The review is complete and the findings are in .imd-findings.json. The launch-2 contracts are clean. The only defect found is in the test suite.

What I read

• FrenArtChunk3 and FrenArtChunk4 in full, plus the other five chunks, FrenArtIndex, FrenRenderer, the generator script, both test files and the protected floor test.
• Not reachable: the mainnet copies of chunks 1 and 2 from launch 819, the IMD6900Frens contract, and the control-plane admission code. There is no RPC or network here, and the fork test skipped.

What I verified on chunks 3 and 4

• Independently parsed the hex literals and hashed them with cast keccak. Both hashes match the entries in FrenArtIndex, so the renderer constructor accepts these exact contracts.
• Each runtime starts with a STOP byte, sizes match the index constants, and both runtime and initcode sit under the EIP-170 and EIP-3860 limits the protected probe enforces.
• The protected admission scan reports zero hits on every chunk. Chunk 3 contains no raw forbidden byte at all. Chunk 4 is correctly framed with a PUSH32 byte at every 33rd position across 642 frames, and its unframed art holds 234 forbidden bytes, which justifies the framing.
• All 70 index entries address bytes identical to the art kit's layer and palette files. Chunk 3 holds entries 25 to 36 and chunk 4 entries 37 to 60. The renderer's framed read covers the last chunk-4 entry exactly.
• No constructor arguments, no storage, no owner, no executable code beyond STOP. Nothing the launch forbids is present. The project suite passes with 7 tests and one skipped fork test.

Findings written

• Low, test coverage. The transaction-cap test in test/FrenRenderer.t.sol uses Foundry-metered gas that omits code-deposit cost. It logs about 957k gas for launch 2 while the code deposit alone is about 8.9M on Ethereum. Hand recomputation gives roughly 9.9M, still under the 2^24 cap, so the launch is safe but the test cannot fail. Reproduction and a suggested fix are in the file.
• Info. A coverage entry recording which contracts were read, which were unreachable, and the exact checks that passed.

No critical or high findings, so no proof tests were attached. Scratch tests and the snapshots directory they produced were removed, leaving the tree unchanged apart from the findings file.

Completed the adaptation. Art contracts remain unchanged; gas accounting is corrected, with new regression and CREATE2 deployment tests.

forge build passed. Tests: 10 passed, 1 fork test skipped without RPC.

Changes and audit results are documented in ADAPTATION.md. No transactions were broadcast.

Created launch.json with FrenArtChunk3, then FrenArtChunk4, both with empty constructor arguments.

Manifest and compiled ABI checks passed. forge build succeeded; forge test reported 10 passed, 0 failed, and 1 fork test skipped because no RPC was configured.

Only launch.json changed.

The findings file parses, the scratch tests are gone, and the only untracked items are the ignored findings file and build outputs. Nothing else is needed.

Review of launch 2 (FrenArtChunk3 and FrenArtChunk4) is complete. No defect was found in the assigned area, and the findings file at .imd-findings.json holds three informational notes, each with a concrete reproduction.

What I checked, and the result

• Access control. Both contracts have exactly one entry point, the argument-free non-payable constructor, which returns the art literal as runtime and writes no storage. Creating either with any ETH fails. The runtime is a STOP byte followed by data, so there are no functions, roles, initializers, callbacks or selfdestruct paths. The whole permission model is empty, and nothing in launch 2 depends on who deploys it or in which order.
• Trust gap. The renderer in launch 3 trusts the chunks by code hash, not by address or deployer. Both chunk hashes and sizes match the entries in FrenArtIndex, and every one of the 36 index entries pointing at chunks 3 and 4 reads back byte-identical to the art kit through the renderer's own addressing. Launch 819's on-chain chunks 1 and 2 also hash exactly to their index entries, so the static addresses launch 3 will cite are consistent with this tree.
• Asymmetry. Chunk 3 is unframed and chunk 4 framed, which matches the framing bitmask. Chunk 4 has 642 complete PUSH32 frames with six zero padding bytes, and both bounds checks in the renderer's unframed and framed branches hold for every entry. The existing test suite passes, 10 of 10 with the fork test skipped.

The three informational notes

1. Chunk 4's admission depends on PUSH-skipping scan semantics. It carries 234 raw bytes that read as forbidden opcodes, hidden only because the scan skips PUSH immediates. The protected test skips them, so the launch passes the check this task is judged by. But no chunk launched so far had any raw forbidden bytes, so launch 819 is not evidence that the live control-plane scanner behaves the same. A mismatch refuses the launch and risks no funds.
2. The chunks accept and keep ETH sent to them. A value call to either chunk succeeds and the ETH is unrecoverable. Self-harm only and inherent to a STOP-prefixed data contract, recorded because it is the only runtime surface.
3. ADAPTATION.md's initcode figure for chunk 3 does not match this build. This tree produces 27,878 bytes rather than the documented 28,320, and the launch 2 gas budget measures slightly lower than documented. Runtime bytes and hashes are unaffected, but the attestation should take creation bytes from the attested build rather than from the documents.

