Done. The WORLD token project is built, tested and committed on main.

What was delivered

• src/WorldToken.sol is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC-20 named "World multichain token", symbol WORLD, 18 decimals. The constructor mints the full 1,000,000,000 supply once to msg.sender and takes no arguments. There is no owner, mint, burn, pause, blocklist, fee or fallback, so no launch address exemptions are needed.
• foundry.toml pins solc 0.8.26, sets bytecode_hash = "none" and cbor_metadata = false, and leaves ffi and fs_permissions off.
• forge-std v1.11.0 and the five OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 files ERC20 needs are vendored as plain files under lib/. No submodules.
• script/DeployWorldToken.s.sol is a reference script with a deploy() function the tests call directly. It reads no environment variables.
• README.md documents assumptions, the launch parameters from the brief, the supply split the factory performs, after-launch responsibilities, and which security tooling ran.

Checks run locally

Check	Result
forge build	clean, no warnings
forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed	34 passed, 0 failed
forge fmt --check	clean

Tests cover metadata and supply, supply landing on the calling contract rather than tx.origin, constructor events, successful and failing transfers and allowances, absence of all 22 admin selectors the protected floor probes, an opcode scan for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT, four fuzz tests, and a handler-driven invariant suite for supply conservation.

Notes for the next step

• Slither and Mythril were not available here and did not run.
• The protected tests in .imd/reads depend on v4-core and the verifier's own harness, so they could not be executed in this tree. The token satisfies every property they check: exact supply to the factory, whole untaxed transfers, no supply growth, no privileged balance moves, no forbidden opcodes.
• No launch.json was written, as the brief requires.

Created launch.json matching WorldToken, its supply, and the required pool and economics. Only this file changed.

Local manifest checks passed. Both forge build and forge test with the supplied seed failed because the installed Solidity compiler returned Permission denied (os error 13).

The review is complete. The findings file is written, valid JSON, and no tracked file was changed.

Result: no defects found in the Access Control, Trust Gap or Asymmetry areas. The .imd-findings.json file holds an empty findings list and eight coverage rows, all holds.

What I checked

• Access control. The compiled ABI has exactly three non-view entry points: approve, transfer and transferFrom. There is no owner, minter, pauser, blocklist, burnFrom, initializer, upgrade path, receive or fallback. The constructor takes no arguments and mints the full 1e27 supply once to msg.sender, which is the factory under launchCustom. Every admin selector the launch floor probes reverts from both the deployer and a stranger, with no state change.
• Trust gap. The token has no economics of its own and no privileged actor, so there is no seam between authorization, value flow and caller class to exploit. I read the vendored OpenZeppelin ERC20, Context and interface files line by line against v5.4.0 and found them unmodified, with the standard storage layout.
• Asymmetry. transfer and transferFrom both route through the same unmodified _transfer and _update. Allowance writes mirror correctly between approve and _spendAllowance. No admin or burn variant exists to diverge from the user path.
• Launch floor compatibility. The supply, decimals, untaxed flows to the distributor, claimant and PoolManager, and the opcode scan for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT all pass. The existing 34 tests, including fuzz and invariant runs, pass under forge 1.8.3.

Not reported on purpose. The standard ERC-20 approve front-running property is present, as in every OpenZeppelin v5 token. It is a documented design choice, the README covers allowance hygiene, and it is not a defect of this code.

Static analysis leads. Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's large-numeric-literal note on line 27 is the supply constant, which tests confirm equals exactly 1e27.

The review is complete. No defects were found in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap areas, and the findings file records that with full coverage.

What was audited. The token at src/WorldToken.sol is OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC-20 with one constructor mint and nothing else. I confirmed all five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the upstream v5.4.0 release, so the arithmetic under review is the audited library code.

Math precision. The supply constant evaluates to exactly 1e27, which fits in 90 bits. There is no division, scale conversion, downcast or fixed-point math anywhere in the token, so the rounding, truncation and overflow failure modes have no site to apply to. The 10/80/10 launch split divides exactly with no dust.

Boundary. The token makes no external calls, has no payable path, no receive or fallback, and decodes no bytes. The only sentinel branches are the library's zero-address checks, which revert correctly on transfer, approve and transferFrom.

Numerical gap. The sum of balances equals total supply under 128,000 invariant calls and my fuzz run. Zero-amount and self-transfers preserve state. Allowance behaves correctly at exactly-equal, minus-one, max-minus-one and infinite values. The supply fits an int128 delta for Uniswap v4, the derived opening price lies inside the v4 sqrtPrice range for either currency order, and seed liquidity is far below the per-tick cap.

Static-analysis lead. The aderyn large-numeric-literal note on line 27 is a style remark about a compile-time constant with no numeric defect, so it is not reported.

Deliverable. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and seven coverage rows: the three ABI entry points marked holds, plus four invariant rows for the supply constant, launch magnitudes, external boundaries and dependency integrity. Scratch tests were run and then removed, leaving the tree clean apart from the findings file.

The review is complete. No defects were substantiated, and the findings file at the repository root holds an empty findings list plus a ten-row coverage record. The working tree is unchanged apart from the ignored scratch test and the findings file.

