First Constitution of the Autonomous Agent Swarm

Proposed rules: the thresholds below are design choices; cited protocols supply precedents, not endorsements. Enforcement belongs to contracts: no administrator, moderator, multisig override, or discretionary seizure. “Accepted answer” means the outcome of the specified procedure, not a guarantee of truth.

1. Admission. Any address may register an agent key, publish its capability declaration on-chain, and escrow the minimum membership bond. Admission becomes effective after a 48-hour challenge window; a bonded challenge invokes Article 2 against the published admission criteria. Rejection returns the bond less the predetermined dispute penalty. Each additional identity requires separate collateral; registration makes no claim of unique ownership. Precedent: Kleros Curate implements deposited submissions, a challenge period, and inclusion when unchallenged. Kleros Scout tutorial

2. Disputed answers. Each task must specify its acceptance rubric, admissible evidence, payment, and bond before work begins. Answers and evidence must be available on-chain. An answer becomes accepted after 48 hours unless challenged with an equal bond. A deterministic verifier decides mechanically checkable disputes; otherwise, eligible agents vote using 24-hour commit and 24-hour reveal periods, weighted by collateral locked before task creation. Parties cannot vote. A ruling requires participation by 20% of eligible weight and two-thirds support; otherwise the result is unresolved, task payment returns to the requester, and both bonds return less fixed costs. There is no discretionary appeal or moderator. Precedent: UMA’s Optimistic Oracle escalates disputed proposals to tokenholder voting; this constitution adapts that procedure to agent voters. UMA oracle documentation

3. Penalties and reputation. A resolved dispute forfeits the losing party’s task or challenge bond: half pays the winner, half funds adjudication. A verifier-proven double-signature or missed contractual deadline forfeits the separately reserved penalty. The contract records successful tasks and adverse rulings in nontransferable reputation; reputation confers no automatic entitlement to treasury assets. Penalties cannot exceed collateral reserved when the obligation began, and no vote may retrospectively invent an offense. Precedent: UMA requires proposer and disputer bonds and allocates forfeited bond proceeds following successful disputes. UMA bond documentation

4. Amendments. Any member may submit executable amendment code with a proposal bond. Voting uses collateral balances snapshotted before submission and locked through execution: seven days to vote, 20% quorum, and two-thirds approval, followed by a fourteen-day execution delay. Anyone may execute a passed proposal. Amendments affect only future obligations. An immutable custody contract must enforce reserved liabilities, the minimum delay, and Article 5; governance cannot replace it or bypass it through arbitrary treasury approvals. Precedent: Compound’s Governor Bravo and Timelock implement token-weighted proposals, voting, and delayed execution. Compound governance

5. Emergency exit. Any member may immediately disable new assignments, withdraw unencumbered collateral, and burn treasury shares for a proportional share of unreserved treasury assets, without a vote. Existing liabilities retain only their previously reserved collateral under their original rules. Every obligation must expire or settle within seven days of exit; unresolved cases then refund under Article 2. Exit remains callable during amendments and pauses. Precedent: Moloch-style DAOhaus ragequit burns voting or nonvoting tokens for proportional treasury redemption. DAOhaus glossary

Most exposed to whale capture: Article 4. Under this proposed weighting, a sufficiently large collateral holder can satisfy quorum and control amendments, including future admission and dispute parameters. This is a design inference from its balance-weighted voting model, whose precedent is Compound’s governance. The delay and immutable exit protect withdrawal opportunities; they do not prevent capture.

---

Sources offered but not confirmed by this machine:

• https://docs.kleros.io/products/curate/kleros-scout/tutorial — did not return a page
• https://docs.uma.xyz/protocol-overview/how-does-umas-oracle-work — does not contain the quoted text
• https://docs.uma.xyz/developers/setting-custom-bond-and-liveness-parameters — does not contain the quoted text

I have enough sources now and am writing the constitution.

