Implemented FARE447, MedallionHook, launch manifest, vendored dependencies, tests, and documentation.

Validation passed: clean offline build, all 50 tests, formatting, and local manifest/opcode checks. Flags are 0x10CC; zero forbidden opcodes.

Deployment assumptions and responsibilities are documented in README.md.

Done. The clean rebuild, the full suite and the format check all pass, and the manifest now has the shape the previous attempt got wrong.

What was built

• src/FareToken.sol: FARE447, a self-contained ERC-20 with a zero-argument constructor that mints exactly 1e27 to the deployer, 18 decimals, burn and burnFrom, no owner or mint path.
• src/MedallionHook.sol: the hook on v4-core 1.0.2 with flags 0x10CC, PoolManager as the only constructor argument, all spec constants public, 2% ETH fee in all four swap shapes collected as ERC-6909 claims, PartialFill in the beforeSwap shapes, the ledger, retire(), burnIMD(), pokeAnchor(), status(), and the pinned LAST_FARE. Runtime is 14,409 bytes with no SELFDESTRUCT, DELEGATECALL or CALLCODE.
• launch.json: contract names, permissions as an array, initialPrice as a sqrtPriceX96 string, notes at 3998 characters.
• README.md opening with the petition verbatim, REVIEW.md, docs/DESIGN.md, docs/OPERATIONS.md, ABIs under docs/abi/.
• lib/ vendors v4-core 1.0.2, its solmate and OpenZeppelin sub-libraries, and forge-std as plain files with no submodule metadata.

Verification

The tests cover the four fee directions, partial-fill reverts, fee-free other pools, a buy on a manager holding no ETH, the donation invariant, burnable staying zero until the cap, Recouped firing once, all three status() sentences, the LAST_FARE hash and length, retire() before the cap and with or without approval, the reentrancy lock, every burnIMD ordering and guard, the fallback band, the once-per-block step, and the start-of-block anchor.

Assumptions to know about

• The initial price is 10,000,000 FARE447 per ETH because the brief gives none. It is flagged in the README, the notes and the operations doc, and the hook does not depend on it.
• The POOL4 view names marketOpen() and refTick() come from the brief and were confirmed live on mainnet during the build.
• Burns are allowed as soon as fees exceed the cap, before retirement, because the spec's burnable formula defines them that way. The 1.64 ETH stays fully backed by claims, which an invariant checks.

One side note: the session's memory directory is write-denied, so I could not save the manifest-schema lesson there.

Updated launch.json with concise, 2,221-character notes. Verified schema constraints, contract names, constructor arguments, permissions, and initial price.

forge build --offline succeeded; all 90 tests passed with forge test --offline.

Only launch.json changed.

The review is complete. The findings file is written, validated, and both quoted snippets match the tree exactly. The scratch probe directory was removed.

Outcome. The hook's control flow holds up under the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles checks. I found no loss-of-funds path. Two items are recorded in .imd-findings.json:

• Low, burnIMD check order. In fallback mode the anchor step runs before the batch is sized. That step reads the plain pool and reverts PoolUnavailable before NothingToBurn is ever evaluated, which contradicts the order SPEC 7 fixes. A scratch test confirmed the wrong revert reason with nothing burnable and no plain pool. Nothing is lost since the revert undoes the step. The fix is to resolve the mode without stepping, size the batch, then seed or step.
• Info, fallback band liveness. During a POOL4 outage, if IMD's plain-pool price moves more than the band in its own favour, every fallback burn reverts until POOL4 answers again. This is what the spec mandates, but the README says burns "continue on the plain pool". Reproduced with a scratch test. Worth documenting for keepers.

What was traced and holds. All four swap shapes were checked against v4-core 1.0.2's delta composition: the claim the hook mints in afterSwap equals the credit the manager books after the callback returns, the PartialFill check matches the pool's raw delta, and no swap callback makes an external call other than mint. retire() sets state before its unlock, pays exactly the cap once, and the transient lock blocks re-entry from the NFT and the ETH take. unlockCallback is reachable only through the hook's own unlock. The ledger invariant and the "no ETH to CREATOR except the cap" guarantee hold on every path. All eleven listed entry points have a coverage row, plus three invariant rows.

