Approved workflow

Done. The Pacts game is implemented, tested and committed on main as commit e51da88, with 98 passing tests, a clean forge build, and forge fmt --check passing under the pinned solc 0.8.26.

What was built

• src/LaunchToken.sol: the Pact (PACT) token, fixed 10^27 supply minted to the deployer, no admin functions.
• src/Guilds.sol: found, join, leave, expel, one-member-one-vote proposals with a strict majority of members who joined before the proposal, expiry at the end of the following epoch, pooled treasuries that release funds only to the majority-named target, and the shared epoch clock.
• src/Realm.sol: 12x12 map, troop purchases with a fee to Season, open attack declarations that fail if the holder changed, in-order epoch settlement with proportional losses and largest-unique-force wins, per-tile income accrual, and top-three standings recorded at each season's final settlement.
• src/Diplomacy.sol: pacts from two matching votes with non-zero bonds, blocked while an attack between the two is unsettled, automatic slashing to the victim on betrayal, bond return on expiry.
• src/Season.sol and src/Banners.sol: 50/30/20 prize claims split equally among members fixed at season end, Winner banners on claim, Peace banners for guilds with no betrayal, and rollover of unfilled shares.

One design decision to flag for the manifest and review. The five contracts depend on each other in both directions, and the launch allows constructor wiring only. Realm therefore creates Diplomacy and Season in its constructor, and Season creates Banners. Each nested contract trusts only its creator, so there is no initializer or binding window. The manifest lists two contracts: Guilds with ["$token", 3600] and Realm with ["$token", "$contract:Guilds", 3600, 604800, "1000000000000000000", 500]. The README explains this and how to read the nested addresses.

Verification

• The protected floor tests were exercised locally against the real init code with computed CREATE2 addresses and all 8 passed; Realm's init code is 26 KB.
• Tests cover multi-attacker settlement, ties, votes and eligibility, expulsion, bond slashing and return, season close and claims, late joiners, and that unauthorized callers cannot move any funds, plus a balance-versus-accounting check through a full season.

Open items documented in the README: troop price (1 PACT) and fee (5%) are my deployment choices, not fixed by the brief; voters must check a proposal's target address since it carries the same authority as a payout; tests are not an audit, and no Slither or Mythril run was part of this task.

Done. The suite passes and three defects are reported with failing proofs.

What I added under test/

• test/Invariants.t.sol: a handler that drives all six contracts with five players and bounded inputs (found, join, leave, expel, buy troops, donate, treasury purchases, payouts, attacks, settlement, income collection, pacts, expiry, season close, claims, peace banners, time warps). It runs with fail-on-revert enabled, so every precondition is checked and every deliberately unmet precondition is asserted to revert. Thirteen invariants hold after every sequence: supply conservation, the game holds exactly what was paid in minus what was paid out, no player receives more than a vote or season awarded, each contract's balance equals its accounting (treasuries, active bonds, owed income, pools plus unclaimed prizes), troops are created only by purchase and destroyed only by settlement, tile and membership bookkeeping stay consistent, executed proposals had a majority, finished pacts never reopen, and settlement never runs ahead of the clock. A scratch probe confirmed the handler reaches deep states: 16 pacts with a betrayal, 18 closed seasons, 81 banners.
• test/EdgeCases.t.sol: 47 tests. Eight fuzz properties cover strict majority for any guild size, proposal expiry at the exact second, member counts versus stints, battle resolution (unique largest wins, ties keep the holder, no troop creation, monotone survivors, unopposed attacker loses nothing), fee splits for any rate, per-tile income with dust carried, the pact window boundary, and season allocation with claims. The rest are failure paths the existing suite skipped: tile 143 versus 144, overflow purchases, expel on a member who already left, rejoined members voting, leavers staying in the denominator, standings with five guilds and a re-encountered pushed-out guild, out-of-order sign arguments, consumed proposals, one-epoch pacts, zero-pool seasons, expelled members claiming, and the full Banners ERC-721 failure surface.

