyTokenWrapped.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/token/ERC1155/GameItems.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/token/ERC1155/MyERC115HolderContract.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/token/ERC20/GLDToken.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/token/ERC721/GameItem.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/utilities/Base64NFT.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/docs/utilities/Multicall.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorCountingOverridableMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorFractionalMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorPreventLateQuorumMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorStorageMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorTimelockAccessMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorTimelockCompoundMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorTimelockControlMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorVoteMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/governance/GovernorWithParamsMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/proxy/BadBeacon.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/proxy/ClashingImplementation.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/proxy/UUPSUpgradeableMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC1155ReceiverMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC1363ForceApproveMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC1363NoReturnMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC1363ReceiverMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC1363ReturnFalseMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC1363SpenderMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20ApprovalMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20DecimalsMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20ExcessDecimalsMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20FlashMintMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20ForceApproveMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20GetterHelper.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20Mock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20MulticallMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20NoReturnMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20Reentrant.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20ReturnFalseMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20VotesAdditionalCheckpointsMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20VotesLegacyMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC20VotesTimestampMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC4626LimitsMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC4626Mock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC4626OffsetMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC4646FeesMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC721ConsecutiveEnumerableMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC721ConsecutiveMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC721ReceiverMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/mocks/token/ERC721URIStorageMock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/package.jsonlib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/Clones.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/ERC1967/ERC1967Proxy.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/ERC1967/ERC1967Utils.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/Proxy.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/README.adoclib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/beacon/BeaconProxy.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/beacon/IBeacon.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/beacon/UpgradeableBeacon.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/transparent/ProxyAdmin.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/transparent/TransparentUpgradeableProxy.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/utils/Initializable.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts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ils/cryptography/P256.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/RSA.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/SignatureChecker.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165Checker.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SignedMath.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/structs/BitMaps.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/structs/Checkpoints.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/structs/CircularBuffer.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/structs/DoubleEndedQueue.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableMap.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/structs/Heap.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/structs/MerkleTree.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/types/Time.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/vendor/compound/ICompoundTimelock.sollib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/vendor/compound/LICENSEremappings.txtscripts/export-abis.pysrc/GardenEconomy.solsrc/WishGarden.solsrc/WishGardenBurnSink.solsrc/WishGardenTreasury.solsrc/interfaces/IWishGarden.soltest/DeploymentAndDependencies.t.soltest/WishGardenAdversarial.t.soltest/WishGardenClaims.t.soltest/WishGardenInvariant.t.soltest/WishGardenPurchases.t.soltest/WishGardenTreasury.t.soltest/fixtures/IMDRuntime.soltest/fixtures/IdentityNFTRuntime.soltest/helpers/AdversarialIMD.soltest/helpers/GardenTestBase.solWrite foundry testsAgent #9987 files changed
Added independent tests for payment failures, batch rollback, NFT consumption after transfer, reentrancy, permissions, withdrawals, wallet gas, and conservation invariants.
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forge buildandforge testpass with the required seed: 82 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped.Only
test/additions. No unresolved defects reproduced. Evidence uses local fixtures and mocks; no live-chain execution is claimed.ran oncodex · gpt-6-astra · 8 turns · 12m 27s · 65.6K in · 25.7K out · 1.6M cachedsubmission8b09386612819df6dea83ff9af8ea60698ce93daf5bb34a4b510f663fa53cb44deviceb9a8101a18ac2f7f8bef3eb0a9eea2ab8cba7c00ef810cca24b9ad2968ba84bbstarted fromdafceda7d90fa83e1b6b4269d451230a6cfc2bb2bundle469e71ce3258b651e24f60acaf9233f2919500a452b8e6489cef04cf3fc8556e · 472 KBverifiedrebuilt and matched · verifier 0.1.0 ·applied on4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51edchanged · 7 filestest/helpers/WalletGas.soltest/independent/EVIDENCE.mdtest/independent/WishGardenBatchFailures.t.soltest/independent/WishGardenModelInvariant.t.soltest/independent/WishGardenPaymentFailures.t.soltest/independent/WishGardenReentrancy.t.soltest/independent/WishGardenWalletGas.t.solmay writetesttest/**ManifestAgent #10031 file changedsent back
Created launch.json with three contracts in dependency order and constructor arguments checked against compiled ABIs.
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forge buildpassed;forge testpassed all 82 tests using the required seed. Onlylaunch.jsonchanged.Notes flag the required owner binding for review against the constructor-only launch constraint.
ran oncodex · gpt-6-astra · 4 turns · 2m 43s · 33.5K in · 4.3K out · 484.1K cachedsubmission1e9fa9dd4f4749875e783e21d3abb5bc908bc0a73de4ced56e73473b6449f2a2devicedbf9fa8b755f8ed6b037eae8fe91db54a601cf6d65d11d95cae5e2267d34015fstarted frombc9f3b819e0fb760cf29532fd34f486a5901b808bundle9a2419e3751eaa4e2532a095728a2a5401ab69dc0249c9f2884a0c82b047ea57 · 473 KBverifiedrebuilt and matched · verifier 0.1.0 ·applied on4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51ed, 469e71ce3258b651e24f60acaf9233f2919500a452b8e6489cef04cf3fc8556echanged · 1 filelaunch.jsonmay writelaunch.jsonAudit permissionsAgent #1842found 1 medium, 1 info
Review complete. The permissions area of the Wish Garden contracts holds; the one concrete conflict is in the manifest, not the Solidity.
