Review launch 170's MedallionHook and FareToken (this commit) as an attacker.

Release Stoploss (token symbol STOP) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Stoploss (STOP), total supply 1,000,000,000 STOP with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Hook: StopLossHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 STOP, LP fee 3000, tickSpacing 60; the factory seeds one-sided STOP liquidity, so the first buy lands in a pool holding no ETH). In v4, amountSpecified < 0 is exact input and zeroForOne is a buy (ETH in, STOP out). Orientation: tick = log base 1.0001 of STOP per ETH, so STOP's ETH price FALLS as the tick RISES; sells (oneForZero) push the tick up and are what trigger a stop-loss. The hook extends v4-periphery BaseHook; constructor (IPoolManager poolManager) with the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543. getHookPermissions enables exactly beforeSwap and afterSwap (no return deltas); the manifest lists the same set. State is keyed by PoolId, so any pool may attach the hook. No owner, no admin, no fee. Orders: placeOrder(PoolKey key, int24 triggerTick, uint128 amount) pulls amount STOP from the caller (approve first), requires amount >= 1 STOP, triggerTick a multiple of 60 and strictly above the current tick, and returns an orderId. Orders at one triggerTick share a bucket; each bucket has an open epoch, and an order joins the open epoch. cancel(orderId): owner only, only while its epoch is unexecuted; refunds the STOP. Execution: beforeSwap stores the pre-swap tick in transient storage. afterSwap, for sells only, finds buckets with triggerTick in (tickBefore, tickAfter] using a bitmap of active trigger ticks (reuse v4-core's TickBitmap library, scanning at most 4 words) and executes up to 5 of those buckets, lowest trigger first; levels crossed only by the hook's own sells are left for execute(). A bucket is executed only while the current tick is below its triggerTick + 1200: a limit on the wrong side of the price would make the PoolManager revert the user's sell, so a bucket the price has already jumped past is skipped, stays open and cancellable, and execute() fills it if the price comes back inside that window. Each bucket's epoch is sold in one internal poolManager.swap (hook as caller, so the PoolManager does not re-enter the hook), exact input, sqrtPriceLimit at triggerTick + 1200 (STOP about 11% cheaper in ETH than at the trigger price) so a thin pool cannot dump an order to nothing. The hook settles the STOP it sells (sync, transfer, settle) and mints the ETH output as ERC-6909 claims; its deltas are zero before afterSwap returns. STOP left unsold at the limit stays with that epoch. The epoch is closed either way; later orders at that tick open a new epoch. execute(PoolKey key, uint256 maxBuckets <= 5) is permissionless: it unlocks the PoolManager and executes open buckets whose trigger is at or below the current tick (catch-up after a crossing of more than 5 levels or by the hook's own sells; it skips buckets whose limit the price has passed, as above). claim(orderId): owner only, once, after execution: pays ETH = epochEthOut x amount / epochAmount (burning claims and taking native ETH to the owner) and unsold STOP = epochUnsold x amount / epochAmount, both rounded down; rounding dust stays in the hook and is documented. unlockCallback accepts only the PoolManager during a call the hook started; placeOrder, cancel, claim and execute are nonReentrant. Events: OrderPlaced(orderId, owner, poolId, triggerTick, amount, epoch), OrderCancelled(orderId), BucketExecuted(poolId, triggerTick, epoch, stopSold, ethOut, unsold), Claimed(orderId, owner, eth, stop). Views: order(orderId), epoch(poolId, triggerTick, epoch), and the open amount per trigger tick; owner is indexed in OrderPlaced so the site can list a wallet's orders. Tests run against a real v4-core PoolManager and include a launch rehearsal: one-sided STOP liquidity below the opening price, a first buy into the ETH-less pool, then a sell. Acceptance: invariants: STOP held == open orders + unclaimed unsold; ETH claims held == unclaimed epoch ETH. A sell crossing 7 levels executes 5 and execute() finishes the rest; a sell that jumps more than 1,200 ticks past a trigger succeeds and leaves that bucket open; buys never trigger; the price limit leaves unsold STOP claimable; cancel after execution and a second claim revert; gas of a sell that executes 5 buckets is reported (the seller pays it; say so in the README). One contract, about 400 lines at most. Then a small website to place (approve, then place), list, cancel and claim orders, show open STOP per trigger price from events, and a swap form. Swaps go through PoolSwapTest 0x9B6b46e2c869aa39918Db7f52f5557FE577B6eEe (it forwards hookData and sqrtPriceLimitX96), prices come from StateView 0xE1Dd9c3fA50EDB962E442f60DfBc432e24537E4C and quotes from V4Quoter 0x61B3f2011A92d183C7dbaDBdA940a7555Ccf9227 (all live on Sepolia). One page, no backend.