Findings in .imd-findings.json (three carry standalone proofs that fail on this code)

• Medium: with lagging settlement an attack resolves against whoever holds the tile after earlier epochs settle, so a guild can take a pact partner's tile with no slash. src/Realm.sol:209
• Medium: Season.close rolls unallocated prize money into the next season even if that season is already closed, stranding it forever. src/Season.sol:112
• Medium: declareAttack has no caller check and approved proposals cannot be withdrawn, so a pact partner can trigger the other guild's stale attack and collect its bond. src/Realm.sol:200
• Medium, no proof: the per-epoch resolution loop is unbounded. One address can freeze settlement permanently for about 1000 PACT plus gas.

• Low: proposal targets are not validated per kind, so a Pact or TreasuryTroops proposal can be a disguised payout. Info: payouts to a game contract address are unrecoverable.

Verification: forge build succeeds, forge test excluding scratch passes 146 tests, the invariant suite passes under three additional fixed seeds, and both new files pass forge fmt --check. Nothing outside test/ and the findings file was touched.

All four reproducible findings reproduced on the starting tree and are fixed. The two advisory findings reproduce but are answered as disputed with reasons. The three reviewer proofs now pass, the full suite passes, and the formatter check is clean.

What I confirmed first

• The three proof tests failed on the starting tree exactly as reported.
• A scratch test with 1000 one-troop attacks on one tile made a single settle call cost about 30.5M gas.

Fixes made

• Stale-holder attacks are void. Each attack in Realm now records the holder it named. At resolution, an attack whose named holder no longer holds the tile does not fight, gets its troops refunded, and emits a new AttackVoided event. An attack can no longer land on a guild it never named, which is what made the pact bypass possible when settlement lagged.
• Seasons close in order. Season.close reverts with PreviousSeasonNotClosed if the prior season is still open, so a rollover always lands in an open pool. Realm records standings in order, so this costs no liveness.
• Pact-breaking declarations need a member. Realm.declareAttack reverts with BetrayalRequiresMember when the declaration would break an active pact and the caller is not a member of the attacking guild. Attacks that break no pact stay declarable by anyone, which the other two proofs require since they declare from the test contract. Diplomacy gained a wouldBreakPact view for this.
• Resumable settlement. Realm.settleStep visits a bounded number of attack entries per call, persists its cursor and running totals, and only advances the settled epoch count when the epoch completes. The existing settle and settlePending calls behave as before and finish any partial settlement. A settlementProgress view reports the state.

Advisory findings

• Per-kind target validation is disputed. Guilds is deployed before Realm and Diplomacy under constructor-only wiring, so it cannot learn their addresses, and a registration call could be front-run and brick the launch. The README now explains the limit.
• Payouts to a game contract address are disputed as self-inflicted and by design under the no-admin rule. The README records both this and the harmless late vote.

Tests and docs

• Ten new tests cover void attacks, stepwise settlement including 300 spam attacks in bounded steps, member-only betrayal, and ordered season closes. Existing betrayal tests now declare as a member.
• ABI exports for Realm, Diplomacy and Season were regenerated. The README documents the new rules, the operator's settleStep fallback, and a revision history.
• The responses file lists all six finding ids with their verdicts.

Test totals: 108 tests in the delivered tree, plus the 3 proof copies and 1 gas scratch test under test/scratch.

The memory directory is read-only in this sandbox, so no note was saved. That does not affect the deliverable.

Recap

What I found. The builder's revision added a member-only gate on betrayal declarations, void attacks, stepwise settlement and in-order season closing. Two of my accepted tests broke on the new gate and needed a member to declare the betrayal. Everything else in the accepted files still holds.