Not reachable offline. The real POOL4 hook's refTick() semantics and the mainnet pool keys cannot be verified without a fork, so the reference's manipulability is a trust assumption, bounded by the 150/300-tick guards and the 96% floor on a 0.05 ETH batch. The existing suite of 90 tests passed throughout.

The review is complete. The findings file is valid, every snippet matches its cited line, and all 11 listed entry points have coverage rows.

Outcome: no critical, high or medium defects in the permission model. I wrote three substantiated items to .imd-findings.json, one low and two info.

What I checked in the assigned area

• Access control. Every hook callback and the unlock callback are restricted to the PoolManager. The unlock callback is only reachable through the hook's own unlock call, so its two actions (pay creator, burn IMD) cannot be driven by outsiders. The fee claims cannot be moved by anyone but the hook. The retire function pays exactly the cap once, and the medallion approval it uses cannot be redirected because the transfer arguments are fixed.
• Trust gap. The launch-pool fee cannot be skipped by making the hook the swapper, since the hook only ever swaps the two fixed ETH/IMD keys. The creator's 1.64 ETH reserve is provably backed by claims before retirement because burnable excludes it. Reentrancy from the medallion contract, POOL4's hook, or a contract at the creator address is blocked by the shared transient lock.
• Asymmetry. The fee derivation in beforeSwap and afterSwap uses identical inputs. The seed and step paths of the anchor write consistent state, and burns use the start-of-block anchor so a same-block poke cannot move the reference.

Findings recorded

1. Low. In fallback mode the plain pool is read, and can revert PoolUnavailable, before the NothingToBurn check. This deviates from the order SPEC 7 fixes. Reproduced: with nothing burnable and no plain pool, the revert selector is PoolUnavailable, not NothingToBurn.
2. Info. The first native-ETH pool with the hook becomes the launch pool regardless of its token. If the factory ever splits deployment and pool initialization across transactions, an outsider's junk pool captures it and the FARE447 pool is fee-free forever. Reproduced in a scratch test. Safe under the documented atomic deploy-and-initialize flow.
3. Info. Anyone can create the plain ETH/IMD pool and be its sole LP. In normal mode they can sell IMD to the hook at 392 bps below POOL4's reference per 0.05 ETH batch. This is bounded by the brief's own constants and amounts to about 0.002 ETH per burn, so it is reported for the author's awareness, not as a defect.

Not reached. Mainnet behaviour of the real POOL4 hook's marketOpen() and refTick() and of the medallion contract could not be verified offline. The three scratch probes live under test/scratch/Probe.t.sol and are not part of the submission.

The review is finished and written to .imd-findings.json: four findings and a 14-row coverage record. No tracked file was changed; the scratch tests I used are deleted.

The math itself holds up. The most serious finding is outside the math area: the medallion address in the brief does not point at a token the requester owns.

Findings

1. High — MEDALLION_NFT is the mainnet Nouns token (src/MedallionHook.sol:53). On mainnet, 0x9C8f…DC03 answers name() with "Nouns". Token 447 is held by 0xb1a32FC9…ef71, the Nouns DAO treasury timelock (649 tokens, 2-day delay). CREATOR holds none and is not an approved operator.

   • retire() can only succeed if that timelock approves the hook or sends the token to DEAD itself. Otherwise the 1.64 ETH stays in the hook permanently.
   • On a mainnet fork, retire() paid exactly 1.64 ETH once I impersonated the treasury to approve the hook.
   • There is no Foundry proof attached: the defect is the constant against chain state, which an offline test cannot show, and the brief says to keep the constants. The requester needs to confirm the address.

2. Medium — fallback burns can stop for good (:573). The anchor is clamped to within 1000 ticks of the last POOL4 reference, and the guard allows 150 more. If POOL4 stays closed and the plain pool trades more than 1150 ticks below that reference (about a 12% rise in $IMD), every burn reverts.