Release Sponsor (ERC-20 symbol SPON) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Sponsor (SPON), total supply 1,000,000,000 SPON with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: DaemonSponsorPool. Currency: SPON is the app's working currency. DaemonSponsorPool's constructor takes one argument, the SPON address (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores the token immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no SPON at deploy and never needs any: users get SPON by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/SPON launch pool the factory seeds. Every payment in is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom; payouts are pull withdrawals (safeTransfer to the caller, checks-effects-interactions, nonReentrant); burns are transfers to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD. SPON is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no transfer fee, so the amount pulled is the amount credited. DaemonSponsorPool has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. A Sepolia test toy modelled on worker daemons; it is not connected to any real IMD payment. Epochs are 24 hours from the deployment timestamp: epoch = (block.timestamp - genesis) / 1 days. Workers: register() pulls a 100,000 SPON bond; deregister() stops future check-ins and the bond becomes withdrawable (withdrawBond) once the epoch in which deregister was called has ended; after withdrawing it the address may register again. Sponsors: sponsor(amount) pulls SPON into the pool; sponsorship is a gift and cannot be withdrawn. checkIn(): a registered worker, once per epoch. Budgets: every state-changing call first rolls the epoch: if the current epoch has no budget yet, it finalises the last epoch that had one (if nobody checked in there its whole budget returns to the pool; otherwise the division dust budget - share x checkIns returns), then sets budget[current] = pool / 7 (floor) and moves it out of the pool. Epochs nobody touched get no budget, so an idle gap loses nothing. claim(epoch): a worker who checked in to a past epoch withdraws share = budget / checkIns (floor), once (pull). Sybil workers need a bond each, so payouts are bond-weighted at best; document that. Views: currentEpoch(), epochInfo(e) (budget, checkIns, finalised), pool(), isRegistered(w), checkedIn(e, w), claimable(e, w). Events: Registered, Deregistered, BondWithdrawn, Sponsored, CheckedIn, EpochRolled(e, budget), Claimed. Tests (Foundry) must show: the 24-hour boundary, an epoch with zero check-ins returning its budget, dust returning, an idle multi-day gap, double check-in and double claim reverting, claims only for past epochs, bond withdrawal timing, and the invariant SPON balance == pool + unclaimed budgets + bonds. The independent adversarial review must attack: budget snapshot timing (sponsoring or checking in first to move the budget), roll ordering bugs, double payment, bond escape before the epoch ends, and SPON left unclaimable. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to register (approve bond), check in, sponsor, show the current epoch with countdown, budget and check-ins, list past epochs with your claimable share and a claim button, and deregister/withdraw the bond. The page reads the SPON address from DaemonSponsorPool.token(), shows the connected wallet's SPON balance and allowance, has an Approve step before every paying action, and says SPON comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Release Allowlist (token symbol ALST) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Allowlist (ALST), total supply 1,000,000,000 ALST with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Hook: AllowlistLaunchHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 ALST, LP fee 3000, tickSpacing 60; the factory seeds one-sided ALST liquidity, so the first buy lands in a pool holding no ETH). In v4, amountSpecified < 0 is exact input and zeroForOne is a buy (ETH in, ALST out). The hook extends v4-periphery BaseHook; its only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543 (constructor (IPoolManager poolManager)); no owner, signer, admin, $owner or $token, and no way to extend the window. getHookPermissions enables exactly afterInitialize and beforeSwap (low address bits 0x1080; no deltas, no fees, no liquidity callbacks, so the factory's seeding and any LP work during the window); the manifest lists the same set. State is keyed by PoolId; pools whose currency0 is not native ETH are never gated. The allowlist is the token's existing holders. Window: afterInitialize sets openAt[poolId] = block.timestamp + 24 hours. While block.timestamp < openAt, beforeSwap allows a swap in either direction only if tx.origin holds at least 1 ALST (10^18 units) of the pool's currency1, read with a low-level staticcall to balanceOf capped at 50,000 gas and decoded only when it returns exactly 32 bytes; a revert, out-of-gas or bad return counts as zero. Otherwise it reverts NotAllowlisted(tx.origin). On the launch pool the ALST outside the pool at launch is mostly the factory's reward distribution (launch contributors and recently active swarm wallets), so the first day belongs to wallets that claimed launch rewards and anyone they send ALST to. From openAt on anyone swaps and nothing is read. Why tx.origin: this hook credits nobody, so the context's hookData identity rule does not apply, and a hookData address would let anyone borrow a holder's place; the v4 sender is the router, so the transaction signer is the only identity the hook can check without a trusted router. Document the limits in NatSpec and README: contract and ERC-4337 wallets are judged by the EOA that sends the transaction, a phishing contract could make a holder swap, sending 1 ALST adds a wallet to the list, the window can pass with no swaps if nobody has claimed rewards, and tx.origin is never read after the window. Events: HolderSwap(PoolId indexed poolId, address indexed origin, uint256 balance) for each swap allowed inside the window. Views: openAt(poolId), isOpen(poolId), isAllowed(poolId, account) (true from openAt on, else the balance rule). Tests run against a real v4-core PoolManager and include a launch rehearsal: one-sided ALST liquidity below the opening price, a first buy into the ETH-less pool, then a sell. The first buy comes from a wallet holding ALST (standing in for a reward claimant). Acceptance: a holder buys and sells in the window; a non-holder, a wallet holding 1 ALST minus 1 wei, and a call where only msg.sender and not tx.origin holds (vm.prank(sender, origin)) revert NotAllowlisted; a currency1 whose balanceOf reverts, returns garbage or burns all gas gives NotAllowlisted, not an unexpected error; at exactly openAt a non-holder swaps; adding and removing liquidity is never gated. Then a small website that shows time left in the window, the connected wallet's ALST balance and whether it may swap now (isAllowed), and a swap form. Swaps go through PoolSwapTest 0x9B6b46e2c869aa39918Db7f52f5557FE577B6eEe (it forwards hookData and sqrtPriceLimitX96), prices come from StateView 0xE1Dd9c3fA50EDB962E442f60DfBc432e24537E4C and quotes from V4Quoter 0x61B3f2011A92d183C7dbaDBdA940a7555Ccf9227 (all live on Sepolia). One page, no backend.

Release Piggy (ERC-20 symbol PIGY) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Piggy (PIGY), total supply 1,000,000,000 PIGY with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: DonationVault4626. Currency: PIGY is the app's working currency. DonationVault4626's constructor takes one argument, the PIGY address as the asset (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores the token immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no PIGY at deploy and never needs any: users get PIGY by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/PIGY launch pool the factory seeds. Every payment in is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom; payouts are pull withdrawals (safeTransfer to the caller, checks-effects-interactions, nonReentrant); burns are transfers to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD. PIGY is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no transfer fee, so the amount pulled is the amount credited. DonationVault4626 has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. No owner, fees, admin, pause or upgrade path. DonationVault4626 is an OpenZeppelin ERC-4626 vault over PIGY with share name "Piggy Vault" and symbol "vPIGY" and _decimalsOffset() = 6 (virtual shares), so the first-depositor inflation attack does not pay. Yield comes only from donations, and donations stream in: donate(amount) pulls PIGY and adds it to a linear 7-day unlock (lockedAmount = unvested(now) + amount, lockEnd = now + 7 days); totalAssets() = PIGY balance - unvested(now), so a deposit placed just before a donation and redeemed just after gains almost nothing. PIGY sent straight to the vault by transfer counts immediately (it cannot be streamed); document it. Rounding follows EIP-4626 (always in the vault's favour); max*/preview* stay consistent with the overridden totalAssets(). A deposit that would mint 0 shares reverts. If every share is redeemed while donations are still vesting, the vested remainder accrues to the next depositors (document). Emit Snapshot(totalAssets, totalSupply) after every deposit, mint, withdraw, redeem and donate, plus Donated(donor, amount, lockEnd). Views: unvested(), lockEnd(), sharePrice() = convertToAssets(10^(18+6)). Tests (Foundry) must show: an attacker who deposits 1 wei and donates before a victim's deposit never profits (fuzz); a deposit-donate-redeem sandwich in one block gains at most rounding; unvested() falls linearly and overlapping donations merge correctly; previews match results; invariant totalAssets() <= PIGY balance. The independent adversarial review must attack: the totalAssets override against every 4626 entry point, rounding direction, stream arithmetic at lockEnd and with overlapping donations, the inflation attack with offset 6, and direct-transfer donations. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to deposit, redeem and donate, showing your shares and their PIGY value, the unvested amount and lockEnd, and a share-price history chart from Snapshot events. The page reads the PIGY address from DonationVault4626.token(), shows the connected wallet's PIGY balance and allowance, has an Approve step before every paying action, and says PIGY comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Port Uniswap v3-periphery's OracleLibrary to TickOracleHook (launch 33, this commit) as a read-side library, with multi-block tests, then have it reviewed.

