The contract stage is complete and committed. The working tree is clean, with build artifacts ignored.

What was delivered, as a Foundry project at the repository root, compiler pinned to 0.8.26 with bytecode_hash = "none":

• LaunchToken (VIMD): fixed-supply OpenZeppelin ERC-20, 10^27 minor units minted to the deployer, no admin surface.
• FinalistArtA, FinalistArtB, FinalistArtC: stateless contracts returning the logomark SVGs byte for byte. The files under art/finalist-{a,b,c}/logomark.svg were verified identical to the constants.
• BrandGenesisNFT (VIMDG): seat-holder voting with one vote per seat id ever, 50,000 VIMD burn mints to the dead address, shared token ids 1 to 4,000, both caps, a 7-day vote window as an immutable, tie-breaking leader and winner, burn that changes no vote, and a fully on-chain Base64 tokenURI. No owner, setters or withdraw. The constructor takes five addresses and calls no contract.
• Dependencies vendored as plain files in lib/ (forge-std 1.9.6, OpenZeppelin 5.1.0), no submodules.
• ABI exports in docs/abi/ for all five contracts, a reviewable local deploy script, and a README with assumptions, manifest arguments, chosen constants, trust notes and an "After launch" section stating nothing needs configuring.

Checks run with the verifier's fuzz seed:

Tests use a mock seat collection and cover every item the workflow lists, plus a reentrant seat collection, zero-address constructor rejection, a constructor run against codeless addresses, and vm.parseJson on the decoded metadata.

One thing to flag. The repository started empty, so the brand-guide stage's logomarks did not exist. I drew three original geometric marks and shipped them in both the art folders and the art contracts. If the brand-guide stage replaces any logomark, the matching SVG constant in that art contract and the expected string in its test must be updated to the new file's exact bytes before the manifest is written. The README records this under the art contracts section.

Done. The manifest is written at launch.json and nothing else in the tree changed.

What it declares

• Token: LaunchToken, name "VisualIdentity.md", symbol "VIMD", 18 decimals, matching src/LaunchToken.sol.
• Contracts in dependency order: FinalistArtA, FinalistArtB, FinalistArtC with empty constructorArgs, then BrandGenesisNFT.
• BrandGenesisNFT constructorArgs mirror its five address parameters in declaration order: $token, the identity.md seat collection address from the approved workflow in lowercase, then $contract:FinalistArtA, B and C. No $owner, since the contract has no owner or admin and the brief says so explicitly.
• Pool: pairedCurrency is the IMD address, fee 12500, tickSpacing 60, initialPrice as the launch facts give it.
• Notes explain each contract, the seat-collection argument, the burn sink used inside mint, and that no contract receives supply.

Checks run

• A scratch script confirmed the manifest uses only the schema keys, unique names within 32 characters, backward-only contract references, lowercase addresses, and notes well under the 4000 character limit.
• forge build succeeds and forge test passes all 49 tests across 4 suites.
• git status shows launch.json as the only new or changed file.

The review is complete. No defects were found on the Access Control, Trust Gap or Asymmetry lenses, and the findings file records that with a full coverage record.

What I checked

• Permission model. BrandGenesisNFT has no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or withdraw path. The constructor assigns no role, never reads the sender, rejects zero addresses, and calls no contract. The compiled ABI exports in docs/abi match the build exactly.
• vote. The only guard is the seat collection's ownerOf against the caller, reached by STATICCALL, so the aderyn reentrancy lead cannot be exercised. Replay, window, range and cap checks run before the call and all writes precede the mint. I queried the hard-coded seat collection on mainnet: it is an ERC-721 named identity.md with ids 0 through 1999 and id 2000 reverting, so the range constant is correct.
• mint. It spends only the caller's own VIMD allowance, so the contract cannot be used as a confused deputy against anyone else's approval. State is written before the token pull.
• burn. OpenZeppelin v5 authorization lets the owner, a per-token approvee or an operator burn. Strangers and nonexistent or already-burned ids revert, so the burned counter cannot be inflated. Votes and seat flags are untouched, as the brief requires.
• Asymmetry. Vote and burn mints write mirrored state. Burn only increments the burned counter so lifetime caps stay lifetime caps. The vote-mint cap is redundant with the seat range but never over-restrictive.
• Trust assumptions. Whoever holds a seat at call time consumes that seat's one vote, including a borrower or escrow. That matches the brief's stated design and the README, so I recorded it as a coverage row rather than a finding.