   • Reproduced offline: plain spot at −1248, anchor stuck at −1000 after 50 pokes, burnIMD(false, 0) reverts PriceOffReference(-1248, -1000).
   • The clamp is what the brief specifies, so this is a scope decision. The README's "burns continue on the plain pool" is wrong in that state.

3. Low — check order in fallback (:413). With POOL4 closed, the plain pool uninitialized and nothing burnable, burnIMD reverts PoolUnavailable where the specified order gives NothingToBurn. Reproduced offline; no state effect.

4. Info — the 2% is taken on different bases (:525). Per unit of ETH the pool trades, the four shapes pay 2.04%, 2.00%, 2.00% and 1.96%. This matches the brief and the existing tests.

What I checked and how

• Math Precision: fee rounding and the zero-fee dust case, every cast and intermediate product, quote() truncation and overflow up to the tick limits, the anchor's int24 arithmetic, and status() formatting.
• Boundary: every external call (the medallion and POOL4 staticcalls, transferFrom, the manager's unlock/swap/mint/burn/take) for no-code, bad-return and zero/max cases, plus the cap boundary and the MIN_BURN and five-block thresholds.
• Numerical Gap: the claims ledger against totalFees, the 96% floor against the tick tolerance, and early-return paths in the anchor step.
• Live state: a mainnet fork run filled burnIMD on both pools at about 98.5% of the reference quote, against the 96% floor.
• Existing suite: 90 tests pass offline.

Not covered

• I did not read the POOL4 hook's code, so how refTick() tracks spot (and whether it can be moved within a transaction) is untested beyond the single live reading.
• Access control, reentrancy and manifest checks were looked at only where they touch the math; the other specialists own those.

Done. The change set is confined to test/: one five-line fix to the existing invariant harness and three new files. The sandbox's dotfiles in the untracked list are device nodes, not mine.

Outcome: 125 tests pass (up from 90), forge build --offline and forge fmt --check are clean. I found no implementation defect, so there is no findings file to report.

What I added

• test/MedallionAdversarial.t.sol (33 tests). Callbacks driven directly from a pranked manager pin the PartialFill arithmetic to the wei, including over-fill and the zero-fee path below 50 wei. Fuzzed price limits show the two beforeSwap shapes either fill fully with exactly 2% or revert cleanly with no fee and no ETH lost, while the two afterSwap shapes always charge 2% of the realised gross. A POOL4 hook whose afterSwap re-enters burnIMD, pokeAnchor or retire mid-burn is stopped by the transient lock. Medallions that misroute the token, revert with a string, or report a zero owner are all refused atomically. A creator that rejects ETH makes retire() fail whole and recover later. status() is fuzzed over the full ledger range via storage writes against an independent formatter, and quote() is checked for monotonicity, linearity and rounding against the one-step formula.
• test/MedallionLedgerInvariant.t.sol (9 invariants). A handler with ghost variables drives all four swap shapes with random binding limits, donations, retire, burns on both pools, anchor pokes, POOL4 toggles and plain-pool price pushes. Every revert is classified against pre-call state in the order the brief fixes (TooSoon, Pool4Unavailable, NothingToBurn, then the guard), and an unexpected or mis-ordered one fails the suite. Invariants hold claims equal to the ledger plus donations to the wei, totalFees equal to what swaps minted, IMD at the sink equal to imdBurned, creator paid once and exactly the cap, retired never flipping back, launch pool fixed, and the anchor inside both bands. A scratch probe confirmed random lifetimes do cross the cap, retire and burn.
• test/mocks/AdversarialMocks.sol: the reentrant POOL4 hook, two lying medallions and a rejecting receiver.

One fix to existing work. The prior invariant suite was fuzzing the handler's public setUp, which redeployed the hook mid-sequence and left the invariants checking a hook nobody drove. Excluding that selector makes those four invariants real. They still pass.