Release Band (token symbol BAND) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Band (BAND), total supply 1,000,000,000 BAND with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Hook: PriceBandHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 BAND, LP fee 3000, tickSpacing 60; the factory seeds one-sided BAND liquidity, so the first buy lands in a pool holding no ETH). In v4, amountSpecified < 0 is exact input and zeroForOne is a buy (ETH in, BAND out). The hook extends v4-periphery BaseHook; constructor (IPoolManager poolManager) with the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543. getHookPermissions enables exactly afterInitialize and afterSwap (no deltas, no fees); the manifest lists the same set. State is keyed by PoolId, so any pool may attach the hook. No owner, no admin. Prices are pool ticks (tick = log base 1.0001 of BAND per ETH). Hours are UTC: h = block.timestamp / 3600. afterInitialize records the tick and time. On every swap, afterSwap first rolls a time-weighted accumulator forward from the last update to block.timestamp at lastTick (the tick after the previous swap; only swaps move it), closing each hour boundary it crosses: a closed hour's average = sum(tick x seconds) / seconds covered, rounded toward negative infinity; the initialisation hour covers only the seconds after initialisation; an hour with no swap averages to the tick that held throughout, so a gap of any length costs O(1) gas. Band: from the last completed hour's average A, lower = A - 2231 and upper = A + 1823 ticks inclusive (1.0001^-2231 ~ 0.80 and 1.0001^1823 ~ 1.20, i.e. BAND per ETH within 80%-120% of the average; BAND's ETH price within about 83%-125%). Until the first hour completes there is no band. With t0 = lastTick and t1 = the tick after the swap, the swap is allowed if lower <= t1 <= upper, or if t1 is strictly closer to the band than t0 (a swap back toward the band is never blocked, so the pool cannot freeze); otherwise afterSwap reverts PriceOutOfBand(t1, lower, upper). Then lastTick = t1. Events: HourClosed(PoolId indexed poolId, uint256 hour, int24 avgTick) for the latest hour a swap closes. Views: band(PoolId) -> (bool active, int24 avgTick, int24 lower, int24 upper, uint256 hour) computed as of block.timestamp exactly as the next swap would, and lastTick(PoolId). Tests run against a real v4-core PoolManager and include a launch rehearsal: one-sided BAND liquidity below the opening price, a first buy into the ETH-less pool, then a sell. Acceptance (vm.warp): first hour unbounded; edges inclusive and one tick outside reverts; a swap moving toward the band from outside is allowed; a 1-hour and a 1,000-hour gap give the right average; negative ticks round down; band() equals what the next swap enforces. Then a small website that shows the last completed hour's average price (in ETH per BAND and BAND per ETH), the allowed band, the current price and whether the band is active, and a swap form that sets sqrtPriceLimitX96 one tick inside the band edge (a swap that stops exactly on an initialized edge tick while falling reports the tick below it) so an oversized swap fills partially instead of reverting. Swaps go through PoolSwapTest 0x9B6b46e2c869aa39918Db7f52f5557FE577B6eEe (it forwards hookData and sqrtPriceLimitX96), prices come from StateView 0xE1Dd9c3fA50EDB962E442f60DfBc432e24537E4C and quotes from V4Quoter 0x61B3f2011A92d183C7dbaDBdA940a7555Ccf9227 (all live on Sepolia). One page, no backend.

Release Trickle (ERC-20 symbol TRKL) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Trickle (TRKL), total supply 1,000,000,000 TRKL with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: ETHStakingRewards. Currency: users stake TRKL and earn ETH. ETHStakingRewards's constructor takes one argument, the TRKL address (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores the token immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no TRKL at deploy and never needs any: users get TRKL by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/TRKL launch pool the factory seeds. stake is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom; withdraw returns TRKL with safeTransfer and getReward pays ETH with call, always to the caller only, checks-effects-interactions, nonReentrant. TRKL is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no transfer fee, so the amount pulled is the amount credited. ETHStakingRewards has no receive/fallback; ETH enters only through notifyRewardAmount(). No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. A Sepolia test toy that only moves Sepolia test ETH; it promises no yield or return, and the README and the page say so. Reward accounting is the usual rewardPerToken / userRewardPerTokenPaid pattern, with TRKL staked, ETH paid out and the notify rules below: stake(amount), withdraw(amount), getReward(), exit(), earned(account), rewardPerToken() (scaled 1e18), rewardRate (wei per second while streaming), periodFinish, currentRate() (rewardRate before periodFinish, 0 after it, so the page never shows a finished stream as live), carry(), totalStaked(), stakedOf(account). notifyRewardAmount() payable: anyone, msg.value >= 0.001 ETH; if the period has finished, it starts a new stream: rewardRate = (msg.value + carry) / 7 days and periodFinish = now + 7 days; while a stream is running, msg.value is added to carry instead, so a top-up never changes or slows the running stream. carry also collects rewards that were scheduled while totalStaked was 0 and the remainder of the rate division; the next stream start re-streams it, and restream() (anyone, only after periodFinish, with totalStaked > 0 and carry >= 0.001 ETH) starts a new 7-day stream from carry alone, so carried ETH never has to wait for a new donor. Reward state is updated before every stake, withdraw, claim and notify. getReward zeroes rewards[msg.sender] before the ETH call. Events: Staked, Withdrawn, RewardPaid, RewardAdded(amount, rate, periodFinish). Edge cases: stake or withdraw 0 reverts; withdrawing more than staked reverts; stake and withdraw in one block earns 0; a staker who joins mid-period earns only from then. Tests (Foundry) must cover: stake, withdraw, getReward and exit; a zero-stake stretch whose rewards reach carry and are re-streamed by restream(); a top-up mid-period landing in carry; stake and withdraw in one block; and, fuzzing stakers, amounts and warps, the invariant that ETH paid + sum of earned + carry + still-scheduled rewards never exceeds ETH notified. The independent adversarial review must attack: the reward-conservation invariant, any top-up that changes a running stream, precision loss for small stakes, the zero-stake period, and re-entrancy on ETH payout. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to stake, withdraw, claim and exit, showing your stake, earned ETH, currentRate(), time to periodFinish, and the reward stream as ETH per day per 1,000,000 TRKL staked (no price oracle, so no % APR), plus a form to add ETH to the reward stream. The page reads the TRKL address from ETHStakingRewards.token(), shows the connected wallet's TRKL balance and allowance, has a TRKL Approve step before staking, and says TRKL comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Everything shown comes from contract views (no backend, no indexer). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Refine VolatilityGuardHook (launch 46

This commit): add a read-only preview of the limits the next swap will face, cover it with tests, then have it independently reviewed.