Constitution of the Swarm, v1.0

Every rule below is enforced by contract logic, bonds and timers. No off-chain moderator, multisig or foundation can override it. "Stake" means the swarm's bonded token. "Agent" means an address, controlled by an autonomous agent, that has posted stake.

---

Article 1: Admission 1.1 Any agent can apply by submitting an on-chain proposal. The proposal names its operator key and pays a tribute bond into the treasury. 1.2 An existing member must sponsor the proposal. Members then vote on it. If it passes, the contract mints the applicant's shares; if it fails, the tribute is refunded automatically. 1.3 New members are provisional for one epoch. During that time their stake is slashable (Art. 3) but they cannot vote on upgrades (Art. 4). Precedent: In Moloch DAO, members are admitted by proposal and vote. Its docs say "Moloch operates through the submission, voting on, and processing of a series of membership proposals." EigenLayer's AllocationManager also admits operators by registration, after which "any stake allocations to the operator set become immediately slashable."

Article 2: Disputed answers 2.1 An agent that posts an answer to a task also posts a bond. The answer stands unless someone challenges it during a fixed challenge window. 2.2 Anyone can dispute the answer by posting an equal bond. The dispute then goes to a vote of staked members. A supermajority of stake is needed to settle it; without one, the vote is re-run. 2.3 The side that loses forfeits its bond to the side that wins. Voters who did not vote, or who voted against the final result, are slashed, and that stake goes to the majority. The dispute can be appealed once to a larger voting pool with a doubled bond. Precedent: UMA's Optimistic Oracle. "Proposals are considered pending for a challenge period during which anyone can dispute the proposal." Its DVM says "Disputes resolve when a minimum 65% majority of staked UMA is cast in favor of a single outcome. Stakers who did not vote, or who voted against the majority, are slashed." Kleros uses a similar design of staked, randomly drawn jurors with appeals.

Article 3: Slashing and reputation 3.1 Faults that can be proven objectively are slashed automatically as soon as anyone submits the proof. Examples: signing two conflicting answers for the same task, or losing a dispute under Art. 2. 3.2 A penalty has two parts. There is a fixed base penalty. On top of that is a correlation penalty that grows with the total stake slashed in the same window, so coordinated cheating costs more than an isolated mistake. 3.3 A slashed agent is removed from the member set and its stake stays locked for a removal period. A slash, once executed, cannot be reversed. Reputation is the agent's unslashed stake multiplied by its age, and it is recomputed on-chain. Precedent: Ethereum proof-of-stake slashes validators "By proposing and signing two different blocks for the same slot." A 36-day removal period follows, with a mid-point penalty that "scales with the total staked ether of all slashed validators." EigenLayer's docs say "slashing is instant and irreversible."

Article 4: Upgrading the rules 4.1 Only a member holding at least the proposal threshold of stake can propose an amendment. Voting opens after a review delay and lasts a fixed voting period. To pass, the amendment needs a quorum and a majority. 4.2 An amendment that passes goes into a timelock before it takes effect. The timelock has a hard-coded minimum delay that no amendment can shorten, including amendments to this article. 4.3 Voting weight is snapshotted at the block where the proposal was created. There is no emergency path that skips the timelock. Precedent: Compound's Governor with Timelock. "The Timelock has a hard-coded minimum delay which is the least amount of notice possible for a governance action." Its "Quorum Votes" are "The required minimum number of votes in support of a proposal for it to succeed."

Article 5: Emergency exit 5.1 At any time, a member who has not voted Yes on a pending amendment can "ragequit." Ragequitting burns their shares and withdraws their proportional share of the treasury. 5.2 Every amendment that passes waits in a grace period at least as long as the timelock (Art. 4.2) before it runs, so dissenters always get the chance to leave first. 5.3 Stake that is open to a pending slash or dispute stays escrowed until that matter resolves. Exit cannot be used to escape a slash. Precedent: Moloch DAO. Members who voted No or did not vote can exit "by calling the ragequit function and withdrawing their proportional share of ETH from the Guild Bank." Proposals also sit in a grace period: "At the end of the voting period, proposals enter into a 7 day" grace period before processing. EigenLayer keeps withdrawn stake slashable during a delay: "the existing allocation remains slashable for DEALLOCATION_DELAY blocks."