Residual risks worth knowing, all mandated by the spec rather than bugs: if medallion #447 is ever destroyed or its contract stops answering, the 1.64 ETH is stranded with no recovery path. The fallback anchor can be walked 1000 ticks by manipulating the plain pool, bounding the loss to one 0.01 ETH batch every five blocks. The first native pool wins as launch pool, which is safe only because the factory deploys and initializes in one transaction.

runtime reported claude-opus-4-8, not the required premium model claude-fable-5-1

The review is complete. The findings file .imd-findings.json is in the repository root with 5 findings and 14 coverage rows, and the working tree is otherwise untouched (both output paths are excluded by .git/info/exclude, as the task expects).

What I found

• Medium, with a failing proof test. The fallback burn reference is clamped to a band around lastRef, and lastRef is only ever written while POOL4 answers. The live POOL4 hook is the verified CappedBurnHook, whose closeMarket() is documented as terminal. After it closes, a lasting IMD repricing of more than about 12% in ETH pins the anchor at the band edge and every burnIMD reverts PriceOffReference forever, even against a deep, unmanipulated plain pool. All post-cap fees are then stranded as claims with no path out. The opposite move erodes the 96% floor toward nothing. The code follows the brief's band exactly, so the fix is a scope decision for the requester. The proof at test/scratch/FallbackStranding.t.sol fails on this tree with PriceOffReference(-1229, -1000).
• Low. The invariant handler's setUp() is public and targeted by the fuzzer. A fresh offline run of the suite failed invariant_creatorPaidIsZeroOrCap because the fuzzer redeployed the hook mid-run. The contract is fine; the suite is flaky, which matters for the verifier's rerun.
• Info. POOL4's owner is a trusted third party for burn economics (terminal close, setMaxRefStep). The launch-pool capture relies on atomic deploy-plus-initialize. The fee base is 2% of the swapper's gross in the carved shapes but 1.96% in the afterSwap shapes, both as specified.

What held. Fee delta accounting in all four swap shapes against v4-core 1.0.2's hook delta math, the claims-cover-ledger invariant, creatorPaid in {0, cap}, retire() paying exactly the cap once, and the sandwich bound on burns at current mainnet depth. Mainnet reads confirmed POOL4 open with refTick 60396 matching both pool ticks, Nouns #447 transferable to the dead address, CREATOR an EOA, and IMD a plain ERC-20 that accepts transfers to the dead address.

Not reached. No fork-level simulation of the POOL4 hook's afterSwap running inside this hook's own unlock, so I did not verify that a burnIMD(true, …) swap on the live POOL4 pool completes; the plain-pool path is unaffected either way.

The review is complete. .imd-findings.json holds 5 judged findings and 17 coverage rows; the scratch tests are removed and no tracked file changed.

What I kept, after reproducing each against the tree

• High. MEDALLION_NFT is the Nouns token and Noun #447 is in the Nouns DAO treasury. I confirmed on mainnet at block 26098044: name() is "Nouns", ownerOf(447) is the DAO timelock holding 649 Nouns, CREATOR holds none and has no approval. retire() is the only release path for the 1.64 ETH, so without a passed DAO proposal it reverts RetireRefused forever and the claims stay locked. The code follows the brief's constant, so the requester must either correct the address or change the disclosure, which currently calls CREATOR the medallion's owner. No offline proof is possible for a chain-state defect, and I said so in the finding.
• Medium. The fallback anchor band strands post-cap fees after a terminal POOL4 close. Merged from three specialists. I verified from the live hook's Sourcify source that closeMarket is terminal, then reproduced with a self-contained proof: after POOL4 closes and the plain pool moves 1229 ticks, 200 blocks of pokeAnchor pin the anchor at -1000 and every burn reverts PriceOffReference(-1229, -1000) while 0.2 ETH stays burnable. This is the brief's own clamp, so I framed it as a scope decision with three options. I also corrected the specialist's setMaxRefStep(0) claim: that setter rejects values below 1.
• Low. Fallback branch reads the plain pool before the batch check. Merged from three specialists, with a self-contained proof that fails PoolUnavailable() != NothingToBurn().
• Two info rows. The launch-pool capture dependency on atomic deploy plus initialize, and the measured 392 bps plain-pool skim bound in normal mode.

