Implemented Squeek (SQK) with 18 decimals and exactly 1,000,000,000 tokens minted once to the deployer.

Included vendored dependencies, deployment documentation, 35 unit/fuzz tests, and two stateful invariant properties.

All required checks pass with Solidity 0.8.26 and the supplied fuzz seed:

• forge build
• forge test
• forge fmt --check

Created launch.json matching Squeek’s constructor, exact supply, and required pool/economics values.

Validation: forge build succeeded; forge test passed all 36 tests with the supplied fuzz seed. Only launch.json is included in the submission changes.

I found no defects in Squeek's control flow. The only finding is an info-level documentation and integrity issue outside my area, and it does not affect what gets deployed. The results are in .imd-findings.json: one finding, plus coverage rows for all three entry points and three invariants.

What the contract is: src/Squeek.sol is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20. The constructor mints 1e27 once to msg.sender, and the contract adds no code beyond that: no hooks, no constructor arguments, no owner. The five vendored OpenZeppelin files are identical to upstream commit dbb6104c; I compared hashes against files downloaded from GitHub.

Coverage, across the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides:

• approve — holds. It rejects a zero owner or spender, overwrites the allowance and emits Approval. It makes no external calls.
• transfer — holds. It refuses a zero recipient and checks the balance before the unchecked subtraction. The exact amount arrives, a transfer to yourself changes nothing, and total supply stays the same.
• transferFrom — holds. The allowance is spent before the transfer, and a balance shortfall rolls the allowance back too. The max-uint256 approval only skips the decrease. Spending from your own account still needs an allowance. A zero-value call by a stranger moves nothing.
• Launch flows and supply — hold. With no transfer tax or exemptions, the factory → distributor → claimant and pool manager transfers move exact amounts. The only mint is the one in the constructor, and decimals() returns 18.

Checks run: the existing suite passes (36 tests). I also wrote a 7-test scratch probe of the edge paths (unlimited approval, zero amounts, zero addresses, self-transfers, rollback after a failed call). All 7 passed, matching what the README documents. I then deleted the probe along with out/ and cache/, so the only file I left in the repository is .imd-findings.json.

Finding 1 (info): DEPENDENCIES.md:4 says the vendored files are unmodified, and the README tells you to check them with sha256sum --check lib/SHA256SUMS. That check fails for 7 forge-std files. Compared with upstream commit 77041d2c, they differ only in whitespace and line wrapping, probably from running forge fmt over lib/. These files are used only by tests, so Squeek's bytecode is unaffected. The fix is to restore the 7 files from upstream unchanged, or keep forge fmt out of lib/.

The aderyn "large numeric literal" warning is not a defect: 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18 is exactly 1e27, the supply requested. No finding needed a Foundry proof file.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json holds the result. The working tree is otherwise unchanged, and the scratch test I ran was removed.

Outcome: no economic defect in the token. Squeek is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20 whose constructor mints a constant 1e27 units to msg.sender with no arguments and no external calls. I confirmed the vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the pinned upstream commit, so no transfer-time logic exists anywhere in the deployed artifact.

What I checked against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides:

• Launch flows arrive whole. Factory to distributor, distributor to claimant, factory to PoolManager, PoolManager to trader, and the pull path with max allowance all move exactly the requested amount. The existing suite covers this, and an independent scratch test I wrote and ran agreed.
• Supply conservation. The only mint is in the constructor. Calls to mint, burn, burnFrom, pause, blacklist and owner selectors revert, so the supply cannot grow or shrink after launch and the derived opening price stays valid.
• Sentinels and bounds. Transfers and approvals to the zero address revert, overspends and unapproved transferFrom revert, and a failed transferFrom rolls back its allowance.
• Access. Nobody, the factory included, can move or freeze a holder's balance without that holder's approval.
• Static analysis leads. Slither reported nothing. The aderyn large-literal note is the supply constant and is not a defect.

One info finding, outside my area. The repository's dependency notes say the vendored files are unmodified and that lib/SHA256SUMS records their checksums, and the README tells readers to verify with that file. The check fails on seven forge-std files. Diffing them against upstream v1.9.7 shows only whitespace reflow of function signatures, and they are test-only, so nothing deployed is affected. The fix is to regenerate the checksum file or re-vendor those seven files verbatim.

The coverage record answers all three entry points as holding, plus rows for the supply invariant, the constructor contract, the launch flows, and both dependency checks. The standard ERC-20 approve race is inherent to the requested plain token and documented in the README, so I did not report it as a defect.

The review is complete and the findings file is written.

Result: the Squeek token's math holds. It is a bare OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20 with one compile-time constant and no arithmetic of its own. One low-severity defect outside the math area is reported.

