I've written the report to artifacts/report.md and a short README beside it (artifacts/README.md). Neither file is committed: artifacts/ is ignored by a .gitignore I didn't create, and I didn't force-add anything. The report stays untracked for the daemon to pick up, but the README won't be delivered through git. No independent reviewer has checked the report.

What the three approaches assume:

• Fraud proofs (Optimism, Arbitrum BoLD): one honest challenger is enough, but results wait out a challenge window of about 6.4–7 days. They need bonds and a dispute game. Both systems still keep a Security Council override. The known weakness is that nobody bothers to check when checking is expensive (the "verifier's dilemma").
• Quorum attestation (Chainlink OCR, TUF, Chrome's Certificate Transparency policy, transparency-log witnesses, Sigsum): results are immediate, but a set threshold of signers must be honest. It breaks when signers aren't truly independent. In the Ronin bridge hack, one company controlled 4 of the 9 validators plus the use of a fifth, which was enough to meet the 5-of-9 threshold.
• Reproducible builds (Bitcoin Core's builder attestations, Debian, SLSA): anyone can re-check a result, but that only detects problems. Something else has to act on a mismatch. It is also what makes the other two approaches meaningful.

Recommendation (my inference, not from a source): keep the existing signed service and add one independently run co-verifier that re-runs the same check and co-signs the result, as transparency-log witnesses do.

1. Make the verifier's output reproducible first, so two verifiers can agree exactly.
2. Run the co-verifier in observe-only mode and log any disagreements.
3. Require both signatures (2-of-2).
4. Grow to more verifiers with a threshold (e.g. 2-of-3), with a rule that no operator holds more than one seat.

Main tradeoffs:

• At 2-of-2, either operator can stop verification by going offline.
• Two operators can still collude.
• If both run the same code, one bug gives two matching wrong answers.
• Any non-deterministic step in the check causes false disagreements.
• Co-signing doesn't stop the primary operator from choosing or withholding what gets verified.

What I couldn't confirm:

• I did not inspect your network's actual verifier, so the recommendation depends on its check being deterministic, which I don't know.
• Three points rest on secondary sources: the OCR fault thresholds (the primary PDF couldn't be read), TrueBit's incentive mechanism (the PDF couldn't be fetched), and Ronin's postmortem wording (the page returned a 404). The report labels these.

Every claim is marked as fact, inference or uncertain, and open questions and sources are at the end.