What I dropped

• The invariant-handler flakiness: the current tree already excludes the handler's setUp selector, the fuzz table shows no setUp calls, and three random seeds pass.
• The fee-base difference across swap shapes: it is what SPEC 4 prescribes and the README fee table already documents both bases.

Coverage. All 11 entry points are answered. The token's five functions, afterSwap and unlockCallback hold after tracing all four swap shapes against v4's delta accounting. Six extra rows cover the ledger invariants, pinned constants, the manifest schema, and the two dropped specialist findings with reasons.

All checks pass and every finding is answered. Here is the recap.

Outcome. All five findings were reproduced and addressed. The reviewer's proof for the fallback band failed on the starting tree with PriceOffReference(-1229, -1000) and now passes. The full offline suite passes with the proof included.

What changed, per finding (all answered in .imd-responses.json):

• Nouns #447 (high, fixed by disclosure). Confirmed on mainnet via cast: the collection is "Nouns", Noun 447 sits in the DAO treasury timelock, CREATOR holds none, no approval. The constant is the brief's and stays. NatSpec, README Disclosure and Operational responsibilities, OPERATIONS, and the manifest notes now state that retirement needs a passed Nouns DAO proposal and that the 1.64 ETH may never be released.
• Fallback band (medium, fixed). New constant FALLBACK_RECENTER_BLOCKS = 100 and state lastRefBlock. In fallback, once 100 blocks pass since lastRef was written, the next anchor step re-centres the band on the anchor and emits BandRecentered. The band follows a lasting move at most 1000 ticks per 100 blocks; a POOL4 re-seed resets the clock. Five new tests cover the down move, the mirror up move, the boundary, the drift bound, and the reset.
• Check order (low, fixed). burnIMD now decides the mode, computes the batch, and only then seeds or steps the anchor and reads the pool. Two new tests pin the order.
• launchPool atomicity and plain-pool LP bound (info). No code changes, both by spec. The atomic deploy dependency and the ~3.9% per-batch bound are now documented in README, OPERATIONS and the notes.

Also fixed on the way. The invariant suite was flaky in the accepted tree: the handler's public setUp() was a fuzz target, so the fuzzer could redeploy the hook mid-sequence. The test now pins the five handler selectors. REVIEW.md records this and the revision round, and the ABI export was regenerated.

Left for the deployer and requester. Retirement cannot happen without Nouns DAO governance acting; nobody in this launch can do that alone. Keepers are still needed for burnIMD and pokeAnchor, especially in fallback mode where they keep the anchor following the plain pool.

could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency, which plan validation should have prevented:

could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency, which plan validation should have prevented:

could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency, which plan validation should have prevented:

could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency, which plan validation should have prevented:

could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency, which plan validation should have prevented:

could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency, which plan validation should have prevented:

Updated only launch.json, preserving contract names, $poolManager, matching permissions, and initial price. Notes shortened to 2,964 characters.

Schema validation passed. Offline forge build succeeded; forge test passed all 97 tests.

Everything is committed and verified. Final state:

Delivered (committed as 63381c0, only paths under test/):

• test/MedallionAdversarial.t.sol: 28 tests, all failure paths and edges. A POOL4 hook that re-enters pokeAnchor, burnIMD or retire mid-burn, or simply reverts, is refused while the plain-pool route keeps working. A creator address that rejects ETH or re-enters blocks retire() without changing state. A medallion whose transferFrom re-enters is refused, and one that trades on the launch pool during retire() does not disturb the exact 1.64 ETH payout. Empty and dry pools revert PartialFill instead of keeping a fee. Two fuzz tests over random price limits show the before-swap shapes either fill exactly or revert with nothing charged, and the after-swap shapes charge 2% of what was actually filled. Also covered: callbacks reaching no contract but the manager, the unlock callback being unreachable from outside the hook's own unlocks, references at MIN_TICK and MAX_TICK, odd ownerOf and transferFrom answers, donated claims, the retired status string with a large burn, and quote monotonicity and linearity.
• test/MedallionLedgerInvariant.t.sol: a handler with three traders, two keepers and an NFT owner. It keeps a ghost ledger computed from the PoolManager's own Swap events, runs swaps, burns, pokes, retirements, POOL4 outages and plain-pool moves, and never reverts (fail-on-revert enabled, 128 runs × 40 depth, 5120 calls, 0 reverts). Nine invariants: claims equal the ledger exactly and are backed by the manager's ETH, fees match the ghost, counters only grow and retirement is final, the creator is paid once and exactly the cap, the entitlement is always backed, every bought IMD is at the sink and the hook holds nothing, the anchor stays inside its bounds, FARE supply is fixed and accounted for, and status() follows the state.
• test/mocks/Collaborators.sol: the misbehaving collaborators the suite etches at the fixed addresses.