Release Gas Tax (token symbol GASP) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Gas Tax (GASP), total supply 1,000,000,000 GASP with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Hook: GasPriceFeeHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 GASP, LP fee 3000, tickSpacing 60; the factory seeds one-sided GASP liquidity, so the first buy lands in a pool holding no ETH). In v4, amountSpecified < 0 is exact input and zeroForOne is a buy (ETH in, GASP out). The hook extends v4-periphery BaseHook; constructor (IPoolManager poolManager) with the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543. getHookPermissions enables exactly afterSwap and afterSwapReturnDelta; the manifest lists the same set. State is keyed by PoolId, so any pool may attach the hook. Rule: tip = tx.gasprice - block.basefee. A swap is high tier, paying a 300 bps (3%) hook fee, when tx.gasprice > 2 x block.basefee AND tip >= 3 gwei (constant MIN_TIP); otherwise it pays 30 bps (0.3%). The 3 gwei floor exists because Sepolia's base fee is often far below 1 gwei, so without it every ordinary wallet tip would count as priority bidding. The hook fee is on top of the pool's 0.3% LP fee. The fee is taken on the unspecified currency in afterSwap through the afterSwapReturnDelta (exact input: it comes off the output; exact output: it is added to the input): fee = ceil(|unspecified amount| x bps / 10,000), capped at that amount. Fees are credited to the hook as ERC-6909 claims with poolManager.mint inside the callback; no ETH or tokens are pushed during a swap. Anyone may call donateFees(PoolKey): it unlocks the PoolManager, burns that pool's accrued claims in both currencies and donates them to in-range LPs with poolManager.donate; it reverts NoLiquidity while in-range liquidity is zero and the claims wait for a later call. unlockCallback accepts only the PoolManager, and only during a call the hook itself started. No owner, no admin. Document in NatSpec and README: tx.gasprice is chosen by the sender, so the rule only taxes public priority bidding; private bundles with a low tip plus a direct coinbase payment avoid it, and simulations with a zero base fee see the low tier. Events: FeeCharged(PoolId indexed poolId, address sender, bool highTier, uint256 gasPrice, uint256 baseFee, Currency currency, uint256 fee), FeesDonated(poolId, amount0, amount1). Views: feeBpsFor(uint256 gasPrice, uint256 baseFee) pure, accrued(poolId) for both currencies. Tests run against a real v4-core PoolManager and include a launch rehearsal: one-sided GASP liquidity below the opening price, a first buy into the ETH-less pool, then a sell. Acceptance: the tier boundary (gasprice exactly 2 x basefee, tip exactly 3 gwei, and one wei either side) using vm.fee and vm.txGasPrice; fee = formula for exact input and output in both directions; invariant: claims held per currency == sum of accrued over pools; donateFees raises in-range LPs' fees by the donated amount and reverts with no in-range liquidity. Then a small website that shows the current base fee, the 2x threshold and the 3 gwei floor, the tier a chosen gas price would pay, recent swaps from FeeCharged with high-tier ones flagged, accrued fees with a donate button, and a swap form. Swaps go through PoolSwapTest 0x9B6b46e2c869aa39918Db7f52f5557FE577B6eEe (it forwards hookData and sqrtPriceLimitX96), prices come from StateView 0xE1Dd9c3fA50EDB962E442f60DfBc432e24537E4C and quotes from V4Quoter 0x61B3f2011A92d183C7dbaDBdA940a7555Ccf9227 (all live on Sepolia). One page, no backend.

Release Invite (ERC-20 symbol INVT) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Invite (INVT), total supply 1,000,000,000 INVT with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: ReferralList. Currency: INVT is the app's working currency. ReferralList's constructor takes one argument, the INVT address (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores the token immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no INVT at deploy and never needs any: users get INVT by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/INVT launch pool the factory seeds. Every payment in is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom; payouts are pull withdrawals (safeTransfer to the caller, checks-effects-interactions, nonReentrant); burns are transfers to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD. INVT is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no transfer fee, so the amount pulled is the amount credited. ReferralList has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. A Sepolia test toy of on-chain referral tracking, not an investment or earning scheme; the README and the page say so. join(referrer): the fee is exactly 1,000 INVT (1,000e18 units) pulled from the joiner; the caller must not already be on the list; referrer is address(0) or an address already on the list (so cycles are impossible). join pulls the 1,000 INVT into ReferralList, then with a referrer credits 200 INVT (20%) to the referrer's claimable balance and forwards 800 INVT to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD; with no referrer it forwards all 1,000 INVT there. ReferralList only ever holds unclaimed referral credit. claim(): the referrer withdraws its whole claimable balance (pull). Tracking: joinedAt, referrerOf, referralCount, depth (0 without a referrer, else the referrer's depth + 1) and maxDepth. Members are enumerable: memberCount() and memberAt(index). Self-referral through a second wallet is possible and amounts to a 20% discount; document it as accepted. Events: Joined(member, referrer, depth), Claimed(referrer, amount). Tests (Foundry) must show: the exact 200/800 and 1,000 splits, referrer not on the list reverts, double join reverts, self as referrer reverts, a 5-level chain gives depths 0-4 and maxDepth 4, claim twice pays once, and the invariant that ReferralList's INVT balance equals the sum of claimable balances. The independent adversarial review must attack: fee split arithmetic, claim re-entrancy or double claim, referral cycles, and any INVT left in the contract that nobody can claim. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to join with a referral link (?ref=0x... pre-fills the referrer), copy your own link, show your earnings with a claim button, your referrals from Joined events, your depth and the member count. The page reads the INVT address from ReferralList.token(), shows the connected wallet's INVT balance and allowance, has an Approve step before every paying action, and says INVT comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Measure MiniPair's (launch 114

This commit) gas use and size, apply safe gas optimisations, and measure again.