What I changed, all under test/:

• test/EdgeCases.t.sol: the two failing tests now declare betrayals as a member and also assert a non-member is refused inside the pact window.
• test/RevisionEdgeCases.t.sol (new, 15 tests): a differential fuzz that settles the same random script with settle() and with settleStep(budget) on a twin Realm and checks identical state and the exact step count; income paid once across steps; purchases and collections between steps; an attack declared mid-settlement becoming void; a tile with only void attacks left untouched; season close refused on a half-settled last epoch; wouldBreakPact fuzzed against the declaration outcome; a pact signed over an undeclared approved attack; betrayal slashed at declaration even when the attack later voids; strict season ordering and rollover chaining.
• test/Invariants.t.sol: attacks are declared by a member, with the handler first proving a non-member cannot trigger a betrayal; a new settleStepwise action steps through settlement with buys, collections and attacks interleaved between steps; per-epoch checks that a tile only falls to an attacker that named its holder and that void-only tiles are untouched; invariants that no settlement is left half done and that nothing but a settlement call moves settledEpochs.

Reported instead of tested around in .imd-findings.json:

• Medium, with proof: the BetrayalRequiresMember gate is bypassed by joining the attacking guild, since Guilds.join is permissionless. The partner's fresh wallet joins and declares the stale approved attack, and the pact is broken with both bonds paid to the partner. The proof test fails on the current code.
• Info: settlementProgress() reports the current epoch's attacked tiles as tilesTotal while no settlement is in progress, contradicting its docstring.

Verification. forge build --offline, forge fmt --check pass. forge test --offline runs 172 tests. 171 pass. The single failure is the scratch proof in test/scratch/, which fails by design and is removed before submission. The invariant suite finishes in about 30 seconds with zero reverts.

Both findings reproduced and fixed:

• Betrayal declarations now require current membership and eligibility at proposal creation.
• Settlement progress returns zeros until settlement starts.

Added regression tests, updated documentation, and recorded both verdicts in .imd-responses.json.

forge build, all 113 tests, and forge fmt --check passed. ABI exports match the compiled contracts.

Added targeted tests for membership changes, pact expiry, and settlement progress, plus delayed-attack invariant coverage.

Offline forge build and forge test pass: 177 tests passed, with 3,840 invariant calls and no failures.

Changes are confined to test/.

Created launch.json with Pact metadata, constructor wiring, and pool settings.

Validation passed: schema/refinements, compiled constructor ABIs, forge build, and all 185 tests, including supplied protected checks. Build emitted existing source warnings.

Only launch.json changed outside permitted scratch files.

Saved .imd-findings.json.

No substantiated defects in the assigned area. Covered all 31 entry points. Existing Foundry tests and all eight protected checks passed; all six ABI exports match. Source and configuration files are unchanged.

Saved .imd-findings.json with one medium finding: caller-supplied holder snapshots bypass attack proposal freshness.

Covered all 31 entry points. All 177 existing tests passed; the targeted reproduction failed as expected. Implementation files remain unchanged.

The review is complete. The findings file is written, both cited snippets match the tree, and the scratch test directory is removed.

Outcome: the math in the assigned area holds up. Every value-moving formula conserves tokens, and the launch manifest's constructor arguments satisfy every constructor check. I recorded two low-severity findings and no medium or higher.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json:

1. Low, Realm.sol:445. The proportional-loss formula floors to zero for small forces. A 1-troop attacker never loses a troop against any total, a 1-troop garrison is never destroyed, and a 2-troop attacker takes a 1-troop tile with zero loss on both sides. This is a boundary × precision seam. No tokens are affected since troops are never redeemable, so the impact is gameplay: free tile flips at the low end and free harassment attacks that block pact signing until settlement.

2. Low, Guilds.sol:154. An expelled member can rejoin in the same block and is counted again for member count, proposal denominators, and the season prize split. Expulsion only resets vote eligibility. This is outside the math area but was cheap to substantiate, and it weakens the brief's expulsion rule.

Both were confirmed with a scratch Foundry test that reproduced the exact numbers quoted in the reproductions.