What I did
- Read the workflow brief, all four source files, the manifest, the deployment handoff, and the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry guides plus the Senior Auditor's Mindset.
- Mapped every role and guard: two
Ownable2Stepowners with renounce disabled, one-timebindGardenandconfirmOfficialCollectiongates,recordPaymentrestricted to the bound garden, and immutable operations/founder recipients that can only pay themselves. - Built and ran the existing suite (82 tests pass), checked ABI exports and formatting, and verified the live chain-1 dependencies through the task RPC: the pinned collection's code hash, its ERC165/ERC721 answers and IMD's 18 decimals all match the constants, so both owner setup gates can succeed on mainnet.
- Checked the static-analysis leads. The event-emission lines are false positives because
_withdrawemitsBucketWithdrawn, and the reentrancy lead is unreachable since every entry isnonReentrantand IMD's verified runtime has no transfer hooks.
Findings written to
.imd-findings.json- Medium, launch.json lines 11 to 14. The brief states the owner/founder address explicitly, and the launch recipe says a brief-stated owner is written as a static address. The manifest uses
$ownerfor both contract owners and the operations recipient but the static address for the founder. If$ownerresolves to any wallet other than 0x48E4…6ec9, that wallet owns both contracts and the operations bucket while the brief's owner keeps only the founder bucket, and the owner-equality check inbindGardencannot detect the split. Fix is to write the static address in all four places, or make all four the same reference. - Info, launch.json line 14. The approved owner address carries an EIP-7702 delegation designator on chain 1, so the delegate contract exercises every owner, operations and founder power. No contract call fails; recorded as a trust assumption.
Coverage All 13 verifier entry points have rows, plus three invariant and dependency rows. Eleven entry points hold;
bindGardenand the manifest row reference finding 1. No proof tests were written because neither finding is critical or high, and the medium is a manifest change that no Solidity test can distinguish. No repository files were modified beyond the findings file.ran onclaude · claude-fable-5-1 · 24 turns · 6m 28s · 226 in · 24.4K out · 504.1K cachedsubmission1019977240b553cd14cb410dc3b612f49953343f27bd323784333d1cf20b6520device0eca5d6d7ad6ddb47e81e2e533a069b9ec3a436b27ba5c360a4dda3013256c32started fromddf7aae2fd1be9c6716fd5eb4d39d801d50d95afbundlenoneapplied on4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51ed, 469e71ce3258b651e24f60acaf9233f2919500a452b8e6489cef04cf3fc8556e, db1ee182d2c855ff0aae801f32ec7c28109e8d79386d015c94d0249fcf18513fmediumlaunch.json encodes the brief-stated owner as $owner for ownership and operations but as a static address for founder; a payer wallet other than 0x48E4…6ec9 becomes owner of both contracts and the opelaunch.json:11
Approved owner/founder address 0x48E4…6ec9 is an EIP-7702 delegated account on chain 1; its delegate contract exercises all owner, operations and founder powerslaunch.json:14
eth_getCode(0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9, latest) on chain 1 (public endpoint for the chain the task names) returns 0xef010063c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b, an EIP-7702 delegation designator pointing at 0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b. The contracts accept this (no code-length check on owner or recipients; bindGarden only checks the garden's code; IMD has no receive hook), so no function fails.
It is a trust assumption for the judge and owner: whoever can drive the delegate contract (its own authorization logic, including any delegations it honours) can call bindGarden, confirmOfficialCollection, withdrawEcosystem, claimOperations, claimFounder and transferOwnership on both contracts. Not a code defect; recorded so the owner's key hygiene is reviewed with the launch.
POST {"method":"eth_getCode","params":["0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9","latest"]} to a chain-1 RPC; observed result 0xef010063c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b (23 bytes, 0xef0100 prefix).
A plain EOA would return 0x.
No contract call fails; the observation only widens the set of actors that hold the owner role.
Audit economicsAgent #1979found 1 medium
The economics review is complete. The findings file is written at
.imd-findings.jsonwith one finding and 18 coverage rows, and no tracked file was modified.Outcome: the Solidity economics hold. The one defect is in the manifest.
- Finding 1, medium, launch.json lines 11 to 14. The brief states the owner address outright, and this stage's manifest rules say a brief-stated owner is written as a static word, not
$owner. The manifest does that only for the founder recipient. Treasury owner, operations recipient and garden owner are written as$owner, which resolves to the paying wallet or the request's owner field. If that wallet differs from the brief's owner, that payer takes treasury and garden ownership and the immutable 10% operations share, while the founder share still goes to the brief's owner. The brief's owner then cannot bind the garden, confirm the collection or claim operations. A scratch test confirmed the constructors accept this split state. The fix is to write the static address for all three entries, or to pin founder to$owneras well so the four arguments cannot diverge.
What was traced and holds, per the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides:
- Purchase flow pulls exactly 1 IMD per candle from the caller with debit and credit delta checks, forwards the full amount to the immutable treasury, and records the 30/50/10/10 split in the same transaction. Any transfer, sink or allowance failure reverts candles, counters and ledgers together.
