Implemented WORLD: 1,000,000,000 tokens with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer, with no administrative controls or later minting.

Dependencies are vendored, and deployment parameters and responsibilities are documented in README.md.

Validation passed:

• forge build, including a forced offline rebuild
• forge test: 34 passing tests with the required seed
• forge fmt --check

Full protected launch integration remains for the independent verifier.

Created launch.json with the accepted token, exact supply, pool settings, and economics. Only the manifest is changed for submission.

Manifest and constructor ABI checks passed. forge build succeeded; forge test passed all 34 tests with the supplied fuzz seed.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json holds the result. The tree is otherwise unchanged apart from that file.

Outcome: no permission defects. The token is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20 with a parameterless constructor that mints the full supply once to its immediate caller. There is no owner, role, initializer, pause, blocklist, fee path, mint or burn selector, receive or fallback. The compiled ABI exposes only the three listed entry points as state-changing, and the runtime has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.

What I checked, from the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry guides:

• The permission map is empty beyond holder self-custody. A scratch Foundry test confirmed the deployer cannot pull a holder's balance without allowance, approve binds only the caller, exact allowances are consumed while max allowances persist, sends to the zero address revert, and ETH sends are rejected.
• No trust-gap seam exists because there is no privileged setter, pricing formula, or oracle. The one trust assumption is that the factory holds the whole supply after deployment, which is the launch design.
• Both transfer paths share the same internal update, so there is no asymmetric write or branch to diverge. The existing 34-test suite, including two stateful invariants, passes.

One informational finding: the committed forge-std copy does not match seven hashes in DEPENDENCIES.sha256, so the integrity check the project documents fails on the tree as shipped. All OpenZeppelin files, the only dependencies in the deployed bytecode, match. The author should regenerate the hash file or re-vendor the stated release.

Coverage: all three entry points are recorded as holds, plus rows for the constructor, the fixed-supply and no-hidden-surface invariants, and the trust-gap and asymmetry passes. The launch manifest row is unreached because no launch.json exists yet.

The findings file is valid JSON, the quoted snippet matches lines 19 and 20 of DEPENDENCIES.md exactly, and the working tree shows no tracked changes. The only files I created are the findings file itself and the gitignored scratch test.

Result

No defects found in the assigned area. The World Market Token is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20 with a single constructor mint. It contains no division, scaling, downcast, accumulator, external call, payable surface or bytes decoding, so the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap failure modes have nothing to attach to. The findings file records one informational item outside my area and a coverage row for every entry point.

What I checked

• Supply constant. The literal flagged by aderyn evaluates to exactly 1e27, divides into one billion whole tokens with no remainder, and sits far below any wrap. The lead is a style note, not a defect.
• transfer and transferFrom. The inherited balance subtraction is checked before its unchecked form runs, and the unchecked addition to the recipient cannot wrap because balances always sum to the fixed supply. One wei, zero, the full balance, supply plus one and max uint all behave correctly.
• approve and the allowance sentinel. Max uint is treated as infinite and never decrements. Max minus one is finite and decrements normally. The allowance check runs before the balance check and a revert leaves both untouched.
• Launch splits. Ten percent, eighty percent and the two-and-eight percent swarm sub-split all divide this supply with zero remainder, so no dust is stranded by rounding in the factory or distributor flows.
• Boundaries. No external calls, no receive or fallback, no sentinel branches beyond the zero-address reverts. Plain ETH and value-bearing calls revert.

I wrote twelve scratch probes covering these edges under test/scratch and ran them alongside the project's own 34 tests. All pass.

One informational finding, outside my area. DEPENDENCIES.md claims every vendored file is unmodified and verifiable with the shipped checksum file, but running that check on the committed tree reports seven forge-std files that do not match. Every OpenZeppelin production file matches, so compiled bytecode is unaffected. The author should re-vendor those seven files or regenerate the checksum file.

Coverage. All three listed entry points are marked holds, with six additional invariant and boundary rows. Nothing was left unreached.

Review complete. The findings file is valid JSON, the quoted snippet matches line 19 of DEPENDENCIES.md, and the working tree is clean apart from the required .imd-findings.json.

Outcome. The token itself has no defect in my area. The one substantiated finding is a low-severity integrity-claim mismatch in the dependency documentation.