Coverage: all 31 listed entry points have a row, plus six invariant rows. Twenty-seven hold, four reference the two findings, none are unreached. The areas traced in depth were the income accumulator and remainder carry, the stepwise settlement state machine at every budget exit, the standings insertion sort, the season share split against the member-count checkpoint and stint lookup, pact epoch boundaries, and every downcast and unchecked block.

Leads dropped after tracing: the Slither divide-before-multiply lines are intentional remainder computations; the uninitialized-state and strict-equality lines on the checkpoint history are false positives; the fee-truncates-to-zero seam is unreachable with the manifest's 1e18 troop price.

The findings file is complete and every snippet now matches the tree. Recap of the audit:

Scope covered. I mapped every role and guard across the six contracts against the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry guides. No owner or admin path exists anywhere. Diplomacy, Season and Banners trust only their constructor creator, Guilds.consume is bound to the proposal target, the betrayal gate cannot be bypassed through the void or expiry paths, and close/claim use consistent membership snapshots. The manifest wires only $token and $contract:Guilds with arguments matching the accepted defaults. Most open-caller behaviours (anyone declares non-pact attacks, arbitrary proposal targets, peace banners for any guild) are already recorded as trust assumptions in the README, so I did not re-report them.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json (3 findings, 31 coverage rows, all entry points answered):

• High: permissionless Guilds.join gives any outsider a voting majority. Four fresh wallets joined a three-member guild, proposed a Payout to themselves and drained a 1000 PACT treasury. Proof test fails on this tree.
• High: season prizes split by member count at the last second. Nine wallets that joined one second before season end claimed 22.5 of the 25 PACT first prize earned by the season-long holder. Proof test fails on this tree.
• Low: an approved Pact proposal is an open offer. The counter-bond is never compared and approval cannot be withdrawn, so a 1000 PACT bond was locked against a 1 wei counter-bond signed by an outsider.

Both high findings meet the workflow's rules literally, so fixing them needs a scope decision on admission control or tenure-weighting. I said so in each description. Scratch proofs live under test/scratch/, which is discarded. No source, test or config file was changed.

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The review is complete and .imd-findings.json is written at the repository root. No source, test, config or manifest file was changed; only the findings file and disposable files under test/scratch/ exist as untracked, ignored paths.

What I found

All three specialist proofs fail on this tree as claimed, and I confirmed the three proof-less findings with my own scratch tests. Build is clean, Realm's init code is 27,900 bytes (under the 49,152 limit), the six ABI files in docs/abi match the compiled output, the manifest matches the constructor signatures, and all 177 permanent tests pass.

Six findings kept, recalibrated by impact:

• Medium, Guilds.join: instant unguarded membership with one vote each lets more fresh wallets than a guild has members vote its treasury to themselves. Reported high by the permissions specialist. Lowered to medium because it follows the approved brief literally, so the fix is a requester scope decision. Carries a fix-shape-agnostic proof that fails now.
• Medium, Season.close and claim: prize shares are fixed by membership at the season's last second, so nine one-second joiners take 22.5 of a 25 PACT first prize. Reported high, lowered for the same reason. Kept separate from the first because the fix lands in different functions.
• Low, Guilds.propose: the attack proposal's "holder at proposal time" is caller-supplied and never checked against Realm, so the holder-change rule can be pre-satisfied against a predicted future holder. Reported medium by the economics specialist. Lowered because voters still explicitly approved the tile and target and no funds move. Carries the specialist's proof, which is fix-location agnostic.
• Low, Guilds.execute: an expelled member rejoins in the same block and keeps an equal prize share.
• Low, Diplomacy.sign: counter-bonds are unconstrained and approved offers cannot be withdrawn, so a 1000 PACT bond can be matched by 1 wei.
• Low, Realm loss formula: integer division floors small forces' losses to zero, so 2-vs-1 captures and 1-troop attacks cost nothing.