What was reviewed

• src/WorldToken.sol is a 39-line fixed-supply token on an unmodified vendored OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20. The constructor mints 1e27 minor units to msg.sender once and the contract adds no other logic.
• The compiled ABI exposes only the seven standard ERC-20 methods and four constant getters. There is no mint, burn, owner, pause, blocklist, receive or fallback.

How the three guides were applied

• Economic Security: no external calls, oracles, ETH handling or price-dependent paths exist, so nothing can be sandwiched, griefed or starved. All launch flows (factory to distributor, distributor to claimant, pool manager settle and take, remainder transfer) move the exact amount because there is no fee or exemption list.
• Invariant: total supply is constant forever. _mint is reachable only from the constructor and transfer to the zero address reverts, so the supply cannot even shrink. Balances always sum to supply. The project's invariant suite passes with the verifier's fuzz seed.
• Flow Gap: the constructor calls nothing, takes no arguments, and there are no application contracts or multi-step flows whose end state could diverge from intent.

Checks run

• Full project suite: 34 tests pass. Invariant suite rerun with the verifier's fuzz seed passes.
• A scratch test under test/scratch/ deployed the token through a factory-like contract and confirmed exact launch splits, max-balance and balance-plus-one boundaries, finite and infinite allowance behavior, zero-address reverts, and that no supply-changing or admin selector is callable. All 5 cases pass.
• The aderyn large-numeric-literal lead at src/WorldToken.sol:27 evaluates to exactly the manifest supply and is cosmetic.

Coverage record

All three listed entry points are marked holds, with additional rows for the supply and balance-sum invariants, deployment recipient and decimals, launch-flow exactness, external-dependency exposure, constructor and script flow, and the static-analysis lead. Nothing was left unreached.

The review is complete. The findings file is valid JSON, no tracked file was changed, and the scratch directory was removed.

Result: no defects found in the Execution Trace, Periphery or First Principles area. The file .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and nine coverage rows, one for each of the three state-changing entry points plus the invariants and periphery I checked.

What I verified:

• Source. src/WorldToken.sol adds only three constants, one event and a constructor to OpenZeppelin ERC20. The constructor mints the full supply to the caller once. There is no owner, hook, fee, override of _update, receive or fallback.
• Periphery. All five vendored OpenZeppelin files are hash-identical to the upstream v5.4.0 release, so the inherited transfer, approve and allowance logic is the audited original.
• Execution traces. I traced every branch of the three entry points and confirmed them with a scratch test: zero-address receiver and spender revert, over-balance and over-allowance revert with the ERC-6093 errors, infinite allowance stays bounded by balance, zero-value calls are harmless no-ops, and a contract deployer standing in for the factory moves the swarm share, pool seed and remainder in exact amounts.
• Launch floor. The behavior matches what the protected test demands: supply equals the manifest value and sits on the factory after construction, decimals are 18, no admin selector exists, and the runtime has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.
• Tooling. Build, formatting check and the project's 34 tests plus two invariants pass under the verifier's fuzz seed. Slither and Aderyn reported nothing above the "large numeric literal" style note, which is the supply constant and not a defect.

Two observations I deliberately did not file as findings, since neither has a failing input against this code: the standard ERC-20 approve-overwrite race is inherent to the interface, and the DECIMALS constant is documentation rather than being wired into decimals(), which today agree at 18.

Added 20 boundary and failure-path tests, strengthened balance and allowance invariants, and corrected admin-call probes.

Only test/ changed. Offline forge build and forge test pass with the supplied seed: 53 unit/fuzz tests and four invariants across 32,768 randomized calls.

No implementation defects found.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. The tree is otherwise untouched.

Outcome: no defects in the code. The token is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 with a one-time constructor mint, and the only item I kept is an info-level stale README sentence.

What I verified:

• The five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to upstream v5.4.0, so the three entry points are the unmodified library code. I traced each one: approve rejects a zero spender, transfer rejects a zero receiver and over-balance sends, transferFrom enforces and decrements allowance except for the infinite case, and no path changes total supply.
• A scratch test deployed the token with CREATE2 from a factory-like contract. The whole supply landed on the factory, metadata and decimals matched the manifest, and the runtime contained no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. Creation code is 3,447 bytes and runtime 2,182 bytes, far under the limits.
• The existing suite of 54 tests, including a 256-run invariant campaign, passes. The protected floor's probes for mint, pause, blocklist and similar selectors have no effect because no such functions exist.
• launch.json uses only schema keys, matches the zero-argument constructor and the exact minted supply, and has lowercase addresses and correct field types.

The one finding, severity info: README.md line 69 says launch.json is deliberately not in the tree, but the manifest step has since added it at the repository root. It is documentation only.

Specialist findings: all four specialists and the test writer reported nothing, so there was nothing to reproduce or merge. The static-analysis lead about a large numeric literal is the supply constant and is not a defect.

The coverage record answers all three listed entry points as holds, plus rows for the constructor, the no-privilege invariant, the launch-flow invariant and manifest consistency.