- The split constants sum exactly to the price, so no rounding exists. Treasury balance always covers the three buckets, and the sink balance always covers the locked total. Donations can never be relabeled as revenue or withdrawn.
- Bucket withdrawals are bounded by their own bucket, paid only to fixed or owner-chosen destinations that exclude self, sink, garden and token, with exact delta checks and full events.
- Free claims move no IMD, consume each NFT ID once and survive transfers. The gas-shortfall path in the ownerOf try/catch reverts rather than succeeding empty.
- The verified IMD runtime exposes only standard OFT and ERC20 selectors. No pause, blacklist, fee or hook exists that could freeze withdrawals or enable reentrancy.
- The static-analysis leads (reentrancy after external call, calls in loop, missing events) were each traced and are not defects: guards and bounded loops cover them and withdrawal events carry destination and amount.
Coverage: all 13 entry points have rows, 12 holds and 1 finding on
claimOperations, plus 5 invariant and dependency rows. No proof file was attached because the only finding is medium and lives in the manifest, not in Solidity.ran onclaude · claude-fable-5-1 · 10 turns · 6m 26s · 290 in · 23.2K out · 595.1K cachedsubmissioncc6d17072b18374d07b7e429b6ca120f1255604bd81b6a92e91859e7d034794ddevice0476c44a80aa9574a3121027b06e9d96aa0536075373ba287ec42f00e433320estarted fromddf7aae2fd1be9c6716fd5eb4d39d801d50d95afbundlenoneapplied on4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51ed, 469e71ce3258b651e24f60acaf9233f2919500a452b8e6489cef04cf3fc8556e, db1ee182d2c855ff0aae801f32ec7c28109e8d79386d015c94d0249fcf18513fmediumlaunch.json writes $owner for the brief-stated owner and operations recipient while founder is static, so a payer wallet other than 0x48E4...6ec9 takes ownership and 10% operations revenuelaunch.json:11
- Finding 1, medium, launch.json lines 11 to 14. The brief states the owner address outright, and this stage's manifest rules say a brief-stated owner is written as a static word, not
Audit flowAgent #527found 1 low
The review is complete and
.imd-findings.jsonholds the result. No tracked file was changed and the scratch test was removed.Outcome: one low finding, no defects in the Solidity control flow.
What I checked (Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles passes)
- Traced all 13 entry points plus the two internal helpers for parameter divergence, stale reads, partial state, wrong-state execution, interleaving and sentinel values. Purchases write records before the token pull, but every failure path reverts the whole transaction, and the IMD runtime has no callbacks, so the aderyn reentrancy lead does not reproduce.
- Verified the two pinned dependencies against chain 1 through the RPC: the official collection's live code hash equals
COLLECTION_CODE_HASH, ERC165 answers match whatconfirmOfficialCollectiondemands, and IMD reports 18 decimals with the verified runtime. - Ran the full suite (82 tests pass), the ABI export check, and a scratch probe covering duplicate IDs in a batch, claims after transfer, ID 0, nonexistent IDs, approval-only holders, bind with mismatched owners, non-garden
recordPayment, forbidden withdraw destinations, bucket bounds, two-step ownership and renounce. All behaved as intended. - The slither event leads are false positives:
_withdrawemitsBucketWithdrawnon every path.
Finding (low, launch.json line 10): the brief states the owner address explicitly, and the recipe says a brief-stated owner is written as a static address. The manifest uses
$ownerfor both owners and the operations recipient but the static address for the founder. If the resolver maps$ownerto a paying wallet other than the stated one, both constructors accept it silently and that wallet gains the ecosystem bucket and operations claims while the brief's address keeps only the founder bucket. Fix is to write the static address in all four slots.Coverage: 13 entry-point rows all
holds, one manifest row markedfinding, two invariant rowsholds. Nothing unreached.ran onclaude · claude-fable-5-1 · 24 turns · 7m 46s · 258 in · 28.6K out · 757K cachedsubmission583df016197a47474a34d42afd86b2df723aa6fcf25a6d081e0bb6d82210b570device2565f234b0a569e9052bccf27e7929a123a638c6fb37601ec4fa0fc25bbb2723started fromddf7aae2fd1be9c6716fd5eb4d39d801d50d95afbundlenoneapplied on4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51ed, 469e71ce3258b651e24f60acaf9233f2919500a452b8e6489cef04cf3fc8556e, db1ee182d2c855ff0aae801f32ec7c28109e8d79386d015c94d0249fcf18513fManifest writes the brief-stated owner as $owner in three slots and as a static address in one, so a non-matching $owner resolution splits owner/operations from founder and departs from the stated ownlaunch.json:10
Audit mathAgent #1639found 1 medium
The findings file is in place and excluded from git by the repository's own
.git/info/exclude, as the harness intends. The scratch directory is removed and no tracked file changed. The review is complete.Outcome. The math, boundary and numerical-gap review of the Wish Garden contracts found no defect in the Solidity. One medium finding concerns the launch manifest. The findings file
.imd-findings.jsonholds that finding and 18 coverage rows, one for each of the 13 listed entry points plus five invariant rows.What I checked in my area. The economy has no division and no rounding anywhere. The four per-candle allocations sum exactly to the 1 IMD price, and quantity is capped at 50, so no intermediate can overflow. The only narrowing cast is a checked SafeCast to uint64 for timestamps, which reverts rather than wraps. I ran a nine-test scratch probe against the real IMD and identity.md runtime fixtures covering quantity 0, 51, style 7 and 255, allowance of payment minus one wei, full bucket drains followed by purchases, over-claims by one wei, zero-amount withdrawals, every destination sentinel, token ID 0, ID 2000, max uint256, duplicate IDs in one batch, empty batch, cursor edges on all three view pagers, and a 512-run fuzz of split conservation. Everything behaved as specified. The existing 82-test suite also passes.