---

The article most likely to be captured by a whale: Article 4 (Upgrades)

The other articles are each bounded by something outside a whale's control:

• Disputes (Art. 2): a whale can win individual disputes, but each attack costs bonds and only affects one answer.
• Slashing (Art. 3): triggered by objective proofs, not votes.
• Exit (Art. 5): individual, so no majority can take it away.

Article 4 is different. Whoever controls a stake majority can rewrite every other article, including admission, slashing parameters and the size of the grace period. Upgrade power is therefore the one lever that controls all the others.

The precedent is Beanstalk in April 2022. Its emergencyCommit let a 2/3-supermajority proposal run after only 24 hours. The attacker "flash-loaned over a billion dollars in DAI, USDC, and other assets from Aave," deposited it to reach about 79% of staked voting weight, and used a single emergencyCommit call to run a proposal that drained the protocol. Beanstalk lost about $182M.

Articles 4.2 and 4.3 respond directly to that attack:

• Snapshotting vote weight at proposal creation blocks flash-loaned votes.
• The timelock that no amendment can shorten makes the attack slow.
• Article 5's ragequit turns that delay into a way out for minority members.

These measures only raise the cost of capture. A patient whale that genuinely holds a majority can still pass any amendment. What the design guarantees is that everyone else can leave with their share before the amendment takes effect.

---

Sources offered but not confirmed by this machine:

• https://github.com/Layr-Labs/eigenlayer-contracts/blob/main/docs/core/AllocationManager.md — does not contain the quoted text

Constitution of the Autonomous Agent Swarm, Version 1.0

Scope. This constitution governs only states the contracts can verify and remedies they can execute: membership, bonded submissions, votes, reputation, assets, and upgrades. Answers and evidence may be stored by content hash, but no administrator, multisig, or off-chain moderator may alter the resulting state.

Article 1 — Admission

1. Any agent may apply by registering its controlling address, public key, capability manifest, and immutable policy/version hash, and by posting the admission bond fixed by the constitution.
2. The application enters a challenge period. If nobody bonds a challenge, admission is automatic.
3. A challenged application is decided under Article 2 against published admission criteria. A successful applicant receives one non-transferable membership credential and initial reputation; a rejected applicant loses the prescribed portion of its bond.
4. Neither wealth nor multiple addresses creates additional reputation. Each credential remains challengeable for duplicate control, fraudulent capabilities, or prohibited conduct.

This follows the on-chain curated-registry pattern: Kleros requires deposits for submissions, permits bonded challenges, and sends challenged entries to its court (Kleros Scout). MolochDAO likewise admits a prospective member through a membership proposal specifying tribute and requested shares (MolochDAO).

Article 2 — Answers and Disputes

1. For every task, answering agents submit an answer hash and performance bond before the deadline; plaintext revelation follows after submissions close.
2. An unchallenged answer becomes final when the challenge window expires.
3. A challenger must bond a conflicting answer and identify the violated task criterion. The contract then randomly draws an odd jury from eligible, staked members, excluding parties and addresses sharing declared controllers.
4. Jurors commit hashed votes and later reveal them. The median or majority result specified when the task was opened becomes the executable ruling.
5. Either party may fund one appeal. The appeal uses a larger independently drawn jury and a higher bond. Its ruling is final and automatically releases rewards, updates reputation, and executes any required transaction.

Kleros already uses randomly drawn jurors for subjective smart-contract disputes (Kleros Court); its on-chain stages include evidence, commit, vote, appeal, and execution (dispute lifecycle). UMA supplies another precedent: disputed assertions escalate to its DVM, which aggregates token-holder votes into a final result (UMA oracle design).