What I covered

• Execution Trace. Traced constructor, transfer, approve and transferFrom through the vendored OpenZeppelin code to final state. Every failure path reverts atomically, no external calls or callbacks exist, infinite allowance is never decremented, and the factory has no allowance bypass. The launch flows (factory to distributor, claims, pool seed and swaps) move exactly the stated amount.
• Periphery. The five OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to upstream v5.0.2, verified by hash against the upstream raw source. Context returns plain msg.sender. Compiled artifact has no constructor inputs, no link references, no receive or fallback, and no CALL-family, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT or CREATE opcodes in runtime or creation code.
• First Principles. Supply constant equals 10^27, name, symbol and decimals match the brief, and the only path that changes total supply is the constructor mint. All 34 project tests pass with the README seed and the test models are sound. Both static-analysis leads were checked and are not defects.

The finding. Seven forge-std files under lib/ were re-wrapped by the project's 120-column formatter, so the documented check sha256sum -c DEPENDENCIES.sha256 fails and the "checksums matched" line in docs/SECURITY.md is false. I fetched upstream v1.9.7 and confirmed the recorded hashes are the correct upstream ones and the differences are whitespace only, so this is test-only and does not touch deployed bytecode. The suggested fix is to restore the files from the archive and add a formatter ignore for lib/, or regenerate the checksum file and reword the claim.

Coverage record. All three listed entry points are marked holds, plus rows for the constructor, supply and opcode invariants, both vendored dependencies, the tests, and the not-yet-written manifest. Nothing was left unreached.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json holds the result. No tracked files were changed.

Outcome: the economics of World Market Token hold. The contract is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no defects in the Economic Security, Invariant, or Flow Gap areas.

What I verified

• The token inherits the vendored OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20. I fetched the five upstream files and confirmed each vendored copy is byte-identical, so _update, _spendAllowance and Context are unmodified.
• The constructor mints exactly 10^27 units to the caller once. The compiled ABI exposes only the standard ERC-20 functions plus the INITIAL_SUPPLY constant, so supply cannot grow or shrink and no privileged call exists.
• Launch flows move exact amounts. No fee, burn, hook or external call touches transfer or transferFrom, so the distributor share, claims, pool seed and swaps arrive whole. The supply fits Uniswap v4's signed 128-bit deltas.
• Compiled runtime and creation code contain no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, and no link references.
• The project's 34 unit, fuzz and stateful invariant tests pass with the documented seed.

One info-level finding

The documented dependency check fails in the committed tree. Running the following reports seven forge-std files as mismatched:

sha256sum -c DEPENDENCIES.sha256

The recorded hashes match the genuine forge-std v1.9.7 release, and the in-tree copies differ only by formatter line reflow. forge-std is test-only, so there is no effect on the token, but the claim in DEPENDENCIES.md and docs/SECURITY.md that the checksums match is not true of this tree.

Coverage: all three entry points (approve, transfer, transferFrom) are marked holds, plus five invariant rows covering constant supply, mint-to-factory, balance conservation, decimals and v4 delta fit, and the opcode scan. Nothing in the assigned area was left unreached. No launch.json exists in the tree yet, which is expected at this stage.

Added 17 boundary, failure-path, and fuzz tests; expanded invariants across nine randomized actions.

forge build and forge test pass with the supplied seed: 51 tests, 32,768 invariant calls, zero failures.

Changes are confined to test/. No implementation defects were found.

The review is complete and the findings file is written and validated. The working tree shows no tracked changes.

Outcome. The token is sound. One low-severity finding survives, merged from all four specialists.

What I verified myself

• src/WorldMarketToken.sol is a bare OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20 that mints exactly 10^27 units to msg.sender in the constructor. It has no owner, mint, burn, pause, or upgrade path.
• All five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the tagged upstream release, so the three entry points (approve, transfer, transferFrom) are unmodified library code and behave as the standard requires.
• The manifest uses only schema keys, an empty constructor argument list matching the parameterless constructor, the exact minted supply, and a 16-character contract name. Creation code is well under the size limits.
• Build, formatting check, and all 51 local tests pass with the project's fuzz seed.

The kept finding (low). The documented command sha256sum -c DEPENDENCIES.sha256 fails for seven forge-std files, while DEPENDENCIES.md calls the files unmodified and docs/SECURITY.md records the check as passing. I fetched the upstream v1.9.7 archive and confirmed the recorded hashes are the genuine ones. The in-tree copies differ only by whitespace from a formatter re-wrap. This is a provenance and documentation defect in test-only material with no effect on deployed bytecode, so it is low and not blocking. The fix is the author's, since it touches lib/ or configuration.

Dropped. Nothing was dropped. All four specialist reports described the same root cause and are merged into the single finding above. The aderyn large-literal note is a style lead with no defect behind it.

Coverage rows answer all three listed entry points as holds, plus one row for the constructor and manifest consistency.