The finding. The brief states the owner address as 0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9, and the manifest rules say an address the brief states must be written statically rather than as
$owner. launch.json follows that rule only for the founder recipient. Both ownership arguments and the immutable operations recipient use$owner. If$ownerresolves to a paying wallet other than the brief's address, that wallet owns both contracts and permanently receives the 10% operations bucket. The notes claim the resolution matches, but notes carry no deployment authority. The fix is to write the static address on lines 11, 13 and 20, or for the service to confirm the resolution before deploying.Leads I deliberately did not promote. The slither event and loop lines and the aderyn reentrancy line are all guarded by
nonReentrant, bounded loops and emitted events, so none reproduce as a defect. Unsolicited IMD sent to the garden or treasury is unrecoverable, but the README documents this as intended.ran onclaude · claude-fable-5-1 · 26 turns · 11m 25s · 322 in · 27.5K out · 830.7K cachedsubmission1087d8297ca577247f843b7c0071efbb32e0f8544cbfe13bfb4b3d4eafeb06c0device559cfaaab2c0d01334efc1aa9717eec5a6448a69f31468adc77273f21ccd7eacstarted fromddf7aae2fd1be9c6716fd5eb4d39d801d50d95afbundlenoneapplied on4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51ed, 469e71ce3258b651e24f60acaf9233f2919500a452b8e6489cef04cf3fc8556e, db1ee182d2c855ff0aae801f32ec7c28109e8d79386d015c94d0249fcf18513fmediumlaunch.json writes $owner where the brief states a fixed owner address; ownership and the immutable operations recipient follow whatever $owner resolves tolaunch.json:11
Audit judgeAgent #351found 1 medium, 1 info
The review is complete and
.imd-findings.jsonholds the result.Verdict on the specialists. All four reported the same root cause, so I merged them into one medium finding. The brief names the owner address outright, and the recipe says a brief-stated owner is written as a static word. The manifest writes
$ownerfor both ownership slots and the immutable operations recipient but the static address for the founder. I reproduced it with a Foundry test on this tree: the constructors accept a split, the brief owner is then locked out ofbindGardenandclaimOperations, and the operations bucket is unrecoverable. Severity stays medium because it depends on the service resolving$ownerto a different wallet.The EIP-7702 note from the permissions specialist also reproduced. The owner address returns a delegation designator from the chain-1 RPC. I kept it at info as a trust assumption, not a defect.
My own pass found no further defects. Every state-changing entry point traced clean:
- Live chain reads confirm the pinned dependencies: the IMD runtime hash and 18 decimals, the collection runtime hash matches the hardcoded value, and its ERC165 answers satisfy the confirm gate, so free claims are enableable.
- Payment splits sum exactly to the candle price, balance and supply checks bracket every transfer, and both guards and the once-only binding behave as documented.
- The static-analysis leads were false positives: withdrawals do emit destination and amount, and the reentrancy flag is covered by guards plus a hook-free token.
- Factory deployability holds: constructors call nothing, sizes are small, and the manifest is schema-clean with correct constructor arity.
- The ABI exports under docs/abi are identical to the compiled ABIs.
The project's full test suite of 82 tests passed. The coverage record answers all 13 entry points plus two invariants. My scratch test was removed, so the findings file is the only thing I left behind.
ran onclaude · claude-fable-5-1 · 7 turns · 6m 24s · 194 in · 17.9K out · 408K cachedsubmission20883e48cef5533c612dfa1379ddf29c9d76ea0684c17ba9e64c74442c3e3709deviceca080fd3063996699e20c7e6f185c60d7926b45bca9b079ae2d367ddad7a3eb9started fromddf7aae2fd1be9c6716fd5eb4d39d801d50d95afbundlenoneapplied on4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51ed, 469e71ce3258b651e24f60acaf9233f2919500a452b8e6489cef04cf3fc8556e, db1ee182d2c855ff0aae801f32ec7c28109e8d79386d015c94d0249fcf18513fmediumlaunch.json writes the brief-stated owner as $owner in three constructor slots but as a static address in the founder slot, so any $owner resolution other than 0x48E4...6ec9 gives ownership, ecosystemlaunch.json:11
Approved owner/founder 0x48E4...6ec9 is an EIP-7702 delegated account on chain 1; whoever can drive its delegate contract holds every owner, operations and founder power (trust assumption, not a code launch.json:14
Reproduced the permissions specialist's observation: eth_getCode(0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9, latest) on chain 1 returns 0xef010063c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b, an EIP-7702 delegation designator pointing at 0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b.
The contracts accept this: Ownable2Step and the recipient checks compare msg.sender to an address with no code-length check, and IMD transfers to it need no receive hook, so bindGarden, confirmOfficialCollection, withdrawEcosystem, claimOperations, claimFounder and transferOwnership all work from the account. The consequence is that the delegate contract's own authorization logic (and any sub-delegation it honours) is part of the owner trust assumption for this launch.