Dropped or not raised

The static-analysis leads were all false positives or benign: the uninitialized-state and uninitialized-local reports are on mappings and memory arrays, the reentrancy reports involve only the hookless launch token, and the divide-before-multiply reports are the intended dust-carry pattern. My own pass surfaced one lead, a partner slashed for an attack later voided under settlement lag, which I dropped because the attacking guild's own eligible member knowingly declares against the holder shown in storage and immediate slashing on declaration is documented design.

Coverage

All 31 entry points are answered: 19 hold, 12 map to a finding, none unreached. Two extra rows record the solvency invariant and the manifest-to-constructor check.

Fixed attack-holder validation and added pact minimum counter-bonds. Documented retained expulsion and rounding behavior.

All six verdicts are in .imd-responses.json. Treasury/prize capture remains under the approved rules; those two findings are disputed. The supplied hostile-join proof still fails, explicitly recorded.

forge build, all 122 tests, and forge fmt --check pass. ABIs verified unchanged.

Updated only test/: corrected invalid-tile revert expectations and added pact-bond rejection, retry, boundary, and invariant coverage.

forge build and forge test pass: 191 tests, zero failures. No new contract defects confirmed.

the task produced no changes; the agent's last message was: The existing launch.json already matches the canonical schema and accepted implementation, so no revision was needed.

• Schema, constructor arguments, references, and token metadata validated.
• forge build passed with warnings.
• forge test: 191 passed, 0 failed.
• No tracked files changed.

Those untracked entries are sandbox device-node masks (character devices owned by nobody), not real files in the tree, so they exist only inside the sandboxed shell. The only tracked change is launch.json.

Done. launch.json is updated with a substantive notes revision and validated.

What changed

• The manifest structure, token metadata, both contracts, constructor arguments and pool fields were already correct against the accepted tree, so they are unchanged.
• The notes now describe behaviour the last source revision added that the previous notes did not cover: Guilds validates an Attack proposal's named holder against the live tile in Realm at creation, and Pact proposals carry a minimum counter-bond that Diplomacy enforces on signing.
• The notes also list the permissionless maintenance calls (epoch settlement in full or bounded steps, season close, prize claim, peace banner minting, pact expiry), the exact constructor signatures and the revert conditions in the Realm constructor, and the accepted open-membership consequence documented in the README.

Verification

• Schema check: kind, key set, identifier patterns, address-only references pointing backward, argument counts and types against docs/abi/Guilds.json and docs/abi/Realm.json, initialPrice below 2^256, notes at 2724 of 4000 characters.
• forge build --offline succeeded.
• forge test --offline: 191 passed, 0 failed.
• git diff --stat shows launch.json as the only changed file. The untracked dotfiles git lists are sandbox device masks, not files in the repository.

Both findings from last round are resolved, and I found no new defects. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list plus a coverage row for all 31 entry points: all 31 are marked holds, none finding or unreached. I changed no project files, and the full test suite passes (191 of 191).

Earlier findings:

• Zero-loss rounding in battles (217df208): Fixed by documentation, which was one of the two options I offered. The code is unchanged: src/Realm.sol still computes losses as c * (total - c) / total, rounding down. The README now states the rule: "Losses round down, with no minimum casualty". It spells out the exact cases I reported (a 1-troop force never loses, a 2-vs-1 capture costs neither side anything) and what they cost the attacker and keepers. The winner still always keeps at least one troop, because c - c(T-c)/T >= 1 whenever c >= 1.
• Expelled member can rejoin (a66e4e06): Fixed by documentation, again an option I offered. The README now says expulsion "is not a ban or cooldown": the expelled address can rejoin in the same block and gets its equal prize share back. This follows the approved open-membership rules.

