Created launch.json matching Aligned’s constructor, exact supply, and required pool and economics values. No application contracts are listed.

forge build succeeded. All 28 tests passed with the supplied fuzz seed. Only launch.json is changed for submission.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. Nothing else depends on further tool calls.

Result: no defects found. The economic review of the Aligned (ALIGN) token is clean, and .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list with eight coverage rows, one per entry point plus five invariant and flow rows.

What was checked

• Source and dependencies. The token is a 15-line contract: a constant and a constructor mint on top of OpenZeppelin ERC20. The five vendored OpenZeppelin files hash-match upstream v5.1.0 byte for byte, so the transfer logic is exactly the audited library code.
• Entry points. approve, transfer and transferFrom are the only state-changing functions in the compiled ABI. Each was traced through its checks, state writes and revert paths. All three hold.
• Invariants. Total supply is fixed at 1e27 from the constructor and no mint, burn or admin path exists. Sum of balances equals total supply under the repository's fuzz suite and a scratch fuzz suite I ran.
• Launch flows. A scratch suite drove the factory to distributor transfer, a claim out of the distributor, a PoolManager-style balance-delta settle for the seed, the remainder forward, and a trader buy and sell round trip. Every flow moved exactly the stated amount with no callbacks or external calls in the path.
• Floor checks. Runtime bytecode contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. Ether sent to the token reverts. The factory cannot move a holder's balance without an approval.
• Static analysis leads. Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's large-literal lead on line 10 is a compile-time constant equal to the manifest supply, confirmed benign.

Tools run. forge build, the 28 repository tests with the README seed, a 6-test scratch suite under test/scratch (removed afterwards so the tree is unchanged), and forge fmt. All passed.

Open items, not defects. No launch.json exists yet, which is expected at this stage. The README's supply, 18 decimals and empty constructor arguments match the token and are what the manifest step should write. The ERC-20 approve race and the unrecoverability of tokens sent to the contract itself are inherent to a no-admin fixed-supply token and are documented in the README as trust notes.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. The working tree has no changes other than the findings file, which is gitignored or untracked as intended.

Result: no defects found. The review file .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and nine coverage rows, all holds.

What was reviewed, against the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides:

• Source. The token is fifteen lines: an OpenZeppelin ERC20 subclass with a constant supply and a constructor that mints it to the caller. No owner, hooks, fees, exemptions, receive or fallback.
• Execution trace. Traced approve, transfer and transferFrom through the vendored implementation. Every failure path reverts atomically, allowance is spent before the balance moves, infinite allowance is preserved, zero receiver and zero approver revert, and malformed calldata is rejected at decode time.
• Periphery. The five vendored OpenZeppelin files hash-match the upstream v5.1.0 tag byte for byte. The compiled creation and runtime code contain no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT or CALL.
• First principles. The supply constant evaluates at compile time to exactly the brief's base-unit figure. The mint goes to the immediate caller, which is the CREATE2 factory in the launch, confirmed by the project's factory probe test. No selector outside the ERC-20 set exists, so no supply growth or holder freeze is reachable.
• Checks run. The project's 28 tests pass with the README's fuzz seed. Ten scratch edge tests I wrote also passed, covering self-spend, near-max allowance decrement, self-to-self transferFrom, transfer to the token address, ether rejection, unknown selectors, short and dirty calldata, a contract holder, and three-party conservation. The scratch directory was removed afterwards.

Not run. The protected launch test needs Uniswap v4 sources and launch environment variables that are not in this tree, so the launch flows were traced rather than executed. Since the token has no transfer customisation, every launch flow is a plain balance move.

One note, not a defect. The runtime uses PUSH0 and MCOPY because the pinned profile is Cancun, so the target chain must support Cancun. Ethereum mainnet and the major L2s do. The aderyn large-numeric-literal lead is style only.

The review is complete and the result is clean. .imd-findings.json holds zero findings and eight coverage rows, one per entry point plus the invariants and boundaries I checked.

What the token is. src/Aligned.sol is a bare OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-20 with one constructor mint of exactly one billion tokens at 18 decimals to the deployer. There is no custom arithmetic, no override of transfer logic, no mint, burn, pause, owner, receive or fallback.