Release ETH Fee (token symbol ETHF) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: ETH Fee (ETHF), total supply 1,000,000,000 ETHF with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Hook: ETHOnlyFeeHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 ETHF, LP fee 3000, tickSpacing 60; the factory seeds one-sided ETHF liquidity, so the first buy lands in a pool holding no ETH). In v4, amountSpecified < 0 is exact input and zeroForOne is a buy (ETH in, ETHF out). The hook extends v4-periphery BaseHook; its only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543 (constructor (IPoolManager poolManager)); no $owner or $token. getHookPermissions enables exactly beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta (low address bits 0x00CC); the manifest lists the same set. State is keyed by PoolId, so any pool may attach the hook. No owner, no admin, no fee setter. Fee: a constant 50 bps (0.5%), always taken in ETH on the ETH amount of the swap, rounded up: (a) buy, exact input: fee = ceil(|amountSpecified| x 50 / 10,000) returned from beforeSwap as a positive specified BeforeSwapDelta, so the pool swaps the rest; (b) sell, exact output (ETH out): fee on amountSpecified, returned from beforeSwap as a positive specified delta, so the pool pays out amountSpecified + fee and the seller receives exactly amountSpecified; (c) buy, exact output and (d) sell, exact input (ETH unspecified): fee on the pool's ETH delta, returned from afterSwap as a positive unspecified delta (the buyer pays more ETH, the seller receives less). In (a) and (b) afterSwap reverts PartialFill if the pool did not fill the whole adjusted amount (price limit hit), and a swap too small to leave anything after the fee reverts SwapTooSmall. Pools whose currency0 is not native ETH get zero deltas and pay nothing. Fees become ERC-6909 claims on id 0 via poolManager.mint, so no ETH moves during a swap and the first buy into the ETH-less pool works. The ETH has one destination, the pool's LPs: anyone may call donateFees(PoolKey), which unlocks the PoolManager, burns that pool's accrued ETH claims and donates them to in-range LPs as currency0 only (poolManager.donate(key, amount, 0)); it reverts NoLiquidity while in-range liquidity is zero and the claims wait for a later call. unlockCallback accepts only the PoolManager during a call the hook started. No path touches LP principal. Events: FeeTaken(PoolId indexed poolId, address sender, bool buy, uint256 ethAmount, uint256 fee), FeesDonated(PoolId indexed poolId, uint256 amount). Views: accrued(poolId), totalCollected(poolId), totalDonated(poolId). Tests run against a real v4-core PoolManager and include a launch rehearsal: one-sided ETHF liquidity below the opening price, a first buy into the ETH-less pool, then a sell. Acceptance: in each of the four paths the swapper's ETH change equals the pool's ETH delta plus or minus exactly the fee; invariant: ETH claims held == the sum over pools of totalCollected - totalDonated; a partial exact-input fill reverts; a swap too small for the fee reverts SwapTooSmall; donateFees raises in-range LPs' ETH fee growth by exactly the donated amount and reverts NoLiquidity with nothing in range. Then a small website that shows accrued ETH, lifetime fees, ETH donated to LPs (FeesDonated events) with a donate button, and a swap form with a fee preview. Swaps go through PoolSwapTest 0x9B6b46e2c869aa39918Db7f52f5557FE577B6eEe (it forwards hookData and sqrtPriceLimitX96), prices come from StateView 0xE1Dd9c3fA50EDB962E442f60DfBc432e24537E4C and quotes from V4Quoter 0x61B3f2011A92d183C7dbaDBdA940a7555Ccf9227 (all live on Sepolia). One page, no backend.

Release Guild (ERC-20 symbol GILD) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Guild (GILD), total supply 1,000,000,000 GILD with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: GuildDues. Currency: GILD is the app's working currency; users get it by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/GILD launch pool the factory seeds. A Sepolia test toy: membership carries no off-chain rights or services, and the README and the page say so. Constructor: (token, treasurer), constructorArgs ["$token", "$owner"]; both are stored immutable and exposed as token() and treasurer(). The treasurer ($owner) is only the destination of swept dues and has no other power: no admin, pause or upgrade path. GuildDues holds no GILD at deploy and never needs any. GILD is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no transfer fee, so the amount pulled is the amount credited. GuildDues has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. Dues are 10,000 GILD (10,000e18 units) per 30-day period and are non-refundable; a member leaves by letting the membership lapse. pay(periods): periods 1 to 12, pulls periods x 10,000 GILD from the caller with approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom and extends the caller's own membership (no paying for others). expiry[member] = max(block.timestamp, expiry[member]) + periods x 30 days, so a lapsed member restarts from now with no back dues; a new expiry more than 5 years ahead reverts. A member is active while block.timestamp < expiry. A member's first payment appends them to an on-chain roster array (once). Dues accrue in the contract. sweep(): callable by anyone, sends the contract's whole GILD balance to the treasurer with SafeERC20.safeTransfer (checks-effects-interactions, nonReentrant); it is the only way GILD leaves, and the treasurer is the only destination. accrued() returns the contract's GILD balance, so GILD sent directly is swept too and nothing is stranded. Views: memberCount(), members(offset, limit) returning (address, expiry) pairs (limit capped at 100; offset past the end returns empty), isActive(member), expiryOf(member), accrued(), treasurer(), token(). Events: Paid(member, periods, newExpiry), Swept(amount). Tests (Foundry) must show: stacking renewals, the lapse boundary (inactive exactly at expiry), restart after lapse, the 5-year cap, periods 0 and 13, pagination edges, sweep reaching only the treasurer whoever calls it, and that total dues paid minus total swept equals the GILD balance when nothing is sent directly. The independent adversarial review must attack: any way to redirect dues from the treasurer, expiry overflow or free extensions, roster duplication, and constructor arguments granting roles. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to join or renew (periods selector), a paginated roster with active/lapsed status and expiry dates, and the accrued dues with a sweep button. The page reads the GILD address from GuildDues.token(), shows the connected wallet's GILD balance and allowance, has an Approve step before paying dues, and says GILD comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views only (no backend, no indexer). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Build a Ponder indexer for IMDOracleDisputeRegistry from launch 177 (this commit), live on Sepolia at 0xbcd93c85adb43628b6b0e4257c864158351b4ecb and deployed in block 11781401 (verified 2026-09-27).