Rest of my area (math precision, boundaries, numerical gaps):

• Troop purchases: the fee rounds down and the rest goes to the income pool, so fee plus pool always equals what was paid.
• Tile income: each epoch's income is split evenly per held tile, and the leftover dust carries into the next epoch, so no tokens are lost or created.
• Stepwise settlement: settling an epoch in pieces with settleStep gives the same result as settling it in one call.
• Season prizes: the 50/30/20 shares add up to 100%, per-member rounding can't pay out more than was allocated, and the dust rolls into the next season.
• Zero-troop attacks: a proposal can't name zero troops, so settlement never divides by zero.
• Pact bonds: a betrayal pays out exactly the two bonds Diplomacy holds, and the last epoch of a pact counts as a break both when attacking and in the wouldBreakPact check.
• Casts to smaller integer types: these can't truncate, because total token supply caps troop counts far below the storage limits.

Static-analysis leads: The divide-before-multiply warnings in Realm._settle and Season.close are the intended rounding down, with the leftover carried forward. The "uninitialized" warnings are storage or locals that Solidity starts at zero, which is correct here. Neither is a defect.

Not covered in depth: reentrancy and ERC-721 behaviour outside the math area. I read the Banners and LaunchToken entry points only for arithmetic.

The review round is settled. My one prior finding is fixed, and I found no new reproducible defect.

What I checked

• The fix. Guilds.propose now reads the tile from the target Realm at src/Guilds.sol:216-219 and reverts unless the named holder currently holds it. The proof I attached last round, copied under test/scratch and run against the revised code, now passes because the forged proposal is rejected at creation.
• Bypasses of the fix. A fake target contract that reports any holder does produce an approved proposal, but the real Realm cannot consume it because Guilds.consume requires the caller to be the proposal's target. A truthful proposal is still rejected at declaration when the tile changes hands. An out-of-range tile is rejected at creation. The tile read is a static call, so it cannot reenter state.
• Full suite. All 192 project tests pass, including the proof.

Output

The findings file at the repository root holds an empty findings list, a resolved entry for the earlier finding with the evidence above, and coverage rows for all 31 entry points, each marked holds with a one-line reason. The scratch tests were deleted and the working tree is clean apart from the findings file.

Review round settled. The findings file is at .imd-findings.json with three settlement entries and 32 coverage rows, and the working tree is otherwise untouched.

What I settled

• Open-join treasury capture (prior high). The behavior is unchanged: the attached proof still fails on this tree. But the author's dispute holds. The approved workflow mandates the exact rules that produce it: anyone can join, one vote per member, and a majority spends the treasury. Every remedy I offered changes one of those rules. I withdrew the high severity and recorded it as a documented trust assumption that needs a requester decision, not an author fix. The README now discloses it in its second paragraph, the Assumptions section, launch.json notes, and a passing executable example.
• Last-second prize dilution (prior high). Same outcome. The brief says prizes are split equally among members who had joined before the season ended, fixed at season end. The code matches that literally, and the proof still fails only because the behavior is what the brief asks for. Withdrawn to info, disclosed in the README and notes. Both issues share one root cause, so a single requester decision to gate join would remove both.
• Pact open offer (prior low). Fixed. Pact proposals carry a minimum counter-bond in the third data word, and Diplomacy rejects a pair below either minimum in both argument orders before any proposal is consumed. I re-ran my original 1 wei scenario with the minimum set and it now reverts with treasuries untouched. The author's revision tests cover the boundaries and a fuzzed replacement path.

Verification run

• Both attached proofs fail on the current tree, confirming the behavior is unchanged rather than silently altered.
• The permanent suite passes: 191 tests across 12 suites.
• Slither and Aderyn leads in my area (external read in propose before state writes, narrowing casts in checkpoints, reentrancy around consume) trace to no privilege gain or fund movement beyond what any address can already do.

Nothing new reported. I found no fresh, reproducible defect in the access control, trust gap or asymmetry areas. The only open item is a requester scope decision on open membership, which the author cannot resolve within the approved rules.

The findings file is in place at the repository root (git excludes it locally by design, alongside .imd/), the scratch directory is gone, and no tracked file changed.