Leads from static analysis. The three timestamp lines implement the fixed vote window the brief specifies. The unchecked-return line is the OpenZeppelin burn path whose return value is intentionally unused. The unsafe-mint lines are the brief's explicit choice of plain mint over safe mint.

Output. The file .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and 15 coverage rows: all 11 listed entry points as holds plus 4 invariant rows. No tracked file was changed. The manifest stage has not run, so no launch.json exists to review; the README's intended constructor arguments match the approved workflow.

The review is complete. The findings file holds an empty list and a full coverage record, and no tracked file was changed.

Outcome: no defects in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap areas. The contracts contain no division, scaling, casting or fixed-point math at all, so the precision and numerical-gap checklists had nothing to bite on. The boundaries I could exercise all behaved as specified.

What I checked and how:

• Seat id boundary against the real contract. I queried the mainnet seat collection named in the brief over a public RPC. It is an ERC-721 named identity.md with supply 2000, ownerOf works for ids 0 and 1999, and reverts for 2000. The contract's 0..1999 range and 2000 vote cap match it exactly.
• Counter and vote invariants. A scratch Foundry invariant handler drove random vote, burn-mint, burn and seat-transfer sequences against an oracle model for 3,840 calls. Minted, vote, burn-mint and burned counters, per-finalist tallies, the dead-address balance and the leader/winner tie-break never diverged. The scratch test is removed.
• Time window edges. Voting accepts strictly before VOTE_END and winner reverts strictly before it, so the two windows are exact complements with no gap or overlap at the boundary second.
• External calls. The seat lookup is a staticcall and precedes all writes; the token pull uses the vendored OpenZeppelin 5.1 SafeERC20, which reverts on no-code or false returns, and the dead address is nonzero so the plain ERC-20 accepts it. The burn path reverts for nonexistent or unauthorized ids before incrementing, so supply arithmetic cannot underflow.
• Artifacts. The five exported ABI files equal the compiler output, and the three SVG constants equal the art files byte for byte.

Coverage: all 11 listed entry points are marked holds, plus six invariant and artifact rows. The one unreached row is launch.json, which does not exist in this tree yet. The README's documented constructor order and values are consistent with the source.

One observation that is not a defect: the vote-mint cap check can never trigger, because the 2,000 distinct seat ids already bound vote mints to 2,000. It is redundant rather than wrong, so I did not report it.

The economics review found no defects. The findings file at .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and a coverage row for all 11 entry points plus 4 invariant and deployment rows, all marked holds. No tracked file was changed.

What I checked, from the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides:

• Value flows. mint moves exactly 50,000 VIMD from the caller to the dead address through SafeERC20 on the launch's own plain ERC-20, then mints. The NFT contract never custodies tokens, nothing refunds, and burn mints never touch votes. The vote and burn caps are separate, so neither can starve the other.
• Invariants. A scratch Foundry invariant test under test/scratch/ ran 5,120 randomized calls mixing votes, burn mints, NFT burns, seat transfers, NFT transfers and time warps. Mint counters, vote counts, the seatVoted count, the dead-address balance, VIMD supply, the leader tie-break and the winner gating all held.
• Flow gaps and periphery. The seat lookup is a STATICCALL, so a hostile seat collection cannot re-enter. State is written before _mint, which has no callback. I verified the mainnet seat collection at the brief's address over RPC: it reports ERC-721 support, 2,000 seats, owners for ids 0, 1, 500 and 1999, and reverts for 2000 and 2001, so the contract's seat range matches reality.
• Deployment inputs. The constructor calls no contract, rejects zero addresses and takes no owner. The exported ABI files match compiler output for all five contracts, and the three SVG constants match the art files byte for byte. No launch.json exists yet, which is correct for this stage.

Static-analysis leads were all checked and dismissed: the timestamp comparisons are the specified vote window, the reentrancy flag is on a view call, the unchecked return is from an internal function that reverts on failure, and _mint without a receiver check is what the brief asks for.