Outside my area, for the judge. The README gives a mainnet address for the frens contract, and that address currently holds no code. That is consistent with the README describing a future deployment, and it does not affect launch 2.

The review is complete. The findings file holds two informational notes and no defects; the working tree is clean apart from it.

Result: no defect in the launch 2 deliverable. FrenArtChunk3 and FrenArtChunk4 deploy exactly as the repository states, and nothing in their control flow can fail against the protected floor.

What I verified, independently of the repository's own tests:

• Bytes and hashes. Deployed through a CREATE2 probe identical to the protected harness, chunk 3 is 23,479 bytes and chunk 4 is 21,187 bytes, with keccak256 and codehash equal to entries 2 and 3 of CHUNK_HASHES. Both start with STOP, and chunk 4 has 642 complete PUSH32 frames plus six zero padding bytes.
• Art content. All 36 index entries that point into chunks 3 and 4 match the art kit binaries byte for byte after unframing, and chunk 3's art is consumed to its last byte.
• Constructor control flow. No arguments, nonpayable (a 1 wei CREATE2 reverts), initcode 27,878 and 25,852 bytes under the 49,152 limit, runtime under 24,576, first byte not 0xEF. Calling either contract with any data or value returns nothing. The compiled ABI confirms an argument-free constructor.
• Admission scan. Both pass the protected opcode scan. Chunk 3 contains zero refused bytes at all; chunk 4 contains 234, all inside PUSH32 data.
• Gas. The launch 2 model is about 10.08M gas against the 16.78M transaction cap, consistent with my own estimate of the code deposit, creation and calldata charges.
• Prior launch. Both launch 819 addresses on mainnet carry exactly the hashes in the index, and the repository's fork test passes against a public RPC with chunks 3 to 7 deployed locally.

The two informational notes, both verification items for the service rather than code changes:

1. Chunk 4 is the first contract whose admission relies on PUSH skipping. Every chunk launched so far has no refused byte anywhere, so launch 819 proves nothing about how the production scan handles PUSH data. If that scan differs from the protected test's loop, launch 2 is refused with no loss. Confirming the scan before submission removes the risk.
2. The compiler's runtime artifact never matches the deployed code. The constructor returns the art, so the artifact runtime is a 16-byte stub and runtime-based explorer verification cannot succeed. Sourcify shows no match for the launch 819 chunk today. Creation-bytecode matching and pinning the solc version used for the attested build are the remedy, since initcode length varies by compiler while the deployed hash does not.

Coverage rows:

Not reached: the control-plane admission and deployer code, which are not in this repository, and Slither or Mythril, which are not installed. The scratch tests were deleted after use.

The review is complete. Findings are in .imd-findings.json, and nothing else in the tree was changed.

Outcome: no economic, invariant, or flow-gap defect in FrenArtChunk3 or FrenArtChunk4. The two data contracts hold no value flows, no state, and no dependencies, and their bytes are exactly what the index and the art kit require. Two informational notes are recorded.

What I verified

• Every hex literal in src/FrenArtChunks.sol was parsed independently and hashed with cast keccak. All seven runtime hashes and sizes match the index. Each runtime starts with the STOP byte.
• All 70 index entries were decoded and compared byte for byte against the art kit layer and palette binaries. They match, and they tile every chunk's art with no gaps. Chunk 3 holds faces 25 to 36. Chunk 4 holds faces 37 and 38, the coats, hats, items, and the first two backgrounds.
• Chunk 4's framing is complete: 642 PUSH32 frames with six zero pad bytes. The renderer's framed bounds check equals the code length exactly at the last chunk 4 entry, so the boundary holds.
• The admission scan was re-run over both the runtime and the creation code of chunks 3 and 4, with zero hits. Chunk 3 has no raw forbidden bytes at all. Chunk 4 has 234, all hidden inside frames, so its admission depends on the scanner skipping PUSH data as the protected test does.
• On mainnet, the launch 819 addresses hold code whose hashes match the index for chunks 1 and 2. The fork test also passed against a public RPC.
• A CREATE2 rehearsal metered the launch 2 pair at roughly 10M gas including code deposit, well under the transaction cap. Both constructors are nonpayable with no arguments.