Result: no substantiated defect in the control-flow area. The findings list is empty and the coverage record answers all 31 entry points as holds, plus five invariant rows.

What I covered

• Execution Trace: every state-changing path in Guilds, Realm, Diplomacy, Season, Banners and LaunchToken, tracing checks, writes and external calls. All external calls from state-changing paths go to trusted game contracts or the hook-free launch token. The single untrusted call, Guilds.propose reading tile() from a proposer-chosen target, is compiled as a STATICCALL because IRealm.tile is view. A probe with a state-changing fake target reverted, so no reentrancy is possible there.
• Cross-transaction interleavings: stepwise settlement with the budget landing exactly on phase and tile boundaries matched one-shot settlement on map, garrisons and reserves. Re-signing a pact in the epoch of a betrayal is blocked until the attack settles. Leave-and-rejoin in the last second of a season counts once in both memberCountAt and wasMemberAt, so close and claim stay consistent.
• Periphery: the IRealm and IERC20 interfaces match Realm and LaunchToken. All six ABI files under docs/abi equal the compiled ABIs byte for byte. Realm's init code is 27,959 bytes, under the EIP-3860 limit, with a 10,290-byte runtime.
• Manifest: launch.json constructor arguments match the ABIs, README and deploy script. The token takes no arguments and matches name, symbol and decimals. No contract holds a privileged role, so the unused $owner is correct.
• Static-analysis leads: all reviewed. The uninitialized-state, divide-before-multiply, strict-equality, unused-return and reentrancy lines are either false positives on mappings of arrays and fixed-token calls or intentional rounding whose dust is carried forward.

One measurement for the services stage, not a defect: creation gas is 1.75M for Guilds and 5.28M for Realm, which nests Diplomacy, Season and Banners. About 7.0M for the application contracts, which the deployer's gas-ceiling simulation should account for.

Not reached: nothing in the assigned area. The existing suite of 191 tests passed on this tree.

This round leaves no outstanding findings. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and a coverage record answering all 31 entry points as holds, plus three invariant rows. No tracked file was changed.

What I settled

• Treasury capture. The supplied proof still fails on this tree, with the attacker holding the full 1000 PACT. The behaviour is unchanged and follows the approved brief: anyone joins, one vote per member, majority spends. My earlier report offered plain README disclosure as the remedy if the design was kept, and the README and manifest notes now state it.
• Last-second prize dilution. My own run reproduced it: nine wallets joining one second before season end took 22.5 PACT and the founder 2.5 PACT. This matches the brief's rule that eligibility is fixed at season end, and it is now disclosed.
• Attack holder. Proposing an attack that names a guild not yet holding the tile now reverts and creates no proposal. The declaration-time check still rejects a holder that changed after an honest proposal.
• Pact counter-bond. A 1 wei bond against a 1000 PACT minimum now reverts in both argument orders. Treasuries, proposals and the pact count stay untouched. A matching bond signs, and both bonds return on expiry.
• Expulsion and rounding. Behaviour is kept and disclosed in the README. The author's tests reproducing both pass.

Decision left to the requester

Both disputed items share one root cause, which is open instant membership. Any guild treasury can be taken at gas cost by whoever brings more wallets than the guild has members. Gating join would remove both consequences, but it changes the approved "anyone can join" rule, so it is a scope decision and not an author defect.

How I verified

• The project suite passes: 191 tests, 0 failures.
• I ran the supplied proof and my own three scratch tests covering the two fixes and the season payout.
• The source changes this round are limited to the two fixes and one interface line. I found no new defect in them.
• All six ABI exports match the compiled output.
• launch.json uses only schema fields, and its two constructor argument lists match the contracts.

Not done

• Protected tests. The two protected launch-floor tests could not run here. They need factory environment variables that only the service supplies.
• Static analysis. Slither and Aderyn were not run by me. I treated their supplied output as leads and none reproduced as a defect.
• Scratch tests. I deleted them after running, so they are not in the tree.