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The salt tool is built, tested and documented, but the final SALT and ADDRESS cannot be printed yet: the brief gives the deployer but not the hook owner, and a CREATE2 address depends on both.
Why the owner is required. The address is
keccak256(0xff ‖ deployer ‖ salt ‖ keccak256(initCode)), and the init code includes the ABI-encoded constructor arguments(manager, owner, launchToken, factory). The owner is not recorded anywhere in the repository or the brief, so a salt mined for any stand-in owner would be wrong for the real deployment. The script therefore takes the owner as its one argument and bakes in everything else.What is in the script (
script/MineSalt.s.sol):- Constants from the brief and pinned inputs: deployer
0x735121A546092F31050A867FD7E3A750C7B0EFF9, PoolManager0x8366…0951, SHK token0x4fE8…1164, chain 4663. - Assumption: the deployer is the contract that executes CREATE2, so it also fills the hook's
factory_argument. The full formmineWith(...)overrides every value if that is wrong. - The search requires the low 16 bits to equal
0x1040. Uniswap v4 only checks 14 bits, so0x5040or0x9040endings would pass v4 but not the brief's "must end in 0x1040". The stricter predicate implies the v4 flags. - The inner loop runs in assembly over a fixed scratch area. The original Solidity loop ran out of gas from memory growth at around 150k attempts.
- Bare
run()reverts withOwnerRequiredand the exact command to use. A missing owner is reported, never guessed.
To get the output, run with the owner's address:
forge build forge script script/MineSalt.s.sol --sig "mineFor(address)" <owner>It prints
SALT:,ADDRESS:(ending in 1040),INIT_CODE_HASH:and each constructor value to cross-check in the deploy transaction. A dry run with a throwaway owner took about 7M gas in simulation.Tests (
test/MineSalt.t.sol, 20 tests): a small CREATE2 factory is etched at the brief's deployer address, and a real CREATE2 from there lands the hook exactly on the predicted address with the real constructor on an empty chain. Also covered: init code equals the compiled artifact, lowest salt is returned, search resumes, zero arguments and exhausted windows revert, a salt mined for one owner or deployer does not serve another, an unmined salt is rejected by the hook constructor withHookAddressNotValid, plus three fuzz tests.Verification results:
Check Result forge buildpasses, 0 errors forge testwith the verifier seed135 passed, 0 failed forge fmt --checkpasses Documentation was added to the README (new "CREATE2 salt mining" section with the input table, assumptions and operator rules, plus an "After launch" item), the test coverage table, and the security record. Operational responsibilities noted there: confirm the deployer is really the CREATE2 executor and not an EOA, confirm the predicted address is empty on chain, confirm the pinned PoolManager and token addresses, and re-mine after any bytecode or argument change.
Protected files were not touched, nothing was deployed, and the changes are left uncommitted in the working tree.
ran onclaude · claude-fable-5-1 · 41 turns · 16m 57s · 546 in · 50.6K out · 1.4M cachedsubmission29be294e6f1ce672288ba781c2fcc32cbe54cbc0c2508b0964dbdf60c1314a0cdevice37eed9f56188ea8bc18cadb56eb376ad83d30a30750e8d54d0203251a3e3d14fstarted from92ca47bd9c6ab3fe2ee6767a8fbd91d2de95a946bundle30597ba8c4a12319c6864d351ef9afa1ec7fa23a901c317a32c6438713a2aaee · 12 KBverifiedrebuilt and matched · verifier 0.1.0 ·changed · 7 filesREADME.mddocs/SECURITY.mdscript/MineSalt.s.soltest/Adversarial.t.soltest/MineSalt.t.soltest/README.mdtest/helpers/Create2Factory.sol- Constants from the brief and pinned inputs: deployer