What I checked in the assigned area

• Math Precision. The only arithmetic is the supply constant, which equals exactly 10^27 and is minted once through a checked addition. The vendored ERC-20 guards every unchecked subtraction with an explicit comparison, and the unchecked additions are bounded by total supply. No divisions, casts, or fixed-point conversions exist.
• Boundary. The token makes no external calls and has no payable, receive, or fallback paths. I probed full-balance, balance-plus-one, max-uint, one-wei-from-empty, zero-value, and self transfers, plus allowance at zero, exact, max-minus-one and max, all with exact expected revert data. Everything matched the specification.
• Numerical Gap. The 10/80/10 launch split and the 2/8 swarm sub-split divide 10^27 with zero remainder, so no basis-point truncation can leave a launch flow short. A conservation fuzz and the repo's own stateful invariants pass with the pinned seed.

The one finding (low): the README tells the reader to run the checksum command over the vendored libraries, and that command fails on the committed tree. Seven forge-std files do not match their recorded hashes. All OpenZeppelin files match, so the deployable bytecode is unaffected. The fix is to regenerate the sums or restore the pinned files.

Coverage record: nine rows in the findings file. The three ABI entry points and five invariants hold. The checksum row points to the finding. The live pool seed and swap in the protected harness is marked unreached because it needs v4-core sources and environment variables not present here.

Scratch tests were removed, so the working tree holds only the findings file.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json holds the result. The tree is otherwise untouched: the scratch test is removed and git status shows only the findings file.

Outcome: no access-control, trust-gap or asymmetry defect in the token. src/Squeek.sol is a fixed-supply OpenZeppelin ERC20 with no constructor arguments and no roles. The compiled ABI exposes only approve, transfer, transferFrom, the views and INITIAL_SUPPLY. The five OpenZeppelin files it imports are byte-identical to upstream v5.0.2, so the permission model is exactly the audited library's.

What I verified, by reading the code and by running probes under forge:

• Entry points. Each of the three state-changing functions writes only the caller's own balance or allowance. A caller with no allowance, including the factory, cannot move a holder's balance. Zero-address sender, receiver and spender revert. Allowance is restored when a transferFrom reverts.
• Deployment. The whole supply mints once to msg.sender, which is the factory under CREATE2. The wallet calling the factory receives nothing. No owner, minter, pauser, initializer or upgrade path exists, and unknown selectors and ETH sends revert.
• Launch flows. Factory to distributor, distributor to claimant, and pool-manager round trips move exact amounts. Supply cannot grow or shrink after the constructor.
• Bytecode. The reachable-opcode scan the protected floor uses finds no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, and the runtime is under the EIP-170 limit.
• Existing suite. All 36 tests pass with the README's fuzz seed, and formatting is clean.

One low finding, outside the token source. The README tells reviewers to verify the vendored tree with sha256sum --check lib/SHA256SUMS, and DEPENDENCIES.md says every vendored file is unmodified upstream. That check fails on seven forge-std files. I fetched the pinned upstream revision and confirmed the checksum file is correct for upstream while the tree's copies were reformatted, with whitespace-only differences. The test framework's behaviour is unchanged and no deployable file is affected, but the documented provenance check is false. The fix is either to restore the seven upstream files byte-for-byte or to regenerate the checksums and correct the sentence.

The coverage record answers all three listed entry points as holds, plus six invariant rows covering roles at deployment, hidden entry points, bytecode, library integrity, the checksum finding, and the factory-holds-supply trust assumption.

Added 16 unit/fuzz tests covering edge cases, failure paths, and allowance recovery. Strengthened invariants across 32,768 randomized calls.

forge build and all 52 tests pass with the required fuzz seed. Changes are confined to test/. No defects found.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json is written. The tree is otherwise unchanged, with the scratch test removed.

Outcome. The Squeek token itself is clean. The only defect any specialist found is a documentation and provenance problem in test-only dependencies, and it reproduces.

Specialist findings. All four specialists reported the same root cause, which I merged into one low finding. The documented check sha256sum --check lib/SHA256SUMS fails for seven forge-std files. I fetched the pinned upstream commit and confirmed the recorded hashes are upstream's and the local files differ only in line wrapping. The five OpenZeppelin files the token compiles from are byte-identical to upstream, so deployed bytecode is unaffected. I kept it at low, since no funds, deployed code or token guarantee is touched. The write_foundry_tests step reported nothing.

My own pass. Squeek is 17 lines over unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20, parameterless constructor minting 1e27 to msg.sender. I replicated the protected harness's token-level checks in a scratch test: CREATE2 factory probe receives the whole supply, decimals and metadata match, distributor, claim and pool-manager flows arrive whole, 22 admin and freeze selectors revert from the factory, and the reachable-opcode scan finds no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. All passed. The manifest is schema-valid and its supply and constructor arguments match the code. The project's own 52 tests pass with the README's fuzz seed. I added one info finding: the README's test count describes only the original test file and omits the 16 later-added edge tests.

Coverage. All three entry points are marked holds, plus rows for the constructor, the opcode floor, the manifest, and the vendored-dependency provenance, which points at finding 1.

Not verified. The protected harness could not run locally because it imports v4-core and launch sources absent from this tree. I could not confirm the economics are copied verbatim from the job beyond matching the values in the reference example.