Release Pawn (ERC-20 symbol PAWN) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Pawn (PAWN), total supply 1,000,000,000 PAWN with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: NFTPawnShop, peer-to-peer ETH loans against any ERC-721. It has no constructor arguments (constructorArgs []), no owner, no admin and no fees, and no receive/fallback: ETH arrives only through fund and repay. PAWN is only the launch token; loans are in ETH because the app is about ETH credit. request(nft, tokenId, principal, interest, duration): principal > 0 wei, interest >= 0 wei (a flat amount), duration 1 hour to 365 days; the NFT is pulled with transferFrom after the borrower's approve and ownerOf(tokenId) == this is checked afterwards; state Requested. cancel(loanId): borrower only, Requested only; NFT returned. fund(loanId) payable: Requested only, msg.value == principal exactly; the caller becomes lender (anyone, even the borrower); deadline = block.timestamp + duration; the principal is credited to the borrower's withdrawable balance; state Funded. repay(loanId) payable: Funded only, block.timestamp <= deadline, msg.value == principal + interest exactly, callable by anyone but the NFT always returns to the borrower; lender credited; state Repaid. claim(loanId): lender only, Funded, block.timestamp > deadline; NFT to the lender; state Defaulted. withdraw(): pull all credited ETH. NFTs go out with transferFrom (not safeTransferFrom) so a receiver hook cannot block repay or claim. The contract does not implement onERC721Received, so stray safeTransfers revert; a plain transferFrom sent outside request() is not tracked (document). All state changes happen before external calls; every external function is nonReentrant, because the NFT contract is arbitrary and may be malicious. Accepted risk, stated in the README and on the site next to every loan's collection address: the shop cannot vouch for a collection, so a fake ERC-721 (lying ownerOf) or one whose transfers revert can cost its lender the principal; lenders choose which collections to trust. The reviewer confirms the shop itself never loses or double-pays ETH on such a collection rather than treating the lender's choice as a finding. Views: loanCount(), loan(id), withdrawable(address). Events: Requested, Cancelled, Funded, Repaid, Claimed, Withdrawn. Tests (Foundry) must cover: every state transition and role; the deadline boundary (repay at == deadline, claim at deadline + 1 s); a malicious re-entrant ERC-721 mock; and the invariants that the ETH balance == sum of withdrawable and every Requested or Funded loan's NFT is owned by the shop. The independent adversarial review must attack: the repay/claim race at the deadline second, re-entrancy through a malicious ERC-721 in request, cancel, repay and claim, fake NFT contracts that lie about ownerOf, re-pawning the same NFT after it is returned, and ETH stuck on any path. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to request a loan (approve the NFT, then request), list open requests and active loans with deadlines, fund, repay, claim, cancel and withdraw. Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Release JIT Guard (token symbol JITP) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: JIT Guard (JITP), total supply 1,000,000,000 JITP with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Hook: JITPenaltyHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 JITP, LP fee 3000, tickSpacing 60; the factory seeds one-sided JITP liquidity, so the first buy lands in a pool holding no ETH). In v4, amountSpecified < 0 is exact input and zeroForOne is a buy (ETH in, JITP out). It penalises just-in-time liquidity, following OpenZeppelin uniswap-hooks' LiquidityPenaltyHook (vendor or reimplement it, MIT, credited). The hook extends v4-periphery BaseHook; constructor (IPoolManager poolManager) with the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543. getHookPermissions enables exactly afterAddLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity, afterAddLiquidityReturnDelta and afterRemoveLiquidityReturnDelta (no swap, initialize or donate callbacks); the manifest lists the same set. State is keyed by PoolId, so any pool may attach the hook. WINDOW = 10 blocks is a constant. No owner, no admin, no fee of its own. Rules, per position key = Position.calculatePositionKey(sender, tickLower, tickUpper, salt), where sender is the address that called modifyLiquidity (a router, or PositionManager with the tokenId as salt): (1) afterAddLiquidity sets lastAdded = block.number; fees this add auto-collects (feeDelta) are withheld: the hook takes them as ERC-6909 claims, adds them to withheld[poolId][key] and returns them as its hook delta, so the LP does not receive them yet. (2) afterRemoveLiquidity (also run for liquidityDelta == 0 fee pokes): total = feeDelta + withheld; elapsed = block.number - lastAdded. If elapsed < 10 the penalty per currency is ceil(total x (10 - elapsed) / 10) (same block 100%, 9 blocks later 10%), donated to the pool with poolManager.donate in the same call; the LP receives total - penalty. If elapsed >= 10 the LP receives all of total. withheld is cleared either way. Principal is never touched. (3) If in-range liquidity is zero when a penalty would be donated (donate would revert), the penalty is waived and paid to the LP with PenaltyWaived emitted: a removal must never revert because of the hook. (4) Zero fees means no penalty and no donate call. Events: WindowStarted(PoolId indexed poolId, bytes32 indexed positionKey, address sender, int24 tickLower, int24 tickUpper, bytes32 salt, uint256 windowEndsBlock = lastAdded + 10), FeesWithheld, PenaltyDonated and PenaltyWaived (poolId, positionKey, amount0, amount1). Views: lastAddedBlock(poolId, key), withheldFees(poolId, key), totalDonated(poolId) for both currencies. Tests run against a real v4-core PoolManager and include a launch rehearsal: one-sided JITP liquidity below the opening price, a first buy into the ETH-less pool, then a sell. Acceptance: add, swap, then remove at elapsed 0, 5, 9 and 10 pays exactly the stated split and another in-range LP collects the donated amount; principal comes back in full on every path; a removal with no other in-range liquidity succeeds (waived); invariant: the hook's claim balance per currency equals the sum of withheld fees; swaps cost the same with and without the hook. Review: the delta signs in both return-delta callbacks (can the hook take principal or pay out more than the fees), the zero-liquidity donate path, window resets through a shared router such as PoolModifyLiquidityTest where sender and salt are shared (document it; recommend PositionManager), and dodging the penalty with pokes, partial removals or new salts. Then a small website that shows positions still inside the window (WindowStarted events whose windowEndsBlock is above the current block), their withheld fees, total donated per currency, and a swap form against the live pool. Swaps go through PoolSwapTest 0x9B6b46e2c869aa39918Db7f52f5557FE577B6eEe (it forwards hookData and sqrtPriceLimitX96), prices come from StateView 0xE1Dd9c3fA50EDB962E442f60DfBc432e24537E4C and quotes from V4Quoter 0x61B3f2011A92d183C7dbaDBdA940a7555Ccf9227 (all live on Sepolia). One page, no backend.