Article 3 — Accountability, Slashing, and Reputation

1. A party whose disputed answer loses forfeits its answer bond; a frivolous challenger forfeits the challenge bond.
2. A juror who fails to reveal loses the locked jury stake. A juror whose vote is incoherent with the final ruling loses a smaller predetermined fraction.
3. Slashed assets first reimburse the prevailing party and jury costs; any remainder goes to the swarm treasury. No ruling may invent a penalty after the relevant action was committed.
4. Correct, timely work increases non-transferable reputation; a reversed answer, non-participation, or slash reduces it according to an on-chain table. Falling below the membership floor suspends task eligibility and opens removal under Article 1.
5. Exit cannot cancel a bond, pending dispute, or previously incurred slash.

UMA’s DVM 2.0 provides the direct precedent for staking rewards and slashing voters who vote incorrectly or fail to vote (UMA DVM 2.0). Kleros similarly reports that non-responsive jurors lose staked tokens and their arbitration fee (Kleros FAQ).

Article 4 — Amendment and Upgrade

1. The constitution, implementation address, quorum, bonds, and reputation table may change only through an on-chain proposal containing the complete executable calls and the hash of the replacement text.
2. Passage requires a two-thirds majority of votes cast, quorum of one-half of active reputation, and a separate simple majority of staked governance weight. Voting power is snapshotted when voting begins.
3. A passed amendment waits seven days in a timelock. During that period members may exercise Article 5. Afterward, anyone may execute it.
4. An amendment may not seize an individual member’s withdrawable share, erase pending liabilities, shorten its own timelock, or confer an unreviewable administrative key.

Compound demonstrates executable token-holder governance followed by a timelock; its contracts permit proposals to change parameters and functionality and execute successful proposals after delay (Compound governance).

Article 5 — Emergency Exit

1. Any member may call rageExit() without permission, including during an amendment timelock.
2. The call immediately disables new assignments and governance voting, then returns the member’s pro-rata share of unrestricted treasury assets.
3. The contract retains only amounts covering open bonds, funded appeals, and already-recorded liabilities. When those matters settle, any remainder becomes claimable automatically.
4. Exit burns the membership credential and reputation. Re-entry requires a new Article 1 application.

MolochDAO’s RageQuit mechanism calculates an exiting member’s claim from that member’s shares and loot relative to the total (MolochDAO bank). Compound also describes its timelock as a “time-delayed, opt-out” upgrade pattern (Compound governance).

Most capture-prone: Article 4. The staked-governance chamber expressly gives capital more weight, and an amendment can reshape every later admission, jury, slash, and exit. A whale can buy or borrow influence, coordinate delegates, or suppress turnout more predictably than it can control Article 2’s randomly sampled jury. The timelock and reputation chamber reduce the danger but cannot eliminate it. Kleros itself notes that juror selection probability rises with the amount staked, illustrating the underlying plutocratic pressure (Kleros juror tutorial).

---

Sources offered but not confirmed by this machine:

• https://docs.kleros.io/products/curate/kleros-scout/earn-with-kleros-scout — did not return a page
• https://molochdao.com/docs/moloch-2.0-operating-manual/features-overview/bank/ — did not return a page
• https://docs.kleros.io/products/court — did not return a page
• https://docs.kleros.io/products/court/what-happens-during-a-dispute — did not return a page
• https://docs.uma.xyz/protocol-overview/how-does-umas-oracle-work — does not contain the quoted text
• https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faq — did not return a page
• https://docs.compound.finance/v2/governance/ — does not contain the quoted text
• https://docs.compound.finance/v2/governance/ — does not contain the quoted text
• https://molochdao.com/docs/moloch-2.0-operating-manual/features-overview/bank/ — did not return a page
• https://docs.kleros.io/products/court/kleros-juror-tutorial — did not return a page