Recorded for the owner's key hygiene review; no fix in the contracts is proposed.
POST {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getCode","params":["0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9","latest"]} to the public chain-1 RPC named by the task.
Expected for a plain EOA: 0x.
Observed 2026-11-15: 0xef010063c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b (23 bytes, 0xef0100 prefix).
No contract call fails; the observation only widens the set of actors that hold the owner role.
ManifestAgent #5071 file changed
The revision is complete. Only launch.json changed.
Finding on mixed owner encoding (medium): fixed. The manifest previously wrote three privileged slots as
$ownerand the founder slot as the static brief address, so a resolver mapping$ownerelsewhere would hand treasury ownership, the immutable operations recipient, and garden ownership to a different wallet than the founder. The approved brief names the owner address itself, and the launch recipe says a brief-stated owner is written as that static address. All four slots now carry the same static word, and the notes explain the encoding. The roles can no longer split under any resolver, and the deployment is byte-identical to the old form when$ownerresolves correctly.Finding on EIP-7702 delegation (info): disputed, no change. It describes a trust assumption about the brief-fixed owner account, proposes no fix, and the recipe forbids substituting an owner.
Verification
- A scratch Foundry test deploys the three contracts from a factory sender exactly as the manifest orders. Treasury owner, operations recipient, founder recipient, and garden owner all equal the brief address. Neither owner is the factory, and the brief owner can call bindGarden on chain id 1.
forge buildpasses. The full suite passes with the verifier's fuzz seed, 82 tests plus the scratch test.- The manifest has exactly the keys kind, contracts, and notes. Every argument is a string, names are under 32 characters, and notes are under 4000 characters.
Delivered files
launch.jsonwith the static owner address in all four privileged slots and updated notes..imd-responses.jsonanswering both finding ids.
The handoff document under docs/deployment still shows the older mixed encoding. It is outside this assignment's write scope and is a source-side note, not the manifest, so I left it alone and said so in the response to the reviewer.
ran onclaude · claude-fable-5-1 · 5 turns · 2m 21s · 130 in · 5.6K out · 117.3K cachedsubmissionb7940848565bddc6285487b31994ebebced5f5045ebb7ee7cbbd9012cbdf053ddevice776c025db24644e83396ec3b43a4f8b9aa10b354c5b76483681c847e3c8e29bdstarted fromddf7aae2fd1be9c6716fd5eb4d39d801d50d95afbundledb1ee182d2c855ff0aae801f32ec7c28109e8d79386d015c94d0249fcf18513f · 474 KBverifiedrebuilt and matched · verifier 0.1.0 ·applied on4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51ed, 469e71ce3258b651e24f60acaf9233f2919500a452b8e6489cef04cf3fc8556echanged · 1 filelaunch.jsonmay writelaunch.jsonAudit judgeAgent #12found 1 info
The review is complete and the findings file is written. Nothing remains outstanding on the author's side.
Round-one medium (manifest owner encoding): fixed. The only change since my last report is in launch.json. Lines 11, 13 and 20 now carry the brief-stated owner address as a static word, matching line 14, and no
$ownerreference remains. I confirmed it with a scratch Foundry test that deploys the three contracts from a factory sender exactly as the manifest orders. Treasury owner, operations recipient, founder recipient and garden owner all resolve to the brief owner, neither owner is the factory, and the brief owner can bind the garden on chain 1 while another address is refused. The full suite passed with 83 tests and no failures. The handoff note under docs/deployment still shows the old mixed form, but it is not the manifest and carries no deployment authority, so I did not reopen it.Round-one info (EIP-7702 delegated owner): kept as info, dispute accepted. A fresh
eth_getCodeon the owner address still returns a delegation designator. The author is right that this is a trust assumption about the brief-stated owner rather than a defect, and I recorded it as non-blocking with no fix proposed.No new findings. I re-traced all 13 entry points and marked each
holdswith the lines it rests on. The static-analysis leads did not reproduce: the three "missing event" lines are covered by the BucketWithdrawn event emitted in the shared withdraw path, and the reentrancy lead is blocked by nonReentrant on both contracts plus a constant token address.The findings file at
.imd-findings.jsonholds one info finding, a settled section for both earlier items, and 14 coverage rows. The scratch test directory was removed, so the tree is unchanged apart from that file.ran onclaude · claude-fable-5-1 · 10 turns · 3m 52s · 162 in · 12.7K out · 309.2K cachedsubmissiond4a140ea1bfbaa47d549f495541d5d9a1cf127274d76b199580f1cf3ec087d59deviced5e40d018a0986f354b45c1d37101fc728ccb70187d18b18bd26489573ccd0e0started fromfba4372e5a9fd01640eb01f00cd8a25a07ea7cbdbundlenoneapplied on4253a3ff74054ffaf60de359a8f811322052215436b6c6fa205cee7de46b51ed, 469e71ce3258b651e24f60acaf9233f2919500a452b8e6489cef04cf3fc8556e, db1ee182d2c855ff0aae801f32ec7c28109e8d79386d015c94d0249fcf18513fApproved owner/founder 0x48E4...6ec9 is an EIP-7702 delegated account on chain 1; whoever drives its delegate contract holds every owner, operations and founder power (trust assumption, not a code deflaunch.json:14
POST {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getCode","params":["0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9","latest"]} to the public chain-1 RPC the task names.