Extend the invariant testing of MiniPair (launch 114

This commit; live on Sepolia at 0x898a07c8911f43218c5c2e1b7ae8146026f7e040 and still unused, totalShares() == 0 on 2026-09-27) with properties the existing suite does not cover, then review it.

Release Nosandwich (token symbol NOSAND) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Nosandwich (NOSAND), total supply 1,000,000,000 NOSAND with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: AntiSandwichHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool built on OpenZeppelin uniswap-hooks' AntiSandwichHook (v1.2, on BaseDynamicAfterFee), vendored as source (Solidity 0.8.26, foundry.toml evm_version = "cancun" for its transient storage). In this pool currency0 is ETH, so, as that design documents, sells (oneForZero, token to ETH) never fill at a better price than the pool's start-of-block state: the first swap of each block checkpoints slot0, liquidity and the ticks between the last and current tick; later sells in that block are simulated against the checkpoint, and any output beyond the simulated amount (exact-in) or input short of it (exact-out) is taken as a positive afterSwap unspecified delta and minted to the hook as ERC-6909 claims. Two required deviations from OpenZeppelin's _beforeSwap, recorded in the README: on a pool's first swap the checkpoint is empty, so OpenZeppelin would take lastTick = 0 and walk every tickSpacing step from tick 0 to the opening tick (about 2,300-3,000 getTickInfo reads and stores at the factory's launch price, tens of millions of gas, beyond Sepolia's per-transaction gas cap), and no swap could ever succeed; the hook therefore treats an empty checkpoint (blockNumber 0) as lastTick = the current tick, and caps the loop at the 100 tickSpacing steps nearest the current tick. Buys (zeroForOne) follow the normal curve. _afterSwapHandler donates the collected amount to in-range LPs in the same afterSwap, like OpenZeppelin's mock; when in-range liquidity after the swap is zero it keeps the claims instead and permissionless donateCollected(poolKey) donates them later, so a swap never reverts because of a donate. No other fee, no admin. README: why a buy-sandwich's back-run sell earns nothing, what the one-direction limit leaves open, OpenZeppelin's MemoryOOG warning for the tick loop at tickSpacing 60, and that prices can lag the market because arbitrage is dampened. Events: Clipped(poolId, blockNumber, currency, amount), Donated(poolId, currency, amount). The symbol is NOSAND, not SAND, which is a widely traded token's ticker. Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): AntiSandwichHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly beforeSwap, afterSwap, afterSwapReturnDelta (low address bits 0x00C4), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 NOSAND, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided NOSAND liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided NOSAND liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: a buy front-run, victim buy and attacker sell in one block leave the attacker no profit; a lone sell in a fresh block is not clipped; clipped amounts reach LP fee growth; a zero-liquidity end keeps claims and donateCollected pays them later; exact-in and exact-out sells; gas of the first swap on a fresh pool at the launch price and of the checkpoint loop after a large tick move. An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: fidelity to OpenZeppelin's code, the direction mapping with currency0 = ETH, checkpoint correctness when liquidity changes within a block, the tick-loop gas bound (first swap from an empty checkpoint, the 100-step cap), JIT capture of donations, and the settle order in the handler. It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code). It shows the start-of-block price, the current price, recent sells and how much each was clipped (Clipped events).

Release Pocket (ERC-20 symbol PCKT) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Pocket (PCKT), total supply 1,000,000,000 PCKT with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: AllowanceWallet. Currency: PCKT is the app's working currency. AllowanceWallet's constructor takes one argument, the PCKT address (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores the token immutable, exposes it as token(), and holds no PCKT at deploy and never needs any: users get PCKT by swapping Sepolia ETH in the ETH/PCKT launch pool the factory seeds. Every payment in is approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom; payouts are pull withdrawals (safeTransfer to the caller, checks-effects-interactions, nonReentrant); burns are transfers to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD. PCKT is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no transfer fee, so the amount pulled is the amount credited. AllowanceWallet has no payable function and no receive/fallback, so it never holds ETH. No owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. AllowanceWallet holds PCKT pocket money between a parent and a child. openAccount(child, weeklyAllowance, deposit): child != 0 and != caller; the caller is the parent; deposit (may be 0) is pulled as the opening balance; ids from 1; one parent may open many accounts and a child may be in many. Amounts are PCKT units (18 decimals). Windows are 7-day periods anchored at the account's opening timestamp: window = (block.timestamp - openedAt) / 7 days. childWithdraw(id, amount): only the child; amount > 0, amount <= weeklyAllowance - spentThisWindow and amount <= balance; unspent allowance never rolls over (spent resets to 0 when the window index changes). Parent only: topUp(id, amount), setAllowance(id, newAllowance) effective immediately (what was already spent this window still counts; 0 freezes the child), and parentWithdraw(id, amount) of any part of the balance at any time. The allowance is therefore not a guarantee to the child; say so on the site and in the README. Withdrawals go only to msg.sender (the child or the parent). Views: accountCount(), account(id) (parent, child, allowance, balance, openedAt), remainingThisWindow(id), windowEndsAt(id). Events: Opened (parent and child indexed), ToppedUp, AllowanceSet, ChildWithdrew, ParentWithdrew. Tests (Foundry) must show: the exact 7-day boundary (the second before and the second of the new window), no rollover, allowance changes mid-window, role checks on every function, cross-account isolation, and the invariant that the contract's PCKT balance equals the sum of account balances. The independent adversarial review must attack: window arithmetic off-by-one, withdrawing more than the allowance by splitting calls or across windows, cross-account confusion, and a parent or child moving another account's PCKT. Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website with a parent view (accounts I opened, open, top up, set allowance, withdraw) and a child view (accounts where I am the child, remaining allowance this window, time to reset, withdraw), both built from Opened events filtered by address. The page reads the PCKT address from AllowanceWallet.token(), shows the connected wallet's PCKT balance and allowance, has an Approve step before every paying action, and says PCKT comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Build a Ponder indexer for the live 'pepes armed with ai' JackpotHook pool on Sepolia (launch 183: this repository and commit; a Sepolia test toy with no real value).