Nothing in my area was left unreached. The only item I could not fully confirm is whether the seat collection's bytecode is upgradeable, since its reported owner is the deterministic CREATE2 deployer and the opcode scan may hit data bytes. That dependency belongs to the brief's design and is already listed in its risks.

The review is complete. The findings file is written and validated, and the working tree is unchanged apart from my gitignored scratch tests.

Outcome: no defects found. The contract stage holds against the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides. The findings file carries one info-level note and seventeen coverage rows, all eleven listed entry points marked holds.

What I verified

• vote path. All six guards traced in order. The seat lookup is a STATICCALL, so the Aderyn reentrancy lead cannot write state, and _mint has no receiver callback. I ran it against a mainnet fork with the real seat collection: the live owner of seat 0 votes, a stranger reverts, a replay reverts, and every id 0 to 1999 has an owner while 2000 reverts. That matches the hardcoded seat range.
• mint and burn accounting. A stateful invariant run of 10,240 calls over vote, mint, burn, seat transfers and time warps held every accounting relation: minted equals votes plus burns, dead-address balance equals 50,000 times burn mints, the NFT never holds VIMD, and leader/winner tie-break and window boundaries stay consistent.
• Periphery. The vendored OpenZeppelin v5.1.0 and forge-std v1.9.6 diff clean against the upstream tags. The three SVG constants are byte-identical to the art files. All five exported ABI files equal the compiled output. Runtime sizes are well under the limit and contain no forbidden opcodes.
• Launch floor. The constructor stores only immutables, uses no msg.sender or owner, refuses zero addresses, and takes five address arguments in the README's stated manifest order. No launch.json exists in this tree, so no manifest was reviewed. The seat contract on mainnet is a non-upgradeable ERC-721 named "identity.md".

The one note (info, no revision needed). seatOf returns 0 for burn-mint tokens, the same value a vote with seat id 0 stores. On-chain behaviour is correct and tokenURI already branches on isVoteToken. The frontend stage should read isVoteToken before seatOf.

Static analysis leads. All four were checked and rejected: the timestamp comparisons are the intended fixed seven-day window, the reentrancy state-change is behind a STATICCALL and a hook-free token, the unchecked return on _update is safe because authorization is enforced inside it, and _mint instead of _safeMint is what the brief specifies.

Done. The suite now has 75 passing tests under the verifier's fuzz seed, up from 49, and only three new files were added under test/.

What I added

• test/BrandGenesisNFT.invariant.t.sol: a handler that drives the NFT with six actors over random sequences of votes, burn mints, burns, operator and token approvals, seat and NFT transfers, and time warps across the vote end. Each action computes whether it should succeed from the approved rules, asserts the outcome and that failed calls changed nothing, and records ghost state. Eleven invariants check after every call: minted equals vote mints plus burn mints, the tally equals successful votes and distinct seats used, used seats never flip back, caps hold, the dead address holds exactly 50,000 VIMD per burn mint, the NFT contract never custodies VIMD, token ids are contiguous and per-token records never change, leader is the argmax with the lowest index on ties, winner is gated by time and votes, and the tally freezes at VOTE_END.
• test/LaunchToken.invariant.t.sol: random transfers, approvals and transferFroms among holders, including over-balance and over-allowance attempts. Supply stays fixed and balances always sum to the supply.
• test/BrandGenesisNFT.adversarial.t.sol: 24 unit and property tests for paths the existing suite did not cover. Contract-held seats can vote and mint because the code uses plain _mint, the receiver hook is never invoked so it cannot re-enter, a seat collection that re-enters mint or burn from ownerOf fails whole, a seat sold and bought back still cannot vote, a wallet with forty seats votes exactly once per seat, exact-balance and one-wei-short mints, unlimited versus exact allowance consumption, a failed mint leaves no partial state, cleared approvals cannot burn, burning every token frees no seat and changes no winner, one-transaction deployment leaves the whole supply with the deployer, and a fuzzed oracle for leader and winner over all tallies up to 12 votes each.