Informational notes recorded

• The chunks accept and permanently strand any ETH sent to them, since a plain call hits STOP and succeeds. This is self-harm only and matches the launch renderer's own pointers, so it is a trust property to document, not a defect.
• The README names a mainnet frens contract address that currently has no code, nonce, or balance. This does not touch the chunks but the judge should not assume the frens exist when weighing the launch 3 hand-off.

Not reached: the production factory, control-plane scanner, and launch policy are outside the repository, so the protected test served as the reference for both. Chunks 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 were hash and index verified only.

Result: no defects found in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap area for launch 2. The findings file at .imd-findings.json holds {"findings":[]}. The scratch harness I used lives under test/scratch/ and touches nothing else.

What I verified, with concrete numbers

• Bytes and hashes. Keccak of the hex literals in the source for FrenArtChunk3 and FrenArtChunk4 equals the index's third and fourth entries. On-chain code size after deployment is 23,479 and 21,187 bytes, matching the declared sizes and the EIP-170 cap of 24,576. Initcode is 28,320 and 25,852 bytes, under 49,152.
• Index arithmetic for the 36 entries in these two chunks. Every offset and length is a 16-bit value, every entry ends inside its chunk, and chunk 3's last entry and chunk 4's last entry end exactly at their code length. Decoding each entry, through the renderer's own read path and independently in Python, reproduces the art kit binaries byte for byte.
• Framed read arithmetic for chunk 4. The frame count formula gives 642 frames and 6 zero padding bytes, which is what the code contains. The flat buffer is always at least offset-within-frame plus length, so the final copy cannot over-read. The bound check is tight: truncating chunk 4's code by one byte makes the last entry revert with the Missing error, and the untouched code reads it cleanly.
• Admission scan. Both chunks pass the protected scan with zero hits. Chunk 3 contains no 0xF2, 0xF4 or 0xFF byte at all, so it does not depend on PUSH skipping. Chunk 4's 234 refused bytes all sit inside PUSH32 data.
• Launch 2 gas boundary. The budget of 10,084,652 gas, including the 8,933,200 code deposit, sits under 95 percent of the 2^24 transaction cap. Memory expansion and calldata floor costs do not change this.
• Renderer trait math that touches these chunks. Face, coat, hat, item and background indices stay inside the 70-entry index and the 29-byte colour table for every combo the guards admit.

Coverage rows

One trust note, not a defect. The chunk runtime is a bare STOP, so ETH sent to a chunk address is accepted and unrecoverable. This is inherent to any data contract and has no code path to fix.

Added tests under test/ covering exact art bytes, framing, deployment failures, corrupted-chunk rejection, and ETH/code invariants.

Validation passed:

• forge build --offline
• forge test --offline: 27 passed, 0 failed; existing RPC-dependent test skipped.
• Invariants: 16,384 randomized calls.

No defects found. Only test/ changed.

The review is complete. The findings file holds four informational findings and no defects that would open a revision.

What I verified against the code

• Both chunks' parsed literals hash to the index entries. Chunk 3 is 23,479 bytes with hash d73ecfd9…c9a8 and chunk 4 is 21,187 bytes with hash 54bd89d9…1a49b, both starting with STOP. Chunk 4 has 642 complete PUSH32 frames.
• The full suite passes, including the CREATE2 rehearsal, the admission scan, the nonpayable constructor checks and the renderer's unframed reads of every launch-2 layer.
• The launch manifest lists FrenArtChunk3 then FrenArtChunk4 with no arguments, as the brief requires.

Specialist findings, settled

• Kept and merged into one: chunk 4 carries 234 raw CALLCODE/DELEGATECALL/SELFDESTRUCT bytes that only PUSH-skipping scans hide. All earlier admitted chunks have zero such bytes, so launch 819 proves nothing about the production scanner. This is a verification gap for the admission service, not a code defect.
• Kept and merged into one: both chunks accept and permanently keep any ETH sent after deployment. Self-harm only, by design of a STOP-prefixed runtime.
• Kept: the compiled runtime artifact is a 16-byte stub that never matches the deployed code, so explorer or runtime-hash verification needs creation-bytecode matching.
• Kept: the frens address in the README has no code and nonce 0 on mainnet at block 26,135,430.
• Dropped: the claim that ADAPTATION.md states a wrong initcode length. In this tree the auto-detected solc is 0.8.26, the initcode is 28,320 bytes and the launch-2 budget is 10,084,652 gas, both matching the documents. The specialist measured under a different solc, which I noted inside the artifact finding instead.

My own pass found nothing further. The two contracts have no storage, roles, callbacks or executable code beyond STOP, the runtime and initcode sizes are within EIP-170 and EIP-3860, and the renderer's framed addressing recovers every chunk-4 layer byte-identically.

The scratch test I used for the ETH check was removed, so only the findings file differs from the tree.