Verification: forge clean then env -i HOME PATH forge test --offline: 126 passed, 0 failed across the 8 delivered suites. The only failing test is the scratch proof, which is git-ignored and removed before verification.

Finding reported in .imd-findings.json (git-ignored by the harness, left in the tree):

• Medium: in fallback mode the implementation re-centres lastRef on the anchor every 100 blocks via a constant SPEC 3 does not list, so the burn reference is not clamped to the last POOL4 reference ± FALLBACK_BAND as SPEC 7 states. With POOL4 closed and the plain pool held 2500 ticks lower, the anchor reaches -1200 at block 100 and later equals the plain spot, and a burn is accepted about 22% below the last POOL4 quote where the spec would refuse it. The embedded proof fails on the current code and passes with the re-centre disabled. Two existing tests in MedallionBurn.t.sol pin the deviation and should be revisited with the fix.
• Info: a POOL4 refTick at MIN_TICK makes the contract's own floor zero, leaving only callerMinOut. Spec-conformant, pinned by a test.

Saved .imd-findings.json with one medium finding and coverage for all 11 required entry points.

• Fallback stranding is fixed, but re-centering violates SPEC 7’s fixed reference band. Reproduced and proof attached.
• Nouns DAO disclosure: resolved.
• Burn-check ordering: fixed.
• Atomic deployment and normal plain-pool tolerance advisories: adequately disclosed.

Offline repository suite: 126 passed. The original proof passes; the fixed-band proof fails as reported. Implementation files remain unchanged.

The finding reproduced and is fixed. The reviewer's proof now passes, and the full suite, build, format check and opcode walk are clean.

What the finding was. The previous round's fix for fallback liveness re-centred lastRef on the plain-pool-derived anchor every 100 blocks. That let permissionless pokeAnchor() calls walk the guard reference and the 96% output floor outside the fixed band SPEC 7 requires, with no new POOL4 observation. The supplied proof failed on the starting tree exactly as the reviewer reported.

What changed.

• Hook. Removed FALLBACK_RECENTER_BLOCKS, lastRefBlock and the BandRecentered event. The anchor step no longer writes lastRef; only a seed from a POOL4 reference does. The band is fixed at the last POOL4 reference plus or minus 1000 ticks for as long as POOL4 is silent.
• Liveness limit disclosed, not papered over. NatSpec, README, DESIGN, OPERATIONS, REVIEW and the launch notes now say that a plain-pool move held more than 1150 ticks below the last POOL4 reference stops burns until POOL4 answers again, which after a terminal close is never, with the fees left as claims. The old "burns never strand" claim was not reinstated.
• Tests. The five re-centre tests were replaced by four fixed-band tests, including a 250-block poke loop that asserts the anchor never leaves the band and lastRef never moves, then expects PriceOffReference and recovery only through a new POOL4 reference. The constants test no longer expects the removed constant.
• Artifacts. The hook ABI was regenerated. The launch manifest keeps its accepted shape (contract names, permissions array, string initial price) with the notes updated and under the 4000-character limit. The responses file answers the finding as fixed.

Verification.

One thing I could not do: git status fails in this sandbox because the user gitconfig is unreadable, so I did not produce a diff listing. The edited files are the hook source, the two test files, the hook ABI, README, REVIEW, the two docs files, launch.json and the responses file.

could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency, which plan validation should have prevented:

could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency, which plan validation should have prevented:

could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency, which plan validation should have prevented:

The suite builds and passes again. The change is one file inside test/.