Release Checkin (ERC-20 symbol CHKN) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract. Token: Checkin (CHKN), total supply 1,000,000,000 CHKN with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Application contract: EventCheckin, which records soulbound event attendance authorised by EIP-712 signatures and pays optional CHKN attendance rewards. EventCheckin's constructor takes one argument, the CHKN address (constructorArgs ["$token"]); it stores it immutable, exposes it as token() and holds no CHKN at deploy. CHKN comes in only through fundEvent (approve + SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom) and leaves only through withdraw() to the caller (pull, checks-effects-interactions, nonReentrant). No payable function, no receive/fallback, no owner, admin, pause or upgrade path. A Sepolia test toy: attendance records are not tickets or credentials, and the README and the page say so. The EIP-712 domain name "EventCheckin" and version "1" are string literals passed to OpenZeppelin's EIP712 base constructor in source, not constructor arguments. createEvent(bytes32 title, uint64 endsAt, uint256 rewardPerCheckIn): endsAt after block.timestamp and at most 365 days ahead; rewardPerCheckIn is in CHKN base units (18 decimals) and may be 0; the caller becomes that event's organiser; ids from 1. fundEvent(eventId, amount): anyone, amount > 0, while the event is open, adds CHKN to that event's reward pool. closeEvent(eventId): organiser only, irreversible. checkIn(eventId, attendee, deadline, signature): callable by anyone (so a friend or relayer can submit), requires the event open (not closed and block.timestamp <= endsAt), block.timestamp <= deadline, attendee not yet checked in to that event, and a valid signature by the event's organiser over the EIP-712 struct CheckIn(uint256 eventId,address attendee,uint256 deadline) in domain {name "EventCheckin", version "1", chainId, verifyingContract}. It records the attendance and, if the pool holds at least rewardPerCheckIn, moves rewardPerCheckIn from the pool to the attendee's withdrawable balance; with a smaller pool the check-in is still recorded, unrewarded. reclaim(eventId): organiser only, once the event is closed or past endsAt; moves the unspent pool to the organiser's withdrawable balance. Verify signatures with OpenZeppelin SignatureChecker so both EOA organisers (ECDSA, high-s rejected) and ERC-1271 contract-wallet organisers work. Attendance is a non-transferable record, not a token; the attendee, not msg.sender, is credited and rewarded. A signature is single-use per (event, attendee); an organiser cannot revoke a signed pass except by closing the event or letting deadline/endsAt pass. Funders trust the organiser, who decides whom to sign for (README says so). Views: eventCount(), eventInfo(id) (organiser, title, endsAt, closed, rewardPerCheckIn, pool, attendeeCount), attended(eventId, attendee), attendanceCount(attendee), withdrawable(account), CHECKIN_TYPEHASH, domainSeparator(), token(). Events: EventCreated, EventFunded, EventClosed, CheckedIn(eventId, attendee, submitter, reward), Reclaimed, Withdrawn. Tests (Foundry) must show: valid EOA signature; wrong signer; signature for another event, attendee or chain id; expired deadline; after close and after endsAt; double check-in; a relayed submission credits and rewards the attendee; a check-in with a short pool recorded without reward; reclaim before close or endsAt refused and reclaim twice paying once; a mock ERC-1271 organiser accepted and a rejecting one refused; and the invariant that CHKN held == sum of event pools + withdrawable balances. The independent adversarial review must attack: typehash/domain mismatch with the website's typed data, signature malleability and replay, ERC-1271 griefing, organiser impersonation, and pool accounting across events (paying one event's reward from another's pool, reclaim racing a check-in). Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website with an organiser view (create, fund, close and reclaim events; enter an attendee address and sign a pass with eth_signTypedData_v4 from the connected wallet, shown as copyable text and a link carrying eventId, attendee, deadline and signature) and an attendee view (open the link or paste the pass, submit check-in, withdraw rewards), plus each event's attendee list from CheckedIn events. ERC-1271 organisers are covered by the Foundry tests; the page signs with the connected EOA. The page reads the CHKN address from EventCheckin.token(), shows the connected wallet's CHKN balance, allowance and withdrawable balance, has an Approve step before funding, and says CHKN comes from swapping Sepolia ETH in the launch pool (no in-page swap). Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.

Audit TollgateHook and TollToken from launch 168 (this commit) as an attacker, and explain the live Sepolia deployment facts below from the source.

Think about how to grow the Swarm Pepe NFT collection

Then propose five ideas.

Release Breaker (token symbol CBRK) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch. Token: Breaker (CBRK), total supply 1,000,000,000 CBRK with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin). Hook: CircuitBreakerHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that trips on sharp moves within a block. beforeSwap: if refBlock[poolId] != block.number, store refBlock = block.number and refSqrtPrice = the current sqrtPriceX96 (StateLibrary.getSlot0), the price before the block's first swap, and emit ReferenceSet(poolId, block, sqrtPriceX96). afterSwap: read the new sqrtPriceX96 and revert with Tripped(refSqrtPrice, newSqrtPrice) when the price (sqrtPrice squared) is more than 10% above or below the reference: the allowed band is refSqrt x sqrt(0.9) <= newSqrt <= refSqrt x sqrt(1.1), computed with FullMath.mulDiv against Q96 constants for sqrt(0.9) and sqrt(1.1), rounded inward so the band never exceeds 10%. This includes a block's first swap, so any single swap moving the price more than 10% reverts and large trades must be split across blocks. Liquidity changes and donations do not move the price and are never checked. No deltas, fee, funds or admin. Tripped swaps revert, so they leave no event; the site simulates instead. Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170 and 186 (168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): CircuitBreakerHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument. Permissions are exactly beforeSwap, afterSwap (low address bits 0x00C0), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits. The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 CBRK, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided CBRK liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect. Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager. Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided CBRK liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: a 9.9% move passes and 10.1% reverts, up and down; two swaps in one block that together pass 10% make the second revert; a swap back inside the band passes; a new block resets the reference; on the freshly seeded pool a small first buy passes and an oversized one reverts. An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: the sqrt constants and rounding direction, overflow in the band maths, that the reference is captured before any swap including the first, any same-block path that moves the price without reaching afterSwap, and griefing (pushing the price to the band edge to block others for a block; document it). It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it. Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router (check it has code). It shows this block's reference price (from ReferenceSet, or the current price when there is no swap yet this block), the plus/minus 10% band, and a pre-check that simulates a typed swap with eth_call and says whether it would trip (replacing the earlier 'recent tripped swaps' list, which reverted swaps cannot supply).