I've made all the v3.4 contract fixes from the brief in source; nothing was deployed. forge build and forge fmt --check pass, and the tests come to 173 passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped (the existing opt-in fork test). That total comes from two runs: the full suite had 3 failures in test/V4Integration.t.sol, I fixed that test file, and I re-ran only that file (5/5 pass). The full suite was not re-run after that last test-only edit.

I could not commit: git has no author identity on this machine. Everything is staged in the working tree.

What's fixed (full table in report.md):

• H-1 (packs never lose value): a pack or starter whose entropy has expired is re-armed to a new future block. Nothing is minted until then, and the fallback Commons are gone. There is a new one-click reveal(id), a rearm(id), and a tested bot path that captures entropy two blocks after purchase and is paid once.
• H-2 (launch protection):
  • Only the launcher address can initialize the pool, so nobody else can start the clock.
  • The buy tax steps 90% / 50% / 25% over minutes 0–10 / 10–20 / 20–30, then the normal fee. All launch tax goes to the reward pool.
  • The max buy is removed.
  • PackSale opens at the hook's start time + 60 minutes, not from a constructor input.
• H-3: packs need the endowment funded and the hook bound to this game's FeeRouter.
• H-4: anyone can call bindFeeRouter, but it only accepts the FeeRouter registered in the genuine GameRegistry. The hook recomputes both CREATE2 addresses from the pinned factory and the pinned FeeRouter code, and the registry must point back to the hook. Tests show look-alikes are rejected.
• M-1: activateEndowment is removed. Making the RewardPool the token's remainderTo isn't possible: the pool's address depends on the registry, which depends on the token address, so it isn't known before the token exists. fundEndowment stays, and the public steps are in docs/launch-v34.md.
• Fairness (M-3, L-1, L-2, L-4, L-5): all the requested rules are implemented and tested. Referrals are unchanged.

Bug I found and fixed: with slippage capped at 1.5%, buybacks through the real hook would always have reverted, because the hook takes its 2.25% fee before the swap. The 1.5% limit now applies on top of that fee.

Things you should know:

• Two values must be supplied at launch: the IMD launcher address (the one that calls the pool's initialize) and the IMD application factory. Both are hook constructor arguments; I used no placeholders. If the wrong launcher is given, the pool can't be initialized at all, which fails safe.

• Remaining risk with re-arming: if no bot captures entropy within 256 blocks (about a minute on Robinhood Chain), the pack owner could let it expire to get a new draw. Running the bounty bot is what prevents this; the steps are in the launch doc.

• Section 7 is proposals only, not in the contracts:

  • emission following the 7-day pack sales trend;
  • first rewards from the joining epoch;
  • a 25% newcomer boost for 7 days.

  I tested them only in the simulation. Earning from the joining epoch would change the reward accounting and needs its own review.

• 42 vs 56 day drip: 56 days is slightly worse for early payback, so I kept 42.

• The simulation is a simplified daily model I rebuilt for v3.4, so its numbers can't be compared directly with the v3.3 tables. It runs 7 seeds per scenario and reports median and range. The levers make week-3 joiners pay back about 1–2 days faster and week-1 joiners about 2–3 days slower. Its drawdown figures are low because the model has no speculative sellers.

• Sniper case (5 ETH buys at minutes 1, 15 and 25): the bots pay 15 ETH, of which 8.06 ETH goes to the reward pool, and lose about 9.3 ETH if they sell afterwards.

• Pins: module code pins must be regenerated after any source change, including formatting, because formatting changes the bytecode. I formatted before pinning, and t

the task produced no changes; the agent's last message was: I've stopped without changing anything in the repository. No command can run on this machine: every shell invocation (echo hi, pwd, ls, and a background monitor) fails before it starts with:

apply-seccomp: write /proc/self/setgroups (nested userns is capability-restricted; caller must provide CAP_SYS_ADMIN): Permission denied

The sandbox can't create its user namespace, so no command runs at all. Turning the sandbox off is disabled in this session, and changing that is your call, not mine.

Why I didn't write the code anyway: this task is large and needs commands at almost every step:

• The fixes for H-1 to H-4, M-1, M-3 and L-1 to L-5 touch most of the 15 or so contracts in src/, plus the shared test setup (test/Base.t.sol) and most of the roughly 25 test files.
• The acceptance criteria require forge build, forge test and forge fmt --check to pass, and a code-analysis check runs after that. Code I can't compile or test even once is very unlikely to pass, and I couldn't honestly tell you whether it does.
• The simulation in item 8 (5+ seeds, median and range, payback by join week, sniper scenario) and the 42-vs-56-day drip comparison in item 7 need the Python model to run. Without it, any numbers in report.md would be made up.

I also didn't write .imd-blocked.json. That file is for a value only the requester has, and the requester can't fix this machine's sandbox.

What I read, ready for a retry:

• project.md and the v3.3 code. src/V4Market.sol still has the team-only bindFeeRouter, the 30-minute linear launch-tax decay, MAX_BUY of 0.5 ETH, and the clock starting at afterInitialize with no check on who initialized the pool. Those are the targets for H-2 and H-4.
• The last rejection was for an abi.encodePacked call with several variable-length arguments in the new bindFeeRouter. The retry should build that hash with abi.encode, or packed fixed-size values only. The analysis also flagged Season.topSpenders as "never initialized" at high severity, and that mapping is in the current code too.

What's needed: a session where shell commands run, either the sandbox fixed (the machine allows nested user namespaces, or CAP_SYS_ADMIN is granted) or the job re-run on a machine where it works. With that, the task as briefed fits in the time limit.

Implemented BLACKOUT v3.4, including independent review repairs. No deployment.

• forge build and forge fmt --check pass.
• Tests: 179 passed, 1 RPC-dependent skip; five invariants passed.
• Python/JS keeper, reveal and economy tests pass.
• Simulations still show weak week-2/3 payback, documented explicitly.

Implementation report · Updated launch steps · Independent review