What was wrong. The previous attempts failed at clone time because my accepted ledger invariant no longer compiled against the revised hook. The implementer's second revision round removed the fallback re-centre, along with lastRefBlock, and my invariant read that getter in test/MedallionLedgerInvariant.t.sol. That was the only reference in my three files. The adversarial suite and the collaborator mocks had no dependence on the removed behaviour.

What I changed.

• Dropped the dead assertion on the removed getter.
• Replaced it with a ghost property that pins the revised rule the implementer introduced: the band centre is written only by a POOL4 seed. The handler now records the reference it expects after a normal-mode burn or an open-POOL4 poke, and asserts the centre is untouched after every fallback step, fallback burn, refused burn and refused poke.
• Added the invariant that checks the hook's seeded flag and band centre against that ghost after every random sequence. On the pre-revision contract, which rewrote the centre every 100 blocks, this invariant would have failed, so it guards against that behaviour returning.

Verification.

No new defect surfaced, so no findings file was written. The untracked dotfiles in the root are the sandbox's device nodes, not mine, and were present before I started.

Updated launch.json with 3,339-character notes, preserving verified contract names, permissions, $poolManager, and initial price.

• Schema and implementation checks passed.
• Offline build passed with existing warnings.
• Offline tests: 96 passed, zero failures.
• Only launch.json changed.

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The finding I raised last round is fixed and I found nothing new to report: .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and a coverage record for all 11 entry points, each holds.

My earlier finding (fallback re-centring broke the fixed band): fixed.

• _stepAnchor no longer writes lastRef; only _seedAnchor does, from a POOL4 reference.
• The attached proof Proof_35bdb332a451.t.sol now passes against the revised code, including its final check that the burn reverts PriceOffReference(spot, -1000) after 250 blocks of pokeAnchor.
• My own scratch runs agree: after 400 blocks of poking, lastRef stayed at 0 with the anchor pinned at −1000 (and at +1000 for the upward move). Burns resumed only once POOL4 answered again.
• The perpetual-burn claim was not reinstated. The liveness limit (plain pool more than 1150 ticks below lastRef stops fallback burns until POOL4 answers) is stated in NatSpec, README, DESIGN, OPERATIONS and the launch notes.

Specialist findings, each checked against the current tree:

• Fallback check order (low, reported by three areas, merged): fixed. burnIMD now computes the batch before stepping the anchor; with POOL4 closed, no plain pool and nothing burnable, it reverts NothingToBurn, and PoolUnavailable only once there is something to burn.
• Frozen-band stranding (medium, two areas, merged): this is the band SPEC 7 specifies. It was settled last round as a scope decision and is now disclosed, so I dropped it.
• Nouns #447 held by the Nouns DAO treasury (high): the constant is fixed by the brief and the code follows it. The dependency on a DAO proposal is now disclosed everywhere, so it is not a code defect. The requester should know retire() may never succeed on mainnet without that vote.
• Invariant handler exposing setUp() (low): fixed with targetSelector; both invariant suites passed on six further seeds.
• Info items (fee base per swap shape, first-ETH-pool launch capture, plain-pool LP skim bound, POOL4 owner trust): all are behaviour the brief specifies. Three are documented as bounds or trust assumptions; the fee-base difference appears as the README fee table. Dropped.

Other checks:

• The full offline suite passes (126 tests).
• Neither runtime contains SELFDESTRUCT, DELEGATECALL or CALLCODE; the hook runtime is 14,408 bytes.
• docs/abi matches the compiled ABI.
• launch.json matches the implementation: $poolManager, the five permissions, 3,339-character notes.
• The pinned protected tests could not be run here because their helper imports are not in the tree; I checked their assertions by other means (the opcode walk above, the repo's own equivalents, reading the token).

Two cosmetic leftovers I did not raise as findings: README and REVIEW.md still quote 92/96 tests, and forge fmt --check reports diffs in two test files (test/MedallionAdversarial.t.sol, test/mocks/Collaborators.sol); src/ is clean.

I removed my scratch tests and build output; the only file I wrote is .imd-findings.json.