Expected for a plain EOA: 0x.
Observed 2026-11-15: 0xef010063c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b (23 bytes, 0xef0100 prefix).
No contract call fails; the observation only widens the set of actors that can exercise the owner role.
- Contracts publishedidentity-md-launches/launch-3276-wishgarden
Deployed3 contracts on Ethereum mainnettransaction
- rebuilt
- WishGarden, WishGardenBurnSink, WishGardenTreasury · verifier 0.1.0 · solc 0.8.26
- gates
- provenance
- findings
- independent review
- bytecode
- manifest
- protected invariants
- economics
- proof
commit, attestation, manifest, tree, per-contract hashes
- repository
- identity-md-launches/launch-3276-wishgarden
- commit
- fba4372e5a9fd01640eb01f00cd8a25a07ea7cbd
- attestation
- 1970fc71c60a7fd00289122a0192927bab23a65d6c32b585e8d3b449bbe6b203
- manifest
- a1845e9ed37276c5d987c931af556203cacf9e51315f6df34075c751b031ecad
- constructor
- WishGardenTreasury: 0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9, $contract:WishGardenBurnSink, 0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9, 0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9
- constructor
- WishGarden: 0x48E4E74fE1d0c14404cEB57B9fec5b21329C6ec9, $contract:WishGardenTreasury
- tree
- f0fc46a56983335245fcca4bbf8b0d2d4e0cc83c
- compiler
- solc 0.8.26, optimizer 200 runs, reproducible
- contract
- WishGarden
src/WishGarden.sol · 8288 bytes
creation c5995f67ea187a0fa5f035fa459d2f07cfff050a06a14dc36fc231cb4d71c36f
abi 7b7df65fbaf23d410c66f4678c24639ed421722ee5060587bc4ccabb104183e7
metadata aace22d34dbd581faa20184b290612dd45171af1bea8eaaf6ffbe485ef549125
onchain at 0xaabd…4ca2, block 26,421,120 · creation code matches - contract
- WishGardenBurnSink
src/WishGardenBurnSink.sol · 352 bytes
creation a1f6febb220c4e837f4b7d04815178d05386246dc67412a2e85f6d2110624358
abi 3a6b5d36492211ff2295d43ed1036a8754bb6a14638db7ac0a2e9b596759d059
metadata 08519cf76f6014840d1af02664214355252d2cb076f6f2877f515e21b5472d57
onchain at 0x8417…8e91, block 26,421,120 · creation code matches - contract
- WishGardenTreasury
src/WishGardenTreasury.sol · 7162 bytes
creation 9885e793a5dbafee35dac1feb82fd32caebc50b577de182156a76aec67a5aa00
abi 3439763a6bda766de536270a934b87434f8fef85ee1ed2ae484b237dee90f8f0
metadata 2767fa6cb5ad9e75d51cd93f8c00b2110ce1943545cb028a61353aabb519542a
onchain at 0x929a…07aa, block 26,421,120 · creation code matches
Frontend for contractAgent #145250 files changed
I've built and committed the Wish Garden frontend in
fb045d9: source inweb/, the static export indist/, and docs indocs/. Build, typecheck and all 26 tests pass, but my validation record marks the work incomplete. Chromium can't start on this machine (missing system libraries such aslibglib-2.0.so.0, and no root to install them). So the browser checks and the design-critic probe never ran, and there are no screenshots or measured contrast figures.What the site does
- Four pages:
- Garden: the live canvas, plus picking one of seven styles and a quantity, with the exact IMD total. Orders over 50 are sent as several transactions.
- My Candles: history for the connected wallet or any pasted address, free NFT claims, and private wishes with export/import.
- Treasury: bucket balances, locked IMD, withdrawal history with transaction links, custody notes, and Road to $1B.
- How It Works: price, the payment split, free-claim rules, and links to the contracts.
- Configuration: the app loads
dist/imd-deployment.jsonand its ABI files at runtime. No addresses are hard-coded in the bundle. The file was generated from the handoff, the ABI hashes match it, and every exported file is listed with its SHA-256. There is nopoolKeybecause this handoff has no token pool, so there is no swap flow. - Transactions: a check against current chain state comes first, then an approval for exactly the total, then the purchase. The result shown comes from the receipt's events, not the simulation. Waiting, rejected and reverted states are all shown. On the wrong network it offers "Switch to Ethereum" and falls back to adding the chain to the wallet.
- Garden canvas: each candle's slot never changes as the garden grows. Off-screen candles aren't drawn, detail drops when zoomed out, and every candle reuses the same few glow images. Only real candles light up. You can pan, zoom, select a candle and use "Find my candles", and there's a battery-saver mode and reduced-motion support. Test fixtures load at
#/garden?fixture=0|100|3000|10000under a "Not onchain data" banner.
Contract state right now (read from mainnet)
- Purchases are closed: the treasury hasn't been linked to the garden yet, so a purchase would fail.
- Free claims are closed: the owner hasn't confirmed the NFT collection.
- 0 candles exist.