Verification

• The art constants match the three SVG files byte for byte and the ABI exports under docs/abi match the compiled ABIs.
• A scratch driver confirmed the handler reaches both the success and rejection paths of every action before I deleted it.
• forge build and forge test pass with the verifier seed. The invariant suites run 15,360 and 12,800 calls with zero handler reverts.

Defects

None found, so no findings file was written. One observation that is not a defect: the vote cap check in vote can never trigger, because the seat range already limits votes to 2,000. It is harmless dead code.

The review found no defects. .imd-findings.json has an empty findings list and a coverage row for each of the 11 entry points, all marked holds, plus two rows for invariants I checked.

What I checked:

• Build and tests: forge build succeeds and all 75 existing tests pass. The largest contract, BrandGenesisNFT, is 9,821 bytes deployed and 15.7 KB of creation code, well under the 24,576 and 49,152 byte limits.
• Art contracts: the SVG strings in FinalistArtA, FinalistArtB and FinalistArtC match the art/finalist-*/logomark.svg files byte for byte.
• Deployment: no constructor calls another contract, so they run on an empty chain. launch.json gives BrandGenesisNFT five address arguments in the constructor's order. There is no $owner and no privileged role anywhere.
• vote: the checks run in this order: finalist below 3, voting window open, seat id 0–1999, seat not already voted, cap, then seat owner equals the caller. The "already voted" flag is never cleared, so a seat can't vote again after it is transferred. NFTs are minted with _mint, which makes no callback to the receiver.
• mint: state is updated before exactly 50,000 VIMD moves to the dead address. It never changes the vote counts.
• burn: it rejects callers who aren't the owner or approved, and nonexistent token ids. It changes only totalBurned.
• Results: leader() keeps the lowest index on a tie and reverts with no votes. winner() also reverts before VOTE_END.
• Token: LaunchToken is the plain OpenZeppelin ERC-20 with a fixed supply of 10^27.

Leads I dropped:

• Aderyn's "high" reentrancy at line 126: SEATS.ownerOf is a read-only call, so the seat collection can't call back into vote during it. The address is also fixed at deployment.
• Slither's timestamp warnings: the 7-day voting window is supposed to depend on time, so these are intended.
• Aderyn's unchecked-return lead: line 160 is _update, whose return value isn't needed because it reverts on any authorization failure. The VIMD transfer goes through SafeERC20.
• Aderyn's _mint warning: the approved spec requires _mint.
• The flow specialist's "seatOf is 0 for burn mints" note: I confirmed the behaviour, but on-chain logic is correct. tokenURI checks isVoteToken first, and the README documents it. It is a reminder for the website, not a defect.

None of the other specialists reported findings, so there were no duplicates to merge.

Implemented the frontend and 1.1 MB static export.

Validation passed: 7 tests, 28 browser checks, 16 design checks, and deployment/asset hashes. No live transactions were sent.

Design documentation is in docs/DESIGN.md to respect the write scope.

Commit blocked: Git reported .git/index.lock: Read-only file system. All deliverables remain in the workspace, with evidence under docs/frontend/.

Recorded two findings in .imd-findings.json:

• Medium — bug: Trade cannot recover through “Refresh chain data.” After protocol verification fails, restoring RPC service and refreshing leaves Get quote disabled. Editing the amount removes its error explanation. Navigating away and back recovers it. Reproduced at 390 × 844; fix the existing refresh action to retry Trade verification.
• Medium — bug: Small swap proceeds display as zero. A live quote for selling 0.1 VIMD displayed 0 IMD for both estimated and minimum proceeds, although the actual values were 0.000000262968490811 and 0.000000261653648356 IMD. Reproduced at 390 × 844 without signing. Preserve meaningful decimal precision visibly.

Build, typecheck, seven unit tests and 28 supplied browser checks passed. Independent checks covered eight routes in Chromium at 320/390/1440 and WebKit at 390, with no measured overflow, overlap, text-contrast or automated accessibility failures. The rebuilt export matched the submitted export byte for byte. Website files remain unchanged.

The requirement mapping below consolidates duplicated workflow text. Contract entries concern the preserved, previously accepted implementation and tests; this review does not claim a new Solidity audit.