What I checked in my area (Math Precision, Boundary, Numerical Gap):

• Supply constant. The literal 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18 evaluates to exactly 1e27, well under 2^128. The aderyn "large numeric literal" lead is a style note, not a defect.
• Transfer boundaries. 1 wei, full supply, supply plus one, uint256 max, self-transfer of the full supply, and zero-amount to the zero address all behave as intended. Insufficient balance reverts before the unchecked subtraction. The receiver add cannot overflow because balances sum to the fixed supply.
• Allowance boundaries. Exact spend leaves zero, off-by-one reverts with allowance untouched, max minus one is finite and decremented, max is treated as infinite and preserved, zero-amount with zero allowance succeeds and moves nothing, and a balance shortfall reverts even with a huge allowance.
• Invariants. Fuzzed conservation of supply across transfers, plus the existing 28 project tests, all pass. No path reaches a mint or burn after the constructor.
• External boundaries. No external calls, payable functions, sentinel branches beyond OZ's zero-address checks, or bytes decoding exist.
• Launch floor opcode scan. A disassembly matching the protected test's PUSH-skipping walk finds no real DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT in the compiled runtime.

Scratch work. I wrote an 18-test boundary suite under test/scratch/, ran it (all passed), and removed it so the only file I leave is the findings record.

Note for the manifest step. No launch.json exists yet. The constructor takes no parameters, so constructorArgs must be an empty list, totalSupply must be the 28-digit string for 1e27, decimals 18, contract name Aligned.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json is written. The Aligned token is clean in my area.

Result: no defects in Access Control, Trust Gap or Asymmetry. One informational note is recorded.

What I checked

• Access control surface. The compiled ABI exposes only the ERC-20 functions and one constant getter. There is no owner, role, pause, blacklist, mint, burn, initializer, fallback or receive. Unknown selectors and plain ETH sends revert.
• Guard consistency. Both transfer paths write balances through the same internal update with identical checks. The allowance row can only be set by its owner and only decremented by the approved spender, bounded by the current allowance. The factory, which holds the whole supply at launch, has no bypass and needs an allowance like any holder.
• Trust gap. No privileged actor, fee or settable recipient exists, so there is no seam between authorization, economics and asymmetry to exploit.
• Vendored library. All five OpenZeppelin files hash identically to upstream v5.1.0, so the inherited logic is the audited one.
• Launch floor. The constructor mints exactly 1e27 units to the immediate caller, with no arguments and no external calls. The runtime bytecode, scanned with the floor test's own loop, contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. The aderyn large-literal lead evaluates to exactly one billion tokens and is not a defect.

Verification run

Check	Outcome
forge build, forge fmt --check	pass
Project suite (28 tests, pinned seed)	all pass
Scratch probes (8 tests, removed afterwards)	all pass

Informational finding. The inherited approve-then-transferFrom allowance race is recorded at info severity with a concrete trace, because the Asymmetry guide's approve/pull pair points at it. It is standard ERC-20 behaviour, the README already documents the mitigation, and it needs no code change.

Coverage. All three listed entry points are marked holds, plus five invariant rows covering the constructor, access map, trust gap, storage symmetry and floor compatibility. No files in the repository were modified.

Added failure-path and boundary tests, six fuzz properties, and three multi-actor invariants under test/.

forge build and the full forge test pass with the required seed, including 32,768 randomized handler calls. No reproducible defects found. All changes are confined to test/.

Review complete. The findings file is valid JSON and the working tree is clean apart from the gitignored build output.

Outcome: the Aligned token has no defects. One informational note is kept, and no revision is needed.

What I checked

• The token is a 15-line contract inheriting OpenZeppelin v5.1.0 ERC20 with a zero-argument constructor that mints the supply to the caller. Every vendored OpenZeppelin file matched the upstream v5.1.0 tag by SHA-256.
• I traced all three entry points through the library: zero-address rejection, balance and allowance reverts, exact amount movement, no fees or callbacks, and no supply change.
• The constant equals the manifest supply exactly, decimals are 18, and the manifest has valid keys, types, lowercase addresses and an empty constructor argument list matching the constructor.
• Deployed and creation code sizes are far under the limits, and no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT is present. No mint, burn, owner, pause, blacklist or upgrade path exists, so the protected floor tests cannot be tripped.
• The project suite of 46 tests passed with the pinned fuzz seed, and the format check passed.

Specialist findings

• Four areas reported nothing. The permissions specialist's single info note, the standard ERC-20 approve overwrite race, reproduced: I ran a scratch test showing a front-running spender collecting 150 units from allowances of 100 then 50. I kept it at info with the explicit statement that it is standard behaviour, already documented in the README, and requires no code change.

Coverage answers all three entry points, plus rows for the supply, privilege, launch-flow and manifest invariants.