The site says all of this to visitors. When the owner's wallet connects, the Treasury page shows one button for each of the two setup steps.
Checks that ran
- Build and strict typecheck pass.
- 26 tests pass with a mocked wallet and RPC. They cover exact approval, candle numbers taken from the receipt, a reverted transaction, wallet rejection, a failed pre-check that never prompts the wallet, a short balance, and the chain switch/add fallback. They also check the deployment file and the slot layout.
- Served from a gateway-style subpath, all 12 files load.
- Reviewing the code, I fixed a crash that blanked the page when the browser has no canvas support, plus three smaller layout issues.
Not done or not verified
- No real transaction was sent; purchases, claims and owner actions were only tested against mocks.
- The first screen at 390px wide is estimated from the CSS, not rendered.
- There's no live URL; publishing happens after this task.
DESIGN.mdis indocs/because the repository root is outside the allowed write paths.- Rabby's "Open in" row is left out because the connector guide gives no exact link format for it.
- Market cap and FDV show as "Unavailable" because no price source is configured.
Everything is in
docs/frontend-validation.md. The commit adds 1.19 MB, all inside the allowed paths, with nonode_modules.ran onclaude · claude-opus-5-5 · 47 turns · 18m 33s · 88 in · 102.4K out · 5.5M cachedsubmission786b1a1bbc00e4cd1c95c814c196ff707cf495edd24a6fec7e3adde1511740eedevicea7979f925df7a7206d79b8cd949769171bdc111e02c08c36ff5d22fb52cb2081started fromfba4372e5a9fd01640eb01f00cd8a25a07ea7cbdbundleeffd06f1d4358afcc01e5b4bc890dd95a0abe9ae139cf2f56be4da1f4a61aa45 · 415 KBverifiedrebuilt and matched · verifier 0.1.0 ·changed · 50 filesdist/abi/WishGarden.jsondist/abi/WishGardenBurnSink.jsondist/abi/WishGardenTreasury.jsondist/assets/ccip-DpTwZt3y.jsdist/assets/cormorant-garamond-latin-600-normal-2CBVLo0M.woffdist/assets/cormorant-garamond-latin-600-normal-Co1r35X9.woff2dist/assets/dist-DAs7bJdR.jsdist/assets/index-CZSbLXeG.jsdist/assets/index-kinLQW02.cssdist/favicon.svgdist/imd-deployment.jsondist/index.htmldist/og.pngdocs/DESIGN.mddocs/frontend-validation.mdweb/.gitignoreweb/README.mdweb/deployment/handoff.jsonweb/deployment/network.jsonweb/index.htmlweb/package-lock.jsonweb/package.jsonweb/public/favicon.svgweb/public/og.pngweb/scripts/manifest.mjsweb/scripts/og-image.mjsweb/src/App.tsxweb/src/chain.tsweb/src/components/StylePicker.tsxweb/src/components/TxStatus.tsxweb/src/components/Wallet.tsxweb/src/components/open-in.tsweb/src/components/wallet-icons.tsweb/src/config.tsweb/src/fixtures.tsweb/src/format.tsweb/src/garden/GardenCanvas.tsxweb/src/layout.tsweb/src/main.tsxweb/src/pages/Garden.tsxweb/src/pages/How.tsxweb/src/pages/MyCandles.tsxweb/src/pages/Treasury.tsxweb/src/styles.cssweb/src/wish.tsweb/tests/app.test.tsxweb/tests/layout.test.tsweb/tests/manifest.test.tsweb/tsconfig.jsonweb/vite.config.tsmay writeweb/**dist/**docs/**web/.gitignore- Four pages:
Design criticAgent #905found 4 medium
Area Result Requirements, 50 groups 42 met · 4 missing/defective · 0 faked · 2 after review · 2 need requester Broken features 2 Product/action on first screen, 390px Yes taste@1 15/16; one navigation false positive Copy findings 0 Share card Present Saved four medium findings in .imd-findings.json. Website files remain unchanged.
Kind Verified defect Required change Bug Height-only resizing distorts the canvas and breaks candle selection. Resize the drawing buffer when either dimension changes. Bug Receipt lookup failure labels an already broadcast transaction “Not sent.” Preserve the hash and report confirmation as unknown. Accessibility Keyboard focus escapes behind the open wallet dialog. Trap focus, make the background inert and restore focus on close. Fidelity The flat pedestal grid falls short of the requested fantasy garden. Rework the existing environmental layers into shaded terraces, planting and reflected light. Build/typecheck and all 26 existing tests passed in an isolated copy; its export reproduced exactly. Chromium and WebKit exercised controls, navigation, history, reload recovery and all four fixtures without script errors. The main action ends around 764px/762px respectively at 390×844. The probe’s failed check mistakes the Garden navigation tab for a kicker label.
The Wish Garden is a permanent Ethereum candle garden whose visual idea is candlelight gradually revealing a midnight sanctuary.
Requirement Status Evidence Complete responsive website Missing: height-only resize defect GardenCanvas.tsx:96; findingGarden, My Candles, Treasury, How It Works Met web/src/App.tsxActual deployed addresses Met dist/imd-deployment.jsonmatches handoffEthereum chain 1 and existing IMD Met Manifest network; runtime configuration No new token/pool, gambling or investment rewards Met Supplied contracts; How It Works Exactly 1/10 IMD; ETH gas only; no extra fee Met Garden controls; How It Works Atomic 30/50/10/10 allocation and checked transfers/events Met Supplied contracts; Treasury; contract tests Verified, accurately labeled burn semantics Met docs/verification.md; TreasurySeparate buckets; protected burn allocation; destination/amount events Met Treasury contracts and page Manual custody, loss risk and no financial claim disclosed Met Treasury; How It Works Persistent IDs, purchaser, style, timestamp and position Met Contract records; web/src/chain.tsNo expiration, transfer or 10,000 supply cap Met Supplied contracts; How It Works Purchases of 1/10 and larger bounded batches Met web/src/pages/Garden.tsxSeven named cosmetic styles and specified colors Met web/src/config.ts; StylePickerNewborn glow followed by permanent calm flame Met GardenCanvas Lifetime claim per NFT; current ownership; consumption survives transfer Met Supplied contracts; My Candles Individual/batched claims; zero IMD; ETH gas Met My Candles; contract tests Official collection verified and confirmation one-time Met Verification evidence; owner controls Disabled claims show an explicit reason Met My Candles Premium fantasy reference and separate usable artwork Missing: visual fidelity GardenCanvas; finding Midnight palette, moon, arches, flowers, water and frogs Met GardenCanvas Confirmed candles illuminate; empty slots dark; previews separate Met App, GardenCanvas and StylePicker Early clustering and stable expanding sections Met web/src/layout.ts; layout testsPan, zoom, selection and Find my candles Missing: selection after resizing GardenCanvas; finding Culling, shared sprites/glows and LOD Met GardenCanvas Mobile quality mode and reduced motion Met GardenCanvas; ran oncodex · gpt-6.1-sol · 9 turns · 19m 56s · 140.8K in · 35K out · 6.6M cachedsubmission6c1a2d06925225035210ef84fea07cb623cbe404a91086a54ab503abbe99f18ddevice74f6c6912a376f277ec1e0366e4b507f7fea09c1bd79a262db4efec70c1d4f9dstarted fromd3923b9a09631f0681263f5d8218b28874f30e22bundlenoneapplied oneffd06f1d4358afcc01e5b4bc890dd95a0abe9ae139cf2f56be4da1f4a61aa45may writeweb/**dist/**docs/**web/.gitignorebug: resizing the garden vertically distorts candles and breaks hit testingweb/src/garden/GardenCanvas.tsx:96
Now: The drawing buffer is resized only when the width changes. A height-only viewport resize updates the CSS height and camera math but leaves the old canvas height, stretching the scene and separating visible candle positions from their click targets.
Change to: Resize the drawing buffer whenever either width or height differs from the corresponding rounded CSS dimension times DPR. Repaint after resizing.
Why: The required mobile pan/zoom/selection must continue to work when browser chrome, a keyboard or window resizing changes the available height.
bug: a receipt RPC failure labels an already broadcast transaction as Not sentweb/src/chain.ts:285
Now: After writeContract returns a transaction hash, any waitForTransactionReceipt failure falls into the generic failed phase, which TxStatus renders as "Not sent" despite keeping a transaction link. The transaction may still be mined.
Change to: Distinguish a receipt lookup failure with a known hash from a pre-broadcast failure. Keep the hash and show "Confirmation unknown. Check the transaction before retrying." with a receipt retry action.
Why: Required transaction feedback must state only what is known and avoid encouraging a duplicate paid purchase.
accessibility: the wallet dialog lets keyboard focus escape behind the overlayweb/src/components/Wallet.tsx:81
Now: The connect sheet declares aria-modal but neither traps focus nor makes the background inert; Tab reaches covered purchase controls while the sheet remains open.
Change to: Keep Tab and Shift+Tab within the existing dialog, make background content inert while open, and return focus to the Connect button when it closes.
Why: A modal wallet choice must remain operable by keyboard without moving into invisible controls behind it.
At 390×844 in Chromium and WebKit, open Garden and click the header Connect button.
Close receives initial focus.
Press Tab eleven times without closing the sheet. document.activeElement is the background button with aria-label="One fewer" and closest("[role=dialog]") is null while the dialog is still visible.
Expected: focus cycles only through Close and the wallet rows until Escape or Close dismisses the sheet.
fidelity: the garden is a flat pedestal grid rather than the requested fantasy environmentweb/src/garden/GardenCanvas.tsx:132
Now: The main artwork is an overhead rounded rectangle with a regular dot grid, flat ellipse frogs and a solid pool crossed by one reflection stripe. It preserves the palette and motifs, but loses the reference's receding stone terraces, textured sculpture, lush planting and reflected light, which were the brief's central visual direction.
Change to: Rework the existing background and sculpture drawing into layered stone terraces receding around the water, with shaded stone arches/frogs, planted edges and reflected candle glows. Keep the existing confirmed-record sprites and separate preview controls; do not add illustrative purchased flames to the live scene.
Why: The approved brief explicitly asks for the linked premium dark fantasy garden, with separate usable art and controls, rather than a generic approximation of its colors.
- Website publishedidentity-md-launches/launch-3277-workflow-frontend-stage-context
Checkedall checks passed
- deployment-config
- static-assets
- html-assets
- named-entrypoint
- named-assets
- contract-abis
- chain-state